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zkey-cryptsetup: Support PHMAC integrity with setkey command

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In case the volume is integrity protected, and the integrity algorithm is
PHMAC, then the setkey command also checks the integrity key part of the
volume key, and then sets the key into a new key slot, and sets the
verification pattern to the verification-pattern token.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ingo Franzki
2024-03-15 13:15:39 +01:00
committed by Jan Höppner
parent f11c71237e
commit 771c794580
1 changed files with 73 additions and 15 deletions
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88
zkey/zkey-cryptsetup.c
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@@ -2453,13 +2453,15 @@ out:
static int command_setkey(void)
{
struct crypt_params_integrity ip = { 0 };
char int_vp[VERIFICATION_PATTERN_LEN];
char vp[VERIFICATION_PATTERN_LEN];
size_t keysize = 0, newekey_size;
size_t integrity_keysize = 0;
size_t password_len = 0;
struct vp_token vp_tok;
size_t newkey_size = 0;
int is_phmac_integrity;
char *password = NULL;
size_t keysize = 0;
u8 *newkey = NULL;
u8 *key = NULL;
int is_old_mk;
@@ -2482,26 +2484,32 @@ static int command_setkey(void)
if (rc == 0)
integrity_keysize = ip.integrity_key_size;
rc = check_keysize_and_cipher_mode(newkey,
newkey_size - integrity_keysize);
is_phmac_integrity = is_integrity_phmac(ip.integrity,
integrity_keysize);
newekey_size = newkey_size - integrity_keysize;
rc = check_keysize_and_cipher_mode(newkey, newekey_size);
if (rc != 0)
goto out;
rc = validate_secure_key(g.pkey_fd, newkey,
newkey_size - integrity_keysize, NULL,
rc = validate_secure_key(g.pkey_fd, newkey, newekey_size, NULL,
&is_old_mk, NULL, g.verbose);
if (rc != 0) {
warnx("The secure key in file '%s' is not valid",
warnx("The %s key%s in file '%s' is not valid",
is_phmac_integrity ? "encryption" : "secure",
is_phmac_integrity ? " part" : "",
g.volume_key_file);
goto out;
}
if (is_secure_key(newkey, newkey_size - integrity_keysize) &&
if (is_secure_key(newkey, newekey_size) &&
is_old_mk) {
util_asprintf(&msg, "The secure key in file '%s' is "
util_asprintf(&msg, "The %s key%s in file '%s' is "
"enciphered with the master key in the OLD "
"master key register. Do you want to set this "
"key as the new volume key anyway [y/N]?",
is_phmac_integrity ? "encryption" : "secure",
is_phmac_integrity ? " part" : "",
g.volume_key_file);
util_print_indented(msg, 0);
free(msg);
@@ -2513,6 +2521,34 @@ static int command_setkey(void)
}
}
if (is_phmac_integrity) {
rc = validate_secure_key(g.pkey_fd, newkey + newekey_size,
integrity_keysize, NULL,
&is_old_mk, NULL, g.verbose);
if (rc != 0) {
warnx("The integrity key part in file '%s' is not "
"valid", g.volume_key_file);
goto out;
}
if (is_secure_key(newkey + newekey_size, integrity_keysize) &&
is_old_mk) {
util_asprintf(&msg, "The integrity key part in file "
"'%s' is enciphered with the master key "
"in the OLD master key register. Do you "
"want to set this key as the new volume "
"key anyway [y/N]?", g.volume_key_file);
util_print_indented(msg, 0);
free(msg);
if (!_prompt_for_yes()) {
warnx("Device '%s' is left unchanged", g.pos_arg);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
}
util_asprintf(&prompt, "Enter passphrase for '%s': ", g.pos_arg);
rc = open_keyslot(CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &key, &keysize, &integrity_keysize,
NULL, &password, &password_len, prompt, false);
@@ -2520,16 +2556,17 @@ static int command_setkey(void)
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
if (keysize - integrity_keysize == newkey_size - integrity_keysize &&
memcmp(newkey, key, keysize - integrity_keysize) == 0) {
if (keysize == newkey_size &&
memcmp(newkey, key, newkey_size) == 0) {
warnx("The secure key in file '%s' is equal to the current "
"volume key, setkey is ignored", g.volume_key_file);
rc = 0;
goto out;
}
if (integrity_keysize > 0 &&
memcmp(newkey + newkey_size - integrity_keysize,
key + keysize - integrity_keysize, integrity_keysize) != 0) {
!is_phmac_integrity &&
memcmp(newkey + newekey_size, key + newekey_size,
integrity_keysize) != 0) {
warnx("The secure key in file '%s' contains a different "
"integrity key (i.e. the last %lu bytes of the key) than "
"the current volume key.", g.volume_key_file,
@@ -2538,8 +2575,7 @@ static int command_setkey(void)
goto out;
}
rc = generate_key_verification_pattern(newkey,
newkey_size - integrity_keysize,
rc = generate_key_verification_pattern(newkey, newekey_size,
vp, sizeof(vp), g.verbose);
if (rc != 0) {
warnx("Failed to generate the verification pattern: %s",
@@ -2549,6 +2585,21 @@ static int command_setkey(void)
goto out;
}
if (is_phmac_integrity) {
rc = generate_key_verification_pattern(newkey + newekey_size,
integrity_keysize,
int_vp, sizeof(int_vp),
g.verbose);
if (rc != 0) {
warnx("Failed to generate the verification pattern: %s",
strerror(-rc));
warnx("Make sure that kernel module 'phmac_s390' is "
"loaded and that the 'phmac' cipher is "
"available");
goto out;
}
}
token = find_token(g.cd, PAES_VP_TOKEN_NAME);
if (token >= 0) {
rc = get_vp_token(g.cd, token, &vp_tok);
@@ -2558,7 +2609,9 @@ static int command_setkey(void)
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(vp_tok.verification_pattern, vp) != 0) {
if (strcmp(vp_tok.verification_pattern, vp) != 0 ||
(is_phmac_integrity &&
strcmp(vp_tok.int_verification_pattern, int_vp) != 0)) {
warnx("The verification patterns of the new and old "
"volume keys do not match");
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -2607,8 +2660,13 @@ static int command_setkey(void)
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
memset(&vp_tok, 0, sizeof(vp_tok));
memcpy(vp_tok.verification_pattern, vp,
sizeof(vp_tok.verification_pattern));
if (is_phmac_integrity)
memcpy(vp_tok.int_verification_pattern, int_vp,
sizeof(vp_tok.int_verification_pattern));
rc = put_vp_token(g.cd, token, &vp_tok);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;