// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
//
// Copyright IBM Corp. 2024

use std::path::PathBuf;

use clap::{Args, Parser, Subcommand, ValueEnum, ValueHint};
use utils::{CertificateOptions, DeprecatedVerbosityOptions};

/// create, perform, and verify attestation measurements
///
/// Create, perform, and verify attestation measurements for IBM Secure Execution guest systems.
#[derive(Parser, Debug)]
pub struct CliOptions {
    #[clap(flatten)]
    pub verbosity: DeprecatedVerbosityOptions,

    /// Print version information and exit
    // Implemented for the help message only. Actual parsing happens in the
    // version command.
    #[arg(long)]
    pub version: bool,

    #[command(subcommand)]
    pub cmd: Command,
}

#[derive(Subcommand, Debug)]
pub enum Command {
    /// Create an attestation measurement request.
    ///
    /// Create attestation measurement requests to attest an IBM Secure Execution guest. Only build
    /// attestation requests in a trusted environment such as your Workstation. To avoid
    /// compromising the attestation do not publish the attestation request protection key and
    /// shred it after verification. Every 'create' will generate a new, random protection key.
    Create(Box<CreateAttOpt>),

    /// Send the attestation request to the Ultravisor (s390x only.)
    ///
    /// Run a measurement of this system through ’/dev/uv’. This device must be accessible and the
    /// attestation Ultravisor facility must be present. The input must be an attestation request
    /// created with ’pvattest create’. Output will contain the original request and the response
    /// from the Ultravisor. Only available on s390x.
    Perform(PerformAttOpt),

    /// Verify an attestation response.
    ///
    /// Verify that a previously generated attestation measurement of an IBM Secure Execution guest
    /// is as expected. Only verify attestation requests in a trusted environment, such as your
    /// workstation. Input must contain the response as produced by ’pvattest perform’. The
    /// protection key must be the one that was used to create the request by ’pvattest create’.
    /// Shred the protection key after the verification. The header must be the IBM Secure
    /// Execution header of the image that was attested during ’pvattest perform’. The verify
    /// command solely verifies that the Attestation measurement is correct. It does not check for
    /// the content of additional data or user data. See `pvattest check` for policy checks after
    /// you verified the Attestation measurement.
    Verify(VerifyOpt),

    /// Check if the attestation result matches defined policies.
    ///
    /// After the attestation verification, check whether the attestation result complies with
    /// user-defined policies.
    Check(CheckOpt),

    /// Print version information and exit.
    #[command(aliases(["--version"]), hide(true))]
    Version,
}

#[derive(Args, Debug)]
pub struct CreateAttOpt {
    #[command(flatten)]
    pub certificate_args: CertificateOptions,

    /// Write the generated request to FILE.
    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
    pub output: String,

    /// Save the protection key as unencrypted GCM-AES256 key in FILE
    ///
    /// Do not publish this key, otherwise your attestation is compromised.
    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
    pub arpk: String,

    /// Specify additional data for the request.
    ///
    /// Additional data is provided by the Ultravisor and returned during the attestation request
    /// and is covered by the attestation measurement. Can be specified multiple times.
    /// Optional.
    #[arg(
        long,
        value_name = "FLAGS",
        use_value_delimiter = true,
        value_delimiter = ','
    )]
    pub add_data: Vec<AttAddFlags>,
}

#[derive(Debug, ValueEnum, Clone, Copy)]
pub enum AttAddFlags {
    /// Request the public host-key-hash of the key that decrypted the SE-image as additional-data.
    PhkhImg,
    /// Request the public host-key-hash of the key that decrypted the attestation request as
    /// additional-data.
    PhkhAtt,

    /// Request a hash over all successful Add-secret requests and the lock state as
    /// additional-data.
    SecretStoreHash,

    /// Request the state of the firmware as additional-data.
    FirmwareState,
}

#[derive(Args, Debug)]
pub struct PerformAttOpt {
    /// Specify the request to be sent.
    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
    input: Option<String>,

