add the new testgrid dashboard information into the release doc
and readme so that it can act as CI signal for a containerd release
Signed-off-by: Akhil Mohan <akhilerm@gmail.com>
The latest setup-go action caches the Go pkg cache and may have several
minute-per-run speed improvement on CI runs which have to fill the
pkg cache.
Signed-off-by: Phil Estes <estesp@amazon.com>
go1.20.3 (released 2023-04-04) includes security fixes to the go/parser,
html/template, mime/multipart, net/http, and net/textproto packages, as well
as bug fixes to the compiler, the linker, the runtime, and the time package.
See the Go 1.20.3 milestone on our issue tracker for details:
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.20.3+label%3ACherryPickApproved
full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.20.2...go1.20.3
go1.19.8 (released 2023-04-04) includes security fixes to the go/parser,
html/template, mime/multipart, net/http, and net/textproto packages, as well as
bug fixes to the linker, the runtime, and the time package. See the Go 1.19.8
milestone on our issue tracker for details:
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.19.8+label%3ACherryPickApproved
full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.19.7...go1.19.8
Further details from the announcement on the mailing list:
We have just released Go versions 1.20.3 and 1.19.8, minor point releases.
These minor releases include 4 security fixes following the security policy:
- go/parser: infinite loop in parsing
Calling any of the Parse functions on Go source code which contains `//line`
directives with very large line numbers can cause an infinite loop due to
integer overflow.
Thanks to Philippe Antoine (Catena cyber) for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2023-24537 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/59180.
- html/template: backticks not treated as string delimiters
Templates did not properly consider backticks (`) as Javascript string
delimiters, and as such did not escape them as expected. Backticks are
used, since ES6, for JS template literals. If a template contained a Go
template action within a Javascript template literal, the contents of the
action could be used to terminate the literal, injecting arbitrary Javascript
code into the Go template.
As ES6 template literals are rather complex, and themselves can do string
interpolation, we've decided to simply disallow Go template actions from being
used inside of them (e.g. "var a = {{.}}"), since there is no obviously safe
way to allow this behavior. This takes the same approach as
github.com/google/safehtml. Template.Parse will now return an Error when it
encounters templates like this, with a currently unexported ErrorCode with a
value of 12. This ErrorCode will be exported in the next major release.
Users who rely on this behavior can re-enable it using the GODEBUG flag
jstmpllitinterp=1, with the caveat that backticks will now be escaped. This
should be used with caution.
Thanks to Sohom Datta, Manipal Institute of Technology, for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2023-24538 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/59234.
- net/http, net/textproto: denial of service from excessive memory allocation
HTTP and MIME header parsing could allocate large amounts of memory, even when
parsing small inputs.
Certain unusual patterns of input data could cause the common function used to
parse HTTP and MIME headers to allocate substantially more memory than
required to hold the parsed headers. An attacker can exploit this behavior to
cause an HTTP server to allocate large amounts of memory from a small request,
potentially leading to memory exhaustion and a denial of service.
Header parsing now correctly allocates only the memory required to hold parsed
headers.
Thanks to Jakob Ackermann (@das7pad) for discovering this issue.
This is CVE-2023-24534 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/58975.
- net/http, net/textproto, mime/multipart: denial of service from excessive resource consumption
Multipart form parsing can consume large amounts of CPU and memory when
processing form inputs containing very large numbers of parts. This stems from
several causes:
mime/multipart.Reader.ReadForm limits the total memory a parsed multipart form
can consume. ReadForm could undercount the amount of memory consumed, leading
it to accept larger inputs than intended. Limiting total memory does not
account for increased pressure on the garbage collector from large numbers of
small allocations in forms with many parts. ReadForm could allocate a large
number of short-lived buffers, further increasing pressure on the garbage
collector. The combination of these factors can permit an attacker to cause an
program that parses multipart forms to consume large amounts of CPU and
memory, potentially resulting in a denial of service. This affects programs
that use mime/multipart.Reader.ReadForm, as well as form parsing in the
net/http package with the Request methods FormFile, FormValue,
ParseMultipartForm, and PostFormValue.
