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rust: Improve code formatting

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Do some formatting that are in experimental stage but improve the code
readability.

Use rustfmt with a nightly toolchain and enable:

format_code_in_doc_comments = true
reorder_impl_items = true
comment_width = 100
wrap_comments = true
normalize_comments = true

(see .rustfmt.toml)

Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Steffen Eiden
2024-05-24 13:18:52 +02:00
parent dea5f80215
commit 503e241db1
16 changed files with 78 additions and 71 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
rust/pv/src/req.rs
+1 -2
View File
@@ -177,7 +177,6 @@ impl ReqEncrCtx {
/// | Request type dependent AAD data |
/// |-------------------------------------------------------------|
/// ```
///
pub fn build_aad<O>(
&self,
version: RequestVersion,
@@ -571,7 +570,7 @@ mod tests {
let hdr_bin_exp = [
0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0, // magic
0, 0, 2, 0, // vers
0, 0, 0x12, 0x34, //size
0, 0, 0x12, 0x34, // size
0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, // iv
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // res
15, // nks
rust/pv/src/uvsecret/asrcb.rs
+5 -5
View File
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ impl From<AddSecretVersion> for RequestVersion {
/// An ASRCB wraps a secret to securely transport it to the Ultravisor.
///
/// Layout:
///```none
/// ```none
/// _______________________________________________________________
/// | generic header (48)
/// | --------------------------------------------------- |
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ impl From<AddSecretVersion> for RequestVersion {
/// | --------------------------------------------------- |
/// | AES GCM Tag (16) |
/// |_____________________________________________________________|
///```
/// ```
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct AddSecretRequest {
version: AddSecretVersion,
@@ -148,7 +148,6 @@ impl AddSecretRequest {
///
/// The request has no extension secret, no configuration UID, no host-keys,
/// and no user data
///
pub fn new(
version: AddSecretVersion,
secret: GuestSecret,
@@ -207,7 +206,8 @@ impl AddSecretRequest {
/// - RSA 2048 bit (up to 256 byte message)
/// - RSA 3072 bit (up to 128 byte message)
///
/// The signature can be verified during the verification of the secret-request on the target machine.
/// The signature can be verified during the verification of the secret-request on the target
/// machine.
pub fn set_user_data<T: Into<Vec<u8>>>(
&mut self,
msg: T,
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ impl AddSecretRequest {
/// Encrypts data, sign request with user-provided signing key, insert signature into aad,
/// calculate request tag
fn encrypt_with_signed_user_data(&self, ctx: &ReqEncrCtx) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
//encrypt data w/o aead
// encrypt data w/o aead
let conf = self.conf.to_bytes();
let aad = self.aad(ctx, conf.value().len())?;
let AesGcmResult {
rust/pv/src/uvsecret/guest_secret.rs
+3 -2
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
//
// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
#[allow(unused_imports)] //used for more convenient docstring
#[allow(unused_imports)] // used for more convenient docstring
use super::asrcb::AddSecretRequest;
use crate::assert_size;
use crate::{
@@ -74,11 +74,12 @@ impl GuestSecret {
GuestSecret::Association { secret, .. } => secret.value().as_slice(),
}
}
/// Creates the non-confidential part of the secret ad-hoc
pub(crate) fn auth(&self) -> SecretAuth {
match &self {
GuestSecret::Null => SecretAuth::Null,
//Panic: every non null secret type is listable -> no panic
// Panic: every non null secret type is listable -> no panic
listable => {
SecretAuth::Listable(ListableSecretHdr::from_guest_secret(listable).unwrap())
}
rust/pv/src/uvsecret/user_data.rs
+3 -2
View File
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ impl UserData {
let magic: AddSecretMagic = self.data_type().into();
magic.get()
}
/// Creates new user data
///
/// Verifies that the provided data + signature fits into 512 bytes
@@ -264,7 +265,7 @@ pub fn verify_asrcb_and_get_user_data(
