Files in the zkey repository can be created by any member of the
'zkeyadm' group as well as 'root'. Such files are owned by the creator
and the 'zkeyadm' group, and allow read and write for the owner user
and owner group.
When creating or writing files inside the zkey repository, make sure
that the file is not a sysmlink. That way, only files within the zkey
repository are set to be read/write for the owner user and members of
the 'zkeyadm' group. Make sure to open such files with the 'O_NOFOLLOW'
flag, and use 'lstat()' to check for files and directories.
Assisted-by: IBM Bob:2.0.0
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Check the values that are incorporated into commands that might get
executed to not contain any characters that could be used for
shell-injection attacks.
Assisted-by: IBM Bob:2.0.0
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
The 'paes' and 'phmac' kernel ciphers and the respective kernel modules
are no longer used for calculating the key verification pattern. Instead,
the 'pkey' kernel module and its sub modules is used now.
In case the 'pkey' kernel module is not available, an appropriate error
message is already printed by open_pkey_device() when opening the device.
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
To be able to calculate the key verification pattern of a key blob without
the use of AF_ALG, the file descriptor of the /dev/pkey device needs to
be passed through to all functions that might need to calculate the key
verification pattern.
Also make sure that all commands that might need to calculate the key
verification pattern have 'need_pkey_device = 1' so that the device is
opened.
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Fix compile warnings like
warning: assignment discards 'const' qualifier from pointer target type
[-Wdiscarded-qualifiers]
by declaring the variables as const or cast appropriately.
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
The commands 'zkey cryptsetup' generates commands for formatting and
opening volumes of type PLAIN and LUKS2.
For LUKS2, if there exists an HMAC key that is associated to the same
volume as the AES key, generate a 'cryptsetup luksFormat' command for
combined encryption and integrity protection. This uses the '--integrity'
and '--integrity-key-size' options of the 'cryptsetup luksFormat'
command to specify the integrity settings.
The volume key specified with '--master-key-file' must contain the
encryption key and the integrity key concatenated to each other. The
size of the volume key specified with '--key-size' however must be the
size of the encryption key only, in bits. The 'cryptsetup luksFormat'
command will internally read the whole file, use the first part as
encryption key, and the second part as integrity key. The size of the
second part must be specified with the '--integrity-key-size'.
Note: This requires 'wrapped integrity key' support in the cryptsetup
package, as well as in the dm-crypt kernel module.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
The commands 'zkey integritytab' generates /etc/integritytab entries for
volumes of type INTEGRITY.
The 'zkey integritysetup' generates integritysetup commands for formatting
and opening volumes of type INTEGRITY.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
The commands 'zkey crypttab' and 'zkey cryptsetup' should only operate on
AES-type keys, but not on HMAC keys.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
You can only set a sector size for an HMAC key of a volume of type
INTEGTRITY. For combined integrity protection with encryption, the
sector size of a LUKS2 volume must be set on the AES key, but can
not be set on the HMAC key.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
For combined integrity protected with encryption, a LUKS2 volume can be
associated to exactly one AES type key and also to exactly one HMAC type
key.
For other volume types, a volume can only be associated to exactly one
key, either an AES type key, or an HMAC type key.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Although HMAC keys can be associated to volumes of type 'LUKS2', the dummy
passphrase can only be set to AES-type keys, i.e. to keys that encrypt the
volume.
Reject trying to set a dummy passphrase for an HMAC key with a volume type
of 'LUKS2'.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Keys of type PVSECRET-HMAC can be associated to volumes of volume type
'INTEGTRITY' or 'LUKS2'.
Volumes of type 'INTEGTRITY' are set up for standalone dm-integrity via
the 'integritysetup' tool. Volumes of type 'LUKS2' are setup for combined
encryption and integrity using the 'cryptsetup' tool using the integrity
option.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Similar as for AES keys, a verification pattern is calculated from an HMAC
key by MACing an all zero message of 64 bytes. The first 32 bytes of the
result is the verification pattern.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Add the definitions and utility functions for the PVSECRET-HMAC key type.
A PVSECRET-HMAC key token contains the secret id of a protected
virtualization secret. It does not contain the key material, just a
reference to the key in the ultravisor.
When such a key token is used to perform HMAC operations later on, the
PHMAC kernel cipher will obtain the protected key belonging to this secret
id with the help of the pkey kernel module.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
For supporting integrity protected volumes with dm-integrity,
cryptsetup of version 2.8.2 or later is required.
Make cryptsetup of version 2.8.2 a build requirement for zkey, not
only for zkey-cryptsetup. Although zkey could be built with an older
cryptsetup version, the commands that it generates might not work
with older cryptsetup versions.
