Merge pull request #9635 from Burning1020/fix-cri-mounts

cri: Stat host sandbox files before adding them
This commit is contained in:
Fu Wei 2024-02-20 09:54:16 +00:00 committed by GitHub
commit 4612201f87
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2 changed files with 59 additions and 56 deletions

View File

@ -1008,27 +1008,37 @@ func (c *criService) linuxContainerMounts(sandboxID string, config *runtime.Cont
}
if !isInCRIMounts(etcHosts, config.GetMounts()) {
mounts = append(mounts, &runtime.Mount{
ContainerPath: etcHosts,
HostPath: c.getSandboxHosts(sandboxID),
Readonly: securityContext.GetReadonlyRootfs(),
SelinuxRelabel: true,
UidMappings: uidMappings,
GidMappings: gidMappings,
})
hostpath := c.getSandboxHosts(sandboxID)
// /etc/hosts could be delegated to remote sandbox controller. That file isn't required to be existed
// in host side for some sandbox runtimes. Skip it if we don't need it.
if _, err := c.os.Stat(hostpath); err == nil {
mounts = append(mounts, &runtime.Mount{
ContainerPath: etcHosts,
HostPath: hostpath,
Readonly: securityContext.GetReadonlyRootfs(),
SelinuxRelabel: true,
UidMappings: uidMappings,
GidMappings: gidMappings,
})
}
}
// Mount sandbox resolv.config.
// TODO: Need to figure out whether we should always mount it as read-only
if !isInCRIMounts(resolvConfPath, config.GetMounts()) {
mounts = append(mounts, &runtime.Mount{
ContainerPath: resolvConfPath,
HostPath: c.getResolvPath(sandboxID),
Readonly: securityContext.GetReadonlyRootfs(),
SelinuxRelabel: true,
UidMappings: uidMappings,
GidMappings: gidMappings,
})
hostpath := c.getResolvPath(sandboxID)
// The ownership of /etc/resolv.conf could be delegated to remote sandbox controller. That file isn't
// required to be existed in host side for some sandbox runtimes. Skip it if we don't need it.
if _, err := c.os.Stat(hostpath); err == nil {
mounts = append(mounts, &runtime.Mount{
ContainerPath: resolvConfPath,
HostPath: hostpath,
Readonly: securityContext.GetReadonlyRootfs(),
SelinuxRelabel: true,
UidMappings: uidMappings,
GidMappings: gidMappings,
})
}
}
if !isInCRIMounts(devShm, config.GetMounts()) {
@ -1036,23 +1046,27 @@ func (c *criService) linuxContainerMounts(sandboxID string, config *runtime.Cont
if securityContext.GetNamespaceOptions().GetIpc() == runtime.NamespaceMode_NODE {
sandboxDevShm = devShm
}
mounts = append(mounts, &runtime.Mount{
ContainerPath: devShm,
HostPath: sandboxDevShm,
Readonly: false,
SelinuxRelabel: sandboxDevShm != devShm,
// XXX: tmpfs support for idmap mounts got merged in
// Linux 6.3.
// Our Ubuntu 22.04 CI runs with 5.15 kernels, so
// disabling idmap mounts for this case makes the CI
// happy (the other fs used support idmap mounts in 5.15
// kernels).
// We can enable this at a later stage, but as this
// tmpfs mount is exposed empty to the container (no
// prepopulated files) and using the hostIPC with userns
// is blocked by k8s, we can just avoid using the
// mappings and it should work fine.
})
// The ownership of /dev/shm could be delegated to remote sandbox controller. That file isn't required
// to be existed in host side for some sandbox runtimes. Skip it if we don't need it.
if _, err := c.os.Stat(sandboxDevShm); err == nil {
mounts = append(mounts, &runtime.Mount{
ContainerPath: devShm,
HostPath: sandboxDevShm,
Readonly: false,
SelinuxRelabel: sandboxDevShm != devShm,
// XXX: tmpfs support for idmap mounts got merged in
// Linux 6.3.
// Our Ubuntu 22.04 CI runs with 5.15 kernels, so
// disabling idmap mounts for this case makes the CI
// happy (the other fs used support idmap mounts in 5.15
// kernels).
// We can enable this at a later stage, but as this
// tmpfs mount is exposed empty to the container (no
// prepopulated files) and using the hostIPC with userns
// is blocked by k8s, we can just avoid using the
// mappings and it should work fine.
})
}
}
return mounts
}

View File

@ -733,32 +733,21 @@ func TestLinuxContainerMounts(t *testing.T) {
expectedMounts: nil,
},
{
desc: "should skip hostname mount if the old sandbox doesn't have hostname file",
desc: "should skip sandbox mounts if the old sandbox doesn't have sandbox file",
statFn: func(path string) (os.FileInfo, error) {
assert.Equal(t, filepath.Join(testRootDir, sandboxesDir, testSandboxID, "hostname"), path)
return nil, errors.New("random error")
sandboxRootDir := filepath.Join(testRootDir, sandboxesDir, testSandboxID)
sandboxStateDir := filepath.Join(testStateDir, sandboxesDir, testSandboxID)
switch path {
case filepath.Join(sandboxRootDir, "hostname"), filepath.Join(sandboxRootDir, "hosts"),
filepath.Join(sandboxRootDir, "resolv.conf"), filepath.Join(sandboxStateDir, "shm"):
return nil, errors.New("random error")
default:
t.Fatalf("expected sandbox files, got: %s", path)
}
return nil, nil
},
securityContext: &runtime.LinuxContainerSecurityContext{},
expectedMounts: []*runtime.Mount{
{
ContainerPath: "/etc/hosts",
HostPath: filepath.Join(testRootDir, sandboxesDir, testSandboxID, "hosts"),
Readonly: false,
SelinuxRelabel: true,
},
{
ContainerPath: resolvConfPath,
HostPath: filepath.Join(testRootDir, sandboxesDir, testSandboxID, "resolv.conf"),
Readonly: false,
SelinuxRelabel: true,
},
{
ContainerPath: "/dev/shm",
HostPath: filepath.Join(testStateDir, sandboxesDir, testSandboxID, "shm"),
Readonly: false,
SelinuxRelabel: true,
},
},
expectedMounts: nil,
},
} {
test := test