Go mod vendor

Signed-off-by: Shengjing Zhu <zhsj@debian.org>
This commit is contained in:
Shengjing Zhu
2020-11-22 01:32:09 +08:00
parent fc946ca82a
commit 7e46676e7c
546 changed files with 36459 additions and 14130 deletions

4
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/go-digest/.mailmap generated vendored Normal file
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Aaron Lehmann <aaronl@vitelus.com> <aaron.lehmann@docker.com>
Derek McGowan <derek@mcg.dev> <derek@mcgstyle.net>
Stephen J Day <stephen.day@docker.com> <stevvooe@users.noreply.github.com>
Haibing Zhou <zhouhaibing089@gmail.com>

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version: 2
requirements:
signed_off_by:
required: true
always_pending:
title_regex: '^WIP'
explanation: 'Work in progress...'
group_defaults:
required: 2
approve_by_comment:
enabled: true
approve_regex: '^LGTM'
reject_regex: '^Rejected'
reset_on_push:
enabled: true
author_approval:
ignored: true
conditions:
branches:
- master
groups:
go-digest:
teams:
- go-digest-maintainers

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language: go
go:
- 1.12.x
- 1.13.x
- master

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# Contributing to Docker open source projects
Want to hack on this project? Awesome! Here are instructions to get you started.
This project is a part of the [Docker](https://www.docker.com) project, and follows
the same rules and principles. If you're already familiar with the way
Docker does things, you'll feel right at home.
Otherwise, go read Docker's
[contributions guidelines](https://github.com/docker/docker/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md),
[issue triaging](https://github.com/docker/docker/blob/master/project/ISSUE-TRIAGE.md),
[review process](https://github.com/docker/docker/blob/master/project/REVIEWING.md) and
[branches and tags](https://github.com/docker/docker/blob/master/project/BRANCHES-AND-TAGS.md).
For an in-depth description of our contribution process, visit the
contributors guide: [Understand how to contribute](https://docs.docker.com/opensource/workflow/make-a-contribution/)
### Sign your work
The sign-off is a simple line at the end of the explanation for the patch. Your
signature certifies that you wrote the patch or otherwise have the right to pass
it on as an open-source patch. The rules are pretty simple: if you can certify
the below (from [developercertificate.org](http://developercertificate.org/)):
```
Developer Certificate of Origin
Version 1.1
Copyright (C) 2004, 2006 The Linux Foundation and its contributors.
1 Letterman Drive
Suite D4700
San Francisco, CA, 94129
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this
license document, but changing it is not allowed.
Developer's Certificate of Origin 1.1
By making a contribution to this project, I certify that:
(a) The contribution was created in whole or in part by me and I
have the right to submit it under the open source license
indicated in the file; or
(b) The contribution is based upon previous work that, to the best
of my knowledge, is covered under an appropriate open source
license and I have the right under that license to submit that
work with modifications, whether created in whole or in part
by me, under the same open source license (unless I am
permitted to submit under a different license), as indicated
in the file; or
(c) The contribution was provided directly to me by some other
person who certified (a), (b) or (c) and I have not modified
it.
(d) I understand and agree that this project and the contribution
are public and that a record of the contribution (including all
personal information I submit with it, including my sign-off) is
maintained indefinitely and may be redistributed consistent with
this project or the open source license(s) involved.
```
Then you just add a line to every git commit message:
Signed-off-by: Joe Smith <joe.smith@email.com>
Use your real name (sorry, no pseudonyms or anonymous contributions.)
If you set your `user.name` and `user.email` git configs, you can sign your
commit automatically with `git commit -s`.

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Derek McGowan <derek@mcgstyle.net> (@dmcgowan)
Stephen Day <stevvooe@gmail.com> (@stevvooe)
Vincent Batts <vbatts@hashbangbash.com> (@vbatts)
Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp> (@AkihiroSuda)
Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl> (@thaJeztah)

