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Merge pull request #3081 from thaJeztah/bump_runc

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update runc to 2b18fe1d885ee5083ef9f0838fee39b62d653e30
This commit is contained in:
Michael Crosby 2019-03-07 15:10:41 -06:00 committed by GitHub
commit a15b6e2097
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GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
4 changed files with 320 additions and 72 deletions
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2
vendor.conf
View File

@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.0.0
github.com/gogo/googleapis 08a7655d27152912db7aaf4f983275eaf8d128ef
github.com/golang/protobuf v1.1.0
github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec 29686dbc5559d93fb1ef402eeda3e35c38d75af4 # v1.0.1-59-g29686db
github.com/opencontainers/runc 6635b4f0c6af3810594d2770f662f34ddc15b40d
github.com/opencontainers/runc 2b18fe1d885ee5083ef9f0838fee39b62d653e30
github.com/konsorten/go-windows-terminal-sequences v1.0.1
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.3.0
github.com/urfave/cli 7bc6a0acffa589f415f88aca16cc1de5ffd66f9c

5
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/README.md generated vendored
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@ -16,10 +16,9 @@ This means that `runc` 1.0.0 should implement the 1.0 version of the specificati
You can find official releases of `runc` on the [release](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/releases) page.
### Security
## Security
If you wish to report a security issue, please disclose the issue responsibly
to security@opencontainers.org.
Reporting process and disclosure communications are outlined in [/org/security](https://github.com/opencontainers/org/blob/master/security/)
## Building

