Remove genprotimg-C and switch to genprotimg-Rust implementation

Removes the C implementation of genprotimg and use the Rust
implementation instead.

Adapt the README.md accordingly.

Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Marc Hartmayer
2024-11-26 16:09:15 +00:00
committed by Jan Höppner
parent 849819cb77
commit 195579cf0b
54 changed files with 9 additions and 8029 deletions

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@@ -15,12 +15,12 @@ TOOL_DIRS = zipl zdump fdasd dasdfmt dasdview tunedasd \
vmcp man mon_tools dasdinfo vmur cpuplugd ipl_tools \
ziomon iucvterm hyptop cmsfs-fuse qethqoat zfcpdump zdsfs cpumf \
systemd hmcdrvfs cpacfstats zdev dump2tar zkey netboot etc zpcictl \
genprotimg lsstp hsci hsavmcore chreipl-fcp-mpath ap_tools rust
lsstp hsci hsavmcore chreipl-fcp-mpath ap_tools rust
else
BASELIB_DIRS =
LIB_DIRS = libpv
TOOL_DIRS = genprotimg rust
TOOL_DIRS = rust
endif
SUB_DIRS = $(BASELIB_DIRS) $(LIB_DIRS) $(TOOL_DIRS)

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@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ Package contents
Display unique DASD ID, either UID or volser.
* genprotimg:
Create a protected virtualization image.
Create an IBM Secure Execution (protected virtualization) image. The
genprotimg command is a symbolic link to the `pvimg create` command.
* udev rules:
- 59-dasd.rules: rules for unique DASD device nodes created in /dev/disk/.
@@ -314,17 +315,15 @@ build options:
| ncurses | `HAVE_NCURSES` | hyptop |
| net-snmp | `HAVE_SNMP` | osasnmpd |
| glibc-static | `HAVE_LIBC_STATIC` | zfcpdump |
| openssl | `HAVE_OPENSSL` | genprotimg, zkey, libekmfweb, |
| | | libkmipclient, zgetdump, |
| | | rust/pvattest, rust/pvsecret, |
| | | rust/pvimg |
| openssl | `HAVE_OPENSSL` | zkey, libekmfweb, libkmipclient, |
| | | zgetdump, rust/pvattest, rust/pvimg, |
| | | zgetdump/pvsecret |
| cryptsetup | `HAVE_CRYPTSETUP2` | zkey-cryptsetup |
| json-c | `HAVE_JSONC` | zkey-cryptsetup, libekmfweb, |
| | | libkmipclient |
| glib2 | `HAVE_GLIB2` | genprotimg, zgetdump |
| libcurl | `HAVE_LIBCURL` | genprotimg, libekmfweb, libkmipclient, |
| glib2 | `HAVE_GLIB2` | zgetdump |
| libcurl | `HAVE_LIBCURL` | libekmfweb, libkmipclient, rust/pvimg, |
| | | rust/pvattest, rust/pvsecret, |
| | | rust/pvimg |
| libxml2 | `HAVE_LIBXML2` | libkmipclient |
| systemd | `HAVE_SYSTEMD` | hsavmcore |
| libudev | `HAVE_LIBUDEV` | cpacfstatsd |
@@ -359,14 +358,6 @@ the different tools are provided:
* dbginfo.sh:
The tar package is required to archive collected data.
* genprotimg:
For building genprotimg you need OpenSSL version 1.1.0 or newer
installed (openssl-devel.rpm). Also required is glib2
(glib2-devel.rpm). Tip: you may skip the genprotimg build by adding
`HAVE_OPENSSL=0` or `HAVE_GLIB2=0`.
The runtime requirements are: openssl-libs (>= 1.1.0) and glib2.
* rust/pvimg:
For building pvimg you need OpenSSL version 1.1.1 or newer
installed (openssl-devel.rpm). Also required is cargo and libcurl.

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@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
tags
compile_commands.json
src/.check-dep-genprotimg
src/.detect-openssl.dep.c
src/genprotimg

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@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
# Common definitions
include ../common.mak
.DEFAULT_GOAL := all
PKGDATADIR := $(TOOLS_DATADIR)/genprotimg
TESTS :=
SUBDIRS := boot src man
RECURSIVE_TARGETS := all-recursive install-recursive clean-recursive
all: all-recursive
install: install-recursive
$(INSTALL) -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(PKGDATADIR)
$(INSTALL) -g $(GROUP) -o $(OWNER) -m 755 samples/check_hostkeydoc $(DESTDIR)$(PKGDATADIR)
clean: clean-recursive
$(RECURSIVE_TARGETS):
@target=`echo $@ |sed s/-recursive//`; \
for d in $(SUBDIRS); do \
$(MAKE) -C $$d $$target || exit 1; \
done
.PHONY: all install clean $(RECURSIVE_TARGETS)

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@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
# genprotimg
`genprotimg` takes a kernel, key files, optionally an initrd image,
optionally a file containing the kernel command line parameters, and
generates a single, bootable image file. The generated image file
consists of a concatenation of a plain text boot loader, the encrypted
components for kernel, initrd, kernel command line, and the
integrity-protected PV header, containing the metadata necessary for
running the guest in protected mode. See [Memory Layout](#memory-layout)
for details about the internal structure of the created image.
It is possible to use the generated image as a kernel for zipl or for
a direct kernel boot using QEMU.
## Getting started
If all dependencies are met a simple `make` call in the source tree
should be enough for building `genprotimg`.
## Details
The main idea of `genprotimg` is:
1. read in all keys, IVs, and other information needed for the
encryption of the components and the generation of the PV header
2. add stub stage3a (so we can calculate the memory addresses)
3. add components: prepare the components (alignment and encryption)
and add them to the memory layout
4. build and add stage3b: generate the stage3b and add it to the memory layout
5. generate the PV header: generate the hashes (pld, ald, and tld) of
the components and create the PV header and IPIB
6. parameterize the stub stage3a: uses the IPIB and PV header
7. write the final image to the specified output path
### Boot Loader
The boot loader consists of two parts:
1. stage3a boot loader (cleartext), this loader is responsible for the
transition into the protected mode by doing diag308 subcode 8 and
10 calls.
2. stage3b boot loader (encrypted), this loader is very similar to the
normal zipl stage3 boot loader. It will be loaded by the Ultravisor
after the successful transition into protected mode. Like the zipl
stage3 boot loader it moves the kernel and patches in the values
for initrd and parmline.
The loaders have the following constraints:
1. It must be possible to place stage3a and stage3b at a location
greater than 0x10000 because the zipl stage3 loader zeroes out
everything at addresses lower than 0x10000 of the image.
2. As the stage3 loader of zipl assumes that the passed kernel image
looks like a normal kernel image, the zipl stage3 loader modifies the
content at the memory area 0x10400 - 0x10800, therefore we leave this
area unused in our stage3a loader.
3. The default entry address used by the zipl stage3 loader is 0x10000
so we add a simple branch to 0x11000 at 0x10000 so the zipl stage3
loader can modify the area 0x10400 - 0x10800 without affecting the
stage3a loader.
#### Detail about stage3b
The stage3b.bin is linked at address 0x9000, therefore it will not
work at another address. The relocation support for the stage3b
loader, so that it can be placed at addresses != 0x9000, is added in
the loader with the name stage3b_reloc.bin. By default, if we're
talking about stage3b we refer to stage3b_reloc.bin.
### Memory Layout
The memory layout of the bootable file looks like:
| Start | End | Use |
|------------------------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 0 | 0x7 | Short PSW, starting instruction at 0x11000 |
| 0x10000 | 0x10012 | Branch to 0x11000 |
| 0x10013 | 0x10fff | Left intentionally unused |
| 0x11000 | 0x12fff | Stage3a |
| 0x13000 | 0x13fff | IPIB used as argument for the diag308 call |
| 0x14000 | 0x1[45]fff | UV header used for the diag308 call (size can be either 1 or 2 pages) |
| NEXT_PAGE_ALIGNED_ADDR | | Encrypted kernel |
| NEXT_PAGE_ALIGNED_ADDR | | Encrypted kernel parameters |
| NEXT_PAGE_ALIGNED_ADDR | | Encrypted initrd |
| NEXT_PAGE_ALIGNED_ADDR | | Encrypted stage3b_reloc |

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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
*.elf
*.lds
*.bin
*.d

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@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
# Common definitions
include ../../common.mak
FILES := stage3a.bin stage3b.bin stage3b_reloc.bin
DEBUG_FILES := $(addsuffix .debug,$(FILES))
ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),s390x)
ZIPL_DIR := $(rootdir)/zipl
ZIPL_BOOT_DIR := $(ZIPL_DIR)/boot
PKGDATADIR := $(TOOLS_DATADIR)/genprotimg
INCLUDE_PATHS := $(ZIPL_BOOT_DIR) $(ZIPL_DIR)/include $(rootdir)/include
INCLUDE_PARMS := $(addprefix -I,$(INCLUDE_PATHS))
ALL_CFLAGS := $(NO_PIE_CFLAGS) -Os -g \
$(INCLUDE_PARMS) \
-DENABLE_SCLP_ASCII=1 \
-DS390_TOOLS_RELEASE=$(S390_TOOLS_RELEASE) \
-fno-builtin -ffreestanding -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables \
-fno-delete-null-pointer-checks -fno-stack-protector \
-fexec-charset=IBM1047 -m64 -mpacked-stack \
-mstack-size=4096 -mstack-guard=128 -msoft-float \
-Wall -Wformat-security -Wextra \
-Wno-array-bounds
ZIPL_SRCS_C := libc.c ebcdic.c ebcdic_conv.c sclp.c
ZIPL_SRCS_ASM := entry.S
ZIPL_OBJS_C := $(ZIPL_SRCS_C:%.c=%.o)
ZIPL_OBJS_ASM := $(ZIPL_SRCS_ASM:%.S=%.o)
ZIPL_OBJS := $(ZIPL_OBJS_C) $(ZIPL_OBJS_ASM)
# Prevent make from using some default rules...
%: %.S
%.o: %.S Makefile
$(CC) $(ALL_CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
%.o: %.c Makefile
$(CC) $(ALL_CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
# Dependencies for the .lds generation
sources_lds_S = $(wildcard *.lds.S)
dependencies_lds_S = $(sources_lds_S:%.lds.S=.%.lds.d)
# Include all ".lds.d" dependency files for all make targets except for "clean"
ifneq ($(MAKECMDGOALS),clean)
-include $(dependencies_lds_S)
endif
%.lds: %.lds.S Makefile
$(CPP) -Wp,-MD,.$@.d,-MT,$@ $(INCLUDE_PARMS) -P -C -o $@ $<
# Special rules for zipl object files
$(ZIPL_OBJS_C): %.o : $(ZIPL_BOOT_DIR)/%.c
$(CC) $(ALL_CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
$(ZIPL_OBJS_ASM): %.o : $(ZIPL_BOOT_DIR)/%.S
$(CC) $(ALL_CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
dependencies_zipl_c := $(ZIPL_SRCS_C:%.c=.%.o.d)
$(dependencies_zipl_c): .%.o.d : $(ZIPL_BOOT_DIR)/%.c
$(CC_SILENT) -MM $(ALL_CPPFLAGS) $(ALL_CFLAGS) $< > $@
ifneq ($(MAKECMDGOALS),clean)
-include $(dependencies_zipl_c)
endif
stage3b_reloc.o: stage3b.bin
stage3a.elf: head.o stage3a_init.o $(ZIPL_OBJS)
stage3b.elf: head.o $(ZIPL_OBJS)
.SECONDARY: $(FILES:.bin=.lds)
%.elf: %.lds %.o
$(LINK) $(NO_PIE_LDFLAGS) $(NO_WARN_RWX_SEGMENTS_LDFLAGS) -Wl,-T,$< -Wl,--build-id=none -m64 -static -nostdlib $(filter %.o, $^) -o $@
@chmod a-x $@
%.bin.debug: %.elf
$(OBJCOPY) --only-keep-debug $< $@
@chmod a-x $@
%.bin: %.elf
$(OBJCOPY) -O binary $< $@
@chmod a-x $@
install: stage3a.bin stage3b_reloc.bin
$(INSTALL) -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(PKGDATADIR)
$(INSTALL) -g $(GROUP) -o $(OWNER) -m 644 stage3a.bin $(DESTDIR)$(PKGDATADIR)
$(INSTALL) -g $(GROUP) -o $(OWNER) -m 644 stage3b_reloc.bin $(DESTDIR)$(PKGDATADIR)
else
# Don't generate the dependency files (see `common.mak` for the
# `-include $(dependencies_c)` statement).
.PHONY: $(dependencies_c)
$(FILES) $(DEBUG_FILES):
echo " SKIP $@ due to HOST_ARCH != s390x"
install:
echo " SKIP Bootloader installation due to HOST_ARCH != s390x"
endif
.DEFAULT_GOAL := all
all: $(FILES) $(DEBUG_FILES)
clean:
rm -f -- *.o *.elf *.bin *.map .*.d *.lds *.debug
.PHONY: all clean

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@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
/*
* Common memory layout for stage3a and stage3b bootloader.
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef COMMON_MEMORY_LAYOUT_H
#define COMMON_MEMORY_LAYOUT_H
#include "boot/loaders_layout.h"
#define STACK_ADDRESS STAGE3_STACK_ADDRESS
#define STACK_SIZE STAGE3_STACK_SIZE
#define HEAP_ADDRESS STAGE3_HEAP_ADDRESS
#define HEAP_SIZE STAGE3_HEAP_SIZE
#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
#endif /* COMMON_MEMORY_LAYOUT_H */

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@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
/*
* Entry code for stage 3a and stage 3b boot loader
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include "common_memory_layout.h"
#include "boot/s390.h"
#include "boot/sigp.h"
.section .text.start
.globl _start
_start:
/* Might be called after a diag308 so better set
* architecture and addressing mode
*/
lhi %r1, 1
sigp %r1, %r0, SIGP_SET_ARCHITECTURE
sam64
/* Initialize stack */
basr %r13, 0
.Lbase: llgf %r15, .Lstack - .Lbase(%r13)
brasl %r14, initialize
.Lstack: .long STACK_ADDRESS + STACK_SIZE - STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD
.previous
/* The code doesn't require an executable stack */
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif

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@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
/*
* Main program for stage3a bootloader
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include "libc.h"
#include "stage3a.h"
#include "lib/zt_common.h"
#include "boot/error.h"
#include "boot/s390.h"
#include "boot/ipl.h"
#include "sclp.h"
static volatile struct stage3a_args __section(".loader_parms") loader_parms;
void __noreturn start(void)
{
int rc;
volatile struct stage3a_args *args = &loader_parms;
/* calculate the IPIB memory address */
struct ipl_parameter_block *ipib = (void *)((uint64_t)args + args->ipib_offs);
/* Calculate the PV header memory address and set it and its
* size in the IPIB. This allows the PV header to be position
* independent.
*/
ipib->pv.pv_hdr_addr = (uint64_t)args + args->hdr_offs;
ipib->pv.pv_hdr_size = args->hdr_size;
/* set up ASCII and line-mode */
sclp_setup(SCLP_LINE_ASCII_INIT);
/* test if Secure Execution Unpack facility is available */
stfle(S390_lowcore.stfle_fac_list,
ARRAY_SIZE(S390_lowcore.stfle_fac_list));
rc = test_facility(UNPACK_FACILITY);
if (rc == 0)
panic(ENOPV, "Secure unpack facility is not available\n");
rc = diag308(DIAG308_SET_PV, ipib);
if (rc != DIAG308_RC_OK)
panic(EPV, "Protected boot setup has failed: 0x%x\n", rc);
rc = diag308(DIAG308_UNPACK_PV, 0x0);
if (rc != DIAG308_RC_OK) {
sclp_setup(SCLP_LINE_ASCII_INIT);
panic(EPV, "Protected boot has failed: 0x%x\n", rc);
}
while (1)
;
}
void panic_notify(unsigned long UNUSED(rc))
{
}

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@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
/*
* Main program for stage3a bootloader.
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef STAGE3A_H
#define STAGE3A_H
#include "lib/zt_common.h"
#include "boot/loaders_layout.h"
#define STAGE3A_INIT_ENTRY IMAGE_ENTRY
#define STAGE3A_ENTRY (STAGE3A_INIT_ENTRY + _AC(0x1000, UL))
#define STAGE3A_LOAD_ADDRESS IMAGE_LOAD_ADDRESS
#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
#include <stdint.h>
/* Must not have any padding */
struct stage3a_args {
uint64_t hdr_offs;
uint64_t hdr_size;
uint64_t ipib_offs;
};
STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(struct stage3a_args) == 3 * 8)
#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
#endif /* STAGE3A_H */

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@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
/*
* Memory layout for stage 3a
* ==========================
*
* General memory layout
* ---------------------
*
* 0x00000 - 0x01fff Lowcore
* 0x02000 - 0x05fff Memory allocation (heap)
* 0x0f000 - 0x0ffff Stack
* 0x10000 - 0x10012 Jump to the "actual" stage3a code
* 0x11000 - 0x12fff Stage3a code + arguments (offsets and lengths to the
* actual data: IPIB and UV header)
*/
#include "stage3a.h"
#include "common_memory_layout.h"
OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf64-s390", "elf64-s390", "elf64-s390")
OUTPUT_ARCH(s390:64-bit)
ENTRY(_init)
SECTIONS
{
. = HEAP_ADDRESS;
__heap_start = .;
.heap : {
. = . + HEAP_SIZE;
ASSERT(__heap_stop - __heap_start == HEAP_SIZE,
"Heap section doesn't conform to the described memory layout");
}
__heap_stop = .;
. = STACK_ADDRESS;
__stack_start = .;
.stack : {
. = . + STACK_SIZE;
ASSERT(__stack_end - __stack_start == STACK_SIZE,
"Stack section doesn't conform to the described memory layout");
}
__stack_end = .;
. = STAGE3A_INIT_ENTRY;
__text_init_start = .;
.text : {
*(.text.init)
__text_init_stop = ABSOLUTE(.);
/* Text size of text_init must be smaller than 'PARMAREA - IMAGE_ENTRY',
* otherwise the text data could be overwritten by the original zipl stage3
* boot loader */
ASSERT(__text_init_stop - __text_init_start < PARMAREA - IMAGE_ENTRY,
"Text size must be smaller than 'PARMAREA - IMAGE_ENTRY'");
. = 0x1000;
ASSERT(ABSOLUTE(.) == STAGE3A_ENTRY,
"Text section doesn't conform to the described memory layout");
*(.text.start)
*(.text .text.*)
}
.ex_table ALIGN(16) : {
__ex_table_start = .;
*(.ex_table)
__ex_table_stop = .;
}
.bss ALIGN(16) : {
__bss_start = .;
*(.bss)
__bss_stop = .;
}
.rodata ALIGN(16) : {
*(.rodata)
*(.rodata*)
}
.data ALIGN(16) : {
*(.data)
. = ALIGN(16);
/* The IPIB offset and the UV header offset and size will be
* saved in 'loader_parms' */
__loader_parms_start = .;
KEEP(*(.loader_parms));
__loader_parms_stop = .;
ASSERT(__loader_parms_stop - __loader_parms_start == 3 * 8,
"Data size must be equal to 'sizeof(struct stage3a_args)'");
ASSERT(ABSOLUTE(.) < 0x13000, "Data section doesn't conform to the described memory layout");
}
/* Sections to be discarded */
/DISCARD/ : {
*(.eh_frame)
*(.interp)
*(.note.GNU-stack)
*(.note.package)
}
}