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# OCI Image Format Specification
<div>
<a href="https://travis-ci.org/opencontainers/image-spec">
<img src="https://travis-ci.org/opencontainers/image-spec.svg?branch=master"></img>
</a>
</div>
The OCI Image Format project creates and maintains the software shipping container image format spec (OCI Image Format).
**[The specification can be found here](spec.md).**
This repository also provides [Go types](specs-go), [intra-blob validation tooling, and JSON Schema](schema).
The Go types and validation should be compatible with the current Go release; earlier Go releases are not supported.
Additional documentation about how this group operates:
- [Code of Conduct](https://github.com/opencontainers/tob/blob/d2f9d68c1332870e40693fe077d311e0742bc73d/code-of-conduct.md)
- [Roadmap](#roadmap)
- [Releases](RELEASES.md)
- [Project Documentation](project.md)
The _optional_ and _base_ layers of all OCI projects are tracked in the [OCI Scope Table](https://www.opencontainers.org/about/oci-scope-table).
## Running an OCI Image
The OCI Image Format partner project is the [OCI Runtime Spec project](https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec).
The Runtime Specification outlines how to run a "[filesystem bundle](https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/master/bundle.md)" that is unpacked on disk.
At a high-level an OCI implementation would download an OCI Image then unpack that image into an OCI Runtime filesystem bundle.
At this point the OCI Runtime Bundle would be run by an OCI Runtime.
This entire workflow supports the UX that users have come to expect from container engines like Docker and rkt: primarily, the ability to run an image with no additional arguments:
* docker run example.com/org/app:v1.0.0
* rkt run example.com/org/app,version=v1.0.0
To support this UX the OCI Image Format contains sufficient information to launch the application on the target platform (e.g. command, arguments, environment variables, etc).
## FAQ
**Q: Why doesn't this project mention distribution?**
A: Distribution, for example using HTTP as both Docker v2.2 and AppC do today, is currently out of scope on the [OCI Scope Table](https://www.opencontainers.org/about/oci-scope-table).
There has been [some discussion on the TOB mailing list](https://groups.google.com/a/opencontainers.org/d/msg/tob/A3JnmI-D-6Y/tLuptPDHAgAJ) to make distribution an optional layer, but this topic is a work in progress.
**Q: What happens to AppC or Docker Image Formats?**
A: Existing formats can continue to be a proving ground for technologies, as needed.
The OCI Image Format project strives to provide a dependable open specification that can be shared between different tools and be evolved for years or decades of compatibility; as the deb and rpm format have.
Find more [FAQ on the OCI site](https://www.opencontainers.org/faq).
## Roadmap
The [GitHub milestones](https://github.com/opencontainers/image-spec/milestones) lay out the path to the future improvements.
# Contributing
Development happens on GitHub for the spec.
Issues are used for bugs and actionable items and longer discussions can happen on the [mailing list](#mailing-list).
The specification and code is licensed under the Apache 2.0 license found in the `LICENSE` file of this repository.
## Discuss your design
The project welcomes submissions, but please let everyone know what you are working on.
Before undertaking a nontrivial change to this specification, send mail to the [mailing list](#mailing-list) to discuss what you plan to do.
This gives everyone a chance to validate the design, helps prevent duplication of effort, and ensures that the idea fits.
It also guarantees that the design is sound before code is written; a GitHub pull-request is not the place for high-level discussions.
Typos and grammatical errors can go straight to a pull-request.
When in doubt, start on the [mailing-list](#mailing-list).
## Weekly Call
The contributors and maintainers of all OCI projects have a weekly meeting Wednesdays at 2:00 PM (USA Pacific).
Everyone is welcome to participate via [UberConference web][UberConference] or audio-only: +1-415-968-0849 (no PIN needed).
An initial agenda will be posted to the [mailing list](#mailing-list) earlier in the week, and everyone is welcome to propose additional topics or suggest other agenda alterations there.
Minutes are posted to the [mailing list](#mailing-list) and minutes from past calls are archived [here][minutes].
## Mailing List
You can subscribe and join the mailing list on [Google Groups](https://groups.google.com/a/opencontainers.org/forum/#!forum/dev).
## IRC
OCI discussion happens on #opencontainers on Freenode ([logs][irc-logs]).
## Markdown style
To keep consistency throughout the Markdown files in the Open Container spec all files should be formatted one sentence per line.
This fixes two things: it makes diffing easier with git and it resolves fights about line wrapping length.
For example, this paragraph will span three lines in the Markdown source.
## Git commit
### Sign your work
The sign-off is a simple line at the end of the explanation for the patch, which certifies that you wrote it or otherwise have the right to pass it on as an open-source patch.
The rules are pretty simple: if you can certify the below (from [developercertificate.org](http://developercertificate.org/)):
```
Developer Certificate of Origin
Version 1.1
Copyright (C) 2004, 2006 The Linux Foundation and its contributors.
660 York Street, Suite 102,
San Francisco, CA 94110 USA
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this
license document, but changing it is not allowed.
Developer's Certificate of Origin 1.1
By making a contribution to this project, I certify that:
(a) The contribution was created in whole or in part by me and I
have the right to submit it under the open source license
indicated in the file; or
(b) The contribution is based upon previous work that, to the best
of my knowledge, is covered under an appropriate open source
license and I have the right under that license to submit that
work with modifications, whether created in whole or in part
by me, under the same open source license (unless I am
permitted to submit under a different license), as indicated
in the file; or
(c) The contribution was provided directly to me by some other
person who certified (a), (b) or (c) and I have not modified
it.
(d) I understand and agree that this project and the contribution
are public and that a record of the contribution (including all
personal information I submit with it, including my sign-off) is
maintained indefinitely and may be redistributed consistent with
this project or the open source license(s) involved.
```
then you just add a line to every git commit message:
Signed-off-by: Joe Smith <joe@gmail.com>
using your real name (sorry, no pseudonyms or anonymous contributions.)
You can add the sign off when creating the git commit via `git commit -s`.
### Commit Style
Simple house-keeping for clean git history.
Read more on [How to Write a Git Commit Message](http://chris.beams.io/posts/git-commit/) or the Discussion section of [`git-commit(1)`](http://git-scm.com/docs/git-commit).
1. Separate the subject from body with a blank line
2. Limit the subject line to 50 characters
3. Capitalize the subject line
4. Do not end the subject line with a period
5. Use the imperative mood in the subject line
6. Wrap the body at 72 characters
7. Use the body to explain what and why vs. how
* If there was important/useful/essential conversation or information, copy or include a reference
8. When possible, one keyword to scope the change in the subject (i.e. "README: ...", "runtime: ...")
[UberConference]: https://www.uberconference.com/opencontainers
[irc-logs]: http://ircbot.wl.linuxfoundation.org/eavesdrop/%23opencontainers/
[minutes]: http://ircbot.wl.linuxfoundation.org/meetings/opencontainers/

