- as soon as a request is received by the apiserver, determine the
timeout of the request and set a new request context with the deadline.
- the timeout filter that times out non-long-running requests should
use the request context as opposed to a fixed 60s wait today.
- admission and storage layer uses the same request context with the
deadline specified.
Aborted requests are the ones that were disrupted with http.ErrAbortHandler.
For example, the timeout handler will panic with http.ErrAbortHandler when a response to the client has been already sent
and the timeout elapsed.
Additionally, a new metric requestAbortsTotal was defined to count aborted requests. The new metric allows for aggregation for each group, version, verb, resource, subresource and scope.
This change removes support for basic authn in v1.19 via the
--basic-auth-file flag. This functionality was deprecated in v1.16
in response to ATR-K8S-002: Non-constant time password comparison.
Similar functionality is available via the --token-auth-file flag
for development purposes.
Signed-off-by: Monis Khan <mok@vmware.com>
- Add handlers for service account issuer metadata.
- Add option to manually override JWKS URI.
- Add unit and integration tests.
- Add a separate ServiceAccountIssuerDiscovery feature gate.
Additional notes:
- If not explicitly overridden, the JWKS URI will be based on
the API server's external address and port.
- The metadata server is configured with the validating key set rather
than the signing key set. This allows for key rotation because tokens
can still be validated by the keys exposed in the JWKs URL, even if the
signing key has been rotated (note this may still be a short window if
tokens have short lifetimes).
- The trust model of OIDC discovery requires that the relying party
fetch the issuer metadata via HTTPS; the trust of the issuer metadata
comes from the server presenting a TLS certificate with a trust chain
back to the from the relying party's root(s) of trust. For tests, we use
a local issuer (https://kubernetes.default.svc) for the certificate
so that workloads within the cluster can authenticate it when fetching
OIDC metadata. An API server cannot validly claim https://kubernetes.io,
but within the cluster, it is the authority for kubernetes.default.svc,
according to the in-cluster config.
Co-authored-by: Michael Taufen <mtaufen@google.com>
This change removes the audience logic from the oidc authenticator
and collapses it onto the same logic used by other audience unaware
authenticators.
oidc is audience unaware in the sense that it does not know or
understand the API server's audience. As before, the authenticator
will continue to check that the token audience matches the
configured client ID.
The reasoning for this simplification is:
1. The previous code tries to make the client ID on the oidc token
a valid audience. But by not returning any audience, the token is
not valid when used via token review on a server that is configured
to honor audiences (the token works against the Kube API because the
audience check is skipped).
2. It is unclear what functionality would be gained by allowing
token review to check the client ID as a valid audience. It could
serve as a proxy to know that the token was honored by the oidc
authenticator, but that does not seem like a valid use case.
3. It has never been possible to use the client ID as an audience
with token review as it would have always failed the audience
intersection check. Thus this change is backwards compatible.
It is strange that the oidc authenticator would be considered
audience unaware when oidc tokens have an audience claim, but from
the perspective of the Kube API (and for backwards compatibility),
these tokens are only valid for the API server's audience.
This change seems to be the least magical and most consistent way to
honor backwards compatibility and to allow oidc tokens to be used
via token review when audience support in enabled.
Signed-off-by: Monis Khan <mok@vmware.com>