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@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
/*
* Entry code for stage 3a boot loader
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include "stage3a.h"
#include "boot/sigp.h"
.section .text.init
.globl _init
_init:
/* set architecture and switch to 64bit */
lhi %r1, 1
sigp %r1, %r0, SIGP_SET_ARCHITECTURE
sam64
/* The original stage3 boot loader will try to store the
* kernel command line and the address and size of the
* ramdisk. Simply ignore this by starting at 0x11000.
*/
basr %r13, 0
.Lbase: llgf %r1, .Lstage3a_entry - .Lbase(%r13)
br %r1
.Lstage3a_entry: .long STAGE3A_ENTRY
.previous
/* The code doesn't require an executable stack */
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif

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@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
/*
* Main program for stage3b bootloader
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include "libc.h"
#include "stage3b.h"
#include "lib/zt_common.h"
#include "boot/psw.h"
#include "boot/error.h"
#include "boot/s390.h"
#include "boot/linux_layout.h"
#include "boot/loaders_layout.h"
#include "sclp.h"
static volatile struct stage3b_args __section(".loader_parms") loader_parms;
static inline void __noreturn load_psw(struct psw_t psw)
{
asm volatile("lpswe %0" : : "Q"(psw) : "cc");
while (1)
;
}
static unsigned long get_kernel_cmdline_size(void)
{
unsigned long size = *(volatile unsigned long *)MAX_COMMAND_LINE_SIZE;
if (size != 0)
return size;
return LEGACY_COMMAND_LINE_SIZE;
}
void __noreturn start(void)
{
volatile struct stage3b_args *args = &loader_parms;
volatile struct memblob *kernel = &args->kernel;
volatile struct memblob *cmdline = &args->cmdline;
volatile struct memblob *initrd = &args->initrd;
struct psw_t psw = args->psw;
/* set up ASCII and line-mode */
sclp_setup(SCLP_LINE_ASCII_INIT);
if (kernel->size < IMAGE_LOAD_ADDRESS)
panic(EINTERNAL, "Invalid kernel\n");
/* move the kernel and cut the kernel header */
memmove((void *)IMAGE_LOAD_ADDRESS,
(void *)(kernel->src + IMAGE_LOAD_ADDRESS),
kernel->size - IMAGE_LOAD_ADDRESS);
if (cmdline->size > get_kernel_cmdline_size())
panic(EINTERNAL, "Command line is too large\n");
if (cmdline->size > 0) {
/* make sure the cmdline is a null-terminated string */
if (((char *)cmdline->src)[cmdline->size - 1] != '\0')
panic(EINTERNAL, "Command line needs to be null-terminated\n");
/* move the kernel cmdline */
memmove((void *)COMMAND_LINE, (void *)cmdline->src, cmdline->size);
}
/* the initrd does not need to be moved */
if (initrd->size > 0) {
/* copy initrd start address and size into new kernel space */
*(unsigned long long *)INITRD_START = initrd->src;
*(unsigned long long *)INITRD_SIZE = initrd->size;
}
/* disable ASCII and line-mode */
sclp_setup(SCLP_DISABLE);
/* use lpswe instead of diag308 as a I/O subsystem reset is not
* needed as this was already done by the diag308 subcode 10 call
* in stage3a
*/
load_psw(psw);
}
void panic_notify(unsigned long UNUSED(rc))
{
}

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@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
/*
* Main program for stage3b bootloader
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef STAGE3B_H
#define STAGE3B_H
#include "lib/zt_common.h"
#include "boot/loaders_layout.h"
#define STAGE3B_ENTRY STAGE3_ENTRY
#define STAGE3B_LOAD_ADDRESS STAGE3B_ENTRY
#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
#include <stdint.h>
#include "boot/psw.h"
/* Must not have any padding included */
struct memblob {
uint64_t src;
uint64_t size;
};
STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(struct memblob) == 2 * 8)
/* Must not have any padding included */
struct stage3b_args {
struct memblob kernel;
struct memblob cmdline;
struct memblob initrd;
struct psw_t psw;
};
STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(struct stage3b_args) == 3 * sizeof(struct memblob) + 16)
#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
#endif /* STAGE3B_H */

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@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
/*
* Memory layout for stage 3b
* ==========================
*
* General memory layout
* ---------------------
*
* 0x00000 - 0x01fff Lowcore
* 0x02000 - 0x05fff Memory allocation (heap)
* 0x0a000 - 0x0efff Stage3b code
* 0x0f000 - 0x0ffff Stack
*/
#include "stage3b.h"
#include "common_memory_layout.h"
OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf64-s390", "elf64-s390", "elf64-s390")
OUTPUT_ARCH(s390:64-bit)
ENTRY(_start)
SECTIONS
{
. = HEAP_ADDRESS;
__heap_start = .;
.heap : {
. = . + HEAP_SIZE;
ASSERT(__heap_stop - __heap_start == HEAP_SIZE,
"Heap section doesn't conform to the described memory layout");
}
__heap_stop = .;
. = STAGE3B_ENTRY;
.text : {
*(.text.start)
*(.text .text.*)
}
.ex_table ALIGN(16) : {
__ex_table_start = .;
*(.ex_table)
__ex_table_stop = .;
}
.bss ALIGN(16) : {
__bss_start = .;
*(.bss)
__bss_stop = .;
}
.rodata ALIGN(16) : {
*(.rodata)
*(.rodata*)
}
.data ALIGN(16) : {
*(.data)
. = ALIGN(16);
__loader_parms_start = .;
KEEP(*(.loader_parms));
__loader_parms_end = .;
ASSERT(__loader_parms_end - __loader_parms_start == 3 * 16 + 16,
"Data size must be equal to 'sizeof(struct stage3b_args)'");
}
. = STACK_ADDRESS;
__stack_start = .;
.stack : {
. = . + STACK_SIZE;
ASSERT(__stack_end - __stack_start == STACK_SIZE,
"Stack section doesn't conform to the described memory layout");
}
__stack_end = .;
ASSERT(. <= IMAGE_ENTRY, "stage3b size must be smaller than 0x10000 bytes")
/* Sections to be discarded */
/DISCARD/ : {
*(.eh_frame)
*(.interp)
*(.note.GNU-stack)
*(.note.package)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
/*
* Relocator code for stage 3b boot loader
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include "stage3b.h"
#include "boot/sigp.h"
.macro MEMCPY dst,src,len
lgr %r0, \dst
lgr %r1, \len
lgr %r2, \src
lgr %r3, \len
20: mvcle %r0, %r2, 0
jo 20b
.endm
.org 0x0
.section .text.start
.globl _start
_start:
/* Might be called after a diag308 so better set
* architecture and addressing mode
*/
lhi %r1, 1
sigp %r1, %r0, SIGP_SET_ARCHITECTURE
sam64
/* Location of stage3b in memory */
larl %r8, stage3b_start
/* Destination for stage3b */
basr %r13, 0
.Lbase: llgf %r9, .Lstage3b_load_address - .Lbase(%r13)
/* Size of stage3b */
lghi %r11, stage3b_end - stage3b_start
/* Copy the stage3b loader to address STAGE3B_LOAD_ADDRESS */
MEMCPY %r9, %r8, %r11
/* Branch to STAGE3B_ENTRY */
llgf %r9, .Lstage3b_entry - .Lbase(%r13)
br %r9
.Lstage3b_load_address: .long STAGE3B_LOAD_ADDRESS
.Lstage3b_entry: .long STAGE3B_ENTRY
stage3b_start:
.incbin "stage3b.bin"
stage3b_end:
.previous
/* The code doesn't require an executable stack */
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif

View File

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf64-s390", "elf64-s390", "elf64-s390")
OUTPUT_ARCH(s390:64-bit)
ENTRY(_start)
SECTIONS
{
.text : {
*(.text.start)
*(.text .text.*)
}
/* Sections to be discarded */
/DISCARD/ : {
*(.eh_frame)
*(.interp)
*(.note.GNU-stack)
*(.note.package)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# Common definitions
include ../../common.mak
all:
install:
$(INSTALL) -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/man1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 -c genprotimg.1 $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/man1
clean:
.PHONY: all install clean

View File

@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
.\" Copyright 2020 IBM Corp.
.\" s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
.\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
.\"
.TH GENPROTIMG 1 "May 2022" "s390-tools"
.SH NAME
genprotimg \- Create a protected virtualization image
.SH SYNOPSIS
.SY
.B genprotimg
\fB\-k\fR \fIHOST_KEY_DOCUMENT\fR...
\fB\-C\fR \fICERTIFICATE\fR...
\fB\-i\fR \fIVMLINUZ\fR
[\fB\-r\fR \fIRAMDISK\fR]
[\fB\-p\fR \fIPARMFILE\fR]
\fB\-o\fR \fIOUTFILE\fR
[\fIOPTION\fR]...
.YS
.SH DESCRIPTION
.PP
Use \fBgenprotimg\fR to generate a single bootable image file with
encrypted and integrity-protected parts. The command requires a kernel
image, a host-key document, certificates for the host-key document
verification, and an output file name. Optionally, specify an initial
RAM filesystem, and a file containing the kernel parameters. If the
command should be run offline, use the \fB\-\-offline\fR option and
specify the certificate revocation lists (CRLs) by using the
\fB\-\-crl\fR option. Should special circumstances require it, you can
optionally specify your own keys for the encryption by using the
experimental options. For all certificates, CRLs, and host-key
documents, both the PEM and DER input formats are supported. In the
resulting image file, a plain text boot loader, the encrypted
components for kernel, initial RAM disk, kernel parameters, and the
encrypted and integrity-protected header are concatenated. The header
contains metadata necessary for running the guest in protected mode.
.PP
Use this image file as a kernel image for zipl or for a direct kernel
boot using QEMU.
.SH OPTIONS
.TP
\fB\-h\fR, \fB\-\-help\fR
Prints usage information, then exits.
.TP
\fB\-\-help-experimental\fR
Prints experimental usage information, then exits.
.TP
\fB\-\-help-all\fR
Prints all usage information, then exits.
.TP
\fB\-V\fR, \fB\-\-verbose\fR
Provides more detailed output.
.TP
\fB\-k\fR, \fB\-\-host-key-document\fR=\fI\,HOST_KEY_DOCUMENT\/\fR
Specifies a host-key document. At least one is required. Specify this
option multiple times to enable the image to run on more than one
host.
.TP
\fB\-C\fR, \fB\-\-cert\fR=\fI\,FILE\/\fR
Specifies the certificate that is used to establish a chain of trust
for the verification of the host-key documents. Specify this option
twice to specify the IBM Z signing key and the intermediate CA
certificate (signed by the root CA).
Required. Ignored if \fB--no-verify\fP is specified.
.TP
\fB\-o\fR, \fB\-\-output\fR=\fI\,OUTPUT_FILE\/\fR
Specifies the output file. Required.
.TP
\fB\-i\fR, \fB\-\-image\fR=\fI\,VMLINUZ\/\fR
Specifies the Linux kernel image file. Required.
.TP
\fB\-r\fR, \fB\-\-ramdisk\fR=\fI\,RAMDISK\/\fR
Specifies the RAM disk image. Optional.
.TP
\fB\-p\fR, \fB\-\-parmfile\fR=\fI\,PARMFILE\/\fR
Specifies the kernel command line stored in \fI\,PARMFILE\/\fR. Optional.
.TP
\fB\-\-crl\fR=\fI\,FILE\/\fR
Specifies the revocation list that is used to check whether a
certificate of the chain of trust is revoked. Specify this option
multiple times to use multiple CRLs. Optional.
.TP
\fB\-\-offline\fR
Specifies offline mode, in which no attempt is made to download
CRLs. Optional.
.TP
\fB\-\-root\-ca\fR=\fI\,FILE\/\fR
Specifies the root CA certificate for the verification. If omitted,
the system wide root CAs installed on the system is used. Use
this only if you trust the specified certificate. Optional.
.TP
\fB\-\-no-verify\fR
Does not require the host-key documents to be valid.
Do not use for a production image unless you verified
the host-key document before. Optional.
.TP
\fB\-\-comm\-key\fR=\fI\,FILE\/\fR
Specifies the customer communication key (CCK). This key is used for the
PV guest dump encryption and to derive the CCK-derived extension secret
used for add-secret requests. Use a secure, random, plaintext AES-256
GCM key. Optional.
.TP
\fB\-\-enable\-dump\fR
Enable PV guest dumps. Requires the \fB\-\-comm\-key\fR option. Optional.
.TP
\fB\-\-disable\-dump\fR
Disable PV guest dumps. This is the default.
.TP
\fB\-\-enable\-cck\-extension\-secret\fR
Add-secret requests must provide an extension secret that matches the
CCK-derived extension secret. Requires the \fB\-\-comm\-key\fR option.
Optional.
.TP
\fB\-\-disable\-cck\-extension\-secret\fR
Add-secret requests don't have to provide an extension secret. This is
the default.
.TP
\fB\-\-enable\-pckmo\fR
Enable the support for the DEA, TDEA, AES, and ECC PCKMO key encryption
functions. This is the default.
.TP
\fB\-\-disable\-pckmo\fR
Disable the support for the DEA, TDEA, AES, and ECC PCKMO key encryption
functions. Optional.
.TP
\fB\-v\fR, \fB\-\-version\fR
Prints version information, then exits.
.SH EXAMPLES
These are examples to generate a protected virtualization image in
\fI\,/boot/vmlinuz.pv\/\fR, using the kernel file \fI\,vmlinuz\/\fR, the
initrd in \fI\,initramfs\/\fR, the kernel parameters contained in
\fI\,parmfile\/\fR, the intermediate CA in \fI\,DigiCertCA.crt\/\fR, the
IBM Z signing key in \fI\,ibm-z-host-key-signing.crt\/\fR, and the
host-key document in \fI\,host_key.crt\/\fR. An AES-256 GCM key is stored in
\fI\,comm-key\/\fR, which is used for the PV guest dump support in the second
example.
Generate a protected virtualization image:
.PP
.B genprotimg \-i \fI\,vmlinuz\/\fR \-r \fI\,initramfs\/\fR \-p \fI\,parmfile\/\fR \-k \fI\,host_key.crt\/\fR \-C \fI\,ibm-z-host-key-signing.crt\/\fR \-C \fI\,DigiCertCA.crt\fR \-o \fI\,/boot/vmlinuz.pv\/\fR
Generate a protected virtualization image with PV guest dump support:
.PP
.B genprotimg \-i \fI\,vmlinuz\/\fR \-r \fI\,initramfs\/\fR \-p \fI\,parmfile\/\fR \-k \fI\,host_key.crt\/\fR \-C \fI\,ibm-z-host-key-signing.crt\/\fR \-C \fI\,DigiCertCA.crt\fR \-o \fI\,/boot/vmlinuz.pv\/\fR \-\-enable\-dump \-\-comm\-key \fI\,comm-key\fR
.SH NOTES
.IP "1." 4
An ELF file cannot be used as a Linux kernel image.
.IP "2." 4
Remember to re-run \fBzipl\fR after updating a protected
virtualization image.
.SH SEE ALSO
\&\fBzipl\fR\|(5), \fBqemu\fR\|(1)