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# runc
[![Build Status](https://travis-ci.org/opencontainers/runc.svg?branch=master)](https://travis-ci.org/opencontainers/runc)
[![Go Report Card](https://goreportcard.com/badge/github.com/opencontainers/runc)](https://goreportcard.com/report/github.com/opencontainers/runc)
[![GoDoc](https://godoc.org/github.com/opencontainers/runc?status.svg)](https://godoc.org/github.com/opencontainers/runc)
[![CII Best Practices](https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/projects/588/badge)](https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/projects/588)
## Introduction
`runc` is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification.
## Releases
`runc` depends on and tracks the [runtime-spec](https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec) repository.
We will try to make sure that `runc` and the OCI specification major versions stay in lockstep.
This means that `runc` 1.0.0 should implement the 1.0 version of the specification.
You can find official releases of `runc` on the [release](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/releases) page.
Currently, the following features are not considered to be production-ready:
* [Support for cgroup v2](./docs/cgroup-v2.md)
## Security
The reporting process and disclosure communications are outlined [here](https://github.com/opencontainers/org/blob/master/SECURITY.md).
### Security Audit
A third party security audit was performed by Cure53, you can see the full report [here](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/blob/master/docs/Security-Audit.pdf).
## Building
`runc` currently supports the Linux platform with various architecture support.
It must be built with Go version 1.13 or higher.
In order to enable seccomp support you will need to install `libseccomp` on your platform.
> e.g. `libseccomp-devel` for CentOS, or `libseccomp-dev` for Ubuntu
```bash
# create a 'github.com/opencontainers' in your GOPATH/src
cd github.com/opencontainers
git clone https://github.com/opencontainers/runc
cd runc
make
sudo make install
```
You can also use `go get` to install to your `GOPATH`, assuming that you have a `github.com` parent folder already created under `src`:
```bash
go get github.com/opencontainers/runc
cd $GOPATH/src/github.com/opencontainers/runc
make
sudo make install
```
`runc` will be installed to `/usr/local/sbin/runc` on your system.
#### Build Tags
`runc` supports optional build tags for compiling support of various features,
with some of them enabled by default (see `BUILDTAGS` in top-level `Makefile`).
To change build tags from the default, set the `BUILDTAGS` variable for make,
e.g.
```bash
make BUILDTAGS='seccomp apparmor'
```
| Build Tag | Feature | Enabled by default | Dependency |
|-----------|------------------------------------|--------------------|------------|
| seccomp | Syscall filtering | yes | libseccomp |
| selinux | selinux process and mount labeling | yes | <none> |
| apparmor | apparmor profile support | yes | <none> |
| nokmem | disable kernel memory accounting | no | <none> |
### Running the test suite
`runc` currently supports running its test suite via Docker.
To run the suite just type `make test`.
```bash
make test
```
There are additional make targets for running the tests outside of a container but this is not recommended as the tests are written with the expectation that they can write and remove anywhere.
You can run a specific test case by setting the `TESTFLAGS` variable.
```bash
# make test TESTFLAGS="-run=SomeTestFunction"
```
You can run a specific integration test by setting the `TESTPATH` variable.
```bash
# make test TESTPATH="/checkpoint.bats"
```
You can run a specific rootless integration test by setting the `ROOTLESS_TESTPATH` variable.
```bash
# make test ROOTLESS_TESTPATH="/checkpoint.bats"
```
You can run a test using your container engine's flags by setting `CONTAINER_ENGINE_BUILD_FLAGS` and `CONTAINER_ENGINE_RUN_FLAGS` variables.
```bash
# make test CONTAINER_ENGINE_BUILD_FLAGS="--build-arg http_proxy=http://yourproxy/" CONTAINER_ENGINE_RUN_FLAGS="-e http_proxy=http://yourproxy/"
```
### Dependencies Management
`runc` uses [Go Modules](https://github.com/golang/go/wiki/Modules) for dependencies management.
Please refer to [Go Modules](https://github.com/golang/go/wiki/Modules) for how to add or update
new dependencies. When updating dependencies, be sure that you are running Go `1.14` or newer.
```
# Update vendored dependencies
make vendor
# Verify all dependencies
make verify-dependencies
```
## Using runc
### Creating an OCI Bundle
In order to use runc you must have your container in the format of an OCI bundle.
If you have Docker installed you can use its `export` method to acquire a root filesystem from an existing Docker container.
```bash
# create the top most bundle directory
mkdir /mycontainer
cd /mycontainer
# create the rootfs directory
mkdir rootfs
# export busybox via Docker into the rootfs directory
docker export $(docker create busybox) | tar -C rootfs -xvf -
```
After a root filesystem is populated you just generate a spec in the format of a `config.json` file inside your bundle.
`runc` provides a `spec` command to generate a base template spec that you are then able to edit.
To find features and documentation for fields in the spec please refer to the [specs](https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec) repository.
```bash
runc spec
```
### Running Containers
Assuming you have an OCI bundle from the previous step you can execute the container in two different ways.
The first way is to use the convenience command `run` that will handle creating, starting, and deleting the container after it exits.
```bash
# run as root
cd /mycontainer
runc run mycontainerid
```
If you used the unmodified `runc spec` template this should give you a `sh` session inside the container.
The second way to start a container is using the specs lifecycle operations.
This gives you more power over how the container is created and managed while it is running.
This will also launch the container in the background so you will have to edit the `config.json` to remove the `terminal` setting for the simple examples here.
Your process field in the `config.json` should look like this below with `"terminal": false` and `"args": ["sleep", "5"]`.
```json
"process": {
"terminal": false,
"user": {
"uid": 0,
"gid": 0
},
"args": [
"sleep", "5"
],
"env": [
"PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin",
"TERM=xterm"
],
"cwd": "/",
"capabilities": {
"bounding": [
"CAP_AUDIT_WRITE",
"CAP_KILL",
"CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE"
],
"effective": [
"CAP_AUDIT_WRITE",
"CAP_KILL",
"CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE"
],
"inheritable": [
"CAP_AUDIT_WRITE",
"CAP_KILL",
"CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE"
],
"permitted": [
"CAP_AUDIT_WRITE",
"CAP_KILL",
"CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE"
],
"ambient": [
"CAP_AUDIT_WRITE",
"CAP_KILL",
"CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE"
]
},
"rlimits": [
{
"type": "RLIMIT_NOFILE",
"hard": 1024,
"soft": 1024
}
],
"noNewPrivileges": true
},
```
Now we can go through the lifecycle operations in your shell.
```bash
# run as root
cd /mycontainer
runc create mycontainerid
# view the container is created and in the "created" state
runc list
# start the process inside the container
runc start mycontainerid
# after 5 seconds view that the container has exited and is now in the stopped state
runc list
# now delete the container
runc delete mycontainerid
```
This allows higher level systems to augment the containers creation logic with setup of various settings after the container is created and/or before it is deleted. For example, the container's network stack is commonly set up after `create` but before `start`.
#### Rootless containers
`runc` has the ability to run containers without root privileges. This is called `rootless`. You need to pass some parameters to `runc` in order to run rootless containers. See below and compare with the previous version.
**Note:** In order to use this feature, "User Namespaces" must be compiled and enabled in your kernel. There are various ways to do this depending on your distribution:
- Confirm `CONFIG_USER_NS=y` is set in your kernel configuration (normally found in `/proc/config.gz`)
- Arch/Debian: `echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone`
- RHEL/CentOS 7: `echo 28633 > /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces`
Run the following commands as an ordinary user:
```bash
# Same as the first example
mkdir ~/mycontainer
cd ~/mycontainer
mkdir rootfs
docker export $(docker create busybox) | tar -C rootfs -xvf -
# The --rootless parameter instructs runc spec to generate a configuration for a rootless container, which will allow you to run the container as a non-root user.
runc spec --rootless
# The --root parameter tells runc where to store the container state. It must be writable by the user.
runc --root /tmp/runc run mycontainerid
```
#### Supervisors
`runc` can be used with process supervisors and init systems to ensure that containers are restarted when they exit.
An example systemd unit file looks something like this.
```systemd
[Unit]
Description=Start My Container
[Service]
Type=forking
ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/runc run -d --pid-file /run/mycontainerid.pid mycontainerid
ExecStopPost=/usr/local/sbin/runc delete mycontainerid
WorkingDirectory=/mycontainer
PIDFile=/run/mycontainerid.pid
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
```
#### cgroup v2
See [`./docs/cgroup-v2.md`](./docs/cgroup-v2.md).
## License
The code and docs are released under the [Apache 2.0 license](LICENSE).

