genprotimg: remove DigiCert root CA pinning

Remove the DigiCert root CA pinning. The root CA used for the chain of trust can
change in the future therefore let's remove this check. If someone wants to
enforce the usage of a specific root CA it can be selected by the genprotimg
command line option `--root-ca $CA`. Make it transparent to the user which root
CA is actually being used by printing the subject name of the root CA to stdout
in verbose mode.

Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Viktor Mihajlovski <mihajlov@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Marc Hartmayer
2022-03-31 14:00:31 +00:00
committed by Jan Höppner
parent ab06a5d88a
commit 78b053326c
6 changed files with 35 additions and 51 deletions

View File

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ CRLs. Optional.
.TP
\fB\-\-root\-ca\fR=\fI\,FILE\/\fR
Specifies the root CA certificate for the verification. If omitted,
the DigiCert root CA certificate installed on the system is used. Use
the system wide root CAs installed on the system is used. Use
this only if you trust the specified certificate. Optional.
.TP
\fB\-\-no-verify\fR

View File

@@ -29,9 +29,6 @@
*/
#define PV_CERTS_SECURITY_LEVEL 2
/* SKID for DigiCert Assured ID Root CA */
#define DIGICERT_ASSURED_ID_ROOT_CA_SKID "45EBA2AFF492CB82312D518BA7A7219DF36DC80F"
union ecdh_pub_key {
struct {
uint8_t x[80];

View File

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static gint pv_args_validate_options(PvArgs *args, GError **err)
g_strv_length(args->untrusted_cert_paths) == 0)) {
g_set_error(
err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PR_PARSE_ERROR_MISSING_ARGUMENT,
_("Either specify the IBM Z signing key and (DigiCert) intermediate CA certificate\n"
_("Either specify the IBM Z signing key and intermediate CA certificate\n"
"by using the '--cert' option, or use the '--no-verify' flag to disable the\n"
"host-key document verification completely (at your own risk)."));
return -1;

View File

@@ -311,9 +311,10 @@ static gint pv_img_hostkey_verify(GSList *host_key_certs,
}
/* Load all untrusted certificates (e.g. IBM Z signing key and
* DigiCert intermediate CA) that are required to establish a chain of
* trust starting from the host-key document up to the root CA (if not
* otherwise specified that's the DigiCert Assured ID Root CA).
* intermediate CA) that are required to establish a chain of trust
* starting from the host-key document up to the root CA (if not
* otherwise specified that can be one of the system wide installed
* root CAs, e.g. DigiCert).
*/
untrusted_certs_with_path = load_certificates(untrusted_cert_paths, err);
if (!untrusted_certs_with_path)
@@ -348,9 +349,8 @@ static gint pv_img_hostkey_verify(GSList *host_key_certs,
* For this we must check:
*
* 1. Can a chain of trust be established ending in a root CA
* 2. Is the correct root CA ued? It has either to be the
* 'DigiCert Assured ID Root CA' or the root CA specified via
* command line.
* 2. Is the correct root CA used? It has either to be a system CA
* or the root CA specified via command line.
*/
for (gint i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ibm_signing_certs); ++i) {
X509 *ibm_signing_cert = sk_X509_value(ibm_signing_certs, i);
@@ -371,17 +371,12 @@ static gint pv_img_hostkey_verify(GSList *host_key_certs,
if (verify_cert(ibm_signing_cert, ctx, err) < 0)
goto error;
/* Verify the build chain of trust chain. If the user passes a
* trusted root CA on the command line then the check for the
* Subject Key Identifier (SKID) is skipped, otherwise let's
* check if the SKID meets our expectation.
/* If there is a chain of trust using either the provided root
* CA on the command line or a system wide trusted root CA.
*/
if (!root_ca_path &&
check_chain_parameters(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx),
get_digicert_assured_id_root_ca_skid(),
err) < 0) {
if (check_chain_parameters(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx),
err) < 0)
goto error;
}
ibm_signing_crls = store_ctx_find_valid_crls(ctx, ibm_signing_cert, err);
if (!ibm_signing_crls) {
@@ -595,7 +590,7 @@ PvImage *pv_img_new(PvArgs *args, const gchar *stage3a_path, GError **err)
g_warning(_("host-key document verification is disabled. Your workload is not secured."));
if (args->root_ca_path)
g_warning(_("A different root CA than the default DigiCert root CA is selected. Ensure that this root CA is trusted."));
g_warning(_("The root CA is selected through the command line. Ensure that this root CA is trusted."));
ret->comps = pv_img_comps_new(EVP_sha512(), EVP_sha512(), EVP_sha512(), err);
if (!ret->comps)