    /// Specify the request to be sent.
    #[arg(value_name = "IN", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath, required_unless_present("input"), conflicts_with("input"))]
    input_pos: Option<String>,

    /// Write the result to FILE.
    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
    output: Option<String>,

    /// Write the result to FILE.
    #[arg(value_name = "OUT", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath, required_unless_present("output"), conflicts_with("output"))]
    output_pos: Option<String>,

    /// Provide up to 256 bytes of user input
    ///
    /// User-data is arbitrary user-defined data appended to the Attestation measurement.
    /// It is verified during the Attestation measurement verification.
    /// May be any arbitrary data, as long as it is less or equal to 256 bytes
    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "File", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
    user_data: Option<String>,
}

#[cfg(target_arch = "s390x")]
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct PerformAttOptComb<'a> {
    pub input: &'a str,
    pub output: &'a str,
    pub user_data: Option<&'a str>,
}

#[cfg(target_arch = "s390x")]
impl<'a> From<&'a PerformAttOpt> for PerformAttOptComb<'a> {
    fn from(value: &'a PerformAttOpt) -> Self {
        let input = match (&value.input, &value.input_pos) {
            (None, Some(i)) => i,
            (Some(i), None) => i,
            (Some(_), Some(_)) => unreachable!(),
            (None, None) => unreachable!(),
        };
        let output = match (&value.output, &value.output_pos) {
            (None, Some(o)) => o,
            (Some(o), None) => o,
            (Some(_), Some(_)) => unreachable!(),
            (None, None) => unreachable!(),
        };
        let user_data = value.user_data.as_deref();
        Self {
            input,
            output,
            user_data,
        }
    }
}

#[derive(Args, Debug)]
pub struct VerifyOpt {
    /// Specify the attestation response to be verified.
    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
    pub input: String,

    /// Specify the output for the verification result
    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
    pub output: Option<String>,

    /// Specifies the header of the guest image.
    ///
    /// Can be an IBM Secure Execution image created by genprotimg or an extracted IBM Secure
    /// Execution header. The header must start at a page boundary.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath)]
    pub hdr: String,

    /// Use FILE as the protection key to decrypt the request
    ///
    /// Do not publish this key, otherwise your attestation is compromised.
    /// Delete this key after verification.
    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
    pub arpk: String,

    /// Define the output format.
    #[arg(long, value_enum, default_value_t)]
    pub format: OutputType,

    /// Write the user data to the FILE if any.
    ///
    /// Writes the user data, if the response contains any, to FILE
    /// The user-data is part of the attestation measurement. If the user-data is written to FILE
    /// the user-data was part of the measurement and verified.
    /// Emits a warning if the response contains no user-data.
    #[arg(long, short ,value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
    pub user_data: Option<String>,
}

#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, ValueEnum, Debug, Default)]
pub enum OutputType {
    /// Use yaml format.
    #[default]
    Yaml,
}

#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, ValueEnum, Debug, Default)]
pub enum FirmwareCheckVersion {
    /// Use firmware check API version 1.0.
    #[default]
    #[value(name = "1")]
    V1,
    /// Use firmware check API version 2.0.
    #[value(name = "2")]
    V2,
}

#[derive(Args, Debug)]
pub struct CheckOpt {
    /// Specify the attestation response to check whether the policies are validated.
    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
    input: Option<PathBuf>,

    /// Specify the attestation response to check whether the policies are validated.
    #[arg(value_name = "IN", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath, required_unless_present("input"), conflicts_with("input"))]
    input_pos: Option<PathBuf>,

    /// Specify the output file for the check result.
    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
    output: Option<PathBuf>,

    /// Specify the output file for the check result.
    #[arg(value_name = "OUT", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath, required_unless_present("output"), conflicts_with("output"))]
    output_pos: Option<PathBuf>,

    /// Define the output format.
    #[arg(long, value_enum, default_value_t)]
    pub format: OutputType,