ReadForm now does a better job of estimating the memory consumption of parsed
forms, and performs many fewer short-lived allocations.
In addition, mime/multipart.Reader now imposes the following limits on the
size of parsed forms:
Forms parsed with ReadForm may contain no more than 1000 parts. This limit may
be adjusted with the environment variable GODEBUG=multipartmaxparts=. Form
parts parsed with NextPart and NextRawPart may contain no more than 10,000
header fields. In addition, forms parsed with ReadForm may contain no more
than 10,000 header fields across all parts. This limit may be adjusted with
the environment variable GODEBUG=multipartmaxheaders=.
Thanks to Jakob Ackermann for discovering this issue.
This is CVE-2023-24536 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/59153.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
* Improve error messages
* remove a check for the existance of unmount target. We probably
should not mask that the target was missing.
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Adrian Samfira <gsamfira@cloudbasesolutions.com>
As opposed to a writable layer derived from a base layer, the volume
path of a base layer, once activated and prepared will not be a WCIFS
volume, but the actual path on disk to the snapshot. We cannot directly
mount this folder, as that would mean a client may gain access and
potentially damage important metadata files that would render the layer
unusabble.
For base layers we need to mount the Files folder which must exist in
any valid base windows-layer.
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Adrian Samfira <gsamfira@cloudbasesolutions.com>
Update dependencies and remove the local bindfilter files. Those have
been moved to go-winio.
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Adrian Samfira <gsamfira@cloudbasesolutions.com>
fstest.CheckDirectoryEqual checks if any files in the diff matches a
list of known metadataFiles. This only happens if we specify the initial
layer as the first parameter and the mutated layer as the second.
This also enables the read-only view checks, as the bind filter allows
us to mount a layer as ro.
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Adrian Samfira <gsamfira@cloudbasesolutions.com>
The bind filter supports bind-like mounts and volume mounts. It also
allows us to have read-only mounts.
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Adrian Samfira <gsamfira@cloudbasesolutions.com>
NTFS, when presented with an all-caps filename, assumes you are just
being loud for no reason, and instead stores an all-lower-case filename.
Signed-off-by: Paul "TBBle" Hampson <Paul.Hampson@Pobox.com>
This is necessary on Windows, as it's not possible to delete a snapshot
while it is still mounted, even if the mount-point has been deleted.
Signed-off-by: Paul "TBBle" Hampson <Paul.Hampson@Pobox.com>
Using symlinks for bind mounts means we are not protecting an RO-mounted
layer against modification. Windows doesn't currently appear to offer a
better approach though, as we cannot create arbitrary empty WCOW scratch
layers at this time.
For windows-layer mounts, Unmount does not have access to the mounts
used to create it. So we store the relevant data in an Alternate Data
Stream on the mountpoint in order to be able to Unmount later.
Based on approach in https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/2366,
with sign-offs recorded as 'Based-on-work-by' trailers below.
This also partially-reverts some changes made in #6034 as they are not
needed with this mounting implmentation, which no longer needs to be
handled specially by the caller compared to non-Windows mounts.
Signed-off-by: Paul "TBBle" Hampson <Paul.Hampson@Pobox.com>
Based-on-work-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com>
Based-on-work-by: Darren Stahl <darst@microsoft.com>
The WCOW layer support does not support creating sandboxes with no
parent. Instead, parentless scratch layers must be layed out as a
directory containing only a directory named 'Files', and all data stored
inside 'Files'. At commit-time, this will be converted in-place into a
read-only layer suitable for use as a parent layer.
The WCOW layer support also does not deal with making read-only layers,
i.e. layers that are prepared to be parent layers, visible in a
read-only manner. A bind-mount or junction point cannot be made
read-only, so a view must instead be a small sandbox layer that we can
mount via WCOW, and discard later, to protect the layer against
accidental or deliberate modification.
Signed-off-by: Paul "TBBle" Hampson <Paul.Hampson@Pobox.com>