return Err(Error::BinAsrcbInvVersion);
}
//preventing the two lines after the truncate from panicking
// preventing the two lines after the truncate from panicking
let req_len = req.len();
if asrcb.len() < req_len
|| req_len < AddSecretRequest::V1_USER_DATA_OFFS + UserData::USER_DATA_SIZE
@@ -353,7 +354,7 @@ impl VerifiedUserData {
UserDataType::Unsigned => unreachable!(),
};
//overwrite signature field with zeros
// overwrite signature field with zeros
sgn.fill(0);
ret
}
rust/pv/src/verify/helper.rs
+11 -16
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ use std::{cmp::Ordering, ffi::c_int};
/// Minimum security level for the keys/certificates used to establish a chain of
/// trust (see https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level.html
/// for details).
///
const SECURITY_LEVEL: usize = 2;
const SECURITY_BITS_ARRAY: [u32; 6] = [0, 80, 112, 128, 192, 256];
const SECURITY_BITS: u32 = SECURITY_BITS_ARRAY[SECURITY_LEVEL];
@@ -44,8 +43,8 @@ pub fn verify_hkd_options(hkd: &X509Ref, sign_key: &X509Ref) -> Result<()> {
if SECURITY_BITS > 0 && SECURITY_BITS > security_bits {
return Err(Error::HkdVerify(SecurityBits(security_bits, SECURITY_BITS)));
}
// TODO rust-openssl fix X509::not.after/before() impl to return Option& not panic on nullptr from C?
// try_... rust-openssl
// TODO rust-openssl fix X509::not.after/before() impl to return Option& not panic on nullptr
// from C? try_... rust-openssl
// verify that the HKD is still valid
check_validity_period(hkd.not_before(), hkd.not_after())?;
@@ -183,7 +182,7 @@ pub fn extract_ibm_sign_key(certs: Vec<X509>) -> Result<(X509, Stack<X509>)> {
}
// Name Entry values of an IBM Z key signing cert
//Asn1StringRef::as_slice aka ASN1_STRING_get0_data gives a string without \0 delimiter
// Asn1StringRef::as_slice aka ASN1_STRING_get0_data gives a string without \0 delimiter
const IBM_Z_COMMON_NAME: &[u8; 43usize] = b"International Business Machines Corporation";
const IBM_Z_COUNTRY_NAME: &[u8; 2usize] = b"US";
const IBM_Z_LOCALITY_NAME_POUGHKEEPSIE: &[u8; 12usize] = b"Poughkeepsie";
@@ -274,7 +273,7 @@ fn load_crl_to_store<P: AsRef<Path>>(
Ok(())
}
///Run through the forest of the distribution points and find them
/// Run through the forest of the distribution points and find them
pub fn x509_dist_points(cert: &X509Ref) -> Vec<String> {
let mut res = Vec::<String>::with_capacity(1);
let dps = match cert.crl_distribution_points() {
@@ -303,8 +302,8 @@ pub fn x509_dist_points(cert: &X509Ref) -> Vec<String> {
/// Searches for CRL Distribution points and downloads the CRL. Stops after the first successful
/// download.
///
/// Error if something bad(=unexpected) happens (not bad: CRL not available at link, unexpected format)
/// Other issues are mapped to Ok(None)
/// Error if something bad(=unexpected) happens (not bad: CRL not available at link, unexpected
/// format) Other issues are mapped to Ok(None)
#[cfg(not(test))]
pub fn download_first_crl_from_x509(cert: &X509Ref) -> Result<Option<Vec<openssl::x509::X509Crl>>> {
use crate::utils::read_crls;
@@ -359,10 +358,8 @@ const NIDS_CORRECT_ORDER: [Nid; 6] = [
Nid::STATEORPROVINCENAME,
Nid::COMMONNAME,
];
/**
* Workaround to fix the mismatch between issuer name of the
* IBM Z signing CRLs and the IBM Z signing key subject name.
*/
/// Workaround to fix the mismatch between issuer name of the
/// IBM Z signing CRLs and the IBM Z signing key subject name.
pub fn reorder_x509_names(subject: &X509NameRef) -> std::result::Result<X509Name, ErrorStack> {
let mut correct_subj = X509Name::builder()?;
for nid in NIDS_CORRECT_ORDER {
@@ -373,11 +370,9 @@ pub fn reorder_x509_names(subject: &X509NameRef) -> std::result::Result<X509Name
Ok(correct_subj.build())
}
/**
* Workaround for potential locality mismatches between CRLs and Certs
* # Return
* fixed subject or none if locality was not Armonk or any OpenSSL error
*/
/// Workaround for potential locality mismatches between CRLs and Certs
/// # Return
/// fixed subject or none if locality was not Armonk or any OpenSSL error
pub fn armonk_locality_fixup(subject: &X509NameRef) -> Option<X509Name> {
if !name_data_eq(subject, Nid::LOCALITYNAME, IBM_Z_LOCALITY_NAME_ARMONK) {
return None;