View File

@@ -1,303 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
#
# check_hostkeydoc - Verify an IBM Secure Execution host key document
#
# Sample script to verify that a host key document is genuine by
# verifying the issuer, the validity date and the signature.
# Optionally verify the full trust chain using a CA certificate.
#
# Sample invocation:
#
# ./check_hostkeydoc HKD1234.crt ibm-z-host-key-signing.crt -c DigiCertCA.crt -r ibm-z-host-key.crl
#
# Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
#
# s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
# Allocate temporary files
ISSUER_PUBKEY_FILE=$(mktemp)
SIGNATURE_FILE=$(mktemp)
BODY_FILE=$(mktemp)
ISSUER_DN_FILE=$(mktemp)
SUBJECT_DN_FILE=$(mktemp)
DEF_ISSUER_ARMONK_DN_FILE=$(mktemp)
DEF_ISSUER_POUGHKEEPSIE_DN_FILE=$(mktemp)
CANONICAL_ISSUER_DN_FILE=$(mktemp)
CRL_SERIAL_FILE=$(mktemp)
# Cleanup on exit
cleanup()
{
rm -f "$ISSUER_PUBKEY_FILE" "$SIGNATURE_FILE" "$BODY_FILE" \
"$ISSUER_DN_FILE" "$SUBJECT_DN_FILE" "$DEF_ISSUER_ARMONK_DN_FILE" "$DEF_ISSUER_POUGHKEEPSIE_DN_FILE" \
"$CANONICAL_ISSUER_DN_FILE" "$CRL_SERIAL_FILE"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
# Enhanced error checking for bash
if [ -n "${BASH}" ]; then
# shellcheck disable=SC3040
set -o posix
# shellcheck disable=SC3040
set -o pipefail
# shellcheck disable=SC3040
set -o nounset
fi
set -e
# Usage
usage()
{
cat <<-EOF
Usage: $(basename "$1") [-d] [-c CA-cert] [-r CRL] host-key-doc signing-key-cert
Verify an IBM Secure Execution host key document against
a signing key.
Options:
-d disable default issuer check of host-key-doc
-c CA-cert trusted CA certificate
-r CRL list of revoked host-key-docs
Note that in order to have the full trust chain verified
it is necessary to provide the issuing CA's certificate.
The default issuer check may be disabled if a non-default
signing key certificate needs to be verified against the
CA certificate.
EOF
}
check_verify_chain()
{
# Verify certificate chain in case a CA certificate file/bundle
# was specified on the command line.
if [ -z "$2" ]; then
cat >&2 <<-EOF
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
No CA certificate specified! Skipping trust chain verification.
Make sure that '$1' is a valid certificate.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
EOF
else
openssl verify -crl_download -crl_check "$2" &&
openssl verify -crl_download -crl_check -untrusted "$2" "$1" ||
exit 1
fi
}
extract_pubkey()
{
openssl x509 -in "$1" -pubkey -noout >"$2"
}
extract_signature()
{
# Assuming that the last field is the signature
SIGOFFSET=$(openssl asn1parse -in "$1" | tail -1 | cut -d : -f 1)
openssl asn1parse -in "$1" -out "$2" -strparse "$SIGOFFSET" -noout
}
extract_body()
{
# Assuming that the first field is the full cert body
SIGOFFSET=$(openssl asn1parse -in "$1" | head -2 | tail -1 | cut -d : -f 1)
openssl asn1parse -in "$1" -out "$2" -strparse "$SIGOFFSET" -noout
}
verify_signature()
{
# Assuming that the signature algorithm is SHA512 with RSA
openssl sha512 -verify "$1" -signature "$2" "$3"
}
canonical_dn()
{
OBJTYPE=$1
OBJ=$2
DNTYPE=$3
OUTPUT=$4
openssl "$OBJTYPE" -in "$OBJ" -"$DNTYPE" -noout -nameopt multiline |
LC_ALL=C sort | grep -v "$DNTYPE"= >"$OUTPUT"
}
default_issuer_armonk()
{
cat <<-EOF
commonName = International Business Machines Corporation
countryName = US
localityName = Armonk
organizationName = International Business Machines Corporation
organizationalUnitName = Key Signing Service
stateOrProvinceName = New York
EOF
}
default_issuer_pougkeepsie()
{
cat <<-EOF
commonName = International Business Machines Corporation
countryName = US
localityName = Poughkeepsie
organizationName = International Business Machines Corporation
organizationalUnitName = Key Signing Service
stateOrProvinceName = New York
EOF
}
# As organizationalUnitName can have an arbitrary prefix but must
# end with "Key Signing Service" let's normalize the OU name by
# stripping off the prefix
verify_default_issuer()
{
default_issuer_pougkeepsie >"$DEF_ISSUER_POUGHKEEPSIE_DN_FILE"
default_issuer_armonk >"$DEF_ISSUER_ARMONK_DN_FILE"
sed "s/\(^[ ]*organizationalUnitName[ ]*=[ ]*\).*\(Key Signing Service$\)/\1\2/" \
"$ISSUER_DN_FILE" >"$CANONICAL_ISSUER_DN_FILE"
if ! {
diff "$CANONICAL_ISSUER_DN_FILE" "$DEF_ISSUER_POUGHKEEPSIE_DN_FILE" ||
diff "$CANONICAL_ISSUER_DN_FILE" "$DEF_ISSUER_ARMONK_DN_FILE"
} >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo Incorrect default issuer >&2 && exit 1
fi
}
verify_issuer_files()
{
if [ "$1" -eq 1 ]; then
verify_default_issuer
fi
}
cert_time()
{
DATE=$(openssl x509 -in "$1" -"$2" -noout | sed "s/^.*=//")
date -d "$DATE" +%s
}
crl_time()
{
DATE=$(openssl crl -in "$1" -"$2" -noout | sed "s/^.*=//")
date -d "$DATE" +%s
}
verify_dates()
{
START="$1"
END="$2"
MSG="${3:-Certificate}"
NOW=$(date +%s)
if [ "$START" -le "$NOW" ] && [ "$NOW" -le "$END" ]; then
echo "${MSG} dates are OK"
else
echo "${MSG} date verification failed" >&2 && exit 1
fi
}
crl_serials()
{
openssl crl -in "$1" -text -noout |
grep "Serial Number" >"$CRL_SERIAL_FILE"
}
check_serial()
{
CERT_SERIAL=$(openssl x509 -in "$1" -noout -serial | cut -d = -f 2)
grep -q "$CERT_SERIAL" "$CRL_SERIAL_FILE"
}
check_file()
{
[ -e "$1" ] ||
(echo "File '$1' not found" >&2 && exit 1)
}
# check args
CRL_FILE=
CA_FILE=
CHECK_DEFAULT_ISSUER=1
while getopts 'dr:c:h' opt; do
case $opt in
d) CHECK_DEFAULT_ISSUER=0 ;;
r) CRL_FILE=$OPTARG ;;
c) CA_FILE=$OPTARG ;;
h)
usage "$0"
exit 0
;;
?)
usage "$0"
exit 1
;;
esac
done
shift "$((OPTIND - 1))"
if [ $# -ne 2 ]; then
usage "$0" >&2
exit 1
fi
HKD_FILE=$1
HKSK_FILE=$2
# Check whether all specified files exist
check_file "$HKD_FILE"
check_file "$HKSK_FILE"
# CA and CRL are optional arguments
[ -n "$CA_FILE" ] && check_file "$CA_FILE"
[ -n "$CRL_FILE" ] && check_file "$CRL_FILE"
# Check trust chain
check_verify_chain "$HKSK_FILE" "$CA_FILE"
# Verify host key document signature
printf "Checking host key document signature: "
extract_pubkey "$HKSK_FILE" "$ISSUER_PUBKEY_FILE" &&
extract_signature "$HKD_FILE" "$SIGNATURE_FILE" &&
extract_body "$HKD_FILE" "$BODY_FILE" &&
verify_signature "$ISSUER_PUBKEY_FILE" "$SIGNATURE_FILE" "$BODY_FILE" ||
exit 1
# Verify the issuer
canonical_dn x509 "$HKD_FILE" issuer "$ISSUER_DN_FILE"
canonical_dn x509 "$HKSK_FILE" subject "$SUBJECT_DN_FILE"
verify_issuer_files $CHECK_DEFAULT_ISSUER
# Verify dates
verify_dates "$(cert_time "$HKD_FILE" startdate)" "$(cert_time "$HKD_FILE" enddate)"
# Check CRL if specified
if [ -n "$CRL_FILE" ]; then
printf "Checking CRL signature: "
extract_signature "$CRL_FILE" "$SIGNATURE_FILE" &&
extract_body "$CRL_FILE" "$BODY_FILE" &&
verify_signature "$ISSUER_PUBKEY_FILE" "$SIGNATURE_FILE" "$BODY_FILE" ||
exit 1
printf "CRL "
canonical_dn crl "$CRL_FILE" issuer "$ISSUER_DN_FILE"
canonical_dn x509 "$HKSK_FILE" subject "$SUBJECT_DN_FILE"
verify_issuer_files $CHECK_DEFAULT_ISSUER
verify_dates "$(crl_time "$CRL_FILE" lastupdate)" "$(crl_time "$CRL_FILE" nextupdate)" 'CRL'
crl_serials "$CRL_FILE"
check_serial "$HKD_FILE" &&
echo "Certificate is revoked, do not use it anymore!" >&2 &&
exit 1
fi
# We made it
echo All checks requested for \'"$HKD_FILE"\' were successful

View File

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
# Common definitions
include ../../common.mak
bin_PROGRAM = genprotimg
PKGDATADIR ?= $(TOOLS_DATADIR)/genprotimg
SRC_DIR := $(dir $(realpath $(firstword $(MAKEFILE_LIST))))
TOP_SRCDIR := $(SRC_DIR)/../
ROOT_DIR = $(TOP_SRC_DIR)/../../
ZIPL_DIR = $(ROOT_DIR)/zipl
LOADER_DIR = $(TOP_SRCDIR)/boot
INCLUDE_PATHS = $(SRC_DIR) $(TOP_SRCDIR) $(ROOTDIR)/include
INCLUDE_PARMS = $(addprefix -I,$(INCLUDE_PATHS))
WARNINGS := -Wall -Wextra -Wshadow \
-Wcast-align -Wwrite-strings -Wmissing-prototypes \
-Wmissing-declarations -Wredundant-decls -Wnested-externs \
-Wno-long-long -Wuninitialized -Wconversion -Wstrict-prototypes \
-Wpointer-arith -Wno-error=inline \
$(NULL)
$(bin_PROGRAM)_SRCS := $(bin_PROGRAM).c pv/pv_stage3.c pv/pv_image.c \
pv/pv_comp.c pv/pv_hdr.c pv/pv_ipib.c utils/crypto.c utils/file_utils.c \
pv/pv_args.c utils/buffer.c pv/pv_comps.c pv/pv_error.c \
pv/pv_opt_item.c utils/curl.c \
$(NULL)
$(bin_PROGRAM)_OBJS := $($(bin_PROGRAM)_SRCS:.c=.o)
ALL_CFLAGS += -DPKGDATADIR=$(PKGDATADIR) \
$(GLIB2_CFLAGS) $(LIBCRYPTO_CFLAGS) $(LIBCURL_CFLAGS) \
-DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L \
$(WARNINGS) \
$(NULL)
ALL_CPPFLAGS += $(INCLUDE_PARMS)
LDLIBS += $(GLIB2_LIBS) $(LIBCRYPTO_LIBS) $(LIBCURL_LIBS)
GLIB2_CFLAGS := $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --silence-errors --cflags glib-2.0)
GLIB2_LIBS := $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --silence-errors --libs glib-2.0)
LIBCRYPTO_CFLAGS := $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --silence-errors --cflags libcrypto)
LIBCRYPTO_LIBS := $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --silence-errors --libs libcrypto)
LIBCURL_CFLAGS := $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --silence-errors --cflags libcurl)
LIBCURL_LIBS := $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --silence-errors --libs libcurl)
BUILD_TARGETS := skip-$(bin_PROGRAM)
INSTALL_TARGETS := skip-$(bin_PROGRAM)
ifneq (${HAVE_OPENSSL},0)
ifneq (${HAVE_GLIB2},0)
ifneq (${HAVE_LIBCURL},0)
BUILD_TARGETS := $(bin_PROGRAM)
INSTALL_TARGETS := install-$(bin_PROGRAM)
endif
endif
endif
all: $(BUILD_TARGETS)
install: $(INSTALL_TARGETS)
$(bin_PROGRAM): $($(bin_PROGRAM)_OBJS)
skip-$(bin_PROGRAM):
echo " SKIP $(bin_PROGRAM) due to unresolved dependencies"
install-$(bin_PROGRAM): $(bin_PROGRAM)
$(INSTALL) -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(USRBINDIR)
$(INSTALL) -c $^ $(DESTDIR)$(USRBINDIR)
clean:
$(RM) -f $($(bin_PROGRAM)_OBJS) $(bin_PROGRAM) .check-dep-$(bin_PROGRAM) .detect-openssl.dep.c
.PHONY: all install clean skip-$(bin_PROGRAM) install-$(bin_PROGRAM)
$($(bin_PROGRAM)_OBJS): .check-dep-$(bin_PROGRAM)
.detect-openssl.dep.c:
echo "#include <openssl/evp.h>" > $@
echo "#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L" >> $@
echo " #error openssl version 1.1.0 is required" >> $@
echo "#endif" >> $@
echo "static void __attribute__((unused)) test(void) {" >> $@
echo " EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();" >> $@
echo " EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);" >> $@
echo "}" >> $@
.check-dep-$(bin_PROGRAM): .detect-openssl.dep.c
$(call check_dep, \
"$(bin_PROGRAM)", \
"glib.h", \
"glib2-devel / libglib2.0-dev", \
"HAVE_GLIB2=0")
$(call check_dep, \
"$(bin_PROGRAM)", \
$^, \
"openssl-devel / libssl-dev version >= 1.1.0", \
"HAVE_OPENSSL=0", \
"-I.")
$(call check_dep, \
"$(bin_PROGRAM)", \
"curl/curl.h", \
"libcurl-devel", \
"HAVE_LIBCURL=0")
touch $@

View File

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020, 2022
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef COMMON_H
#define COMMON_H
#define GETTEXT_PACKAGE "genprotimg"
#include <glib.h>
#include <glib/gi18n.h>
#include "boot/linux_layout.h"
#include "lib/zt_common.h"
static const gchar tool_name[] = "genprotimg";
static const gchar copyright_notice[] = "Copyright IBM Corp. 2020";
/* default values */
#define GENPROTIMG_STAGE3A_PATH (STRINGIFY(PKGDATADIR) "/stage3a.bin")
#define GENPROTIMG_STAGE3B_PATH (STRINGIFY(PKGDATADIR) "/stage3b_reloc.bin")
#define DEFAULT_INITIAL_PSW_ADDR IMAGE_ENTRY
#define DEFAULT_INITIAL_PSW_MASK (PSW_MASK_EA | PSW_MASK_BA)
#define DO_PRAGMA(x) _Pragma(#x)
# ifdef __clang__
# define WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(...) \
DO_PRAGMA(clang diagnostic push) \
DO_PRAGMA(clang diagnostic ignored "-Wunused-function") \
G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(__VA_ARGS__) \
DO_PRAGMA(clang diagnostic pop)
# else
# define WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(...) \
G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(__VA_ARGS__)
# endif
#endif

View File

@@ -1,200 +0,0 @@
/*
* genprotimg - build relocatable secure images
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <glib.h>
#include <glib/gstdio.h>
#include <glib/gtypes.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "pv/pv_args.h"
#include "pv/pv_image.h"
#include "utils/crypto.h"
#include "utils/curl.h"
enum {
LOG_LEVEL_CRITICAL = 0,
LOG_LEVEL_INFO = 1,
LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG = 2,
};
static gint log_level = LOG_LEVEL_CRITICAL;
static gchar *tmp_dir;
static void rmdir_recursive(gchar *dir_path, GError **err)
{
const gchar *file = NULL;
g_autoptr(GDir) d = NULL;
if (!dir_path)
return;
d = g_dir_open(dir_path, 0, err);
if (!d) {
g_set_error(err, G_FILE_ERROR,
(gint)g_file_error_from_errno(errno),
_("Failed to open directory '%s': %s"), dir_path,
g_strerror(errno));
return;
}
while ((file = g_dir_read_name(d)) != NULL) {
g_autofree gchar *file_path =
g_build_filename(dir_path, file, NULL);
/* ignore error */
(void)g_unlink(file_path);
}
if (g_rmdir(dir_path) != 0) {
g_set_error(err, G_FILE_ERROR,
(gint)g_file_error_from_errno(errno),
_("Failed to remove directory '%s': %s"), dir_path,
g_strerror(errno));
return;
}
}
static void sig_term_handler(int signal G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
rmdir_recursive(tmp_dir, NULL);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
static void log_handler_cb(const gchar *log_domain G_GNUC_UNUSED,
GLogLevelFlags level, const gchar *message,
gpointer user_data G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
const gchar *prefix = "";
/* filter out messages depending on debugging level */
if ((level & G_LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG) && log_level < LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG)
return;
if ((level & G_LOG_LEVEL_INFO) && log_level < LOG_LEVEL_INFO)
return;
if (level & G_LOG_LEVEL_WARNING)
prefix = "WARNING: ";
if (level & G_LOG_LEVEL_ERROR)
prefix = "ERROR: ";
if (level & (G_LOG_LEVEL_WARNING | G_LOG_LEVEL_ERROR))
g_printerr("%s%s\n", prefix, message);
else
g_print("%s%s\n", prefix, message);
}
static void setup_prgname(const gchar *name)
{
g_set_prgname(name);
g_set_application_name(_(name));
}
static void setup_handler(const gint *signals, const gsize signals_n)
{
/* set up logging handler */
g_log_set_handler(NULL,
G_LOG_LEVEL_MASK | G_LOG_FLAG_FATAL |
G_LOG_FLAG_RECURSION,
log_handler_cb, NULL);
/* set signal handler */
for (gsize i = 0; i < signals_n; i++)
signal(signals[i], sig_term_handler);
}
static void remove_signal_handler(const gint *signals, const gsize signals_n)
{
for (gsize i = 0; i < signals_n; i++)
signal(signals[i], SIG_DFL);
}
static void __attribute__((constructor)) __init(void);
static void __attribute__((destructor)) __cleanup(void);
gint main(gint argc, gchar *argv[])
{
g_autoptr(PvArgs) args = pv_args_new();
gint signals[] = { SIGINT, SIGTERM };
g_autoptr(PvImage) img = NULL;
gint ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
GError *err = NULL;
setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "");
setup_prgname(tool_name);
setup_handler(signals, G_N_ELEMENTS(signals));
if (pv_args_parse_options(args, &argc, &argv, &err) < 0)
goto error;
/* set new log level */
log_level = args->log_level;
/* if the user has not specified a temporary directory let's
* create one
*/
if (!args->tmp_dir) {
tmp_dir = g_dir_make_tmp("genprotimg-XXXXXX", &err);
if (!tmp_dir)
goto error;
args->tmp_dir = g_strdup(tmp_dir);
}
/* allocate and initialize ``pv_img`` data structure */
img = pv_img_new(args, GENPROTIMG_STAGE3A_PATH, &err);
if (!img)
goto error;
/* add user components: `args->comps` must be sorted by the
* component type => by memory address
*/
for (GSList *iterator = args->comps; iterator; iterator = iterator->next) {
const PvArg *arg = iterator->data;
if (pv_img_add_component(img, arg, &err) < 0)
goto error;
}
if (pv_img_finalize(img, GENPROTIMG_STAGE3B_PATH, &err) < 0)
goto error;
if (pv_img_write(img, args->output_path, &err) < 0)
goto error;
ret = EXIT_SUCCESS;
error:
if (err) {
fputs(err->message, stderr);
fputc('\n', stderr);
g_clear_error(&err);
}
rmdir_recursive(tmp_dir, NULL);
remove_signal_handler(signals, G_N_ELEMENTS(signals));
g_free(tmp_dir);
g_clear_pointer(&img, pv_img_free);
g_clear_pointer(&args, pv_args_free);
exit(ret);
}
static void __init(void)
{
pv_crypto_init();
if (curl_init() != 0)
g_abort();
}
static void __cleanup(void)
{
curl_cleanup();
pv_crypto_cleanup();
}

