Bump MSRV to 1.85.0 and upgrade all dependencies using 'cargo upgrade'
from cargo-edit. The bump to 1.85.0 is requiered to get at least openssl
version 0.10.79 including fixes for a couple security issues.
Link: https://crates.io/crates/cargo-edit
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
This lint also covers dependencies that generate code i.e. derives.
Those dependencies might introduce non-ascii chars deliberately as e.g.
zerocopy 0.8.32+ does.
Remove it to avoid any confusing warnings regarding non-ascii chars.
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/151025
[hoeppner@linux.ibm.com: Add link to reported issue]
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
+ Sort and group the imports
+ Normalize and format comments (100 characters width)
Command used:
$ cargo +nightly fmt --
Acked-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Add functions to properly parse required and optional input/output
parameters that have to be combined into one.
Reviewed-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
All pvattest subcommands use the command line option -i <input> and -o
<output> to specify file input and output respectively. pvsecret however
uses mostly positional arguments for <input> and <output> exclusively,
e.g. pvattest check input.bin output.yaml
$ pvsecret add secret.bin
This provides an inconsistent user interface within the Secure
Execution tools and may confuse users.
Add the -i and -o option to the subcommands if applicable.
Input/output can then be specified like so:
$ pvsecret add -i secret.bin
$ pvsecret list -o list.yaml
$ pvsecret verify -i FILE -o out.yaml
$ pvsecret retrieve -i ID -o id.yaml
Reviewed-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Most pvattest subcommands use the command line option -i <input> and -o
<output> to specify file input and output respectively. pvattest check
however only uses positional arguments for <input> and <output>, e.g.
$ pvattest check input.bin output.yaml
This provides an inconsistent user interface within the tool and may
confuse users.
Add the command -i and -o option to the check subcommand to bring it in
line with the rest of the tool.
$ pvattest check -i input.bin -o output.yaml
Reviewed-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Show -i & -o option and display them in the help output. Showing the
additional options to the user may provide a better experience. Users
may expect -i /-o options as other subcommands have them as well.
Reviewed-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
The error texts printed a hardcoded .0 instead of the actual value.
Fix this by using the proper string format arguments.
Reviewed-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 61c5d7d431 ("rust/pv: Attestation generation and verification support")
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
For guests that do not make use of the EBC feature the boot should not
be impacted by this module. This requires removing the boot.mount unit
because it will unconditionally create a dependency on a unit that
conflicts with that idea. The downside is that mounting of the boot
partition has to be done manually.
Fixes: https://github.com/ibm-s390-linux/s390-tools/issues/202
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Include the required kernel modules unconditionally when this module is
installed into an initramfs.
The new .conf file contains a list of kernel modules that are loaded by
the systemd-modules-load.service systemd unit.
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Add 95ibm-sel-ebc dracut module for secure boot-time customization of
SEL guests.
Introduce the IBM SEL EBC dracut module (95ibm-sel-ebc) that enables
Early Boot Customization for SEL guests during the initramfs phase.
The module implements a critical security architecture to prevent
injection attacks: all EBC resources (.asr and .pol files) are copied from
/boot/sics (which resides in the qcow2 image on the host filesystem) to
/run/ibm-sel-ebc (a tmpfs/RAM-backed directory). Since guest RAM is
protected by the Ultravisor, this prevents malicious hosts from modifying
EBC resources during boot.
Systemd units and their purposes:
- ibm-sel-ebc.target: Groups all EBC-related units
- boot.mount: Mounts /dev/disk/by-label/boot to /boot
- ibm-sel-ebc-ensure-sics.service: Fallback to create /boot/sics/ if boot
partition mount fails (supports Kata VM scenarios)
- ibm-sel-ebc-pvebc.service: Main unit that copies EBC resources to RAM,
invokes pvebc tool to verify integrity and add ASRs to UV, retrieves
LUKS passphrase from UV secret store
- ibm-sel-ebc-override-crypttab.service: Replaces /etc/crypttab with
prepared IBM SEL EBC crypttab, reloads systemd daemon, starts cryptsetup
service
- ibm-sel-ebc-paes-enforce.service: Verifies root filesystem uses PAES
encryption to prevent root filesystem substitution attacks
All units write logs to /boot/sics/log for debugging, accessible even if
root filesystem fails to mount. Units are triggered by rd.ibm-sel-ebc
kernel parameter and only execute in initramfs
(ConditionPathExists=/etc/initrd-release).