368
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c generated vendored
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@ -27,8 +27,10 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#include <sys/vfs.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/sendfile.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
@ -36,8 +38,6 @@
#if !defined(SYS_memfd_create) && defined(__NR_memfd_create)
# define SYS_memfd_create __NR_memfd_create
#endif
#ifdef SYS_memfd_create
# define HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
/* memfd_create(2) flags -- copied from <linux/memfd.h>. */
#ifndef MFD_CLOEXEC
# define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U
@ -45,9 +45,14 @@
#endif
int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)
{
#ifdef SYS_memfd_create
return syscall(SYS_memfd_create, name, flags);
}
#else
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
#endif
}
/* This comes directly from <linux/fcntl.h>. */
#ifndef F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE
@ -64,12 +69,10 @@ int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)
# define F_SEAL_WRITE 0x0008 /* prevent writes */
#endif
#define RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX 0x7FFFF000 /* sendfile(2) is limited to 2GB. */
#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
#define CLONED_BINARY_ENV "_LIBCONTAINER_CLONED_BINARY"
#define RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT "runc_cloned:/proc/self/exe"
#define RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS \
(F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_WRITE)
#endif
static void *must_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
{
@ -88,28 +91,61 @@ static void *must_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
static int is_self_cloned(void)
{
int fd, ret, is_cloned = 0;
struct stat statbuf = {};
struct statfs fsbuf = {};
fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0)
return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
/*
* Is the binary a fully-sealed memfd? We don't need CLONED_BINARY_ENV for
* this, because you cannot write to a sealed memfd no matter what (so
* sharing it isn't a bad thing -- and an admin could bind-mount a sealed
* memfd to /usr/bin/runc to allow re-use).
*/
ret = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
if (ret >= 0) {
is_cloned = (ret == RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
#else
struct stat statbuf = {0};
ret = fstat(fd, &statbuf);
if (ret >= 0)
is_cloned = (statbuf.st_nlink == 0);
#endif
goto out;
}
/*
* All other forms require CLONED_BINARY_ENV, since they are potentially
* writeable (or we can't tell if they're fully safe) and thus we must
* check the environment as an extra layer of defence.
*/
if (!getenv(CLONED_BINARY_ENV)) {
is_cloned = false;
goto out;
}
/*
* Is the binary on a read-only filesystem? We can't detect bind-mounts in
* particular (in-kernel they are identical to regular mounts) but we can
* at least be sure that it's read-only. In addition, to make sure that
* it's *our* bind-mount we check CLONED_BINARY_ENV.
*/
if (fstatfs(fd, &fsbuf) >= 0)
is_cloned |= (fsbuf.f_flags & MS_RDONLY);
/*
* Okay, we're a tmpfile -- or we're currently running on RHEL <=7.6
* which appears to have a borked backport of F_GET_SEALS. Either way,
* having a file which has no hardlinks indicates that we aren't using
* a host-side "runc" binary and this is something that a container
* cannot fake (because unlinking requires being able to resolve the
* path that you want to unlink).
*/
if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) >= 0)
is_cloned |= (statbuf.st_nlink == 0);
out:
close(fd);
return is_cloned;
}
/*
* Basic wrapper around mmap(2) that gives you the file length so you can
* safely treat it as an ordinary buffer. Only gives you read access.
*/
/* Read a given file into a new buffer, and providing the length. */
static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length)
{
int fd;
@ -124,7 +160,7 @@ static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length)
*length = 0;
for (;;) {
int n;
ssize_t n;
n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (n < 0)
@ -169,100 +205,312 @@ static int parse_xargs(char *data, int data_length, char ***output)
}
/*
* "Parse" out argv and envp from /proc/self/cmdline and /proc/self/environ.
* "Parse" out argv from /proc/self/cmdline.
* This is necessary because we are running in a context where we don't have a
* main() that we can just get the arguments from.
*/
static int fetchve(char ***argv, char ***envp)
static int fetchve(char ***argv)
{
char *cmdline = NULL, *environ = NULL;
size_t cmdline_size, environ_size;
char *cmdline = NULL;
size_t cmdline_size;
cmdline = read_file("/proc/self/cmdline", &cmdline_size);
if (!cmdline)
goto error;
environ = read_file("/proc/self/environ", &environ_size);
if (!environ)
goto error;
if (parse_xargs(cmdline, cmdline_size, argv) <= 0)
goto error;
if (parse_xargs(environ, environ_size, envp) <= 0)
goto error;
return 0;
error:
free(environ);
free(cmdline);
return -EINVAL;
}
enum {
EFD_NONE = 0,
EFD_MEMFD,
EFD_FILE,
};
/*
* This comes from <linux/fcntl.h>. We can't hard-code __O_TMPFILE because it
* changes depending on the architecture. If we don't have O_TMPFILE we always
* have the mkostemp(3) fallback.
*/
#ifndef O_TMPFILE
# if defined(__O_TMPFILE) && defined(O_DIRECTORY)
# define O_TMPFILE (__O_TMPFILE | O_DIRECTORY)
# endif
#endif
static int make_execfd(int *fdtype)
{
int fd = -1;
char template[PATH_MAX] = {0};
char *prefix = secure_getenv("_LIBCONTAINER_STATEDIR");
if (!prefix || *prefix != '/')
prefix = "/tmp";
if (snprintf(template, sizeof(template), "%s/runc.XXXXXX", prefix) < 0)
return -1;
/*
* Now try memfd, it's much nicer than actually creating a file in STATEDIR
* since it's easily detected thanks to sealing and also doesn't require
* assumptions about STATEDIR.
*/
*fdtype = EFD_MEMFD;
fd = memfd_create(RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
if (fd >= 0)
return fd;
if (errno != ENOSYS && errno != EINVAL)
goto error;
#ifdef O_TMPFILE
/*
* Try O_TMPFILE to avoid races where someone might snatch our file. Note
* that O_EXCL isn't actually a security measure here (since you can just
* fd re-open it and clear O_EXCL).
*/
*fdtype = EFD_FILE;
fd = open(prefix, O_TMPFILE | O_EXCL | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0700);
if (fd >= 0) {
struct stat statbuf = {};
bool working_otmpfile = false;
/*
* open(2) ignores unknown O_* flags -- yeah, I was surprised when I
* found this out too. As a result we can't check for EINVAL. However,
* if we get nlink != 0 (or EISDIR) then we know that this kernel
* doesn't support O_TMPFILE.
