Auto-fixed docs

docs/design/access.md

@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ Improvements:
 ###Namespaces
 K8s will have a have a `namespace` API object.  It is similar to a Google Compute Engine `project`.  It provides a namespace for objects created by a group of people co-operating together, preventing name collisions with non-cooperating groups.  It also serves as a reference point for authorization policies.
 
-Namespaces are described in [namespace.md](namespaces.md).
+Namespaces are described in [namespaces.md](namespaces.md).
 
 In the Enterprise Profile:
    - a `userAccount` may have permission to access several `namespace`s.
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ In the Simple Profile:
 
 Namespaces versus userAccount vs Labels:
 - `userAccount`s are intended for audit logging (both name and UID should be logged), and to define who has access to `namespace`s.
-- `labels` (see [docs/labels.md](/docs/labels.md)) should be used to distinguish pods, users, and other objects that cooperate towards a common goal but are different in some way, such as version, or responsibilities.
+- `labels` (see [docs/labels.md](../../docs/labels.md)) should be used to distinguish pods, users, and other objects that cooperate towards a common goal but are different in some way, such as version, or responsibilities.
 - `namespace`s prevent name collisions between uncoordinated groups of people, and provide a place to attach common policies for co-operating groups of people.
 
 

docs/design/resources.md

@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ The following are planned future extensions to the resource model, included here
 
 ## Usage data
 
-Because resource usage and related metrics change continuously, need to be tracked over time (i.e., historically), can be characterized in a variety of ways, and are fairly voluminous, we will not include usage in core API objects, such as [Pods](pods.md) and Nodes, but will provide separate APIs for accessing and managing that data. See the Appendix for possible representations of usage data, but the representation we'll use is TBD.
+Because resource usage and related metrics change continuously, need to be tracked over time (i.e., historically), can be characterized in a variety of ways, and are fairly voluminous, we will not include usage in core API objects, such as [Pods](../pods.md) and Nodes, but will provide separate APIs for accessing and managing that data. See the Appendix for possible representations of usage data, but the representation we'll use is TBD.
 
 Singleton values for observed and predicted future usage will rapidly prove inadequate, so we will support the following structure for extended usage information: 
 

docs/design/secrets.md

@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ service would also consume the secrets associated with the MySQL service.
 
 ### Use-Case: Secrets associated with service accounts
 
-[Service Accounts](./service_accounts.md) are proposed as a
+[Service Accounts](service_accounts.md) are proposed as a
 mechanism to decouple capabilities and security contexts from individual human users.  A
 `ServiceAccount` contains references to some number of secrets.  A `Pod` can specify that it is
 associated with a `ServiceAccount`.  Secrets should have a `Type` field to allow the Kubelet and
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ memory overcommit on the node.
 
 #### Secret data on the node: isolation
 
-Every pod will have a [security context](./security_context.md).
+Every pod will have a [security context](security_context.md).
 Secret data on the node should be isolated according to the security context of the container.  The
 Kubelet volume plugin API will be changed so that a volume plugin receives the security context of
 a volume along with the volume spec.  This will allow volume plugins to implement setting the
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ Several proposals / upstream patches are notable as background for this proposal
 
 1.  [Docker vault proposal](https://github.com/docker/docker/issues/10310)
 2.  [Specification for image/container standardization based on volumes](https://github.com/docker/docker/issues/9277)
-3.  [Kubernetes service account proposal](./service_accounts.md)
+3.  [Kubernetes service account proposal](service_accounts.md)
 4.  [Secrets proposal for docker (1)](https://github.com/docker/docker/pull/6075)
 5.  [Secrets proposal for docker (2)](https://github.com/docker/docker/pull/6697)
 

docs/design/security.md

@@ -63,14 +63,14 @@ Automated process users fall into the following categories:
 A pod runs in a *security context* under a *service account* that is defined by an administrator or project administrator, and the *secrets* a pod has access to is limited by that *service account*.
 