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module github.com/opencontainers/runc
go 1.14
require (
github.com/checkpoint-restore/go-criu/v4 v4.1.0
github.com/cilium/ebpf v0.0.0-20200702112145-1c8d4c9ef775
github.com/containerd/console v1.0.0
github.com/coreos/go-systemd/v22 v22.1.0
github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.2.2
github.com/docker/go-units v0.4.0
github.com/godbus/dbus/v5 v5.0.3
github.com/golang/protobuf v1.4.2
github.com/moby/sys/mountinfo v0.1.3
github.com/mrunalp/fileutils v0.0.0-20200520151820-abd8a0e76976
github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec v1.0.3-0.20200728170252-4d89ac9fbff6
github.com/opencontainers/selinux v1.6.0
github.com/pkg/errors v0.9.1
github.com/seccomp/libseccomp-golang v0.9.1
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.6.0
github.com/syndtr/gocapability v0.0.0-20180916011248-d98352740cb2
// NOTE: urfave/cli must be <= v1.22.1 due to a regression: https://github.com/urfave/cli/issues/1092
github.com/urfave/cli v1.22.1
github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.1.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20200728102440-3e129f6d46b1
)

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# libcontainer
[![GoDoc](https://godoc.org/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer?status.svg)](https://godoc.org/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer)
Libcontainer provides a native Go implementation for creating containers
with namespaces, cgroups, capabilities, and filesystem access controls.
It allows you to manage the lifecycle of the container performing additional operations
after the container is created.
#### Container
A container is a self contained execution environment that shares the kernel of the
host system and which is (optionally) isolated from other containers in the system.
#### Using libcontainer
Because containers are spawned in a two step process you will need a binary that
will be executed as the init process for the container. In libcontainer, we use
the current binary (/proc/self/exe) to be executed as the init process, and use
arg "init", we call the first step process "bootstrap", so you always need a "init"
function as the entry of "bootstrap".
In addition to the go init function the early stage bootstrap is handled by importing
[nsenter](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/blob/master/libcontainer/nsenter/README.md).
```go
import (
_ "github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/nsenter"
)
func init() {
if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "init" {
runtime.GOMAXPROCS(1)
runtime.LockOSThread()
factory, _ := libcontainer.New("")
if err := factory.StartInitialization(); err != nil {
logrus.Fatal(err)
}
panic("--this line should have never been executed, congratulations--")
}
}
```
Then to create a container you first have to initialize an instance of a factory
that will handle the creation and initialization for a container.
```go
factory, err := libcontainer.New("/var/lib/container", libcontainer.Cgroupfs, libcontainer.InitArgs(os.Args[0], "init"))
if err != nil {
logrus.Fatal(err)
return
}
```
Once you have an instance of the factory created we can create a configuration
struct describing how the container is to be created. A sample would look similar to this:
```go
defaultMountFlags := unix.MS_NOEXEC | unix.MS_NOSUID | unix.MS_NODEV
config := &configs.Config{
Rootfs: "/your/path/to/rootfs",
Capabilities: &configs.Capabilities{
Bounding: []string{
"CAP_CHOWN",
"CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE",
"CAP_FSETID",
"CAP_FOWNER",
"CAP_MKNOD",
"CAP_NET_RAW",
"CAP_SETGID",
"CAP_SETUID",
"CAP_SETFCAP",
"CAP_SETPCAP",
"CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE",
"CAP_SYS_CHROOT",
"CAP_KILL",
"CAP_AUDIT_WRITE",
},
Effective: []string{
"CAP_CHOWN",
"CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE",
"CAP_FSETID",
"CAP_FOWNER",
"CAP_MKNOD",
"CAP_NET_RAW",
"CAP_SETGID",
"CAP_SETUID",
"CAP_SETFCAP",
"CAP_SETPCAP",
"CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE",
"CAP_SYS_CHROOT",
"CAP_KILL",
"CAP_AUDIT_WRITE",
},
Inheritable: []string{
"CAP_CHOWN",
"CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE",
"CAP_FSETID",
"CAP_FOWNER",
"CAP_MKNOD",
"CAP_NET_RAW",
"CAP_SETGID",
"CAP_SETUID",
"CAP_SETFCAP",
"CAP_SETPCAP",
"CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE",
"CAP_SYS_CHROOT",
"CAP_KILL",
"CAP_AUDIT_WRITE",
},
Permitted: []string{
"CAP_CHOWN",
"CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE",
"CAP_FSETID",
"CAP_FOWNER",
"CAP_MKNOD",
"CAP_NET_RAW",
"CAP_SETGID",
"CAP_SETUID",
"CAP_SETFCAP",
"CAP_SETPCAP",
"CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE",
"CAP_SYS_CHROOT",
"CAP_KILL",
"CAP_AUDIT_WRITE",
},
Ambient: []string{
"CAP_CHOWN",
"CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE",
"CAP_FSETID",
"CAP_FOWNER",
"CAP_MKNOD",
"CAP_NET_RAW",
"CAP_SETGID",
"CAP_SETUID",
"CAP_SETFCAP",
"CAP_SETPCAP",
"CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE",
"CAP_SYS_CHROOT",
"CAP_KILL",
"CAP_AUDIT_WRITE",
},
},
Namespaces: configs.Namespaces([]configs.Namespace{
{Type: configs.NEWNS},
{Type: configs.NEWUTS},
{Type: configs.NEWIPC},
{Type: configs.NEWPID},
{Type: configs.NEWUSER},
{Type: configs.NEWNET},
{Type: configs.NEWCGROUP},
}),
Cgroups: &configs.Cgroup{
Name: "test-container",
Parent: "system",
Resources: &configs.Resources{
MemorySwappiness: nil,
Devices: specconv.AllowedDevices,
},
},
MaskPaths: []string{
"/proc/kcore",
"/sys/firmware",
},
ReadonlyPaths: []string{
"/proc/sys", "/proc/sysrq-trigger", "/proc/irq", "/proc/bus",
},
Devices: specconv.AllowedDevices,
Hostname: "testing",
Mounts: []*configs.Mount{
{
Source: "proc",
Destination: "/proc",
Device: "proc",
Flags: defaultMountFlags,
},
{
Source: "tmpfs",
Destination: "/dev",
Device: "tmpfs",
Flags: unix.MS_NOSUID | unix.MS_STRICTATIME,
Data: "mode=755",
},
{
Source: "devpts",
Destination: "/dev/pts",
Device: "devpts",
Flags: unix.MS_NOSUID | unix.MS_NOEXEC,
Data: "newinstance,ptmxmode=0666,mode=0620,gid=5",
},
{
Device: "tmpfs",
Source: "shm",
Destination: "/dev/shm",
Data: "mode=1777,size=65536k",
Flags: defaultMountFlags,
},
{
Source: "mqueue",
Destination: "/dev/mqueue",
Device: "mqueue",
Flags: defaultMountFlags,
},
{
Source: "sysfs",
Destination: "/sys",
Device: "sysfs",
Flags: defaultMountFlags | unix.MS_RDONLY,
},
},
UidMappings: []configs.IDMap{
{
ContainerID: 0,
HostID: 1000,
Size: 65536,
},
},
GidMappings: []configs.IDMap{
{
ContainerID: 0,
HostID: 1000,
Size: 65536,
},
},
Networks: []*configs.Network{
{
Type: "loopback",
Address: "127.0.0.1/0",
Gateway: "localhost",
},
},
Rlimits: []configs.Rlimit{
{
Type: unix.RLIMIT_NOFILE,
Hard: uint64(1025),
Soft: uint64(1025),
},
},
}
```
Once you have the configuration populated you can create a container:
```go
container, err := factory.Create("container-id", config)
if err != nil {
logrus.Fatal(err)
return
}
```
To spawn bash as the initial process inside the container and have the
processes pid returned in order to wait, signal, or kill the process:
```go
process := &libcontainer.Process{
Args: []string{"/bin/bash"},
Env: []string{"PATH=/bin"},
User: "daemon",
Stdin: os.Stdin,
Stdout: os.Stdout,
Stderr: os.Stderr,
Init: true,
}
err := container.Run(process)
if err != nil {
container.Destroy()
logrus.Fatal(err)
return
}
// wait for the process to finish.
_, err := process.Wait()
if err != nil {
logrus.Fatal(err)
}
// destroy the container.
container.Destroy()
```
Additional ways to interact with a running container are:
```go
// return all the pids for all processes running inside the container.
processes, err := container.Processes()
// get detailed cpu, memory, io, and network statistics for the container and
// it's processes.
stats, err := container.Stats()
// pause all processes inside the container.
container.Pause()
// resume all paused processes.
container.Resume()
// send signal to container's init process.
container.Signal(signal)
// update container resource constraints.
container.Set(config)
// get current status of the container.
status, err := container.Status()
// get current container's state information.
state, err := container.State()
```
#### Checkpoint & Restore
libcontainer now integrates [CRIU](http://criu.org/) for checkpointing and restoring containers.
This let's you save the state of a process running inside a container to disk, and then restore
that state into a new process, on the same machine or on another machine.
`criu` version 1.5.2 or higher is required to use checkpoint and restore.
If you don't already have `criu` installed, you can build it from source, following the
[online instructions](http://criu.org/Installation). `criu` is also installed in the docker image
generated when building libcontainer with docker.
## Copyright and license
Code and documentation copyright 2014 Docker, inc.
The code and documentation are released under the [Apache 2.0 license](../LICENSE).
The documentation is also released under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
You may obtain a copy of the license, titled CC-BY-4.0, at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