Assisted-by: IBM Bob:1.0.1
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Add pvebc tool for parsing and verifying EBC Add-Secret-Request structures
Introduce pvebc, a CLI tool that parses and verifies the integrity of
Add-Secret-Request (ASR) structures used in Early Boot Customization for
SEL guests.
The tool processes an integrity-protected ASR structure consisting of:
- toc.asr: Meta secret that links to toc.pol via relative filepath and
SHA512 hash, integrity-protected by its AES GCM authentication tag
- toc.pol: Policy file containing AES GCM authentication tags (last 16
bytes) of all user-provided ASRs
- User ASRs: Individual Add-Secret-Requests containing encrypted secrets
This structure guarantees:
- Prevents ASR removal: toc.pol lists all expected ASR authentication tags
- Prevents ASR insertion: Unlisted ASRs are rejected
- Prevents ASR modification: AES GCM authentication tags provide
cryptographic integrity
- Prevents toc.pol tampering: toc.asr's integrity protection secures the
link
The tool verifies completeness by checking that all ASRs listed in toc.pol
are present and their AES GCM authentication tags match. This prevents
attackers from removing, inserting, or modifying ASRs during transport over
unsecured channels.
After verification, pvebc adds all ASRs to the Ultravisor (UV), which
decrypts them using the guest's secret key and makes them available to
the guest during early boot.
Assisted-by: IBM Bob:1.0.1
Acked-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Add two new command-line options to pvsecret create for Early Boot
Customization (EBC) Table of Contents (TOC) support:
1. --policy FILE
Links an Add-Secret-Request (ASR) to a policy file by embedding a
PolicyReference in the ASR's user data field. The PolicyReference
contains the relative file path and SHA512 hash of the policy file,
enabling integrity verification of the policy. This option conflicts
with --user-data as both use the same user data field in the ASR
structure.
2. --toc-policy FILE
Appends the AES-GCM authentication tag (MAC tag - last 16 bytes of
the encrypted ASR) to the specified TOC policy file. This enables
the TOC policy to maintain a list of all ASR MAC tags for
completeness verification during boot. The TOC can verify that all
expected ASRs are present and unmodified by checking their MAC tags
against this list. This option also conflicts with --user-data.
Both options support the EBC multi-party workflow where an ISV/CSP builds
a generic SEL image and customers customize it with their own secrets. The
TOC mechanism ensures the integrity and completeness of all EBC resources
during the boot process.
Assisted-by: IBM Bob:1.0.1
Acked-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Add EBC (Early Boot Customization) utility functions to pv_core library
for parsing and verifying Add-Secret-Request structures.
Introduce the core library functionality needed for EBC:
- Add ebc_utils module to pv_core with ASR parsing and verification
- Export ebc_utils in pv_core lib.rs
- Re-export ebc_utils in pv lib.rs for downstream consumers
- Update pvsecret Cargo.toml dependencies
The library provides the foundation for tools that work with
integrity-protected ASR structures used in SEL guest customization.
Assisted-by: IBM Bob:1.0.1
Acked-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
The associated type bound for Iterator::Item was unsatisfied for Self.
Fix this by requiring Sized for IntoEnumIterator.
Fixes: 1d2a89b387 ("pvimg: Improve the readability of Display output for control flags")
Reviewed-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
If pvsecret {add, list, retrieve} is executed with options on a non-s390
system the user gets misleading error messages as the options are not
defined.
> pvsecret add -i secret.bin
error: unexpected argument '-i' found
This may lead the user to think wrong arguments where chosen, which is
not entirely true as they are valid on s390. The more helpful error
message would be
error: Command only available on s390x
Which is already the case if no arguments are given.