View File

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV cryptography related definitions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_CRYPTO_DEF_H
#define PV_CRYPTO_DEF_H
#include <stdint.h>
#include "lib/zt_common.h"
/* IBM signing key subject */
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_COMMON_NAME "International Business Machines Corporation"
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_COUNTRY_NAME "US"
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_POUGHKEEPSIE "Poughkeepsie"
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_ARMONK "Armonk"
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_ORGANIZATIONONAL_UNIT_NAME_SUFFIX "Key Signing Service"
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_ORGANIZATION_NAME "International Business Machines Corporation"
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_STATE "New York"
#define PV_IMB_Z_SUBJECT_ENTRY_COUNT 6
/* Minimum security level for the keys/certificates used to establish a chain of
* trust (see https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level.html
* for details).
*/
#define PV_CERTS_SECURITY_LEVEL 2
union ecdh_pub_key {
struct {
uint8_t x[80];
uint8_t y[80];
};
uint8_t data[160];
} __packed;
#endif

View File

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV header definitions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_HDR_DEF_H
#define PV_HDR_DEF_H
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include "boot/psw.h"
#include "lib/zt_common.h"
#include "utils/crypto.h"
#include "pv_crypto_def.h"
/* Magic number which is used to identify the file containing the PV
* header
*/
#define PV_MAGIC_NUMBER 0x49424d5365634578ULL
#define PV_VERSION_1 0x00000100U
/* Internal helper macro */
#define __PV_BIT(nr) (1ULL << (63 - (nr)))
/* Plaintext control flags */
#define PV_PCF_ALLOW_DUMPING __PV_BIT(34) /* dumping of the configuration is allowed */
#define PV_PCF_NO_DECRYPTION __PV_BIT(35) /* prevent Ultravisor decryption during unpack operation */
#define PV_PCF_PCKMO_DEA_TDEA __PV_BIT(56) /* PCKMO encrypt-DEA/TDEA-key functions allowed */
#define PV_PCF_PCKMO_AES __PV_BIT(57) /* PCKMO encrypt-AES-key functions allowed */
#define PV_PCF_PCKM_ECC __PV_BIT(58) /* PCKMO encrypt-ECC-key functions allowed */
/* Secret control flags */
#define PV_SCF_CCK_EXTENSION_SECRET_ENFORCMENT \
__PV_BIT(1) /* All add-secret requests must provide an extension secret */
/* maxima for the PV version 1 */
#define PV_V1_IPIB_MAX_SIZE PAGE_SIZE
#define PV_V1_PV_HDR_MAX_SIZE (2 * PAGE_SIZE)
typedef struct pv_hdr_key_slot {
uint8_t digest_key[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
uint8_t wrapped_key[32];
uint8_t tag[AES_256_GCM_TAG_SIZE];
} __packed PvHdrKeySlot;
typedef struct pv_hdr_opt_item {
uint32_t otype;
uint8_t ibk[32];
uint8_t data[];
} __packed PvHdrOptItem;
/* integrity protected data (by GCM tag), but non-encrypted */
struct pv_hdr_head {
uint64_t magic;
uint32_t version;
uint32_t phs;
uint8_t iv[AES_256_GCM_IV_SIZE];
uint32_t res1;
uint64_t nks;
uint64_t sea;
uint64_t nep;
uint64_t pcf;
union ecdh_pub_key cust_pub_key;
uint8_t pld[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
uint8_t ald[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
uint8_t tld[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
} __packed;
/* Must not have any padding */
struct pv_hdr_encrypted {
uint8_t cust_comm_key[32];
uint8_t img_enc_key_1[AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE / 2];
uint8_t img_enc_key_2[AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE / 2];
struct psw_t psw;
uint64_t scf;
uint32_t noi;
uint32_t res2;
};
STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(struct pv_hdr_encrypted) ==
32 + 32 + 32 + sizeof(struct psw_t) + 8 + 4 + 4)
typedef struct pv_hdr {
struct pv_hdr_head head;
struct pv_hdr_key_slot *slots;
struct pv_hdr_encrypted *encrypted;
struct pv_hdr_opt_item **optional_items;
uint8_t tag[AES_256_GCM_TAG_SIZE];
} PvHdr;
#endif

View File

@@ -1,556 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV arguments related definitions and functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include <glib.h>
#include <glib/gprintf.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "pv_comp.h"
#include "pv_error.h"
#include "pv_args.h"
static gchar summary[] =
"Use genprotimg to create a protected virtualization kernel image file,\n"
"which can be loaded using zipl or QEMU. For all certificates, revocation\n"
"lists, and host-key documents, both the PEM and DER input formats are\n"
"supported.";
static gint pv_arg_compare(gconstpointer arg_1, gconstpointer arg_2)
{
g_assert(arg_1);
g_assert(arg_2);
PvComponentType a = ((PvArg *)arg_1)->type;
PvComponentType b = ((PvArg *)arg_2)->type;
if (a < b)
return -1;
if (a == b)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static gint pv_arg_has_type(gconstpointer arg, gconstpointer type)
{
const PvArg *c = arg;
const PvComponentType *t = type;
g_assert(arg);
if (c->type == *t)
return 0;
if (c->type < *t)
return -1;
return 1;
}
static gint pv_args_set_defaults(PvArgs *args, GError **err G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
if (!args->psw_addr)
args->psw_addr =
g_strdup_printf("0x%lx", DEFAULT_INITIAL_PSW_ADDR);
return 0;
}
static gint pv_args_validate_options(PvArgs *args, GError **err)
{
const PvControlFlagsArgs *cf_args = &args->cf_args;
PvComponentType KERNEL = PV_COMP_TYPE_KERNEL;
/* Check for mutually exclusive arguments */
if (cf_args->pcf &&
!(cf_args->enable_pckmo == PV_NOT_SET && cf_args->enable_dump == PV_NOT_SET)) {
g_set_error(
err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PV_PARSE_ERROR_SYNTAX,
_("The '--x-pcf' option cannot be used with the '--(enable|disable)-pckmo' or"
" '--(enable|disable)-dump' flags.\nUse 'genprotimg --help' for more information"));
return -1;
}
if (cf_args->scf && !(cf_args->enable_cck_extension_secret_enforcement == PV_NOT_SET)) {
g_set_error(
err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PV_PARSE_ERROR_SYNTAX,
_("The '--x-scf' option cannot be used with the '--(enable|disable)-extension-secret-required' flags.\nUse 'genprotimg --help' for more information"));
return -1;
}
/* Check for unused arguments */
if (args->unused_values->len > 0) {
g_autofree gchar *unused = NULL;
for (gsize i = args->unused_values->len; i > 0; i--) {
g_autofree gchar *tmp = unused;
unused = g_strjoin(" ", g_ptr_array_index(args->unused_values, i - 1),
tmp,
NULL);
}
g_set_error(err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PR_PARSE_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
_("Unrecognized arguments: '%s'.\nUse 'genprotimg --help' for more information"),
unused);
return -1;
}
/* Check for mandatory arguments */
if (cf_args->enable_dump == PV_TRUE && !args->cust_comm_key_path) {
g_set_error(err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PR_PARSE_ERROR_MISSING_ARGUMENT,
_("Option '--enable-dump' requires the '--comm-key' option.\nUse 'genprotimg "
"--help' for more information"));
return -1;
}
if (cf_args->enable_cck_extension_secret_enforcement == PV_TRUE &&
!args->cust_comm_key_path) {
g_set_error(
err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PR_PARSE_ERROR_MISSING_ARGUMENT,
_("Option '--enable-cck-extension-secret' requires the '--comm-key' option.\nUse 'genprotimg "
"--help' for more information"));
return -1;
}
if (!args->output_path) {
g_set_error(err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PR_PARSE_ERROR_MISSING_ARGUMENT,
_("Option '--output' is required.\nUse 'genprotimg --help' for more information"));
return -1;
}
if (!g_slist_find_custom(args->comps, &KERNEL, pv_arg_has_type)) {
g_set_error(err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PR_PARSE_ERROR_MISSING_ARGUMENT,
_("Option '--image' is required.\nUse 'genprotimg --help' for more information"));
return -1;
}
if (!args->host_keys || g_strv_length(args->host_keys) == 0) {
g_set_error(err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PR_PARSE_ERROR_MISSING_ARGUMENT,
_("Option '--host-key-document' is required.\nUse 'genprotimg --help' for more information"));
return -1;
}
if (!args->no_verify &&
(!args->untrusted_cert_paths ||
g_strv_length(args->untrusted_cert_paths) == 0)) {
g_set_error(
err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PR_PARSE_ERROR_MISSING_ARGUMENT,
_("Either specify the IBM Z signing key and intermediate CA certificate\n"
"by using the '--cert' option, or use the '--no-verify' flag to disable the\n"
"host-key document verification completely (at your own risk)."));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static gboolean cb_add_component(const gchar *option, const gchar *value,
PvArgs *args, GError **err)
{
PvArg *comp = NULL;
gint type = -1;
if (g_str_equal(option, "-i") || g_str_equal(option, "--image"))
type = PV_COMP_TYPE_KERNEL;
if (g_str_equal(option, "-r") || g_str_equal(option, "--ramdisk"))
type = PV_COMP_TYPE_INITRD;
if (g_str_equal(option, "-p") || g_str_equal(option, "--parmfile"))
type = PV_COMP_TYPE_CMDLINE;
if (type < 0) {
g_set_error(err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PV_PARSE_ERROR_SYNTAX,
_("Invalid option '%s': "), option);
return FALSE;
}
if (g_slist_find_custom(args->comps, &type, pv_arg_has_type)) {
g_set_error(err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PV_PARSE_ERROR_SYNTAX,
_("Multiple values for option '%s'"), option);
return FALSE;
}
comp = pv_arg_new((PvComponentType)type, value);
args->comps = g_slist_insert_sorted(args->comps, comp, pv_arg_compare);
return TRUE;
}
static gboolean cb_set_string_option(const gchar *option, const gchar *value,
PvArgs *args, GError **err)
{
gchar **args_option = NULL;
if (g_str_equal(option, "--comm-key"))
args_option = &args->cust_comm_key_path;
if (g_str_equal(option, "--root-ca"))
args_option = &args->root_ca_path;
if (g_str_equal(option, "-o") || g_str_equal(option, "--output"))
args_option = &args->output_path;
if (g_str_equal(option, "--x-comp-key"))
args_option = &args->xts_key_path;
if (g_str_equal(option, "--x-header-key"))
args_option = &args->cust_root_key_path;
if (g_str_equal(option, "--x-pcf"))
args_option = &args->cf_args.pcf;
if (g_str_equal(option, "--x-psw"))
args_option = &args->psw_addr;
if (g_str_equal(option, "--x-scf"))
args_option = &args->cf_args.scf;
if (!args_option) {
g_set_error(err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PV_PARSE_ERROR_SYNTAX,
_("Invalid option '%s': "), option);
return FALSE;
}
if (*args_option) {
g_set_error(err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PV_PARSE_ERROR_SYNTAX,
_("Multiple values for option '%s'"), option);
return FALSE;
}
*args_option = g_strdup(value);
return TRUE;
}
static gboolean cb_set_log_level(const gchar *option G_GNUC_UNUSED,
const gchar *value G_GNUC_UNUSED, PvArgs *args,
GError **err G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
args->log_level++;
return TRUE;
}
static gboolean cb_remaining_values(const gchar *option G_GNUC_UNUSED,
const gchar *value, PvArgs *args,
GError **err G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
g_ptr_array_add(args->unused_values, g_strdup(value));
return TRUE;
}
#define MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB_NAME(FLAG, VALUE) (cb_##FLAG##_##VALUE)
#define DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB(FLAG, VALUE) \
static gboolean MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB_NAME(FLAG, VALUE)(const gchar *option G_GNUC_UNUSED, \
const gchar *value G_GNUC_UNUSED, \
PvArgs *args, GError **err) \
{ \
if (!(args->cf_args.enable_##FLAG == PV_NOT_SET || \
args->cf_args.enable_##FLAG == VALUE)) { \
g_set_error(err, G_OPTION_ERROR, G_OPTION_ERROR_FAILED, \
"'--enable-" #FLAG "' and '--disable-" #FLAG \
"' are mutually exclusive"); \
return FALSE; \
} \
args->cf_args.enable_##FLAG = VALUE; \
return TRUE; \
}
#define DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CBS(FLAG) \
DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB(FLAG, PV_TRUE) \
DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB(FLAG, PV_FALSE)
#define MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG(NAME, FLAG, ENABLE_DESC, DISABLE_DESC) \
{ \
.long_name = "enable-" #NAME, \
.short_name = 0, \
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NO_ARG, \
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK, \
.arg_data = MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB_NAME(FLAG, PV_TRUE), \
.description = ENABLE_DESC, \
}, \
{ \
.long_name = "disable-" #NAME, .short_name = 0, .flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NO_ARG, \
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK, \
.arg_data = MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB_NAME(FLAG, PV_FALSE), \
.description = DISABLE_DESC, \
}
#define INDENT " "
/* Define the callbacks for mutually exclusive command line flags */
DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CBS(dump);
DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CBS(pckmo);
DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CBS(cck_extension_secret_enforcement);
gint pv_args_parse_options(PvArgs *args, gint *argc, gchar **argv[],
GError **err)
{
g_autoptr(GOptionContext) context = NULL;
gboolean print_version = FALSE;
GOptionGroup *group, *x_group;
g_autofree gchar *psw_desc = g_strdup_printf(
_("Load from the specified hexadecimal ADDRESS.\n" INDENT
"Optional; default: '0x%lx'."),
DEFAULT_INITIAL_PSW_ADDR);
GOptionEntry entries[] = {
{ .long_name = "host-key-document",
.short_name = 'k',
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NONE,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_FILENAME_ARRAY,
.arg_data = &args->host_keys,
.description =
_("FILE specifies a host-key document. At least\n" INDENT
"one is required. Specify this option multiple times\n" INDENT
"to enable the image to run on more than one host."),
.arg_description = _("FILE") },
{ .long_name = "cert",
.short_name = 'C',
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NONE,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_FILENAME_ARRAY,
.arg_data = &args->untrusted_cert_paths,
.description = _(
"FILE contains a certificate that is used to\n" INDENT
"establish a chain of trust for the verification\n" INDENT
"of the host-key documents. The IBM Z signing\n" INDENT
"key and intermediate CA certificate (signed\n" INDENT
"by the root CA) are required."),
.arg_description = _("FILE") },
{ .long_name = "output",
.short_name = 'o',
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_FILENAME,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,
.arg_data = cb_set_string_option,
.description = _("Set FILE as the output file."),
.arg_description = _("FILE") },
{ .long_name = "image",
.short_name = 'i',
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_FILENAME,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,
.arg_data = cb_add_component,
.description = _("Use IMAGE as the Linux kernel image."),
.arg_description = _("IMAGE") },
{ .long_name = "ramdisk",
.short_name = 'r',
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_FILENAME,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,
.arg_data = cb_add_component,
.description = _("Use RAMDISK as the initial RAM disk\n" INDENT
"(optional)."),
.arg_description = _("RAMDISK") },
{ .long_name = "parmfile",
.short_name = 'p',
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_FILENAME,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,
.arg_data = cb_add_component,
.description = _("Use the kernel parameters stored in PARMFILE\n" INDENT
"(optional)."),
.arg_description = _("PARMFILE") },
MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG(dump, dump,
_("Enable PV guest dumps (optional). This option\n" INDENT
"requires the '--comm-key' option."),
_("Disable PV guest dumps (default).")),
MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG(
cck-extension-secret, cck_extension_secret_enforcement,
_("Add-secret requests must provide an extension\n" INDENT
"secret that matches the CCK-derived extension\n" INDENT
"secret (optional). This option requires the\n" INDENT
"'--comm-key' option."),
_("Add-secret requests don't have to provide\n" INDENT
"the CCK-derived extension secret (default).")),
MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG(pckmo, pckmo,
_("Enable the support for the DEA, TDEA, AES, and\n" INDENT
"ECC PCKMO key encryption functions (default)."),
_("Disable the support for the DEA, TDEA, AES, and\n" INDENT
"ECC PCKMO key encryption functions (optional).")),
{ .long_name = "comm-key",
.short_name = 0,
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_FILENAME,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,
.arg_data = cb_set_string_option,
.description = _(
"FILE contains the customer communication key\n" INDENT
"(CCK) (optional)."),
.arg_description = _("FILE") },
{ .long_name = "crl",
.short_name = 0,
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NONE,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_FILENAME_ARRAY,
.arg_data = &args->crl_paths,
.description = _(
"FILE contains a certificate revocation list\n" INDENT
"(optional)."),
.arg_description = _("FILE") },
{ .long_name = "offline",
.short_name = 0,
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NONE,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_NONE,
.arg_data = &args->offline,
.description = _("Don't download CRLs (optional)."),
.arg_description = NULL },
{ .long_name = "root-ca",
.short_name = 0,
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_FILENAME,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,
.arg_data = cb_set_string_option,
.description = _(
"Set FILE as the trusted root CA and don't use the\n" INDENT
"root CAs that are installed on the system (optional)."),
.arg_description = _("FILE") },
{ .long_name = "no-verify",
.short_name = 0,
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NONE,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_NONE,
.arg_data = &args->no_verify,
.description = _("Disable the host-key document verification\n" INDENT
"(optional)."),
.arg_description = NULL },
{ .long_name = "verbose",
.short_name = 'V',
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NO_ARG,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,
.arg_data = cb_set_log_level,
.description = _("Provide more detailed output (optional)."),
.arg_description = NULL },
{ .long_name = "version",
.short_name = 'v',
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NONE,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_NONE,
.arg_data = &print_version,
.description = _("Print the version and exit."),
.arg_description = NULL },
{ .long_name = G_OPTION_REMAINING,
.short_name = 0,
.flags = 0,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,
.arg_data = cb_remaining_values,
.description = NULL,
.arg_description = NULL },
{ 0 },
};
GOptionEntry x_entries[] = {
{ .long_name = "x-comp-key",
.short_name = 0,
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_FILENAME,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,
.arg_data = cb_set_string_option,
.description = _(
"Use FILE as the AES 256-bit XTS key\n" INDENT
"that is used for the component encryption.\n" INDENT
"Optional; default: auto-generated."),
.arg_description = _("FILE") },
{ .long_name = "x-header-key",
.short_name = 0,
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_FILENAME,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,
.arg_data = cb_set_string_option,
.description = _(
"Use FILE as the AES 256-bit GCM header key\n" INDENT
"that protects the PV header.\n" INDENT
"Optional; default: auto-generated."),
.arg_description = _("FILE") },
{ .long_name = "x-pcf",
.short_name = 0,
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NONE,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,
.arg_data = cb_set_string_option,
.description =
_("Specify the plaintext control flags\n" INDENT
"as a hexadecimal value.\n" INDENT
"Optional; mutually exclusive with\n" INDENT
"'--(enable|disable)-pckmo'; default: '0xe0'."),
.arg_description = _("VALUE") },
{ .long_name = "x-psw",
.short_name = 0,
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NONE,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,
.arg_data = cb_set_string_option,
.description = psw_desc,
.arg_description = _("ADDRESS") },
{ .long_name = "x-scf",
.short_name = 0,
.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NONE,
.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,
.arg_data = cb_set_string_option,
.description = _("Specify the secret control flags\n" INDENT
"as a hexadecimal value.\n" INDENT
"Optional; mutually exclusive with\n" INDENT
"'--(enable|disable)-cck-extension-secret';\n" INDENT
"Optional; default: '0x0'."),
.arg_description = _("VALUE") },
{ 0 },
};
context = g_option_context_new(
_("- Create a protected virtualization image"));
g_option_context_set_summary(context, _(summary));
group = g_option_group_new(GETTEXT_PACKAGE, _("Application Options:"),
_("Show help options"), args, NULL);
g_option_group_add_entries(group, entries);
g_option_context_set_main_group(context, group);
x_group = g_option_group_new("experimental", _("Experimental Options:"),
_("Show experimental options"), args, NULL);
g_option_group_add_entries(x_group, x_entries);
g_option_context_add_group(context, x_group);
if (!g_option_context_parse(context, argc, argv, err))
return -1;
if (print_version) {
g_printf(_("%s version %s\n"), tool_name, RELEASE_STRING);
g_printf("%s\n", copyright_notice);
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
if (pv_args_set_defaults(args, err) < 0)
return -1;
return pv_args_validate_options(args, err);
}
PvArgs *pv_args_new(void)
{
g_autoptr(PvArgs) args = g_new0(PvArgs, 1);
args->unused_values = g_ptr_array_new_with_free_func(g_free);
/* `args->cf_args` is implicitly initialized with zeros since
* `g_new0` is used. So there is no reason to explicitly
* initialize the values as PV_NOT_SET == 0.
*/
return g_steal_pointer(&args);
}
void pv_args_free(PvArgs *args)
{
if (!args)
return;
g_free(args->cf_args.pcf);
g_free(args->cf_args.scf);
g_free(args->psw_addr);
g_free(args->cust_root_key_path);
g_free(args->cust_comm_key_path);
g_free(args->gcm_iv_path);
g_free(args->root_ca_path);
g_strfreev(args->crl_paths);
g_strfreev(args->untrusted_cert_paths);
g_strfreev(args->host_keys);
g_free(args->xts_key_path);
g_slist_free_full(args->comps, (GDestroyNotify)pv_arg_free);
g_ptr_array_free(args->unused_values, TRUE);
g_free(args->output_path);
g_free(args->tmp_dir);
g_free(args);
}
void pv_arg_free(PvArg *arg)
{
if (!arg)
return;
g_free(arg->path);
g_free(arg);
}
PvArg *pv_arg_new(PvComponentType type, const gchar *path)
{
g_autoptr(PvArg) ret = g_new0(struct pv_arg, 1);
ret->type = type;
ret->path = g_strdup(path);
return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
}

