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pvimg/boot: Print error messages from stage3a bootloader

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When DIAG 308 subcode 10 is specified, and the configuration fails to enter
the secure mode, then the stage3a bootloader reads the DIAG response code,
UV RC, RRC and command id from bit positions 48-63, 32-47, 16-31, and
0-15 of the general register R1 + 1.

The bootloader now prints the error codes to help pinpoint the error cause.
For some cases that are reported to occur often the bootloader also prints
the cause when possible or prints hints to help understand the cause.

QEMU patch "DIAG 308: extend subcode 10 to return UVC cmd id, RC and RRC
values upon failure to enter secure mode" (commit-id: )
is needed with this patch.

Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gautam Gala <ggala@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Gautam Gala
2025-03-11 12:14:36 +01:00
committed by Jan Höppner
parent 5ece6a3373
commit 084792bdc6
1 changed files with 168 additions and 5 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

173
rust/pvimg/boot/stage3a.c
View File

@@ -16,12 +16,177 @@
#include "boot/ipl.h"
#include "sclp.h"
/*
* The following UV RC and RRC codes correspond to the errors
* that occur often or may be fixeable directly by the user when
* applying DIAG308 subcode 10 but configuration is unable to
* enter the secure mode. Note that it is not an exhaustive list
* of all possible UV RCs and RRCs.
*/
enum UV_RC {
UNPACK_VERIFY_MISMATCH = 0x0102,
SSC_HDR_VER_MISMATCH = 0x0104,
SSC_UNSUPPORTED_PCF = 0x0106,
SSC_HOSTKEY_HASH_ERR = 0x0108,
SSC_UNSUPPORTED_SCF = 0x0109,
SSC_HDR_CORRUPT = 0x010a,
};
enum UV_RRC_UNPACK_VERIFY_MISMATCH {
ALD_MISMATCH = 0x001A,
PLD_MISMATCH = 0x001B,
TLD_MISMATCH = 0x001C,
NUM_ENC_PAGES_MISMATCH = 0x001D,
};
enum UV_RRC_SSC_HDR_VER_MISMATCH {
HDR_VER_MISMATCH = 0x0001,
};
enum UV_RRC_SSC_UNSUPPORTED_PCF {
UNSUPPORTED_PCF = 0x0030,
};
enum UV_RRC_SSC_HOSTKEY_HASH_ERR {
HOSTKEY_MISMATCH = 0x0005,
INVAL_ECDH_KEY_HDR = 0x000B,
BACKUP_HOSTKEY_MISMATCH = 0x0034,
};
enum UV_RRC_SSC_UNSUPPORTED_SCF {
UNSUPPORTED_SCF = 0x0000,
};
enum UV_RRC_SSC_HDR_CORRUPT {
HDR_LEN_MISMATCH = 0x0031,
HDR_SIZE_ENC_INVAL = 0x0039,
KEY_SLOT_EMPTY = 0x0040,
};
static volatile struct stage3a_args __section(".loader_parms") loader_parms;
static void print_error_message(enum UV_RC pv_rc, uint16_t pv_rrc)
{
switch (pv_rc) {
case UNPACK_VERIFY_MISMATCH:
switch ((enum UV_RRC_UNPACK_VERIFY_MISMATCH)pv_rrc) {
case ALD_MISMATCH:
printf("Address digest list (ALD) mismatch.\n");
break;
case PLD_MISMATCH:
printf("Page digest list (PLD) mismatch.\n");
break;
case TLD_MISMATCH:
printf("Tweak digest list (TLD) mismatch.\n");
break;
case NUM_ENC_PAGES_MISMATCH:
printf("Mismatch in number of encrypted pages.\n");
break;
}
break;
case SSC_HDR_VER_MISMATCH:
if (pv_rrc == HDR_VER_MISMATCH)
printf("Mismatch in IBM Secure Execution image header version.\n");
break;
case SSC_UNSUPPORTED_PCF:
if (pv_rrc == UNSUPPORTED_PCF)
printf("An unsupported plaintext control flag is set.\n");
break;
case SSC_HOSTKEY_HASH_ERR:
switch ((enum UV_RRC_SSC_HOSTKEY_HASH_ERR)pv_rrc) {
case HOSTKEY_MISMATCH:
printf("The host key hash of the IBM Secure Execution image ");
printf("does not match the host key of the installed key bundle.\n");
break;
case INVAL_ECDH_KEY_HDR:
printf("The public customer ECDH key in the ");
printf("IBM Secure Execution image is not valid.\n");
break;
case BACKUP_HOSTKEY_MISMATCH:
printf("The secondary host key hash of the ");
printf("IBM Secure Execution image does not match the ");
printf("host key of the installed key bundle.\n");
break;
default:
printf("Ensure that the image is ");
printf("correctly encrypted for this host.\n");
}
break;
case SSC_UNSUPPORTED_SCF:
if (pv_rrc == UNSUPPORTED_SCF)
printf("An unsupported secret control flag is set.\n");
break;
case SSC_HDR_CORRUPT:
switch ((enum UV_RRC_SSC_HDR_CORRUPT)pv_rrc) {
case HDR_LEN_MISMATCH:
printf("Mismatch in IBM Secure Execution image header size.\n");
break;
case HDR_SIZE_ENC_INVAL:
printf("The size of the encrypted area in the ");
printf("IBM Secure Execution image is invalid.\n");
break;
case KEY_SLOT_EMPTY:
printf("There are no host keys in");
printf("the IBM Secure Execution image.\n");
break;
}
break;
}
}
char *get_cmd_name(uint16_t pv_cmd)
{
char *cmd_name;
/*
* QEMU returns command code IDs 2, 3 or 4 corresponding
* to the UV commands (SSC, UNPACK or UNPACK VERIFY) when
* DIAG 308 subcode is applied and the configuration is
* unable to enter the secure mode.
*/
switch (pv_cmd) {
case 2:
cmd_name = "KVM_PV_SET_SEC_PARMS";
break;
case 3:
cmd_name = "KVM_PV_UNPACK";
break;
case 4:
cmd_name = "KVM_PV_VERIFY";
break;
default:
// should not reach here
cmd_name = "UNKNOWN";
}
return cmd_name;
}
void report_diag308_unpack_pv_error(uint64_t rc)
{
union {
struct {
uint16_t pv_cmd;
uint16_t pv_rrc;
uint16_t pv_rc;
uint16_t diag_rc;
};
uint64_t regs;
} resp = { .regs = rc };
sclp_setup(SCLP_LINE_ASCII_INIT);
print_error_message(resp.pv_rc, resp.pv_rrc);
panic(EPV,
"Protected boot failed: 0x%x, "
"%s - RC: 0x%x, RRC:0x%x\n",
resp.diag_rc, get_cmd_name(resp.pv_cmd), resp.pv_rc, resp.pv_rrc);
}
void __noreturn start(void)
{
int rc;
volatile struct stage3a_args *args = &loader_parms;
uint64_t rc;
/* calculate the IPIB memory address */
struct ipl_parameter_block *ipib = (void *)((uint64_t)args + args->ipib_offs);
@@ -46,10 +211,8 @@ void __noreturn start(void)
panic(EPV, "Protected boot setup has failed: 0x%x\n", rc);
rc = diag308(DIAG308_UNPACK_PV, 0x0);
if (rc != DIAG308_RC_OK) {
sclp_setup(SCLP_LINE_ASCII_INIT);
panic(EPV, "Protected boot has failed: 0x%x\n", rc);
}
if (rc != DIAG308_RC_OK)
report_diag308_unpack_pv_error(rc);
while (1)
;