Solve this by allowing non-s390 systems to parse the options:
> pvsecret add -i secret.bin
error: Command only available on s390x
Reported-by: Carlo Della Giusta <carlo.dellagiusta@suse.com>
Fixes: dd82c26f87 ("rust: Add tool to manage UV-secrets")
Reviewed-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
If pvattest perform is executed with options on a non-s390 system the
user gets misleading error messages as the options are not defined.
> pvattest perform -i attestation_request.bin -o attresp.bin
error: unexpected argument '-i' found
This may lead the user to think wrong arguments where chosen, which is
not entirely true as they are valid on s390. The more helpful error
message would be
error: Command only available on s390x
Which is already the case if no arguments are given.
Solve this by allowing non-s390 systems to parse the options:
> pvattest perform -i attestation_request.bin -o attresp.bin
error: Command only available on s390x
While at it ignore some unused code warnings in the exchange format code
that appear on non-s390 systems as not all code is used.
Reported-by: Carlo Della Giusta <carlo.dellagiusta@suse.com>
Fixes: 16610a211f ("rust: pvattest-Rust")
Reviewed-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Add documentation for the JSON structure outputted by 'pvimg info
--format=json ...'.
Created with assistance from IBM Bob AI.
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Add a new '--print-schema <FORMAT>' option to the 'pvimg info' command
that prints the schema, if available, describing the given output
format. For example, 'pvimg info --print-schema json' prints the JSON
schema for the 'pvimg info' command output.
Acked-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Add '--show-secrets' flag to 'pvimg info' to make secret output explicit
and avoid accidental disclosure.
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Auto-detect default format for 'pvimg info' command. If stdout is a
terminal, use 'text', otherwise 'json'.
Adapt the tests accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Add human-readable output format to 'pvimg info' command. The format
'text:normal' shows only basic information about the Secure Execution
header, but skips the keys and other binary data; the format 'text:full'
shows everything.
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
The Display implementation should produce human-readable output. Convert
the flags into a descriptive flag list to improve readability.
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Use the s390-tools JSON meta data for the JSON output of 'pvimg info' to
make the JSON output more stable and to provide an stable API.
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Introduce S390ToolsMetaData struct, it can be used to generate the
s390-tools specific JSON metadata.
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Improve error messages for errors when reading the SE header protection
key or when the decryption/verification of the SE header has failed.
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Add two JSON output variants: pretty and minify. The desired variant can
be selected via '--format json:pretty' and '--format json:minify'. Using
'--format json' without a variant defaults to pretty.
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Add a warning to notify the user when the Secure Execution (SE) header
is present but its integrity and authenticity has not been verified.
This makes the lack of validation explicit and helps avoid unintended
use of untrusted data.
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Improve the documentation of flags and secured components.
Created with assistance from IBM Bob AI.
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Update pvattest and pvsecret mapnages and README.md, as for example the
'pvsecret create update-cck' was not documented.
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
warning: unresolved link to `GuestSecret::retrievable`
--> pv/src/uvsecret/guest_secret.rs:56:37
|
56 | /// Create Retrievables using [`GuestSecret::retrievable`]
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ the enum `GuestSecret` has no variant or associated item named `retrievable`
|
= note: `#[warn(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]` on by default
warning: unresolved link to `GuestSecret::RetrievableKey::name`
--> pv/src/uvsecret/guest_secret.rs:63:30
|
63 | /// SHA256 hash of [`GuestSecret::RetrievableKey::name`]
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ the enum `GuestSecret` has no variant or associated item named `RetrievableKey`
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Change the default firmware hash verification to its final location.
For the old one, there is a redirection in place for the foreseeable
future.
Reviewed-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Brendon Drew <bdrew@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Add a tool that can be used to verify if a given IBM host-key document is
valid. This uses the same logic (and code) as the image/request tools
for IBM Secure Execution, pvimg, pvattest, and pvsecret.
This tool basically just does the first step of the above tools; but without
creating any request or image.
Reviewed-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