 
-1. The API should authenticate and authorize user actions [authn and authz](./access.md)
+1. The API should authenticate and authorize user actions [authn and authz](access.md)
 2. All infrastructure components (kubelets, kube-proxies, controllers, scheduler) should have an infrastructure user that they can authenticate with and be authorized to perform only the functions they require against the API.
 3. Most infrastructure components should use the API as a way of exchanging data and changing the system, and only the API should have access to the underlying data store (etcd)
-4. When containers run on the cluster and need to talk to other containers or the API server, they should be identified and authorized clearly as an autonomous process via a [service account](./service_accounts.md)
+4. When containers run on the cluster and need to talk to other containers or the API server, they should be identified and authorized clearly as an autonomous process via a [service account](service_accounts.md)
    1.  If the user who started a long-lived process is removed from access to the cluster, the process should be able to continue without interruption
    2.  If the user who started processes are removed from the cluster, administrators may wish to terminate their processes in bulk
    3.  When containers run with a service account, the user that created / triggered the service account behavior must be associated with the container's action
-5. When container processes run on the cluster, they should run in a [security context](./security_context.md) that isolates those processes via Linux user security, user namespaces, and permissions.
+5. When container processes run on the cluster, they should run in a [security context](security_context.md) that isolates those processes via Linux user security, user namespaces, and permissions.
    1.  Administrators should be able to configure the cluster to automatically confine all container processes as a non-root, randomly assigned UID
    2.  Administrators should be able to ensure that container processes within the same namespace are all assigned the same unix user UID
    3.  Administrators should be able to limit which developers and project administrators have access to higher privilege actions
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ A pod runs in a *security context* under a *service account* that is defined by
    6.  Developers may need to ensure their images work within higher security requirements specified by administrators
    7.  When available, Linux kernel user namespaces can be used to ensure 5.2 and 5.4 are met.
    8.  When application developers want to share filesytem data via distributed filesystems, the Unix user ids on those filesystems must be consistent across different container processes
-6. Developers should be able to define [secrets](./secrets.md) that are automatically added to the containers when pods are run
+6. Developers should be able to define [secrets](secrets.md) that are automatically added to the containers when pods are run
    1.  Secrets are files injected into the container whose values should not be displayed within a pod. Examples:
        1. An SSH private key for git cloning remote data
        2. A client certificate for accessing a remote system
@@ -93,11 +93,11 @@ A pod runs in a *security context* under a *service account* that is defined by
 
 ### Related design discussion
 
-* [Authorization and authentication](./access.md)
+* [Authorization and authentication](access.md)
 * [Secret distribution via files](https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/kubernetes/pull/2030)
 * [Docker secrets](https://github.com/docker/docker/pull/6697)
 * [Docker vault](https://github.com/docker/docker/issues/10310)
-* [Service Accounts:](./service_accounts.md)
+* [Service Accounts:](service_accounts.md)
 * [Secret volumes](https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/kubernetes/pull/4126)
 
 ## Specific Design Points

docs/design/security_context.md

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Processes in pods will need to have consistent UID/GID/SELinux category labels i
 * The concept of a security context should not be tied to a particular security mechanism or platform 
   (ie. SELinux, AppArmor)
 * Applying a different security context to a scope (namespace or pod) requires a solution such as the one proposed for
-  [service accounts](./service_accounts.md).
+  [service accounts](service_accounts.md).
 
 ## Use Cases
 

docs/design/service_accounts.md

@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ They also may interact with services other than the Kubernetes API, such as:
 A service account binds together several things:
   - a *name*, understood by users, and perhaps by peripheral systems, for an identity
   - a *principal* that can be authenticated and [authorized](../authorization.md)
-  - a [security context](./security_context.md), which defines the Linux Capabilities, User IDs, Groups IDs, and other
+  - a [security context](security_context.md), which defines the Linux Capabilities, User IDs, Groups IDs, and other
     capabilities and controls on interaction with the file system and OS.
-  - a set of [secrets](./secrets.md), which a container may use to
+  - a set of [secrets](secrets.md), which a container may use to
     access various networked resources.
 
 ## Design Discussion