View File

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
## nsenter
The `nsenter` package registers a special init constructor that is called before
the Go runtime has a chance to boot. This provides us the ability to `setns` on
existing namespaces and avoid the issues that the Go runtime has with multiple
threads. This constructor will be called if this package is registered,
imported, in your go application.
The `nsenter` package will `import "C"` and it uses [cgo](https://golang.org/cmd/cgo/)
package. In cgo, if the import of "C" is immediately preceded by a comment, that comment,
called the preamble, is used as a header when compiling the C parts of the package.
So every time we import package `nsenter`, the C code function `nsexec()` would be
called. And package `nsenter` is only imported in `init.go`, so every time the runc
`init` command is invoked, that C code is run.
Because `nsexec()` must be run before the Go runtime in order to use the
Linux kernel namespace, you must `import` this library into a package if
you plan to use `libcontainer` directly. Otherwise Go will not execute
the `nsexec()` constructor, which means that the re-exec will not cause
the namespaces to be joined. You can import it like this:
```go
import _ "github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/nsenter"
```
`nsexec()` will first get the file descriptor number for the init pipe
from the environment variable `_LIBCONTAINER_INITPIPE` (which was opened
by the parent and kept open across the fork-exec of the `nsexec()` init
process). The init pipe is used to read bootstrap data (namespace paths,
clone flags, uid and gid mappings, and the console path) from the parent
process. `nsexec()` will then call `setns(2)` to join the namespaces
provided in the bootstrap data (if available), `clone(2)` a child process
with the provided clone flags, update the user and group ID mappings, do
some further miscellaneous setup steps, and then send the PID of the
child process to the parent of the `nsexec()` "caller". Finally,
the parent `nsexec()` will exit and the child `nsexec()` process will
return to allow the Go runtime take over.
NOTE: We do both `setns(2)` and `clone(2)` even if we don't have any
`CLONE_NEW*` clone flags because we must fork a new process in order to
enter the PID namespace.