View File

@@ -1079,8 +1079,8 @@ int store_set_verify_param(X509_STORE *store, GError **err)
g_abort();
/* The maximum depth level of the chain of trust for the verification of
* the IBM Z signing key is 2, i.e. IBM Z signing key -> (DigiCert)
* intermediate CA -> (DigiCert) root CA
* the IBM Z signing key is 2, i.e. IBM Z signing key -> intermediate CA
* -> root CA
*/
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(param, 2);
@@ -1267,46 +1267,38 @@ static int security_level_to_bits(int level)
return security_bits[level];
}
static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digicert_assured_id_root_ca;
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *get_digicert_assured_id_root_ca_skid(void)
{
pv_crypto_init();
return digicert_assured_id_root_ca;
}
/* Used for the caching of the downloaded CRLs */
static GHashTable *cached_crls;
void pv_crypto_init(void)
{
if (digicert_assured_id_root_ca)
if (cached_crls)
return;
cached_crls = g_hash_table_new_full(g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free,
(GDestroyNotify)X509_CRL_free);
digicert_assured_id_root_ca = s2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(
NULL, NULL, DIGICERT_ASSURED_ID_ROOT_CA_SKID);
}
void pv_crypto_cleanup(void)
{
if (!digicert_assured_id_root_ca)
if (!cached_crls)
return;
g_clear_pointer(&cached_crls, g_hash_table_destroy);
g_clear_pointer(&digicert_assured_id_root_ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free);
}
gint check_chain_parameters(const STACK_OF_X509 *chain,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid, GError **err)
GError **err)
{
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ca_skid = NULL;
const X509_NAME *ca_x509_subject = NULL;
g_autofree gchar *ca_subject = NULL;
gint len = sk_X509_num(chain);
X509 *ca = NULL;
g_assert(skid);
/* at least one root and one leaf certificate must be defined */
g_assert(len >= 2);
if (len < 2) {
g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("there must be at least on root and one leaf certificate in the chain of trust"));
return -1;
}
/* get the root certificate of the chain of trust */
ca = sk_X509_value(chain, len - 1);
@@ -1316,19 +1308,21 @@ gint check_chain_parameters(const STACK_OF_X509 *chain,
return -1;
}
ca_skid = X509_get0_subject_key_id(ca);
if (!ca_skid) {
g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_MALFORMED_ROOT_CA,
_("malformed root certificate"));
ca_x509_subject = X509_get_subject_name(ca);
if (!ca_x509_subject) {
g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("subject of the root CA cannot be retrieved"));
return -1;
}
if (ASN1_STRING_cmp(ca_skid, skid) != 0) {
g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_WRONG_CA_USED,
_("expecting DigiCert root CA to be used"));
ca_subject = X509_NAME_oneline(ca_x509_subject, NULL, 0);
if (!ca_subject) {
g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_INTERNAL,
_("subject name of the root CA cannot be retrieved"));
return -1;
}
g_info("Root CA used: '%s'", ca_subject);
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -125,7 +125,6 @@ int check_crl_valid_for_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509 *cert,
gint verify_flags, GError **err);
void pv_crypto_init(void);
void pv_crypto_cleanup(void);
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *get_digicert_assured_id_root_ca_skid(void);
gint verify_host_key(X509 *host_key, GSList *issuer_pairs,
gint verify_flags, int level, GError **err);
X509 *load_cert_from_file(const char *path, GError **err);
@@ -138,8 +137,7 @@ X509_STORE *store_setup(const gchar *root_ca_path,
int store_set_verify_param(X509_STORE *store, GError **err);
X509_CRL *load_crl_by_cert(X509 *cert, GError **err);
STACK_OF_X509_CRL *try_load_crls_by_certs(GSList *certs_with_path);
gint check_chain_parameters(const STACK_OF_X509 *chain,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid, GError **err);
gint check_chain_parameters(const STACK_OF_X509 *chain, GError **err);
X509_NAME *c2b_name(const X509_NAME *name);
STACK_OF_X509 *delete_ibm_signing_certs(STACK_OF_X509 *certs);