Syself Autopilot is a managed kubernetes solution, added at the end since it's a commercial adopter.
Signed-off-by: Lucas Rattz <lucas.rattz@syself.com>
/usr/sbin/runc is confined with "runc" profile[1] introduced in AppArmor
v4.0.0. This change breaks stopping of containers, because the profile
assigned to containers doesn't accept signals from the "runc" peer.
AppArmor >= v4.0.0 is currently part of Ubuntu Mantic (23.10) and later.
The issue is reproducible both with nerdctl and ctr clients. In the case
of ctr, the --apparmor-default-profile flag has to be specified,
otherwise the container processes would inherit the runc profile, which
behaves as unconfined, and so the subsequent runc process invoked to
stop it would be able to signal it.
Test commands:
root@cloudimg:~# nerdctl run -d --name foo nginx:latest
3d1e74bfe6e7b2912d9223050ae8a81a8f4b73de0846e6d9c956c1e411cdd95a
root@cloudimg:~# nerdctl stop foo
FATA[0000] 1 errors:
unknown error after kill: runc did not terminate successfully: exit status 1: unable to signal init: permission denied
: unknown
or
root@cloudimg:~# ctr pull docker.io/library/nginx:latest
...
root@cloudimg:~# ctr run -d --apparmor-default-profile ctr-default docker.io/library/nginx:latest foo
root@cloudimg:~# ctr task kill foo
ctr: unknown error after kill: runc did not terminate successfully: exit status 1: unable to signal init: permission denied
: unknown
Relevant syslog messages (with long lines wrapped):
Apr 23 22:03:12 cloudimg kernel: audit:
type=1400 audit(1713909792.064:262): apparmor="DENIED"
operation="signal" class="signal" profile="nerdctl-default"
pid=13483 comm="runc" requested_mask="receive"
denied_mask="receive" signal=quit peer="runc"
or
Apr 23 22:05:32 cloudimg kernel: audit:
type=1400 audit(1713909932.106:263): apparmor="DENIED"
operation="signal" class="signal" profile="ctr-default"
pid=13574 comm="runc" requested_mask="receive"
denied_mask="receive" signal=quit peer="runc"
This change extends the default profile with rules that allow receiving
signals from processes that run confined with either runc or crun
profile (crun[2] is an alternative OCI runtime that's also confined in
AppArmor >= v4.0.0, see [1]). It is backward compatible because the peer
value is a regular expression (AARE) so the referenced profile doesn't
have to exist for this profile to successfully compile and load.
[1] https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/commit/2594d936
[2] https://github.com/containers/crun
Signed-off-by: Tomáš Virtus <nechtom@gmail.com>
Fix containerd/nerdctl issue 2730
> [Rootless] `nerdctl rm` fails when AppArmor is loaded:
> `error="unknown error after kill: runc did not terminate successfully: exit status 1:
> unable to signal init: permission denied\n: unknown"`
Caused by:
> kernel: audit: type=1400 audit(1713840662.766:122): apparmor="DENIED" operation="signal" class="signal"
> profile="nerdctl-default" pid=366783 comm="runc" requested_mask="receive" denied_mask="receive" signal=kill
> peer="/usr/local/bin/rootlesskit"
The issue is known to happen on Ubuntu 23.10 and 24.04 LTS.
Doesn't seem to happen on Ubuntu 22.04 LTS.
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
This is a non-functional change, that fixes the following typos:
* Snashotter -> Snapshotter
* expectSnapshotter -> expectedSnapshotter
* expectErr -> expectedErr
* exiting-runtime -> existing-runtime
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <fabiano.fidencio@intel.com>
go1.21.9 (released 2024-04-03) includes a security fix to the net/http
package, as well as bug fixes to the linker, and the go/types and
net/http packages. See the Go 1.21.9 milestone for more details;
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.21.9+label%3ACherryPickApproved
These minor releases include 1 security fixes following the security policy:
- http2: close connections when receiving too many headers
Maintaining HPACK state requires that we parse and process all HEADERS
and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request's headers exceed
MaxHeaderBytes, we don't allocate memory to store the excess headers but
we do parse them. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint
to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request
which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded
data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode
than for an attacker to send.
Set a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before
closing a connection.
Thanks to Bartek Nowotarski (https://nowotarski.info/) for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2023-45288 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/65051.
View the release notes for more information:
https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.22.2
- https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.21.9+label%3ACherryPickApproved
- full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.21.8...go1.21.9
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Some of the snapshotters that allow you to change their root location
were already doing this, this just makes all of them follow the same
pattern.
Signed-off-by: Danny Canter <danny@dcantah.dev>