View File

@@ -1,542 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR LGPL-2.1-or-later
/*
* Copyright (C) 2019 Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
* Copyright (C) 2019 SUSE LLC
*
* This work is dual licensed under the following licenses. You may use,
* redistribute, and/or modify the work under the conditions of either (or
* both) licenses.
*
* === Apache-2.0 ===
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* === LGPL-2.1-or-later ===
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this library. If not, see
* <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#include <sys/vfs.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/sendfile.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
/* Use our own wrapper for memfd_create. */
#if !defined(SYS_memfd_create) && defined(__NR_memfd_create)
# define SYS_memfd_create __NR_memfd_create
#endif
/* memfd_create(2) flags -- copied from <linux/memfd.h>. */
#ifndef MFD_CLOEXEC
# define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U
# define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U
#endif
int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)
{
#ifdef SYS_memfd_create
return syscall(SYS_memfd_create, name, flags);
#else
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
#endif
}
/* This comes directly from <linux/fcntl.h>. */
#ifndef F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE
# define F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE 1024
#endif
#ifndef F_ADD_SEALS
# define F_ADD_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9)
# define F_GET_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10)
#endif
#ifndef F_SEAL_SEAL
# define F_SEAL_SEAL 0x0001 /* prevent further seals from being set */
# define F_SEAL_SHRINK 0x0002 /* prevent file from shrinking */
# define F_SEAL_GROW 0x0004 /* prevent file from growing */
# define F_SEAL_WRITE 0x0008 /* prevent writes */
#endif
#define CLONED_BINARY_ENV "_LIBCONTAINER_CLONED_BINARY"
#define RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT "runc_cloned:/proc/self/exe"
#define RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS \
(F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_WRITE)
static void *must_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
{
void *old = ptr;
do {
ptr = realloc(old, size);
} while(!ptr);
return ptr;
}
/*
* Verify whether we are currently in a self-cloned program (namely, is
* /proc/self/exe a memfd). F_GET_SEALS will only succeed for memfds (or rather
* for shmem files), and we want to be sure it's actually sealed.
*/
static int is_self_cloned(void)
{
int fd, ret, is_cloned = 0;
struct stat statbuf = {};
struct statfs fsbuf = {};
fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "you have no read access to runc binary file\n");
return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
}
/*
* Is the binary a fully-sealed memfd? We don't need CLONED_BINARY_ENV for
* this, because you cannot write to a sealed memfd no matter what (so
* sharing it isn't a bad thing -- and an admin could bind-mount a sealed
* memfd to /usr/bin/runc to allow re-use).
*/
ret = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
if (ret >= 0) {
is_cloned = (ret == RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
goto out;
}
/*
* All other forms require CLONED_BINARY_ENV, since they are potentially
* writeable (or we can't tell if they're fully safe) and thus we must
* check the environment as an extra layer of defence.
*/
if (!getenv(CLONED_BINARY_ENV)) {
is_cloned = false;
goto out;
}
/*
* Is the binary on a read-only filesystem? We can't detect bind-mounts in
* particular (in-kernel they are identical to regular mounts) but we can
* at least be sure that it's read-only. In addition, to make sure that
* it's *our* bind-mount we check CLONED_BINARY_ENV.
*/
if (fstatfs(fd, &fsbuf) >= 0)
is_cloned |= (fsbuf.f_flags & MS_RDONLY);
/*
* Okay, we're a tmpfile -- or we're currently running on RHEL <=7.6
* which appears to have a borked backport of F_GET_SEALS. Either way,
* having a file which has no hardlinks indicates that we aren't using
* a host-side "runc" binary and this is something that a container
* cannot fake (because unlinking requires being able to resolve the
* path that you want to unlink).
*/
if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) >= 0)
is_cloned |= (statbuf.st_nlink == 0);
out:
close(fd);
return is_cloned;
}
/* Read a given file into a new buffer, and providing the length. */
static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length)
{
int fd;
char buf[4096], *copy = NULL;
if (!length)
return NULL;
fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0)
return NULL;
*length = 0;
for (;;) {
ssize_t n;
n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (n < 0)
goto error;
if (!n)
break;
copy = must_realloc(copy, (*length + n) * sizeof(*copy));
memcpy(copy + *length, buf, n);
*length += n;
}
close(fd);
return copy;
error:
close(fd);
free(copy);
return NULL;
}
/*
* A poor-man's version of "xargs -0". Basically parses a given block of
* NUL-delimited data, within the given length and adds a pointer to each entry
* to the array of pointers.
*/
static int parse_xargs(char *data, int data_length, char ***output)
{
int num = 0;
char *cur = data;
if (!data || *output != NULL)
return -1;
while (cur < data + data_length) {
num++;
*output = must_realloc(*output, (num + 1) * sizeof(**output));
(*output)[num - 1] = cur;
cur += strlen(cur) + 1;
}
(*output)[num] = NULL;
return num;
}
/*
* "Parse" out argv from /proc/self/cmdline.
* This is necessary because we are running in a context where we don't have a
* main() that we can just get the arguments from.
*/
static int fetchve(char ***argv)
{
char *cmdline = NULL;
size_t cmdline_size;
cmdline = read_file("/proc/self/cmdline", &cmdline_size);
if (!cmdline)
goto error;
if (parse_xargs(cmdline, cmdline_size, argv) <= 0)
goto error;
return 0;
error:
free(cmdline);
return -EINVAL;
}
enum {
EFD_NONE = 0,
EFD_MEMFD,
EFD_FILE,
};
/*
* This comes from <linux/fcntl.h>. We can't hard-code __O_TMPFILE because it
* changes depending on the architecture. If we don't have O_TMPFILE we always
* have the mkostemp(3) fallback.
*/
#ifndef O_TMPFILE
# if defined(__O_TMPFILE) && defined(O_DIRECTORY)
# define O_TMPFILE (__O_TMPFILE | O_DIRECTORY)
# endif
#endif
static int make_execfd(int *fdtype)
{
int fd = -1;
char template[PATH_MAX] = {0};
char *prefix = getenv("_LIBCONTAINER_STATEDIR");
if (!prefix || *prefix != '/')
prefix = "/tmp";
if (snprintf(template, sizeof(template), "%s/runc.XXXXXX", prefix) < 0)
return -1;
/*
* Now try memfd, it's much nicer than actually creating a file in STATEDIR
* since it's easily detected thanks to sealing and also doesn't require
* assumptions about STATEDIR.
*/
*fdtype = EFD_MEMFD;
fd = memfd_create(RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
if (fd >= 0)
return fd;
if (errno != ENOSYS && errno != EINVAL)
goto error;
#ifdef O_TMPFILE
/*
* Try O_TMPFILE to avoid races where someone might snatch our file. Note
* that O_EXCL isn't actually a security measure here (since you can just
* fd re-open it and clear O_EXCL).
*/
*fdtype = EFD_FILE;
fd = open(prefix, O_TMPFILE | O_EXCL | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0700);
if (fd >= 0) {
struct stat statbuf = {};
bool working_otmpfile = false;
/*
* open(2) ignores unknown O_* flags -- yeah, I was surprised when I
* found this out too. As a result we can't check for EINVAL. However,
* if we get nlink != 0 (or EISDIR) then we know that this kernel
* doesn't support O_TMPFILE.
*/
if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) >= 0)
working_otmpfile = (statbuf.st_nlink == 0);
if (working_otmpfile)
return fd;
/* Pretend that we got EISDIR since O_TMPFILE failed. */
close(fd);
errno = EISDIR;
}
if (errno != EISDIR)
goto error;
#endif /* defined(O_TMPFILE) */
/*
* Our final option is to create a temporary file the old-school way, and
* then unlink it so that nothing else sees it by accident.
*/
*fdtype = EFD_FILE;
fd = mkostemp(template, O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd >= 0) {
if (unlink(template) >= 0)
return fd;
close(fd);
}
error:
*fdtype = EFD_NONE;
return -1;
}
static int seal_execfd(int *fd, int fdtype)
{
switch (fdtype) {
case EFD_MEMFD:
return fcntl(*fd, F_ADD_SEALS, RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
case EFD_FILE: {
/* Need to re-open our pseudo-memfd as an O_PATH to avoid execve(2) giving -ETXTBSY. */
int newfd;
char fdpath[PATH_MAX] = {0};
if (fchmod(*fd, 0100) < 0)
return -1;
if (snprintf(fdpath, sizeof(fdpath), "/proc/self/fd/%d", *fd) < 0)
return -1;
newfd = open(fdpath, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
if (newfd < 0)
return -1;
close(*fd);
*fd = newfd;
return 0;
}
default:
break;
}
return -1;
}
static int try_bindfd(void)
{
int fd, ret = -1;
char template[PATH_MAX] = {0};
char *prefix = getenv("_LIBCONTAINER_STATEDIR");
if (!prefix || *prefix != '/')
prefix = "/tmp";
if (snprintf(template, sizeof(template), "%s/runc.XXXXXX", prefix) < 0)
return ret;
/*
* We need somewhere to mount it, mounting anything over /proc/self is a
* BAD idea on the host -- even if we do it temporarily.
*/
fd = mkstemp(template);
if (fd < 0)
return ret;
close(fd);
/*
* For obvious reasons this won't work in rootless mode because we haven't
* created a userns+mntns -- but getting that to work will be a bit
* complicated and it's only worth doing if someone actually needs it.
*/
ret = -EPERM;
if (mount("/proc/self/exe", template, "", MS_BIND, "") < 0)
goto out;
if (mount("", template, "", MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND | MS_RDONLY, "") < 0)
goto out_umount;
/* Get read-only handle that we're sure can't be made read-write. */
ret = open(template, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
out_umount:
/*
* Make sure the MNT_DETACH works, otherwise we could get remounted
* read-write and that would be quite bad (the fd would be made read-write
* too, invalidating the protection).
*/
if (umount2(template, MNT_DETACH) < 0) {
if (ret >= 0)
close(ret);
ret = -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
}
out:
/*
* We don't care about unlink errors, the worst that happens is that
* there's an empty file left around in STATEDIR.
*/
unlink(template);
return ret;
}
static ssize_t fd_to_fd(int outfd, int infd)
{
ssize_t total = 0;
char buffer[4096];
for (;;) {
ssize_t nread, nwritten = 0;
nread = read(infd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (nread < 0)
return -1;
if (!nread)
break;
do {
ssize_t n = write(outfd, buffer + nwritten, nread - nwritten);
if (n < 0)
return -1;
nwritten += n;
} while(nwritten < nread);
total += nwritten;
}
return total;
}
static int clone_binary(void)
{
int binfd, execfd;
struct stat statbuf = {};
size_t sent = 0;
int fdtype = EFD_NONE;
/*
* Before we resort to copying, let's try creating an ro-binfd in one shot
* by getting a handle for a read-only bind-mount of the execfd.
*/
execfd = try_bindfd();
if (execfd >= 0)
return execfd;
/*
* Dammit, that didn't work -- time to copy the binary to a safe place we
* can seal the contents.
*/
execfd = make_execfd(&fdtype);
if (execfd < 0 || fdtype == EFD_NONE)
return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
binfd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (binfd < 0)
goto error;
if (fstat(binfd, &statbuf) < 0)
goto error_binfd;
while (sent < statbuf.st_size) {
int n = sendfile(execfd, binfd, NULL, statbuf.st_size - sent);
if (n < 0) {
/* sendfile can fail so we fallback to a dumb user-space copy. */
n = fd_to_fd(execfd, binfd);
if (n < 0)
goto error_binfd;
}
sent += n;
}
close(binfd);
if (sent != statbuf.st_size)
goto error;
if (seal_execfd(&execfd, fdtype) < 0)
goto error;
return execfd;
error_binfd:
close(binfd);
error:
close(execfd);
return -EIO;
}
/* Get cheap access to the environment. */
extern char **environ;
int ensure_cloned_binary(void)
{
int execfd;
char **argv = NULL;
/* Check that we're not self-cloned, and if we are then bail. */
int cloned = is_self_cloned();
if (cloned > 0 || cloned == -ENOTRECOVERABLE)
return cloned;
if (fetchve(&argv) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
execfd = clone_binary();
if (execfd < 0)
return -EIO;
if (putenv(CLONED_BINARY_ENV "=1"))
goto error;
fexecve(execfd, argv, environ);
error:
close(execfd);
return -ENOEXEC;
}

