After writing metadata configuration to disk we must
send a flush request to make sure configuration sections
are commited to non-volatile storage.
Signed-off-by: Adam Rutkowski <adam.j.rutkowski@intel.com>
Load properties before checking memory needs and obtain cache line size
from context rather than from cache state.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Stefanowski <rafal.stefanowski@intel.com>
Rather then passing whole structs, supply
_ocf_mngt_calculate_ram_needed() with just the values it actually uses.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Stefanowski <rafal.stefanowski@intel.com>
During recovery procedure there is no guarantee that checksums
of runtime sections were flushed correctly before dirty shutdown.
Signed-off-by: Robert Baldyga <robert.baldyga@intel.com>
WA write must follow follow the same two-pass pattern
as WI does. This change modifies WA engine to default to
WI in case of any miss (either partial or full), not only
partial miss.
Signed-off-by: Adam Rutkowski <adam.j.rutkowski@intel.com>
Add second pass of write invalidate. It is necessary only
if concurrent I/O had inserted target LBAs to cache after
WI request did traversation. These LBAs might have been
written by WI request behind the concurrent I/O's back,
resulting in making these sectors effectively invalid.
In this case we must update these sectors' metadata to
reflect this. However we won't know about this after we
traverse the request again - hence calling ocf_write_wi
again with req->wi_second_pass set to indicate that this
is the second pass (core write should be skipped).
Signed-off-by: Adam Rutkowski <adam.j.rutkowski@intel.com>
core_id should be set in this function. The fact that
it is missing might lead to incorrect behaviour e.g. in
case of promotion policy.
Signed-off-by: Adam Rutkowski <adam.j.rutkowski@intel.com>
In case of partial hit WO engine first reads data for the entire
request address range from core device. Then it plumbs it by fetching
dirty sectors from cache device.
For unindentified reason this leads to a data corruption in YCSB
workload A. After flushing dirty data and re-loading cache the
data is correct.
This change modifies WO read handler to read clean data from the
cache. This is not optimal, as the clean sectors are now read twice
in case of partial hit. For now it seems to be good enough work-around
for the data corruption problem.
The symptoms, combined with the fact that this change seems to make
the problem go away, indicates that at some point WB write handler
(and/or special I/O request handlers like discard) puts CAS in a
state where in-memory medata wrongly indicates that a sector is
clean while in fact it is dirty, as marked in the on-disk metadata.
Signed-off-by: Adam Rutkowski <adam.j.rutkowski@intel.com>
Fail `ocf_mngt_cache_load` function with `OCF_ERR_INVAL`
error code when force flag is in use.
Log error message.
Closes#361
Signed-off-by: Slawomir Jankowski <slawomir.jankowski@intel.com>
ocf_engine_push_req_(front|back) must not dereference req
pointer after putting the request on queue list and unlocking
the queue. At this point handler interface may asynchronously
pick up the request, handle it and deallocate.
Signed-off-by: Adam Rutkowski <adam.j.rutkowski@intel.com>
There is no need to constantly hold metadata global lock
during collecting cachelines to clean. Since we are past
freezing dirty request counter, we know for sure that the
number of dirty cache lines will not increase. So the worst
case is when the loop realxes and releases the lock,
a concurent IO to CAS is serviced in WT mode, possibly
inserting and/or evicting cachelines. This does not interfere
with scanning for dirty cachelines. And the lower layer will
handle synchronization with concurrent I/O by acquiring
asynchronous read lock on each cleaned cacheline.
Signed-off-by: Adam Rutkowski <adam.j.rutkowski@intel.com>