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@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV arguments related definitions and functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_ARGS_H
#define PV_ARGS_H
#include <glib.h>
#include "pv_comp.h"
typedef struct pv_arg {
PvComponentType type;
gchar *path;
} PvArg;
PvArg *pv_arg_new(PvComponentType type, const gchar *path);
void pv_arg_free(PvArg *arg);
typedef enum pv_tristate {
PV_NOT_SET = 0,
PV_TRUE,
PV_FALSE,
} PvTristate;
/* The value of PV_NOT_SET is not allowed to be changed */
STATIC_ASSERT(PV_NOT_SET == 0)
typedef struct {
gchar *pcf;
gchar *scf;
/* Add-secret requests do require CCK-extension secrets */
PvTristate enable_cck_extension_secret_enforcement;
PvTristate enable_dump;
PvTristate enable_pckmo;
} PvControlFlagsArgs;
typedef struct {
gint log_level;
gint no_verify;
gboolean offline;
PvControlFlagsArgs cf_args;
gchar *psw_addr; /* PSW address which will be used for the start of
* the actual component (e.g. Linux kernel)
*/
gchar *cust_root_key_path;
gchar *cust_comm_key_path;
gchar *gcm_iv_path;
gchar **host_keys;
gchar *root_ca_path; /* Trusted root CA used for the verification of the
* chain of trust (if specified).
*/
gchar **untrusted_cert_paths;
gchar **crl_paths;
gchar *xts_key_path;
GSList *comps;
gchar *output_path;
gchar *tmp_dir;
GPtrArray *unused_values;
} PvArgs;
PvArgs *pv_args_new(void);
void pv_args_free(PvArgs *args);
gint pv_args_parse_options(PvArgs *args, gint *argc, gchar **argv[],
GError **err);
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(PvArg, pv_arg_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(PvArgs, pv_args_free)
#endif

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@@ -1,432 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV component related definitions and functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include <glib.h>
#include <glib/gtypes.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "utils/align.h"
#include "utils/buffer.h"
#include "utils/crypto.h"
#include "utils/file_utils.h"
#include "pv_comp.h"
#include "pv_error.h"
static void comp_file_free(CompFile *comp)
{
if (!comp)
return;
g_free(comp->path);
g_free(comp);
}
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(CompFile, comp_file_free)
static PvComponent *pv_component_new(PvComponentType type, gsize size,
PvComponentDataType d_type, void **data,
GError **err)
{
g_autoptr(PvComponent) ret = g_new0(PvComponent, 1);
g_assert(type >= 0 && type <= UINT16_MAX);
ret->type = (int)type;
ret->d_type = (int)d_type;
ret->data = g_steal_pointer(data);
ret->orig_size = size;
if (generate_tweak(&ret->tweak, (uint16_t)type, err) < 0)
return NULL;
return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
}
PvComponent *pv_component_new_file(PvComponentType type, const gchar *path,
GError **err)
{
g_autoptr(CompFile) file = g_new0(CompFile, 1);
gsize size;
gint rc;
g_assert(path != NULL);
rc = file_size(path, &size, err);
if (rc < 0)
return NULL;
file->path = g_strdup(path);
file->size = size;
return pv_component_new(type, size, DATA_FILE, (void **)&file, err);
}
PvComponent *pv_component_new_buf(PvComponentType type, const PvBuffer *buf,
GError **err)
{
g_assert(buf);
g_autoptr(PvBuffer) dup_buf = pv_buffer_dup(buf, FALSE);
return pv_component_new(type, buf->size, DATA_BUFFER, (void **)&dup_buf,
err);
}
void pv_component_free(PvComponent *component)
{
if (!component)
return;
switch ((PvComponentDataType)component->d_type) {
case DATA_BUFFER:
pv_buffer_clear(&component->buf);
break;
case DATA_FILE:
comp_file_free(component->file);
break;
}
g_free(component);
}
gint pv_component_type(const PvComponent *component)
{
return component->type;
}
const gchar *pv_component_name(const PvComponent *component)
{
gint type = pv_component_type(component);
switch ((PvComponentType)type) {
case PV_COMP_TYPE_KERNEL:
return "kernel";
case PV_COMP_TYPE_INITRD:
return "ramdisk";
case PV_COMP_TYPE_CMDLINE:
return "parmline";
case PV_COMP_TYPE_STAGE3B:
return "stage3b";
}
g_assert_not_reached();
}
uint64_t pv_component_size(const PvComponent *component)
{
switch ((PvComponentDataType)component->d_type) {
case DATA_BUFFER:
return component->buf->size;
case DATA_FILE:
return component->file->size;
}
g_assert_not_reached();
}
uint64_t pv_component_get_src_addr(const PvComponent *component)
{
return component->src_addr;
}
uint64_t pv_component_get_orig_size(const PvComponent *component)
{
return component->orig_size;
}
uint64_t pv_component_get_tweak_prefix(const PvComponent *component)
{
return GUINT64_FROM_BE(component->tweak.cmp_idx.data);
}
gboolean pv_component_is_stage3b(const PvComponent *component)
{
return pv_component_type(component) == PV_COMP_TYPE_STAGE3B;
}
gint pv_component_align_and_encrypt(PvComponent *component, const gchar *tmp_path,
void *opaque, GError **err)
{
struct cipher_parms *parms = opaque;
switch ((PvComponentDataType)component->d_type) {
case DATA_BUFFER: {
g_autoptr(PvBuffer) enc_buf = NULL;
if (!(IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(pv_component_size(component)))) {
g_autoptr(PvBuffer) new = NULL;
/* create a page aligned copy */
new = pv_buffer_dup(component->buf, TRUE);
pv_buffer_clear(&component->buf);
component->buf = g_steal_pointer(&new);
}
enc_buf = encrypt_buf(parms, component->buf, err);
if (!enc_buf)
return -1;
pv_buffer_clear(&component->buf);
component->buf = g_steal_pointer(&enc_buf);
return 0;
}
case DATA_FILE: {
const gchar *comp_name = pv_component_name(component);
gchar *path_in = component->file->path;
g_autofree gchar *path_out = NULL;
gsize orig_size;
gsize prep_size;
g_assert(path_in);
path_out = g_build_filename(tmp_path, comp_name, NULL);
if (encrypt_file(parms, path_in, path_out, &orig_size,
&prep_size, err) < 0)
return -1;
if (component->orig_size != orig_size) {
g_set_error(err, G_FILE_ERROR, PV_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("File has changed during the preparation '%s'"),
path_out);
return -1;
}
g_free(component->file->path);
component->file->size = prep_size;
component->file->path = g_steal_pointer(&path_out);
return 0;
}
}
g_assert_not_reached();
}
/* Page align the size of the component */
gint pv_component_align(PvComponent *component, const gchar *tmp_path,
void *opaque G_GNUC_UNUSED, GError **err)
{
if (IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(pv_component_size(component)))
return 0;
switch (component->d_type) {
case DATA_BUFFER: {
g_autoptr(PvBuffer) buf = NULL;
buf = pv_buffer_dup(component->buf, TRUE);
pv_buffer_clear(&component->buf);
component->buf = g_steal_pointer(&buf);
return 0;
} break;
case DATA_FILE: {
const gchar *comp_name = pv_component_name(component);
g_autofree gchar *path_out =
g_build_filename(tmp_path, comp_name, NULL);
gchar *path_in = component->file->path;
gsize size_out;
if (pad_file_right(path_out, path_in, &size_out, PAGE_SIZE,
err) < 0)
return -1;
g_free(component->file->path);
component->file->path = g_steal_pointer(&path_out);
component->file->size = size_out;
return 0;
} break;
}
g_assert_not_reached();
}
int64_t pv_component_update_ald(const PvComponent *comp, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
GError **err)
{
uint64_t addr = pv_component_get_src_addr(comp);
uint64_t size = pv_component_size(comp);
uint64_t cur = addr;
int64_t nep = 0;
g_assert(IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(size) && size != 0);
do {
uint64_t cur_be = GUINT64_TO_BE(cur);
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &cur_be, sizeof(cur_be)) != 1) {
g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("EVP_DigestUpdate failed"));
return -1;
}
cur += PAGE_SIZE;
nep++;
} while (cur < addr + size);
return nep;
}
int64_t pv_component_update_pld(const PvComponent *comp, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
GError **err)
{
uint64_t size = pv_component_size(comp);
int64_t nep = 0;
g_assert(IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(size) && size != 0);
switch (comp->d_type) {
case DATA_BUFFER: {
const PvBuffer *buf = comp->buf;
g_assert(buf->size <= INT64_MAX);
g_assert(buf->size == size);
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, buf->data, buf->size) != 1) {
g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("EVP_DigestUpdate failed"));
return -1;
}
nep = (int64_t)(buf->size / PAGE_SIZE);
break;
}
case DATA_FILE: {
const gchar *in_path = comp->file->path;
guchar in_buf[PAGE_SIZE];
gsize num_bytes_read_total = 0;
gsize num_bytes_read = 0;
FILE *f_in;
f_in = file_open(in_path, "rb", err);
if (!f_in)
return -1;
do {
/* Read data in blocks. Update the digest
* context each read.
*/
if (file_read(f_in, in_buf, sizeof(*in_buf),
sizeof(in_buf), &num_bytes_read,
err) < 0) {
fclose(f_in);
return -1;
}
num_bytes_read_total += num_bytes_read;
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, in_buf, sizeof(in_buf)) != 1) {
g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("EVP_DigestUpdate failed"));
fclose(f_in);
return -1;
}
nep++;
} while (num_bytes_read_total < pv_component_size(comp) &&
num_bytes_read != 0);
if (num_bytes_read_total != pv_component_size(comp)) {
g_set_error(err, G_FILE_ERROR, PV_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("'%s' has changed during the preparation"),
in_path);
fclose(f_in);
return -1;
}
fclose(f_in);
break;
}
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
return nep;
}
int64_t pv_component_update_tld(const PvComponent *comp, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
GError **err)
{
uint64_t size = pv_component_size(comp);
const union tweak *tweak = &comp->tweak;
g_autoptr(BIGNUM) tweak_num = NULL;
int64_t nep = 0;
g_assert(IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(size) && size != 0);
tweak_num = BN_bin2bn(tweak->data, sizeof(tweak->data), NULL);
if (!tweak_num) {
g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("BN_bin2bn failed"));
return -1;
}
for (uint64_t cur = 0; cur < size; cur += PAGE_SIZE) {
guchar tmp[sizeof(tweak->data)] = { 0 };
g_assert(BN_num_bytes(tweak_num) >= 0);
g_assert(sizeof(tmp) - (guint)BN_num_bytes(tweak_num) > 0);
if (BN_bn2binpad(tweak_num, tmp, sizeof(tmp)) < 0) {
g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("BN_bn2binpad failed"));
return -1;
}
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, tmp, sizeof(tmp)) != 1) {
g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("EVP_DigestUpdate failed"));
return -1;
}
/* calculate new tweak value */
if (BN_add_word(tweak_num, PAGE_SIZE) != 1) {
g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("BN_add_word failed"));
return -1;
}
nep++;
}
return nep;
}
gint pv_component_write(const PvComponent *component, FILE *f, GError **err)
{
uint64_t offset = pv_component_get_src_addr(component);
g_assert(f);
switch (component->d_type) {
case DATA_BUFFER: {
const PvBuffer *buf = component->buf;
if (seek_and_write_buffer(f, buf, offset, err) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
case DATA_FILE: {
const CompFile *file = component->file;
if (seek_and_write_file(f, file, offset, err) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
}
g_assert_not_reached();
}

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@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV component related definitions and functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_COMP_H
#define PV_COMP_H
#include <glib.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "utils/crypto.h"
/* The order of this enum also implicitly defines the order of the
* components within the PV image!
*/
typedef enum {
PV_COMP_TYPE_KERNEL = 0,
PV_COMP_TYPE_CMDLINE = 1,
PV_COMP_TYPE_INITRD = 2,
PV_COMP_TYPE_STAGE3B = 3,
} PvComponentType;
typedef enum {
DATA_FILE = 0,
DATA_BUFFER,
} PvComponentDataType;
typedef struct comp_file {
gchar *path;
gsize size;
} CompFile;
typedef struct {
gint type; /* PvComponentType */
gint d_type; /* PvComponentDataType */
union {
struct comp_file *file;
PvBuffer *buf;
void *data;
};
uint64_t src_addr;
uint64_t orig_size;
union tweak tweak; /* used for the AES XTS encryption */
} PvComponent;
PvComponent *pv_component_new_file(PvComponentType type, const gchar *path,
GError **err);
PvComponent *pv_component_new_buf(PvComponentType type, const PvBuffer *buf,
GError **err);
void pv_component_free(PvComponent *component);
gint pv_component_type(const PvComponent *component);
const gchar *pv_component_name(const PvComponent *component);
uint64_t pv_component_size(const PvComponent *component);
uint64_t pv_component_get_src_addr(const PvComponent *component);
uint64_t pv_component_get_orig_size(const PvComponent *component);
uint64_t pv_component_get_tweak_prefix(const PvComponent *component);
gboolean pv_component_is_stage3b(const PvComponent *component);
gint pv_component_align_and_encrypt(PvComponent *component, const gchar *tmp_path,
void *opaque, GError **err);
gint pv_component_align(PvComponent *component, const gchar *tmp_path,
void *opaque G_GNUC_UNUSED, GError **err);
int64_t pv_component_update_pld(const PvComponent *comp, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
GError **err);
int64_t pv_component_update_ald(const PvComponent *comp, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
GError **err);
int64_t pv_component_update_tld(const PvComponent *comp, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
GError **err);
gint pv_component_write(const PvComponent *component, FILE *f, GError **err);
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(PvComponent, pv_component_free)
#endif