This makes the compile switch HAVE_LUKS2_SUPPORT superfluous, since
cryptsetup v2.8.2 always includes LUKS2 support. Remove the ifdefs
from the code and update the man pages to not mention LUKS2 support.
Also, starting with cryptsetup version 2.5.0 the luksFormat command
accepts option '--volume-key-file' to specify the volume key file
instead of --master-key-file'. Thus, use '--volume-key-file' in
cryptsetup commands generated by zkey.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
A KMS login may prompt the user for its credentials. Users may abort that
prompt by Cntl-C. Do not make any permanent changes to a key before the
KMS login, because those changes can not be undone when the user has
aborted during KMS login, leaving the key in a potentially inconsistent
state.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Normally, secure keys generated by zkey are intentionally export
restricted. Export restricted keys can not be wrapped with a key
encrypting key (KEK).
However, keys that are generated inside a Secure Execution for Linux
guest that shall also be used outside of the Secure Execution for Linux
guest can only be transported to outside the Secure Execution for Linux
guest by wrapping them with a KEK and unwrapping them outside of the
Secure Execution for Linux guest. For that such keys must be exportable.
Add an option to generate and import exportable secure keys, which then
can be wrapped, and thus transported to outside of a Secure Execution for
Linux guest.
This applies to keys of type 'CCA-AESCIPHER' and 'EP11-AES'. Keys of type
'CCA-AESDATA' are always exportable, and can not be export restricted.
For keys of type 'EP11-AES' additionally allow to set the
'wrap-with-trusted' attribute. This restricts the key so that it only can
be wrapped with a trusted key encrypting key.
For keys of type 'EP11-AES' to be exportable, the access control point
(ACP) XCP_CPB_ALLOW_COMBINED_EXTRACT must be 'ON' on all APQNs used. This
access control point is only supported on newer EP11 firmware levels. If
the access control point is 'OFF' or not supported by the EP11 firmware,
then the IOCTL to generate the key fails with a generic error
(Input/output error - EIO). The zkey tool prints an appropriate error
message in that case.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Keys of type PVSECRET-AES can also be verified via the pkey IOCTL
PKEY_VERIFYKEY2, but the card and domain fields must be zero, because such
a key does not use a crypto card. Also XTS keys of type PVSRCRET-AES are
not represented by 2 concatenated keys but by just one key of type
PVSECRET-AES. Thus, special handling is required for XTS keys.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jorg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Keys of type PVSECRET-AES can not be reenciphered using 'zkey reencipher'
or 'zkey-cryptsetup reencipher'. Reject that with a proper error message.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jorg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Keys of type PVSECRET-AES can not be generated using 'zkey generate'.
Furthermore, APQNs can not be associated with keys of type PVSECRET-AES
via 'zkey change'. Reject that with a proper error message.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jorg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
The 'pvsecrets import' command imports a protected virtualization secret
into the zkey key repository. Like other key import or key generation
commands, additional information can be associated with the imported key,
such as a textual description, the volume to encrypt with together with
the volume type, the sector size, and a dummy passphrase. You can not
associate a set of APQNs, since a protected virtualization secret does
not need or use a crypto card.
This command only works when running in a secure execution guest.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jorg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Add the definitions and utility functions for the PVSECRETS-AES key type.
A PVSECRETS-AES key token contains the secret id of a protected
virtualization secret. It does not contain the key material, just a
reference to the key in the ultravisor.
When such a key token is used to perform crypto operations later on, the
PAES kernel cipher will obtain the protected key belonging to this secret
id with the help of the pkey kernel module.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jorg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
For LUKS2 volumes, zkey generates 'cryptsetup luksFormat' commands with
options '--pbkdf argon2i --pbkdf-memory 32 --pbkdf-force-iterations 4'
for low memory and time requirements. Using the default Argon2i options
might cause out-of-memory errors when multiple encrypted volumes are
unlocked automatically at boot through /etc/crypttab.
When the system runs in FIPS mode, which is indicated by file
/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled containing '1', the Argon2i password based
key derivation function might be disabled by a policy, and such
'cryptsetup luksFormat' commands might fail.
Generate '--pbkdf pbkdf2' instead if the system runs in FIPS mode.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
The pkey kernel module supports two key blob formats for EP11 AES keys.
The first one (PKEY_TYPE_EP11) contains a 16 bytes header that overlays
the first 32 bytes of the key blob which usually contain the ID of the
EP11 session to which the key is bound. For zkey/dm-crypt that session
ID used to be all zeros. The second blob format (PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES)
prepends the 16 bytes header to the blob, an thus does not overlay the
blob. This format can be used for key blobs that are session-bound, i.e.
have a non-zero session ID in the first 32 bytes.
Change zkey to generate EP11 keys using the new format (i.e. pkey type
PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES), but existing key blobs using the old format can
still be used.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
cryptsetup 2.1.0 requires excessive amount of RAM (1GB) to luksOpen encrypted
drives (LP: #1820049).