*/
if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) >= 0)
working_otmpfile = (statbuf.st_nlink == 0);
if (working_otmpfile)
return fd;
/* Pretend that we got EISDIR since O_TMPFILE failed. */
close(fd);
errno = EISDIR;
}
if (errno != EISDIR)
goto error;
#endif /* defined(O_TMPFILE) */
/*
* Our final option is to create a temporary file the old-school way, and
* then unlink it so that nothing else sees it by accident.
*/
*fdtype = EFD_FILE;
fd = mkostemp(template, O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd >= 0) {
if (unlink(template) >= 0)
return fd;
close(fd);
}
error:
*fdtype = EFD_NONE;
return -1;
}
static int seal_execfd(int *fd, int fdtype)
{
switch (fdtype) {
case EFD_MEMFD:
return fcntl(*fd, F_ADD_SEALS, RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
case EFD_FILE: {
/* Need to re-open our pseudo-memfd as an O_PATH to avoid execve(2) giving -ETXTBSY. */
int newfd;
char fdpath[PATH_MAX] = {0};
if (fchmod(*fd, 0100) < 0)
return -1;
if (snprintf(fdpath, sizeof(fdpath), "/proc/self/fd/%d", *fd) < 0)
return -1;
newfd = open(fdpath, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
if (newfd < 0)
return -1;
close(*fd);
*fd = newfd;
return 0;
}
default:
break;
}
return -1;
}
static int try_bindfd(void)
{
int fd, ret = -1;
char template[PATH_MAX] = {0};
char *prefix = secure_getenv("_LIBCONTAINER_STATEDIR");
if (!prefix || *prefix != '/')
prefix = "/tmp";
if (snprintf(template, sizeof(template), "%s/runc.XXXXXX", prefix) < 0)
return ret;
/*
* We need somewhere to mount it, mounting anything over /proc/self is a
* BAD idea on the host -- even if we do it temporarily.
*/
fd = mkstemp(template);
if (fd < 0)
return ret;
close(fd);
/*
* For obvious reasons this won't work in rootless mode because we haven't
* created a userns+mntns -- but getting that to work will be a bit
* complicated and it's only worth doing if someone actually needs it.
*/
ret = -EPERM;
if (mount("/proc/self/exe", template, "", MS_BIND, "") < 0)
goto out;
if (mount("", template, "", MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND | MS_RDONLY, "") < 0)
goto out_umount;
/* Get read-only handle that we're sure can't be made read-write. */
ret = open(template, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
out_umount:
/*
* Make sure the MNT_DETACH works, otherwise we could get remounted
* read-write and that would be quite bad (the fd would be made read-write
* too, invalidating the protection).
*/
if (umount2(template, MNT_DETACH) < 0) {
if (ret >= 0)
close(ret);
ret = -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
}
out:
/*
* We don't care about unlink errors, the worst that happens is that
* there's an empty file left around in STATEDIR.
*/
unlink(template);
return ret;
}
static ssize_t fd_to_fd(int outfd, int infd)
{
ssize_t total = 0;
char buffer[4096];
for (;;) {
ssize_t nread, nwritten = 0;
nread = read(infd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (nread < 0)
return -1;
if (!nread)
break;
do {
ssize_t n = write(outfd, buffer + nwritten, nread - nwritten);
if (n < 0)
return -1;
nwritten += n;
} while(nwritten < nread);
total += nwritten;
}
return total;
}
static int clone_binary(void)
{
int binfd, memfd;
ssize_t sent = 0;
int binfd, execfd;
struct stat statbuf = {};
size_t sent = 0;
int fdtype = EFD_NONE;
#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
memfd = memfd_create(RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
#else
memfd = open("/tmp", O_TMPFILE | O_EXCL | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0711);
#endif
if (memfd < 0)
/*
* Before we resort to copying, let's try creating an ro-binfd in one shot
* by getting a handle for a read-only bind-mount of the execfd.
*/
execfd = try_bindfd();
if (execfd >= 0)
return execfd;
/*
* Dammit, that didn't work -- time to copy the binary to a safe place we
* can seal the contents.
*/
execfd = make_execfd(&fdtype);
if (execfd < 0 || fdtype == EFD_NONE)
return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
binfd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (binfd < 0)
goto error;
sent = sendfile(memfd, binfd, NULL, RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX);
if (fstat(binfd, &statbuf) < 0)
goto error_binfd;
while (sent < statbuf.st_size) {
int n = sendfile(execfd, binfd, NULL, statbuf.st_size - sent);
if (n < 0) {
/* sendfile can fail so we fallback to a dumb user-space copy. */
n = fd_to_fd(execfd, binfd);
if (n < 0)
goto error_binfd;
}
sent += n;
}
close(binfd);
if (sent < 0)
if (sent != statbuf.st_size)
goto error;
#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
int err = fcntl(memfd, F_ADD_SEALS, RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
if (err < 0)
goto error;
#else
/* Need to re-open "memfd" as read-only to avoid execve(2) giving -EXTBUSY. */
int newfd;
char *fdpath = NULL;
if (asprintf(&fdpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", memfd) < 0)
goto error;
newfd = open(fdpath, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
free(fdpath);
if (newfd < 0)
if (seal_execfd(&execfd, fdtype) < 0)
goto error;
close(memfd);
memfd = newfd;
#endif
return memfd;
return execfd;
error_binfd:
close(binfd);
error:
close(memfd);
close(execfd);
return -EIO;
}
/* Get cheap access to the environment. */
extern char **environ;
int ensure_cloned_binary(void)
{
int execfd;
char **argv = NULL, **envp = NULL;
char **argv = NULL;
/* Check that we're not self-cloned, and if we are then bail. */
int cloned = is_self_cloned();
if (cloned > 0 || cloned == -ENOTRECOVERABLE)
return cloned;
if (fetchve(&argv, &envp) < 0)
if (fetchve(&argv) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
execfd = clone_binary();
if (execfd < 0)
return -EIO;
fexecve(execfd, argv, envp);
if (putenv(CLONED_BINARY_ENV "=1"))
goto error;
fexecve(execfd, argv, environ);
error:
close(execfd);
return -ENOEXEC;
}

3
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/vendor.conf generated vendored
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@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
# OCI runtime-spec. When updating this, make sure you use a version tag rather
# than a commit ID so it's much more obvious what version of the spec we are
# using.
github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec 5684b8af48c1ac3b1451fa499724e30e3c20a294
github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec 29686dbc5559d93fb1ef402eeda3e35c38d75af4
# Core libcontainer functionality.
github.com/checkpoint-restore/go-criu v3.11
github.com/mrunalp/fileutils ed869b029674c0e9ce4c0dfa781405c2d9946d08
github.com/opencontainers/selinux v1.0.0-rc1
github.com/seccomp/libseccomp-golang 84e90a91acea0f4e51e62bc1a75de18b1fc0790f