View File

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
#ifndef NSENTER_NAMESPACE_H
#define NSENTER_NAMESPACE_H
#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
# define _GNU_SOURCE
#endif
#include <sched.h>
/* All of these are taken from include/uapi/linux/sched.h */
#ifndef CLONE_NEWNS
# define CLONE_NEWNS 0x00020000 /* New mount namespace group */
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWCGROUP
# define CLONE_NEWCGROUP 0x02000000 /* New cgroup namespace */
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWUTS
# define CLONE_NEWUTS 0x04000000 /* New utsname namespace */
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWIPC
# define CLONE_NEWIPC 0x08000000 /* New ipc namespace */
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWUSER
# define CLONE_NEWUSER 0x10000000 /* New user namespace */
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWPID
# define CLONE_NEWPID 0x20000000 /* New pid namespace */
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWNET
# define CLONE_NEWNET 0x40000000 /* New network namespace */
#endif
#endif /* NSENTER_NAMESPACE_H */

View File

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
// +build linux,!gccgo
package nsenter
/*
#cgo CFLAGS: -Wall
extern void nsexec();
void __attribute__((constructor)) init(void) {
nsexec();
}
*/
import "C"

View File

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
// +build linux,gccgo
package nsenter
/*
#cgo CFLAGS: -Wall
extern void nsexec();
void __attribute__((constructor)) init(void) {
nsexec();
}
*/
import "C"
// AlwaysFalse is here to stay false
// (and be exported so the compiler doesn't optimize out its reference)
var AlwaysFalse bool
func init() {
if AlwaysFalse {
// by referencing this C init() in a noop test, it will ensure the compiler
// links in the C function.
// https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=65134
C.init()
}
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
// +build !linux !cgo
package nsenter

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

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Tianon Gravi <admwiggin@gmail.com> (@tianon)
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> (@cyphar)