LUKS2 introduced support for Argon2i and Argon2id as a Password-Based Key
Derivation Function (PBKDF).
Argon2 is the winner of Password Hashing Competition and is now officially
recommended by RFC 9106.
PBKDF2 is currently used in zkey to mitigate out-of-memory errors when
multiple LUKS2 volumes are opened automatically via /etc/crypttab.
This patch is to use Argon2i (the deflaut algorithm) as key derivation function
for LUKS2 volumes, but with options for low memory and time requirements.
Using the default Argon2i options might still cause out-of-memory errors.
Link: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/cryptsetup/+bug/1820049
Closes: https://github.com/ibm-s390-linux/s390-tools/pull/138
Signed-off-by: Frank Heimes <frank.heimes@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Franzki ifranzki@linux.ibm.com
[hoeppner@linux.ibm.com: fix whitespace, line break, and commit message]
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
KMS plugins that support multiple key types need to know which
key type to produce with the kms_import_key() function. Extend
the plugin API to allow a plugin to provide a kms_import_key2()
function, that accepts the key type as additional parameter.
Existing plugins do not need to be changed, as the old function
kms_import_key() still exists, and is still used when the plugin
does not provide a kms_import_key2() function.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Extend zkey to allow to store a (dummy) LUKS2 passphrase together with a
secure key, for use with LUKS2 volumes. That way, when the repository is
backed up, or archived, also the passphrases of the associated LUKS2
volumes are backed up, or archived, and thus can not be forgotten.
This passphrase is then used in generated commands to format and open
the LUKS2 volumes.
Because of the use of secure keys to encrypt the volumes, the LUKS2
passphrase is of no or less relevance for security. It is therefore OK to
store the passphrase in clear text in the key repository, and also use
them in /etc/crypttab. Therefore, the passphrase could actually be a
trivial passphrase, or a dummy passphrase.
Note: Such a dummy passphrase is NOT considered a secret that needs to
be protected. If for a certain usage the passphrase is of relevance for
security, then the zkey dummy passphrase option must not be used to store
the passphrase.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Allow to refresh or update a KMS-bound key in the repository.
The secure key is re-imported from the KMS, and optionally also
its properties are updates from the KMS.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Allow to import keys that exist in a key management system into the
repository. The key together with its properties is imported.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
When removing a KMS-bound key from the local repository, call the
KMS plugin and let it perform an action in the KMS. Usually keys are
not removed from key management systems, instead the key state is
changed to non-active or similar.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
When key properties are changed with the 'change' command, also update
the key properties in the KMS, if the key is bound to a KMS. Do not
allow to change the associated APQNs for KMS bound keys. KMS bound keys
inherit the APQNs from the KMS plugin.
When a key is renamed in the repository, also update the key name
property in the KMS if the key is KMS bound.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Do not allow to convert a KMS bound key. The key type of a KMS
bound key is determined by what the KMS plugin supports, thus it
can not be converted.
Do only allow to copy a KMS bound key, if the '--local' option is
specified. The result of the copy is a local key, that is not bound
to a KMS.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
When a repository that is bound to a key management system, the
keys are generated by the key management system by default. To
generate a local key, add option '--local'.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
To support keys that are bound to a key management system (via a KMS
plugin) add new key properties that reflect this. Display if a key is
bound to a KMS with the 'zkey list' and 'zkey validate' commands.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Use after free causes the XTS attribute to be displayed wrongly.
Fixes: 298fab68fe ("zkey: Preparations for introducing a new key type")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Different crypto card types use different ways to re-encipher a secure
key with a new master key. Generalize the handling of re-enciphering,
so that the majority of the code does not have to care about the card
type when dealing with it.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
EP11 secure keys require a certain firmware version. Enhance
the APQN cross check to not only check for a minimum card level,
but also for a minimum firmware version.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Add a new source file that contains EP11 specific helper routines.
These routines require to load the EP11 host library.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Different crypto card types use different master key verification patterns
(MKVPs). Generalize the handling of MKVPs so that the majority of the
code does not have to care about the card type when dealing with MKVPs.
Also generalize messages about the crypto card's master keys to not
mention a specific card type.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
As preparation for adding support for EP11 secure keys,
generalize the code to support different crypto card types.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
The zkey list function uses scandir() to look for files in the
zkey key repository directory. It checks the dirent.d_type field
to consider only regular files, but skip all others.
Unfortunately, not all file systems have full support for returning
the file type in d_type. When the zkey repository is located in a file
system that does not support d_type, such as xfs, zkey list shows no
keys, although the key repository contains keys.
Fix this by also considering directory entries with d_type = DT_UNKNOWN.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
