The zipl internal loader adds a variable BOOT_IMAGE= to the commandline
so that it is visible in the operating system which menu entry has been
chosen.
This entry was overwritten by the stage3 parameter page.
Fix by re-arranging the internal memory layout and putting the command
line extra param, which contains the BOOT_IMAGE entry, at 0xe000.
This location is available because less than one page is used for the
stack.
Fixes: https://github.com/ibm-s390-tools/s390-tools/issues/67
Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
The stfle inline assembly returns the number of double words written
(condition code 0) or the double words it would have written
(condition code 3), if the memory array it got as parameter would have
been large enough.
The current stfle implementation assumes that the array is always
large enough and clears those parts of the array that have not been
written to with a subsequent memset call.
If however the array is not large enough memset will get a negative
length parameter, which means that memset clears memory until it gets
an exception and the system crashes.
To fix this simply limit the maximum length. Move also the inline
assembly to an extra function to avoid clobbering of register 0, which
might happen because of the added MIN invocation together with code
instrumentation.
Reviewed-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
To ensure that only verified code is executed the stage 3 loader has
to check if the load psw points to an address that has previously been
verified by the machine loader.
If secure boot is enabled the IPL process will only continue if the
verification was successful.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
The stage 3 loader size has to be a multiple of the filesystem
blocksize so that the signature maps with the later in memory
stage 3 loader. The lowest common blocksize is 4k so the image
is padded to a 4k boundary.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Add support for parsing IPL file signatures as produced by the Linux
kernel's sign-file tool. When preparing a disk for IPL, the signatures
will be added as separate data components that can be used by the Secure
Boot firmware feature to validate the integrity of the IPL files.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
The first component that gets control after IPL is the zIPL-provided
stage 3 boot loader. This boot loader is based on a binary image linked
into the zIPL executable. When preparing a disk for IPL, zIPL updates
runtime parameters in the boot loader image and writes the resulting
data to disk.
To support the Secure Boot firmware feature, the stage 3 code must be
signed, and can therefore no longer contain variable parameter portions.
Also the boot loader image should be accessible as a separate file to
enable the use of external programs for creating the signature.
This patch moves the stage 3 boot loader code to an external file
location and splits out the parameter portion into a separate, unsigned
on-disk component.
The new memory layout of the stage 3 loader during its execution looks
as follows:
* 0x0000-0x1fff Lowcore
* 0x2000-0x5fff Memory allocation (heap)
* 0x7000-0x8fff free
* 0x9000-0x9fff Stage3 parameter
* 0xa000-0xcfff Stage3 code
* 0xd000-0xefff Section: bss, rodata, data
* 0xf000-0xffff Stack
Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
The binary Linux kernel image is built to be loaded to memory address
0x0 but the first 64 kbyte contain an IPL header that is not used for
disk IPL. zIPL strips away this IPL header when writing IPL records to
disk, loads the remaining data to memory address 0x10000 and uses the
memory area below that for its own boot loader code.
The Secure Boot firmware feature checks the integrity of an installed
image during IPL using a checksum that was generated for the full image.
Since the checksum becomes invalid if the IPL header is removed, zIPL
must be changed to write the full image to disk.
This patch modifies the zIPL logic to no longer strip away the IPL
header. Instead the full image is loaded to a higher memory address and
relocated by the stage 3 boot loader code to its final location.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
With GCC8 the following warning is displayed:
In file included from cio.h:15,
from stage2.h:15,
from menu.h:15,
from stage2.c:14:
s390.h:193:1: warning: alignment 1 of ‘struct _lowcore’ is less than 8
[-Wpacked-not-aligned]
} __packed;
^
Fix by aligning struct _lowcore to double page size.
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Adjust progress_print() function to print dump progress message based on
the time interval thus printing the message with a regular rate.
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Zaslonko <zaslonko@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Update zipl DASD standalone dumpers for single-volume, multi-volume and FBA
to drop the sets of zero pages when dumping memory to disk. Thus, all
continuous sets of zero-megabytes in the memory are dropped during the dump
stage.
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Zaslonko <zaslonko@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Old implementation was using Test Protection (TPROT) instruction to
validate the memory page. Given that it is a rather slow instruction and
the fact that we only need to validate the read-access for a page, we can
use simple Load or Insert Character instruction to test that.
The new version of page_is_valid() without a TPROT is introduced.
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Zaslonko <zaslonko@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
The program check handler has a bug in calculating the address of the target
to jump to. Furthermore the use of relative addresses in the exception table
can lead to situations where the (calculated) fault is not unique. Storing
the absolute address of the fault and target in the exception table solves
both problems.
This patch is intended to:
- Modify exception table to store the absolute address of 'fault' and
'target' points
- Adjust program check handler function pgm_check_handler_fn() accordingly
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Zaslonko <zaslonko@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Compilers in Debian and Ubuntu default to enabling PIE for all binaries.
This is a poor fit for boot loader code that has strict requirements
for its layout. Hence always forcefully disable PIE.
As older compilers still need to be supported, no-pie usage is
conditional on CC's -dumpspecs output.
Fixes: #3
Signed-off-by: Philipp Kern <pkern@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This commit is based on the s390-tools-1.39.0 version.
Changes on top of s390-tools-1.39.0:
- Add MIT license to all source files
- Add LICENSE file
- Transform REAMDE to README.md (markdown)
- Add AUTHORS.md file
- Add CONTRIBUTING.md file
- Move changelog from README to CHANGELOG.md file
Reviewed-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