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@@ -1,252 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV components related definitions and functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include <glib.h>
#include <glib/gtypes.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "boot/psw.h"
#include "boot/stage3b.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "utils/align.h"
#include "utils/crypto.h"
#include "pv_comp.h"
#include "pv_comps.h"
#include "pv_error.h"
#include "pv_stage3.h"
struct _pv_img_comps {
gboolean finalized;
uint64_t next_src;
uint64_t nep;
EVP_MD_CTX *ald; /* context used for the hash of the addresses */
EVP_MD_CTX *pld; /* context used for the hash of the pages content */
EVP_MD_CTX *tld; /* context used for the hash of the tweaks */
GSList *comps; /* elements sorted by component type */
};
void pv_img_comps_free(PvImgComps *comps)
{
if (!comps)
return;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(comps->ald);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(comps->pld);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(comps->tld);
g_slist_free_full(comps->comps, (GDestroyNotify)pv_component_free);
g_free(comps);
}
PvImgComps *pv_img_comps_new(const EVP_MD *ald_md, const EVP_MD *pld_md,
const EVP_MD *tld_md, GError **err)
{
g_autoptr(PvImgComps) ret = g_new0(PvImgComps, 1);
ret->ald = digest_ctx_new(ald_md, err);
if (!ret->ald)
return NULL;
ret->pld = digest_ctx_new(pld_md, err);
if (!ret->pld)
return NULL;
ret->tld = digest_ctx_new(tld_md, err);
if (!ret->tld)
return NULL;
return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
}
guint pv_img_comps_length(const PvImgComps *comps)
{
return g_slist_length(comps->comps);
}
/* Update hashes and nep */
/* Returns 0 in case of success and -1 in case of a failure */
static gint pv_img_comps_hash_comp(PvImgComps *comps, const PvComponent *comp,
GError **err)
{
int64_t nep_1 = 0;
int64_t nep_2 = 0;
int64_t nep_3 = 0;
/* update pld */
nep_1 = pv_component_update_pld(comp, comps->pld, err);
if (nep_1 < 0)
return -1;
/* update ald */
nep_2 = pv_component_update_ald(comp, comps->ald, err);
if (nep_2 < 0)
return -1;
/* update tld */
nep_3 = pv_component_update_tld(comp, comps->tld, err);
if (nep_3 < 0)
return -1;
g_assert(nep_1 == nep_2);
g_assert(nep_2 == nep_3);
/* update comps->nep */
g_assert_true(g_uint64_checked_add(&comps->nep, comps->nep,
(uint64_t)nep_1));
return 0;
}
gint pv_img_comps_add_component(PvImgComps *comps, PvComponent **comp,
GError **err)
{
g_assert(comp);
g_assert(*comp);
g_assert(comps);
g_assert(IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(comps->next_src));
uint64_t src_addr = comps->next_src;
uint64_t src_size = pv_component_size(*comp)
? PAGE_ALIGN(pv_component_size(*comp))
: PAGE_SIZE;
if (comps->finalized) {
g_set_error(err, PV_COMPONENT_ERROR, PV_COMPONENT_ERROR_FINALIZED,
_("Failed to add component, image is already finalized"));
return -1;
}
/* set the address of the component in the memory layout */
(*comp)->src_addr = src_addr;
g_info("%12s:\t0x%012lx (%12ld / %12ld Bytes)",
pv_component_name(*comp), pv_component_get_src_addr(*comp),
pv_component_size(*comp), pv_component_get_orig_size(*comp));
/* append the component and pass the responsibility of @comp
* to @comps
*/
comps->comps = g_slist_append(comps->comps, g_steal_pointer(comp));
comps->next_src += src_size;
g_assert(IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(comps->next_src));
g_assert(!*comp);
return 0;
}
struct stage3b_args *pv_img_comps_get_stage3b_args(const PvImgComps *comps,
struct psw_t *psw)
{
g_autofree struct stage3b_args *ret = g_new0(struct stage3b_args, 1);
for (GSList *iterator = comps->comps; iterator; iterator = iterator->next) {
const PvComponent *img_comp = iterator->data;
uint64_t src_addr, dst_size;
g_assert(img_comp);
src_addr = pv_component_get_src_addr(img_comp);
dst_size = pv_component_get_orig_size(img_comp);
g_assert(dst_size <= pv_component_size(img_comp));
switch ((PvComponentType)pv_component_type(img_comp)) {
case PV_COMP_TYPE_KERNEL:
memblob_init(&ret->kernel, src_addr, dst_size);
break;
case PV_COMP_TYPE_CMDLINE:
memblob_init(&ret->cmdline, src_addr, dst_size);
break;
case PV_COMP_TYPE_INITRD:
memblob_init(&ret->initrd, src_addr, dst_size);
break;
case PV_COMP_TYPE_STAGE3B:
/* nothing needs to be done since it is the
* stage3b itself
*/
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
break;
}
}
/* for `stage3b_args` big-endian format must be used */
ret->psw.mask = GUINT64_TO_BE(psw->mask);
ret->psw.addr = GUINT64_TO_BE(psw->addr);
return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
}
gint pv_img_comps_set_offset(PvImgComps *comps, gsize offset, GError **err)
{
g_assert(IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(comps->next_src));
if (!IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(offset)) {
g_set_error(err, PV_IMAGE_ERROR, PV_IMAGE_ERROR_OFFSET,
_("Offset must be page aligned"));
return -1;
}
if (pv_img_comps_length(comps) > 0) {
g_set_error(err, PV_IMAGE_ERROR, PV_IMAGE_ERROR_OFFSET,
_("Offset cannot be changed after a component was added"));
return -1;
}
comps->next_src += offset;
g_assert(IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(comps->next_src));
return 0;
}
GSList *pv_img_comps_get_comps(const PvImgComps *comps)
{
return comps->comps;
}
gint pv_img_comps_finalize(PvImgComps *comps, PvBuffer **pld_digest,
PvBuffer **ald_digest, PvBuffer **tld_digest,
uint64_t *nep, GError **err)
{
g_autoptr(PvBuffer) tmp_pld_digest = NULL;
g_autoptr(PvBuffer) tmp_ald_digest = NULL;
g_autoptr(PvBuffer) tmp_tld_digest = NULL;
comps->finalized = TRUE;
for (GSList *iterator = comps->comps; iterator; iterator = iterator->next) {
const PvComponent *comp = iterator->data;
/* update hashes and nep */
if (pv_img_comps_hash_comp(comps, comp, err) < 0)
return -1;
}
tmp_pld_digest = digest_ctx_finalize(comps->pld, err);
if (!tmp_pld_digest)
return -1;
tmp_ald_digest = digest_ctx_finalize(comps->ald, err);
if (!tmp_ald_digest)
return -1;
tmp_tld_digest = digest_ctx_finalize(comps->tld, err);
if (!tmp_tld_digest)
return -1;
*pld_digest = g_steal_pointer(&tmp_pld_digest);
*ald_digest = g_steal_pointer(&tmp_ald_digest);
*tld_digest = g_steal_pointer(&tmp_tld_digest);
*nep = comps->nep;
return 0;
}
PvComponent *pv_img_comps_get_nth_comp(PvImgComps *comps, guint n)
{
return g_slist_nth_data(comps->comps, n);
}

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@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV components related definitions and functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_COMPS_H
#define PV_COMPS_H
#include <glib.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "boot/psw.h"
#include "boot/stage3b.h"
#include "utils/buffer.h"
#include "pv_comp.h"
typedef struct _pv_img_comps PvImgComps;
PvImgComps *pv_img_comps_new(const EVP_MD *ald_md, const EVP_MD *pld_md,
const EVP_MD *tld_md, GError **err);
guint pv_img_comps_length(const PvImgComps *comps);
GSList *pv_img_comps_get_comps(const PvImgComps *comps);
struct stage3b_args *pv_img_comps_get_stage3b_args(const PvImgComps *comps,
struct psw_t *psw);
gint pv_img_comps_add_component(PvImgComps *comps, PvComponent **comp,
GError **err);
PvComponent *pv_img_comps_get_nth_comp(PvImgComps *comps, guint n);
gint pv_img_comps_set_offset(PvImgComps *comps, gsize offset, GError **err);
gint pv_img_comps_finalize(PvImgComps *comps, PvBuffer **pld_digest,
PvBuffer **ald_digest, PvBuffer **tld_digest,
uint64_t *nep, GError **err);
void pv_img_comps_free(PvImgComps *comps);
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(PvImgComps, pv_img_comps_free)
#endif

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@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV error related functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include <glib.h>
#include "pv_error.h"
GQuark pv_error_quark(void)
{
return g_quark_from_static_string("pv-error-quark");
}
GQuark pv_crypto_error_quark(void)
{
return g_quark_from_static_string("pv-crypto-error-quark");
}
GQuark pv_component_error_quark(void)
{
return g_quark_from_static_string("pv-component-error-quark");
}
GQuark pv_image_error_quark(void)
{
return g_quark_from_static_string("pv-image-error-quark");
}
GQuark pv_parse_error_quark(void)
{
return g_quark_from_static_string("pv-parse-error-quark");
}

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@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV error related definitions and functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_ERROR_H
#define PV_ERROR_H
#include <glib.h>
GQuark pv_error_quark(void);
GQuark pv_parse_error_quark(void);
GQuark pv_component_error_quark(void);
GQuark pv_crypto_error_quark(void);
GQuark pv_image_error_quark(void);
#define PV_ERROR pv_error_quark()
#define PV_PARSE_ERROR pv_parse_error_quark()
#define PV_CRYPTO_ERROR pv_crypto_error_quark()
#define PV_COMPONENT_ERROR pv_component_error_quark()
#define PV_IMAGE_ERROR pv_image_error_quark()
typedef enum {
PV_ERROR_IPIB_SIZE,
PV_ERROR_PV_HDR_SIZE,
PV_ERROR_INTERNAL,
PV_ERROR_CURL_INIT_FAILED,
PV_ERROR_DOWNLOAD_FAILED,
} PvErrors;
typedef enum {
PV_PARSE_ERROR_OK = 0,
PV_PARSE_ERROR_SYNTAX,
PR_PARSE_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
PR_PARSE_ERROR_MISSING_ARGUMENT,
} PvParseErrors;
typedef enum {
PV_COMPONENT_ERROR_UNALIGNED,
PV_COMPONENT_ERROR_FINALIZED,
} PvComponentErrors;
typedef enum {
PV_IMAGE_ERROR_OFFSET,
PV_IMAGE_ERROR_FINALIZED,
} PvImageErrors;
typedef enum {
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_VERIFICATION,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INIT,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_READ_CERTIFICATE,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INTERNAL,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_DERIVE,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_KEYGENERATION,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_RANDOMIZATION,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INVALID_PARM,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_SIZE,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INVALID_VALIDITY_PERIOD,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_EXPIRED,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_NOT_VALID_YET,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_LOAD_CRL,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_NO_PUBLIC_KEY,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INVALID_URI,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_CRL_DOWNLOAD_FAILED,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_INVALID,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_CRL_SIGNATURE_INVALID,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_CERT_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_CRL_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_NO_IBM_Z_SIGNING_KEY,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_NO_CRL,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_LOAD_ROOT_CA,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_LOAD_DEFAULT_CA,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_MALFORMED_ROOT_CA,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_WRONG_CA_USED,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_SKID_AKID_MISMATCH,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_NO_ISSUER_IBM_Z_FOUND,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_FAILED_DOWNLOAD_CRL,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_NO_CRLDP,
PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_CERT_REVOKED,
} PvCryptoErrors;
#endif

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@@ -1,293 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV header related functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include <glib.h>
#include <glib/gtypes.h>
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "boot/psw.h"
#include "include/pv_crypto_def.h"
#include "utils/buffer.h"
#include "utils/crypto.h"
#include "pv_comp.h"
#include "pv_hdr.h"
#include "pv_image.h"
void pv_hdr_free(PvHdr *hdr)
{
if (!hdr)
return;
g_free(hdr->optional_items);
g_free(hdr->encrypted);
g_free(hdr->slots);
g_free(hdr);
}
uint32_t pv_hdr_size(const PvHdr *hdr)
{
return GUINT32_FROM_BE(hdr->head.phs);
}
gboolean pv_hdr_uses_encryption(const PvHdr *hdr)
{
return !(GUINT64_FROM_BE(hdr->head.pcf) & PV_PCF_NO_DECRYPTION);
}
uint64_t pv_hdr_enc_size(const PvHdr *hdr)
{
return GUINT64_FROM_BE(hdr->head.sea);
}
uint32_t pv_hdr_enc_size_casted(const PvHdr *hdr)
{
uint64_t size = pv_hdr_enc_size(hdr);
if (size > UINT32_MAX)
g_abort();
return (uint32_t)size;
}
static guint pv_hdr_tag_size(const PvHdr *hdr)
{
return sizeof(hdr->tag);
}
uint32_t pv_hdr_aad_size(const PvHdr *hdr)
{
return pv_hdr_size(hdr) - pv_hdr_enc_size_casted(hdr) -
pv_hdr_tag_size(hdr);
}
uint64_t pv_hdr_get_nks(const PvHdr *hdr)
{
return GUINT64_FROM_BE(hdr->head.nks);
}
/* In-place modification of ``buf`` */
static gint pv_hdr_encrypt(const PvHdr *hdr, const PvImage *img, PvBuffer *buf,
GError **err)
{
uint32_t hdr_len = pv_hdr_size(hdr);
uint32_t aad_len = pv_hdr_aad_size(hdr);
guint tag_len = pv_hdr_tag_size(hdr);
uint32_t enc_len = pv_hdr_enc_size_casted(hdr);
const PvBuffer aad_part = { .data = buf->data, .size = aad_len };
PvBuffer enc_part = { .data = (uint8_t *)buf->data + aad_len,
.size = enc_len };
PvBuffer tag_part = { .data = (uint8_t *)buf->data + hdr_len - tag_len,
.size = tag_len };
struct cipher_parms parms;
int64_t c_len;
g_assert(aad_part.size + enc_part.size + tag_part.size == buf->size);
g_assert(img->cust_root_key->size <= INT_MAX);
g_assert(img->gcm_iv->size <= INT_MAX);
g_assert(EVP_CIPHER_key_length(img->gcm_cipher) ==
(int)img->cust_root_key->size);
g_assert(EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(img->gcm_cipher) == (int)img->gcm_iv->size);
parms.key = img->cust_root_key;
parms.iv_or_tweak = img->gcm_iv;
parms.cipher = img->gcm_cipher;
/* in-place encryption */
c_len = gcm_encrypt(&enc_part, &aad_part, &parms, &enc_part, &tag_part, err);
if (c_len < 0)
return -1;
g_assert(c_len == enc_len);
return 0;
}
/* Initializes the unencrypted, but integrity protected part of the PV
* header
*/
static gint pv_hdr_aad_init(PvHdr *hdr, const PvImage *img, GError **err)
{
g_autofree union ecdh_pub_key *cust_pub_key = NULL;
struct pv_hdr_key_slot *hdr_slot = hdr->slots;
struct pv_hdr_head *head = &hdr->head;
g_autoptr(PvBuffer) pld = NULL;
g_autoptr(PvBuffer) ald = NULL;
g_autoptr(PvBuffer) tld = NULL;
uint64_t nep = 0;
g_assert(sizeof(head->iv) == img->gcm_iv->size);
g_assert(sizeof(head->cust_pub_key) == sizeof(*cust_pub_key));
cust_pub_key = evp_pkey_to_ecdh_pub_key(img->cust_pub_priv_key, err);
if (!cust_pub_key)
return -1;
head->magic = GUINT64_TO_BE(PV_MAGIC_NUMBER);
head->version = GUINT32_TO_BE(PV_VERSION_1);
/* ``phs`` is already set so we can skip it here */
memcpy(head->iv, img->gcm_iv->data, sizeof(head->iv));
/* ``nks`` is already set so we can skip it here */
/* ``sea`` is already set so we can skip it here */
head->pcf = GUINT64_TO_BE(img->pcf);
memcpy(head->cust_pub_key.data, cust_pub_key,
sizeof(head->cust_pub_key));
if (pv_img_calc_pld_ald_tld_nep(img, &pld, &ald, &tld, &nep, err) < 0)
return -1;
g_assert(sizeof(head->pld) == pld->size);
g_assert(sizeof(head->ald) == ald->size);
g_assert(sizeof(head->tld) == tld->size);
head->nep = GUINT64_TO_BE(nep);
memcpy(head->pld, pld->data, sizeof(head->pld));
memcpy(head->ald, ald->data, sizeof(head->ald));
memcpy(head->tld, tld->data, sizeof(head->tld));
/* set the key slots */
for (GSList *iterator = img->key_slots; iterator; iterator = iterator->next) {
const PvHdrKeySlot *slot = iterator->data;
g_assert(slot);
/* the memory for the slots is pre-allocated so we
* have not to allocate and since PvHdrKeySlot is
* stored in the big-edian format we can simply use
* memcpy.
*/
memcpy(hdr_slot++, slot, sizeof(*slot));
}
return 0;
}
/* Initializes the encrypted and also integrity protected part of the
* PV header
*/
static gint pv_hdr_enc_init(PvHdr *hdr, const PvImage *img, GError **err)
{
struct pv_hdr_encrypted *enc = hdr->encrypted;
const PvComponent *stage3b;
struct psw_t psw;
g_assert(sizeof(enc->img_enc_key_1) + sizeof(enc->img_enc_key_2) ==
EVP_CIPHER_key_length(img->xts_cipher));
g_assert(sizeof(enc->cust_comm_key) == img->cust_comm_key->size);
g_assert(img->xts_key->size ==
(guint)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(img->xts_cipher));
stage3b = pv_img_get_stage3b_comp(img, err);
if (!stage3b)
return -1;
memcpy(enc->cust_comm_key, img->cust_comm_key->data,
sizeof(enc->cust_comm_key));
memcpy(enc->img_enc_key_1, img->xts_key->data,
sizeof(enc->img_enc_key_1));
memcpy(enc->img_enc_key_2,
(uint8_t *)img->xts_key->data + sizeof(enc->img_enc_key_1),
sizeof(enc->img_enc_key_2));
/* Setup program check handler */
psw.mask = GUINT64_TO_BE(DEFAULT_INITIAL_PSW_MASK);
psw.addr = GUINT64_TO_BE(pv_component_get_src_addr(stage3b));
enc->psw = psw;
enc->scf = GUINT64_TO_BE(img->scf);
enc->noi = GUINT32_TO_BE(g_slist_length(img->optional_items));
/* set the optional items */
for (GSList *iterator = img->optional_items; iterator;
iterator = iterator->next) {
const struct pv_hdr_opt_item *item = iterator->data;
g_assert(item);
/* not supported in the first version */
g_assert_not_reached();
}
return 0;
}
PvHdr *pv_hdr_new(const PvImage *img, GError **err)
{
uint32_t noi = g_slist_length(img->optional_items);
uint32_t hdr_size = pv_img_get_pv_hdr_size(img);
gsize nks = g_slist_length(img->key_slots);
uint32_t sea = pv_img_get_enc_size(img);
g_autoptr(PvHdr) ret = NULL;
g_assert(nks > 0);
/* must be a multiple of AES block size */
g_assert(sea % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0);
g_assert(sea >= sizeof(struct pv_hdr_encrypted));
ret = g_new0(PvHdr, 1);
ret->slots = g_new0(struct pv_hdr_key_slot, nks);
ret->head.phs = GUINT32_TO_BE(hdr_size);
ret->head.nks = GUINT64_TO_BE(nks);
ret->head.sea = GUINT64_TO_BE(sea);
ret->encrypted = g_new0(struct pv_hdr_encrypted, 1);
ret->optional_items = g_malloc0(sea - sizeof(struct pv_hdr_encrypted));
ret->encrypted->noi = GUINT32_TO_BE(noi);
if (pv_hdr_aad_init(ret, img, err) < 0)
return NULL;
if (pv_hdr_enc_init(ret, img, err) < 0)
return NULL;
return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
}
static void pv_hdr_memcpy(const PvHdr *hdr, const PvBuffer *dst)
{
uint64_t nks = pv_hdr_get_nks(hdr);
uint8_t *data;
g_assert(dst->size == pv_hdr_size(hdr));
g_assert(pv_hdr_enc_size_casted(hdr) >= sizeof(*hdr->encrypted));
data = memcpy(dst->data, &hdr->head, sizeof(hdr->head));
data = memcpy(data + sizeof(hdr->head), hdr->slots,
sizeof(struct pv_hdr_key_slot) * nks);
data = memcpy(data + sizeof(struct pv_hdr_key_slot) * nks,
hdr->encrypted, sizeof(*hdr->encrypted));
if (pv_hdr_enc_size_casted(hdr) - sizeof(*hdr->encrypted) > 0) {
(void)memcpy(data + sizeof(*hdr->encrypted),
hdr->optional_items,
pv_hdr_enc_size_casted(hdr) - sizeof(*hdr->encrypted));
}
}
PvBuffer *pv_hdr_serialize(const PvHdr *hdr, const PvImage *img,
enum PvCryptoMode mode, GError **err)
{
uint32_t hdr_size = pv_hdr_size(hdr);
g_autoptr(PvBuffer) ret = NULL;
ret = pv_buffer_alloc(hdr_size);
pv_hdr_memcpy(hdr, ret);
if (mode == PV_ENCRYPT) {
/* The buffer @ret is modified in-place */
if (pv_hdr_encrypt(hdr, img, ret, err) < 0)
return NULL;
} else {
/* Simply copy the tag */
memcpy((uint8_t *)ret->data + hdr_size - pv_hdr_tag_size(hdr),
hdr->tag, pv_hdr_tag_size(hdr));
}
return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
}