    /// Use FILE to check for a  host-key document.
    ///
    /// Verifies that the attestation response contains the host-key hash of one of the specified
    /// host keys. The check fails if none of the host-keys match the hash in the response. This
    /// parameter can be specified multiple times.
    #[arg(
        short = 'k',
        long = "host-key-document",
        value_name = "FILE",
        value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,
        use_value_delimiter = true,
        value_delimiter = ',',
        )]
    pub host_key_documents: Vec<PathBuf>,

    /// Define the host-key check policy
    ///
    /// By default, all host-key hashes are checked, and it is not considered a failure if a hash
    /// is missing from the attestation response. Use this policy switch to trigger a failure if no
    /// corresponding hash is found. Requires at least one host-key document.
    #[arg(
        long = "host-key-check",
        requires("host_key_documents"),
        use_value_delimiter = true,
        value_delimiter = ','
    )]
    pub host_key_checks: Vec<HostKeyCheckPolicy>,

    /// Check if the provided user data matches the data from the attestation response.
    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
    pub user_data: Option<PathBuf>,

    /// Use FILE to include as successful Add-secret request.
    ///
    /// Checks if the Attestation response contains the hash of all specified add secret
    /// requests-tags. The hash is sensible to the order in which the secrets where added. This
    /// means that if the order of adding here different from the order the add-secret requests
    /// where sent to the UV this check will fail even though the same secrets are included in the
    /// UV secret store. Can be specified multiple times.
    #[arg(
        long,
        value_name = "FILE",
        value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,
        use_value_delimiter = true,
        value_delimiter = ',',
        requires("secret_store_locked"),
        )]
    pub secret: Vec<PathBuf>,

    /// Check whether the guests secret store is locked or not.
    ///
    /// Compares the hash of the secret store state to the one calculated by this option and
    /// optionally specified add-secret-requests in the correct order. If the attestation response
    /// does not contain a secret store hash, this check fails.
    ///
    /// Required if add-secret-requests are specified.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "BOOL")]
    pub secret_store_locked: Option<bool>,

    /// Check whether the firmware is supported by IBM.
    ///
    /// Requires internet access.
    #[arg(long)]
    pub firmware: bool,

    /// Specify the firmware verification request version.
    #[arg(
        long,
        visible_alias("fw-ver"),
        requires("firmware"),
        value_enum,
        default_value_t
    )]
    pub firmware_check_version: FirmwareCheckVersion,

    /// Specify the endpoint to use for firmware version verification.
    ///
    /// Use an endpoint you trust. Requires the --firmware option.
    #[arg(long, requires("firmware"), value_name = "URL", value_hint = ValueHint::Url)]
    pub firmware_verify_url: Option<String>,
}

#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct CheckOptIO<'a> {
    pub input: &'a PathBuf,
    pub output: &'a PathBuf,
}

impl<'a> From<&'a CheckOpt> for CheckOptIO<'a> {
    fn from(value: &'a CheckOpt) -> Self {
        let input = match (&value.input, &value.input_pos) {
            (None, Some(i)) => i,
            (Some(i), None) => i,
            (Some(_), Some(_)) => unreachable!(),
            (None, None) => unreachable!(),
        };
        let output = match (&value.output, &value.output_pos) {
            (None, Some(o)) => o,
            (Some(o), None) => o,
            (Some(_), Some(_)) => unreachable!(),
            (None, None) => unreachable!(),
        };
        Self { input, output }
    }
}

#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, ValueEnum, Debug)]
pub enum HostKeyCheckPolicy {
    /// Check the host-key used for the attestation request.
    ///
    /// The check is considered failed, if no given host-key matches the hash from the attestation
    /// host-key hash, or no attestation host-key has is in the attestation response.
    AttKeyHash,
    /// Check the host-key used to the boot the image.
    ///
    /// The check is considered failed, if no given host-key matches the hash from the boot
    /// host-key hash, or no boot host-key has is in the attestation response.
    BootKeyHash,
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
    #[test]
    fn verify_cli() {
        use clap::CommandFactory;
        super::CliOptions::command().debug_assert()
    }
}