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# Open Container Initiative Runtime Specification
The [Open Container Initiative][oci] develops specifications for standards on Operating System process and application containers.
The specification can be found [here](spec.md).
## Table of Contents
Additional documentation about how this group operates:
- [Code of Conduct][code-of-conduct]
- [Style and Conventions](style.md)
- [Implementations](implementations.md)
- [Releases](RELEASES.md)
- [charter][charter]
## Use Cases
To provide context for users the following section gives example use cases for each part of the spec.
### Application Bundle Builders
Application bundle builders can create a [bundle](bundle.md) directory that includes all of the files required for launching an application as a container.
The bundle contains an OCI [configuration file](config.md) where the builder can specify host-independent details such as [which executable to launch](config.md#process) and host-specific settings such as [mount](config.md#mounts) locations, [hook](config.md#posix-platform-hooks) paths, Linux [namespaces](config-linux.md#namespaces) and [cgroups](config-linux.md#control-groups).
Because the configuration includes host-specific settings, application bundle directories copied between two hosts may require configuration adjustments.
### Hook Developers
[Hook](config.md#posix-platform-hooks) developers can extend the functionality of an OCI-compliant runtime by hooking into a container's lifecycle with an external application.
Example use cases include sophisticated network configuration, volume garbage collection, etc.
### Runtime Developers
Runtime developers can build runtime implementations that run OCI-compliant bundles and container configuration, containing low-level OS and host-specific details, on a particular platform.
## Contributing
Development happens on GitHub for the spec.
Issues are used for bugs and actionable items and longer discussions can happen on the [mailing list](#mailing-list).
The specification and code is licensed under the Apache 2.0 license found in the [LICENSE](./LICENSE) file.
### Discuss your design
The project welcomes submissions, but please let everyone know what you are working on.
Before undertaking a nontrivial change to this specification, send mail to the [mailing list](#mailing-list) to discuss what you plan to do.
This gives everyone a chance to validate the design, helps prevent duplication of effort, and ensures that the idea fits.
It also guarantees that the design is sound before code is written; a GitHub pull-request is not the place for high-level discussions.
Typos and grammatical errors can go straight to a pull-request.
When in doubt, start on the [mailing-list](#mailing-list).
### Meetings
Please see the [OCI org repository README](https://github.com/opencontainers/org#meetings) for the most up-to-date
information on OCI contributor and maintainer meeting schedules. You can also find links to meeting agendas and
minutes for all prior meetings.
### Mailing List
You can subscribe and join the mailing list on [Google Groups][dev-list].
### IRC
OCI discussion happens on #opencontainers on Freenode ([logs][irc-logs]).
### Git commit
#### Sign your work
The sign-off is a simple line at the end of the explanation for the patch, which certifies that you wrote it or otherwise have the right to pass it on as an open-source patch.
The rules are pretty simple: if you can certify the below (from http://developercertificate.org):
```
Developer Certificate of Origin
Version 1.1
Copyright (C) 2004, 2006 The Linux Foundation and its contributors.
660 York Street, Suite 102,
San Francisco, CA 94110 USA
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this
license document, but changing it is not allowed.
Developer's Certificate of Origin 1.1
By making a contribution to this project, I certify that:
(a) The contribution was created in whole or in part by me and I
have the right to submit it under the open source license
indicated in the file; or
(b) The contribution is based upon previous work that, to the best
of my knowledge, is covered under an appropriate open source
license and I have the right under that license to submit that
work with modifications, whether created in whole or in part
by me, under the same open source license (unless I am
permitted to submit under a different license), as indicated
in the file; or
(c) The contribution was provided directly to me by some other
person who certified (a), (b) or (c) and I have not modified
it.
(d) I understand and agree that this project and the contribution
are public and that a record of the contribution (including all
personal information I submit with it, including my sign-off) is
maintained indefinitely and may be redistributed consistent with
this project or the open source license(s) involved.
```
then you just add a line to every git commit message:
Signed-off-by: Joe Smith <joe@gmail.com>
using your real name (sorry, no pseudonyms or anonymous contributions.)
You can add the sign off when creating the git commit via `git commit -s`.
#### Commit Style
Simple house-keeping for clean git history.
Read more on [How to Write a Git Commit Message][how-to-git-commit] or the Discussion section of [git-commit(1)][git-commit.1].
1. Separate the subject from body with a blank line
2. Limit the subject line to 50 characters
3. Capitalize the subject line
4. Do not end the subject line with a period
5. Use the imperative mood in the subject line
6. Wrap the body at 72 characters
7. Use the body to explain what and why vs. how
* If there was important/useful/essential conversation or information, copy or include a reference
8. When possible, one keyword to scope the change in the subject (i.e. "README: ...", "runtime: ...")
[charter]: https://www.opencontainers.org/about/governance
[code-of-conduct]: https://github.com/opencontainers/org/blob/master/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
[dev-list]: https://groups.google.com/a/opencontainers.org/forum/#!forum/dev
[how-to-git-commit]: http://chris.beams.io/posts/git-commit
[irc-logs]: http://ircbot.wl.linuxfoundation.org/eavesdrop/%23opencontainers/
[iso-week]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_week_date#Calculating_the_week_number_of_a_given_date
[minutes]: http://ircbot.wl.linuxfoundation.org/meetings/opencontainers/
[oci]: https://www.opencontainers.org
[rfc5545]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5545
[runtime-wiki]: https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/wiki
[uberconference]: https://www.uberconference.com/opencontainers
[git-commit.1]: http://git-scm.com/docs/git-commit

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# selinux
[![GoDoc](https://godoc.org/github.com/opencontainers/selinux?status.svg)](https://godoc.org/github.com/opencontainers/selinux) [![Go Report Card](https://goreportcard.com/badge/github.com/opencontainers/selinux)](https://goreportcard.com/report/github.com/opencontainers/selinux) [![Build Status](https://travis-ci.org/opencontainers/selinux.svg?branch=master)](https://travis-ci.org/opencontainers/selinux)
Common SELinux package used across the container ecosystem.
## Usage
When compiling consumers of this project, the `selinux` build tag must be used to enable selinux functionality.
For complete documentation, see [godoc](https://godoc.org/github.com/opencontainers/selinux).
## Code of Conduct
Participation in the OpenContainers community is governed by [OpenContainer's Code of Conduct][code-of-conduct].
## Security
If you find an issue, please follow the [security][security] protocol to report it.
[security]: https://github.com/opencontainers/org/blob/master/security
[code-of-conduct]: https://github.com/opencontainers/org/blob/master/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md

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module github.com/opencontainers/selinux
go 1.13
require (
github.com/pkg/errors v0.9.1
github.com/willf/bitset v1.1.11-0.20200630133818-d5bec3311243
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20191115151921-52ab43148777
)