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@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV header related functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_HDR_H
#define PV_HDR_H
#include <glib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "include/pv_hdr_def.h"
#include "utils/crypto.h"
#include "utils/buffer.h"
#include "pv_image.h"
PvHdr *pv_hdr_new(const PvImage *img, GError **err);
void pv_hdr_free(PvHdr *hdr);
G_GNUC_UNUSED gboolean pv_hdr_uses_encryption(const PvHdr *hdr);
PvBuffer *pv_hdr_serialize(const PvHdr *hdr, const PvImage *img,
enum PvCryptoMode mode, GError **err);
uint32_t pv_hdr_size(const PvHdr *hdr);
uint32_t pv_hdr_aad_size(const PvHdr *hdr);
uint64_t pv_hdr_enc_size(const PvHdr *hdr);
uint32_t pv_hdr_enc_size_casted(const PvHdr *hdr);
uint64_t pv_hdr_get_nks(const PvHdr *hdr);
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(PvHdr, pv_hdr_free)
#endif

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/*
* PV image related definitions and functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_IMAGE_H
#define PV_IMAGE_H
#include <glib.h>
#include <glib/gtypes.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "boot/psw.h"
#include "utils/buffer.h"
#include "pv_args.h"
#include "pv_comp.h"
#include "pv_comps.h"
#include "pv_stage3.h"
typedef struct {
gchar *tmp_dir; /* directory used for temporary files */
PvBuffer *stage3a; /* stage3a containing IPIB and PV header */
gsize stage3a_bin_size; /* size of stage3a.bin */
struct psw_t stage3a_psw; /* (short) PSW that is written to
* location 0 of the created image
*/
struct psw_t initial_psw; /* PSW loaded by stage3b */
EVP_PKEY *cust_pub_priv_key; /* customer private/public key */
GSList *host_pub_keys; /* public host keys */
gint nid; /* Elliptic Curve used for the key derivation */
/* keys and cipher used for the AES-GCM encryption */
PvBuffer *cust_root_key;
PvBuffer *gcm_iv;
const EVP_CIPHER *gcm_cipher;
/* Information for the IPIB and PV header */
uint64_t pcf;
uint64_t scf;
PvBuffer *cust_comm_key;
const EVP_CIPHER *cust_comm_cipher;
PvBuffer *xts_key;
const EVP_CIPHER *xts_cipher;
GSList *key_slots;
GSList *optional_items;
PvImgComps *comps;
} PvImage;
PvImage *pv_img_new(PvArgs *args, const gchar *stage3a_path, GError **err);
void pv_img_free(PvImage *img);
gint pv_img_add_component(PvImage *img, const PvArg *arg, GError **err);
gint pv_img_finalize(PvImage *img, const gchar *stage3b_path, GError **err);
gint pv_img_calc_pld_ald_tld_nep(const PvImage *img, PvBuffer **pld, PvBuffer **ald,
PvBuffer **tld, uint64_t *nep, GError **err);
gint pv_img_load_and_set_stage3a(PvImage *img, const gchar *path, GError **err);
const PvComponent *pv_img_get_stage3b_comp(const PvImage *img, GError **err);
gint pv_img_add_stage3b_comp(PvImage *img, const gchar *path, GError **err);
uint32_t pv_img_get_enc_size(const PvImage *img);
uint32_t pv_img_get_pv_hdr_size(const PvImage *img);
gint pv_img_write(PvImage *img, const gchar *path, GError **err);
G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(PvImage, pv_img_free)
#endif

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@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV IPIB related definitions and functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include <glib.h>
#include <glib/gtypes.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "boot/ipl.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "include/pv_hdr_def.h"
#include "lib/zt_common.h"
#include "utils/align.h"
#include "utils/buffer.h"
#include "pv_comp.h"
#include "pv_error.h"
#include "pv_ipib.h"
uint64_t pv_ipib_get_size(uint32_t num_comp)
{
gsize ipib_size = sizeof(struct ipl_pl_hdr) +
sizeof(struct ipl_pb0_pv) +
num_comp * sizeof(struct ipl_pb0_pv_comp);
/* the minimal size is one page */
return MAX(ipib_size, PAGE_SIZE);
}
static gint pv_ipib_init(IplParameterBlock *ipib, GSList *comps,
const PvBuffer *hdr)
{
g_assert(sizeof(struct ipl_pl_hdr) <= UINT32_MAX);
g_assert(sizeof(struct ipl_pb0_pv_comp) <= UINT32_MAX);
g_assert(sizeof(struct ipl_pb0_pv) <= UINT32_MAX);
g_assert(ipib);
guint comps_length = g_slist_length(comps);
uint32_t ipl_pl_hdr_size = (uint32_t)sizeof(struct ipl_pl_hdr);
struct ipl_pb0_pv *pv = &ipib->pv;
uint32_t ipib_comps_size;
uint32_t blk0_len;
uint32_t ipib_size;
gsize i;
g_assert_true(
g_uint_checked_mul(&ipib_comps_size, comps_length,
(uint32_t)sizeof(struct ipl_pb0_pv_comp)));
g_assert_true(g_uint_checked_add(&blk0_len, (uint32_t)sizeof(*pv),
ipib_comps_size));
g_assert(ipl_pl_hdr_size + blk0_len <= PAGE_SIZE);
ipib_size = MAX(ipl_pl_hdr_size + blk0_len, (uint32_t)PAGE_SIZE);
g_assert(pv_ipib_get_size(comps_length) == ipib_size);
pv->pbt = IPL_PBT_PV;
pv->len = GUINT32_TO_BE(blk0_len);
pv->num_comp = GUINT32_TO_BE(comps_length);
/* both values will be overwritten during the IPL process by
* the stage3a loader
*/
pv->pv_hdr_addr = GUINT64_TO_BE(0x0);
pv->pv_hdr_size = GUINT64_TO_BE(hdr->size);
ipib->hdr.len = GUINT32_TO_BE(ipib_size);
ipib->hdr.version = IPL_PARM_BLOCK_VERSION;
i = 0;
for (GSList *iterator = comps; iterator; iterator = iterator->next, i++) {
const PvComponent *comp = iterator->data;
uint64_t comp_addr, comp_size;
g_assert(comp);
comp_addr = pv_component_get_src_addr(comp);
comp_size = pv_component_size(comp);
g_assert(IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(comp_size));
pv->components[i].addr = GUINT64_TO_BE(comp_addr);
pv->components[i].len = GUINT64_TO_BE(comp_size);
pv->components[i].tweak_pref =
GUINT64_TO_BE(pv_component_get_tweak_prefix(comp));
if (i > 0) {
/* tweak prefixes of the components must grow
* strictly monotonous
*/
g_assert(GUINT64_FROM_BE(pv->components[i].tweak_pref) >
GUINT64_FROM_BE(pv->components[i - 1].tweak_pref));
}
}
return 0;
}
IplParameterBlock *pv_ipib_new(GSList *comps, const PvBuffer *hdr, GError **err)
{
uint64_t ipib_size = pv_ipib_get_size(g_slist_length(comps));
g_autoptr(IplParameterBlock) ret = NULL;
if (ipib_size > PV_V1_IPIB_MAX_SIZE) {
g_set_error(err, PV_ERROR, PV_ERROR_IPIB_SIZE,
_("IPIB size is too large: %lu < %lu"), ipib_size,
PAGE_SIZE);
return NULL;
}
ret = g_malloc0(ipib_size);
if (pv_ipib_init(ret, comps, hdr) < 0)
return NULL;
return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
}
void pv_ipib_free(IplParameterBlock *ipib)
{
if (!ipib)
return;
g_free(ipib);
}

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@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV IPIB related definitions and functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_IPIB_H
#define PV_IPIB_H
#include <glib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "boot/ipl.h"
#include "utils/buffer.h"
typedef struct ipl_parameter_block IplParameterBlock;
uint64_t pv_ipib_get_size(uint32_t num_comp);
IplParameterBlock *pv_ipib_new(GSList *comps, const PvBuffer *hdr, GError **err);
void pv_ipib_free(IplParameterBlock *ipib);
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(IplParameterBlock, pv_ipib_free)
#endif

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@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV optional item related definitions and functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include <glib.h>
#include "pv_opt_item.h"
uint32_t pv_opt_item_size(const struct pv_hdr_opt_item *item G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
/* not implemented yet */
g_assert_not_reached();
}
void pv_opt_item_free(struct pv_hdr_opt_item *item)
{
if (!item)
return;
g_free(item);
}

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@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
/*
* PV optional item related definitions and functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_OPT_ITEM_H
#define PV_OPT_ITEM_H
#include <stdint.h>
#include "include/pv_hdr_def.h"
uint32_t pv_opt_item_size(const struct pv_hdr_opt_item *item);
void pv_opt_item_free(struct pv_hdr_opt_item *item);
#endif

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/*
* PV stage3 loader related definitions and functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include <glib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "boot/ipl.h"
#include "boot/stage3a.h"
#include "boot/stage3b.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "utils/align.h"
#include "pv_error.h"
#include "pv_stage3.h"
#define STAGE3A_ARGS(data_ptr, loader_size) \
((struct stage3a_args *)((uint64_t)data_ptr + loader_size - \
sizeof(struct stage3a_args)))
static PvBuffer *loader_getblob(const gchar *filename, gsize *loader_size,
gsize args_size, gsize data_size,
gboolean data_aligned, GError **err)
{
g_autoptr(GMappedFile) mapped_file = NULL;
g_autoptr(PvBuffer) ret = NULL;
gsize size, tmp_loader_size;
gchar *loader_data;
g_assert(loader_size);
mapped_file = g_mapped_file_new(filename, FALSE, err);
if (!mapped_file)
return NULL;
loader_data = g_mapped_file_get_contents(mapped_file);
if (!loader_data) {
g_set_error(err, G_FILE_ERROR, G_FILE_ERROR_BADF,
_("File '%s' is empty"), filename);
return NULL;
}
tmp_loader_size = g_mapped_file_get_length(mapped_file);
if (tmp_loader_size < args_size) {
g_set_error(err, G_FILE_ERROR, G_FILE_ERROR_BADF,
_("File size less than expected: %lu < %ln"),
tmp_loader_size, loader_size);
return NULL;
}
/* For example, the PV header and IPIB data must be page
* aligned.
*/
size = (data_aligned ? PAGE_ALIGN(tmp_loader_size) : tmp_loader_size) +
data_size;
ret = pv_buffer_alloc(size);
/* copy the loader "template" */
memcpy(ret->data, loader_data, tmp_loader_size);
/* reset our dummy data (offsets and length) to zeros */
memset((uint8_t *)ret->data + tmp_loader_size - args_size, 0,
args_size);
*loader_size = tmp_loader_size;
return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
}
PvBuffer *stage3a_getblob(const gchar *filename, gsize *loader_size,
gsize data_size, GError **err)
{
return loader_getblob(filename, loader_size,
sizeof(struct stage3a_args), data_size, TRUE,
err);
}
/* For the memory layout see stage3a.lds */
/* Set the right offsets and sizes in the stage3a template + add
* the IPIB block with the PV header
*/
static gint stage3a_set_data(PvBuffer *loader, gsize loader_size,
const PvBuffer *hdr, struct ipl_parameter_block *ipib,
GError **err)
{
uint32_t ipib_size = GUINT32_FROM_BE(ipib->hdr.len);
gsize args_size = sizeof(struct stage3a_args);
uint32_t hdr_size = (uint32_t)hdr->size;
uint64_t args_addr, next_data_addr;
if (hdr->size > UINT32_MAX) {
g_set_error(err, PV_ERROR, PV_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("Invalid header size: %zu"), hdr->size);
return -1;
}
/* we assume here that the loader ``stage3a`` is loaded page
* aligned in the guest
*/
args_addr = (uint64_t)loader->data + loader_size - args_size;
/* therefore `next_data_addr` is also page aligned */
next_data_addr = (uint64_t)loader->data + PAGE_ALIGN(loader_size);
/* copy IPIB data */
memcpy((void *)next_data_addr, ipib, ipib_size);
/* set IPIB offset in relation to the stage3a arguments */
STAGE3A_ARGS(loader->data, loader_size)->ipib_offs =
GUINT64_TO_BE(next_data_addr - args_addr);
next_data_addr = next_data_addr + PAGE_ALIGN(ipib_size);
/* copy PV header */
memcpy((void *)next_data_addr, hdr->data, hdr_size);
/* set PV header size and offset in relation to the stage3a
* arguments
*/
STAGE3A_ARGS(loader->data, loader_size)->hdr_offs =
GUINT64_TO_BE(next_data_addr - args_addr);
STAGE3A_ARGS(loader->data, loader_size)->hdr_size = GUINT64_TO_BE(hdr_size);
return 0;
}
gint build_stage3a(PvBuffer *loader, gsize loader_size, const PvBuffer *hdr,
struct ipl_parameter_block *ipib, GError **err)
{
return stage3a_set_data(loader, loader_size, hdr, ipib, err);
}
PvBuffer *stage3b_getblob(const gchar *filename, GError **err)
{
g_autoptr(PvBuffer) ret = NULL;
gsize rb_size;
ret = loader_getblob(filename, &rb_size, sizeof(struct stage3b_args), 0,
FALSE, err);
if (!ret)
return NULL;
g_assert(ret->size == rb_size);
return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
}
void build_stage3b(PvBuffer *stage3b, const struct stage3b_args *args)
{
g_assert(stage3b->size > sizeof(*args));
/* at the end of the stage3b there are the stage3b args
* positioned
*/
memcpy((uint8_t *)stage3b->data + stage3b->size - sizeof(*args), args,
sizeof(*args));
}
void memblob_init(struct memblob *arg, uint64_t src, uint64_t size)
{
arg->src = GUINT64_TO_BE(src);
arg->size = GUINT64_TO_BE(size);
}

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/*
* PV stage3 loader related definitions and functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_STAGE3_H
#define PV_STAGE3_H
#include <glib.h>
#include <glib/gtypes.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "boot/ipl.h"
#include "boot/stage3b.h"
#include "utils/buffer.h"
PvBuffer *stage3a_getblob(const gchar *filename, gsize *loader_size,
gsize data_size, GError **err);
gint build_stage3a(PvBuffer *dc, gsize dc_size, const PvBuffer *hdr,
struct ipl_parameter_block *ipib, GError **err);
PvBuffer *stage3b_getblob(const gchar *filename, GError **err);
void build_stage3b(PvBuffer *stage3b, const struct stage3b_args *args);
void memblob_init(struct memblob *arg, uint64_t src, uint64_t size);
#endif

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@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
/*
* Alignment utils
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_UTILS_ALIGN_H
#define PV_UTILS_ALIGN_H
#include "lib/zt_common.h"
#include "boot/page.h"
#define IS_ALIGNED(addr, size) (!(addr & (size - 1)))
/* align addr to the next page boundary */
#define PAGE_ALIGN(addr) ALIGN((unsigned long)addr, PAGE_SIZE)
/* test whether an address is aligned to PAGE_SIZE or not */
#define IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(addr) IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)(addr), PAGE_SIZE)
#endif

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@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
/*
* Buffer functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <glib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "align.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "file_utils.h"
PvBuffer *pv_buffer_alloc(gsize size)
{
PvBuffer *ret = g_new0(PvBuffer, 1);
ret->data = g_malloc0(size);
ret->size = size;
return ret;
}
PvBuffer *pv_buffer_take(char *data, gsize size)
{
PvBuffer *ret = g_new0(PvBuffer, 1);
ret->data = data;
ret->size = size;
return ret;
}
PvBuffer *pv_buffer_dup(const PvBuffer *buf, gboolean page_aligned)
{
PvBuffer *ret;
gsize size;
if (!buf)
return NULL;
size = buf->size;
if (page_aligned)
size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
ret = pv_buffer_alloc(size);
/* content will be 0-right-padded */
memcpy(ret->data, buf->data, buf->size);
return ret;
}
gint pv_buffer_write(const PvBuffer *buf, FILE *file, GError **err)
{
return file_write(file, buf->data, buf->size, 1, NULL, err);
}
void pv_buffer_free(PvBuffer *buf)
{
if (!buf)
return;
g_free(buf->data);
g_free(buf);
}
void pv_buffer_clear(PvBuffer **buf)
{
if (!buf || !*buf)
return;
pv_buffer_free(*buf);
*buf = NULL;
}

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@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
/*
* Buffer definition and functions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_UTILS_BUFFER_H
#define PV_UTILS_BUFFER_H
#include <glib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "common.h"
typedef struct PvBuffer {
void *data;
gsize size; /* in bytes */
} PvBuffer;
PvBuffer *pv_buffer_alloc(gsize size);
/* After this call @data belongs to the PvBuffer and must no longer be modified
* by the caller.
*/
PvBuffer *pv_buffer_take(char *data, gsize size);
void pv_buffer_free(PvBuffer *buf);
void pv_buffer_clear(PvBuffer **buf);
gint pv_buffer_write(const PvBuffer *buf, FILE *file, GError **err);
PvBuffer *pv_buffer_dup(const PvBuffer *buf, gboolean page_aligned);
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(PvBuffer, pv_buffer_free)
#endif

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/*
* General cryptography helper functions and definitions
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_UTILS_CRYPTO_H
#define PV_UTILS_CRYPTO_H
#include <glib.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/safestack.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "include/pv_crypto_def.h"
#include "lib/zt_common.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#define AES_256_GCM_IV_SIZE 12
#define AES_256_GCM_TAG_SIZE 16
#define AES_256_XTS_TWEAK_SIZE 16
#define AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE 64
#define CRL_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_MS 3000
#define CRL_DOWNLOAD_MAX_SIZE (1024 * 1024) /* in bytes */
enum PvCryptoMode {
PV_ENCRYPT,
PV_DECRYPT,
};
typedef GSList HostKeyList;
/* play nice with g_autoptr */
typedef STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) STACK_OF_DIST_POINT;
typedef STACK_OF(X509) STACK_OF_X509;
typedef STACK_OF(X509_CRL) STACK_OF_X509_CRL;
void STACK_OF_DIST_POINT_free(STACK_OF_DIST_POINT *stack);
void STACK_OF_X509_free(STACK_OF_X509 *stack);
void STACK_OF_X509_CRL_free(STACK_OF_X509_CRL *stack);
typedef struct {
X509 *cert;
const gchar *path;
} x509_with_path;
x509_with_path *x509_with_path_new(X509 *cert, const gchar *path);
void x509_with_path_free(x509_with_path *cert);
typedef struct {
X509 *cert;
STACK_OF_X509_CRL *crls;
} x509_pair;
x509_pair *x509_pair_new(X509 **cert, STACK_OF_X509_CRL **crls);
void x509_pair_free(x509_pair *pair);
/* Register auto cleanup functions */
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(ASN1_INTEGER, ASN1_INTEGER_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(AUTHORITY_KEYID, AUTHORITY_KEYID_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(BIGNUM, BN_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(BIO, BIO_free_all)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(BN_CTX, BN_CTX_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(EC_GROUP, EC_GROUP_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(EC_POINT, EC_POINT_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(EVP_CIPHER_CTX, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(EVP_MD_CTX, EVP_MD_CTX_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(EVP_PKEY_CTX, EVP_PKEY_CTX_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(STACK_OF_DIST_POINT, STACK_OF_DIST_POINT_free);
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(STACK_OF_X509, STACK_OF_X509_free);
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(STACK_OF_X509_CRL, STACK_OF_X509_CRL_free);
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(X509, X509_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(X509_CRL, X509_CRL_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(X509_LOOKUP, X509_LOOKUP_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(X509_NAME, X509_NAME_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(x509_pair, x509_pair_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(X509_STORE, X509_STORE_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE_CTX_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(X509_VERIFY_PARAM, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(x509_with_path, x509_with_path_free)
union cmp_index {
struct {
uint16_t idx;
guchar rand[6];
} __packed;
uint64_t data;
};
/* The tweak is always stored in big endian format */
union tweak {
struct {
union cmp_index cmp_idx;
uint64_t page_idx; /* page index */
} __packed;
uint8_t data[AES_256_XTS_TWEAK_SIZE];
};
struct cipher_parms {
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
const PvBuffer *key;
const PvBuffer *iv_or_tweak;
};
int check_crl_valid_for_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509 *cert,
gint verify_flags, GError **err);
void pv_crypto_init(void);
void pv_crypto_cleanup(void);
gint verify_host_key(X509 *host_key, GSList *issuer_pairs,
gint verify_flags, int level, GError **err);
X509 *load_cert_from_file(const char *path, GError **err);
X509_CRL *load_crl_from_file(const gchar *path, GError **err);
GSList *load_certificates(const gchar *const *cert_paths, GError **err);
STACK_OF_X509 *get_x509_stack(const GSList *x509_with_path_list);
X509_STORE *store_setup(const gchar *root_ca_path,
const gchar * const *crl_paths,
GError **err);
int store_set_verify_param(X509_STORE *store, GError **err);
X509_CRL *load_crl_by_cert(X509 *cert, GError **err);
STACK_OF_X509_CRL *try_load_crls_by_certs(GSList *certs_with_path);
gint check_chain_parameters(const STACK_OF_X509 *chain, GError **err);
X509_NAME *c2b_name(const X509_NAME *name);
STACK_OF_X509 *delete_ibm_signing_certs(STACK_OF_X509 *certs);
STACK_OF_X509_CRL *store_ctx_find_valid_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert,
GError **err);
X509_STORE_CTX *create_store_ctx(X509_STORE *trusted, STACK_OF_X509 *chain,
GError **err);
gint verify_cert(X509 *cert, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, GError **err);
X509_CRL *get_first_valid_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, GError **err);
void store_setup_crl_download(X509_STORE *st);
EVP_PKEY *read_ec_pubkey_cert(X509 *cert, gint nid, GError **err);
PvBuffer *compute_exchange_key(EVP_PKEY *cust, EVP_PKEY *host, GError **err);
PvBuffer *generate_aes_key(guint size, GError **err);
PvBuffer *generate_aes_iv(guint size, GError **err);
EVP_PKEY *generate_ec_key(gint nid, GError **err);
gint generate_tweak(union tweak *tweak, uint16_t i, GError **err);
union ecdh_pub_key *evp_pkey_to_ecdh_pub_key(EVP_PKEY *key, GError **err);
EVP_MD_CTX *digest_ctx_new(const EVP_MD *md, GError **err);
PvBuffer *digest_ctx_finalize(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, GError **err);
PvBuffer *sha256_buffer(const PvBuffer *buf, GError **err);
int64_t gcm_encrypt(const PvBuffer *in, const PvBuffer *aad,
const struct cipher_parms *parms, PvBuffer *out,
PvBuffer *tag, GError **err);
gint encrypt_file(const struct cipher_parms *parms, const gchar *in_path,
const gchar *path_out, gsize *in_size, gsize *out_size,
GError **err);
PvBuffer *encrypt_buf(const struct cipher_parms *parms, const PvBuffer *in,
GError **err);
G_GNUC_UNUSED PvBuffer *decrypt_buf(const struct cipher_parms *parms,
const PvBuffer *in, GError **err);
#endif

View File

@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
/*
* Libcurl utils
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <glib.h>
#include <glib/gtypes.h>
#include <curl/curl.h>
#include "lib/zt_common.h"
#include "pv/pv_error.h"
#include "curl.h"
struct UserData {
GByteArray *buffer;
guint max_size;
};
static size_t write_callback(char *ptr, size_t size, size_t nmemb, void *userdata)
{
g_assert(userdata);
struct UserData *data = (struct UserData *)userdata;
GByteArray *buffer = data->buffer;
guint64 actual_size;
size_t err;
g_assert(buffer);
if (!g_uint64_checked_mul(&actual_size, size, nmemb))
g_abort();
/* Signal an error condition by returning a amount that differs
* from the amount passed to the callback. This results in a
* CURLE_WRITE_ERROR.
*/
err = actual_size + 1;
if (actual_size > G_MAXUINT)
return err;
data->buffer = g_byte_array_append(buffer, (guchar *)ptr, (guint)actual_size);
if (data->buffer->len > data->max_size)
return err;
return actual_size;
}
gint curl_init(void)
{
if (curl_global_init(CURL_GLOBAL_ALL) != 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
void curl_cleanup(void)
{
curl_global_cleanup();
}
GByteArray *curl_download(const gchar *url, long timeout_ms, guint max_size,
GError **err)
{
g_autoptr(GByteArray) ret = NULL;
g_autoptr(CURL) handle = NULL;
g_autofree gchar *agent = NULL;
struct UserData userdata;
CURLcode rc;
/* set up curl session */
handle = curl_easy_init();
if (!handle)
g_abort();
/* follow redirection */
rc = curl_easy_setopt(handle, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, 1l);
if (rc != CURLE_OK)
goto curl_err;
rc = curl_easy_setopt(handle, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT_MS, timeout_ms);
if (rc != CURLE_OK)
goto curl_err;
rc = curl_easy_setopt(handle, CURLOPT_NOSIGNAL, 1l);
if (rc != CURLE_OK)
goto curl_err;
agent = g_strdup_printf("%s/%s", tool_name, RELEASE_STRING);
rc = curl_easy_setopt(handle, CURLOPT_USERAGENT, agent);
if (rc != CURLE_OK)
goto curl_err;
rc = curl_easy_setopt(handle, CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, write_callback);
if (rc != CURLE_OK)
goto curl_err;
ret = g_byte_array_new();
userdata.buffer = ret;
userdata.max_size = max_size;
rc = curl_easy_setopt(handle, CURLOPT_WRITEDATA, (void *)&userdata);
if (rc != CURLE_OK)
goto curl_err;
rc = curl_easy_setopt(handle, CURLOPT_URL, url);
if (rc != CURLE_OK)
goto curl_err;
rc = curl_easy_perform(handle);
if (rc != CURLE_OK) {
g_set_error(err, PV_ERROR, PV_ERROR_DOWNLOAD_FAILED,
_("download failed: %s"), curl_easy_strerror(rc));
return NULL;
}
return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
curl_err:
g_set_error(err, PV_ERROR,
PV_ERROR_CURL_INIT_FAILED,
_("cURL initialization failed: %s"),
curl_easy_strerror(rc));
return NULL;
}

View File

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
/*
* Libcurl utils
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_UTILS_LIBCURL_H
#define PV_UTILS_LIBCURL_H
#include <glib.h>
#include <curl/curl.h>
#include "common.h"
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(CURL, curl_easy_cleanup)
GByteArray *curl_download(const gchar *url, long timeout_ms, guint max_size,
GError **err);
gint curl_init(void);
void curl_cleanup(void);
#endif /* PV_UTILS_LIBCURL_H */

View File

@@ -1,234 +0,0 @@
/*
* General file utils
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <glib.h>
#include <glib/gstdio.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "pv/pv_error.h"
#include "align.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "file_utils.h"
FILE *file_open(const gchar *filename, const gchar *mode, GError **err)
{
FILE *f = fopen(filename, mode);
if (!f) {
g_set_error(err, G_FILE_ERROR,
(gint)g_file_error_from_errno(errno),
_("Failed to open file '%s': %s"), filename,
g_strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
return f;
}
gint file_size(const gchar *filename, gsize *size, GError **err)
{
GStatBuf st_buf;
g_assert(size);
if (g_stat(filename, &st_buf) != 0) {
g_set_error(err, G_FILE_ERROR,
(gint)g_file_error_from_errno(errno),
_("Failed to get file status '%s': %s"), filename,
g_strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (!S_ISREG(st_buf.st_mode)) {
g_set_error(err, G_FILE_ERROR, PV_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("File '%s' is not a regular file"), filename);
return -1;
}
if (st_buf.st_size < 0) {
g_set_error(err, G_FILE_ERROR, PV_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("Invalid file size for '%s': %zu"), filename,
st_buf.st_size);
return -1;
}
*size = (gsize)st_buf.st_size;
return 0;
}
/* Returns 0 on success, otherwise -1. Stores the total number of
* elements successfully read in @count_read
*/
gint file_read(FILE *in, void *ptr, gsize size, gsize count,
gsize *count_read, GError **err)
{
gsize tmp_count_read;
tmp_count_read = fread(ptr, size, count, in);
if (count_read)
*count_read = tmp_count_read;
if (ferror(in)) {
g_set_error(err, G_FILE_ERROR, 0, _("Failed to read file"));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
gint file_write(FILE *out, const void *ptr, gsize size, gsize count,
gsize *count_written, GError **err)
{
gsize tmp_count_written;
tmp_count_written = fwrite(ptr, size, count, out);
if (count_written)
*count_written = tmp_count_written;
if (tmp_count_written != count || ferror(out)) {
g_set_error(err, G_FILE_ERROR, 0, _("Failed to write file"));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static gint file_seek(FILE *f, uint64_t offset, GError **err)
{
gint rc;
if (offset > LONG_MAX) {
g_set_error(err, PV_ERROR, 0, _("Offset is too large"));
return -1;
}
rc = fseek(f, (long)offset, SEEK_SET);
if (rc != 0) {
g_set_error(err, G_FILE_ERROR,
(gint)g_file_error_from_errno(errno),
_("Failed to seek: '%s'"), g_strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
gint seek_and_write_file(FILE *o, const CompFile *ifile, uint64_t offset,
GError **err)
{
gsize bytes_read, bytes_written;
gsize total_bytes_read = 0;
FILE *i = NULL;
gchar buf[4096];
gint ret = -1;
if (file_seek(o, offset, err) < 0)
return -1;
i = file_open(ifile->path, "rb", err);
if (!i)
return -1;
do {
if (file_read(i, buf, 1, sizeof(buf), &bytes_read, err) < 0) {
g_prefix_error(err, _("Failed to read file '%s': "),
ifile->path);
goto err;
}
if (bytes_read == 0)
break;
total_bytes_read += bytes_read;
if (file_write(o, buf, bytes_read, 1, &bytes_written, err) < 0)
goto err;
} while (bytes_written != 0);
if (ifile->size != total_bytes_read) {
g_set_error(err, PV_ERROR, PV_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("'%s' has changed during the preparation"),
ifile->path);
goto err;
}
ret = 0;
err:
fclose(i);
return ret;
}
gint seek_and_write_buffer(FILE *o, const PvBuffer *buf, uint64_t offset,
GError **err)
{
if (file_seek(o, offset, err) < 0)
return -1;
if (pv_buffer_write(buf, o, err) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
gint pad_file_right(const gchar *path_out, const gchar *path_in, gsize *size_out,
guint padding, GError **err)
{
FILE *f_in, *f_out = NULL;
guchar buf[padding];
gsize num_bytes_written;
gsize num_bytes_read;
uint64_t size_in = 0;
gint ret = -1;
*size_out = 0;
f_in = file_open(path_in, "rb", err);
if (!f_in)
goto err;
f_out = file_open(path_out, "wb", err);
if (!f_out)
goto err;
do {
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
if (file_read(f_in, buf, 1, sizeof(buf), &num_bytes_read, err) < 0) {
g_prefix_error(err, _("Failed to read file '%s': "),
path_in);
goto err;
}
size_in += num_bytes_read;
if (file_write(f_out, buf, 1, sizeof(buf), &num_bytes_written, err)) {
g_prefix_error(err, _("Failed to write file '%s': "),
path_out);
goto err;
}
*size_out += num_bytes_written;
} while (num_bytes_read == padding);
g_assert(num_bytes_written == ALIGN(num_bytes_read, padding));
ret = 0;
err:
if (f_out)
fclose(f_out);
if (f_in)
fclose(f_in);
return ret;
}

View File

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
/*
* General file utils
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_FILE_UTILS_H
#define PV_FILE_UTILS_H
#include <glib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "pv/pv_comp.h"
#include "buffer.h"
FILE *file_open(const gchar *filename, const gchar *mode, GError **err);
gint file_size(const gchar *filename, gsize *size, GError **err);
gint file_read(FILE *in, void *ptr, gsize size, gsize count,
gsize *count_read, GError **err);
gint file_write(FILE *out, const void *ptr, gsize size, gsize count,
gsize *count_written, GError **err);
gint pad_file_right(const gchar *path_out, const gchar *path_in,
gsize *size_out, guint padding, GError **err);
gint seek_and_write_buffer(FILE *out, const PvBuffer *buf, uint64_t offset,
GError **err);
gint seek_and_write_file(FILE *o, const CompFile *ifile, uint64_t offset,
GError **err);
#endif

View File

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
/*
* OpenSSL compatibility utils
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2021
*
* s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
*/
#ifndef PV_UTILS_OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
#define PV_UTILS_OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
#define Pv_X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx) \
X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert((X509_STORE_CTX *)(ctx))
#define Pv_X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, nm) \
X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls((X509_STORE_CTX *)(ctx), (X509_NAME *)(nm))
#define Pv_X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls(st, cb) \
X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls(st, (X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn)(cb))
#else
#define Pv_X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx) \
X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx)
#define Pv_X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, nm) \
X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, nm)
#define Pv_X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls(st, cb) \
X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls(st, cb)
#endif
#endif