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zkey-cryptsetup: Support PHMAC integrity with reencipher command

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In case the volume is integrity protected, and the integrity algorithm is
PHMAC, then the reencipher command also reenciphers the integrity key part
of the volume key.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ingo Franzki
2024-03-27 11:07:31 +01:00
committed by Jan Höppner
parent 771c794580
commit 96d5b0bb02
1 changed files with 210 additions and 103 deletions
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313
zkey/zkey-cryptsetup.c
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@@ -1744,6 +1744,108 @@ out:
return rc;
}
static int reencipher_key(u8 *key, size_t securekeysize,
int fromold, int tonew, int is_old_mk,
int is_integrity_key)
{
bool selected;
char *msg;
int rc;
if (!fromold && !tonew) {
/* Autodetect reencipher mode */
if (is_old_mk) {
fromold = 1;
util_asprintf(&msg, "The secure %s key of device '%s' "
"is enciphered with the OLD master key "
"and is being re-enciphered with the "
"CURRENT master key.",
is_integrity_key ?
"integrity" : "encryption",
g.pos_arg);
util_print_indented(msg, 0);
free(msg);
} else {
tonew = 1;
util_asprintf(&msg, "The secure %s key of device '%s' "
"is enciphered with the CURRENT master "
"key and is being re-enciphered with the "
"NEW master key.",
is_integrity_key ?
"integrity" : "encryption",
g.pos_arg);
util_print_indented(msg, 0);
free(msg);
}
}
if (fromold) {
rc = reencipher_secure_key(&g.lib, key, securekeysize,
NULL, REENCIPHER_OLD_TO_CURRENT,
&selected, g.verbose);
if (rc != 0) {
if (rc == -ENODEV) {
warnx("No APQN found that is suitable for "
"re-enciphering the secure %s key from "
"the OLD to the CURRENT master key.",
is_integrity_key ?
"integrity" : "encryption");
} else {
warnx("Failed to re-encipher the secure %s key "
"for device '%s'\n",
is_integrity_key ?
"integrity" : "encryption",
g.pos_arg);
if (!selected &&
!is_ep11_aes_key(key, securekeysize) &&
!is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(key,
securekeysize))
is_integrity_key ?
print_msg_for_cca_envvars(
"secure volume key") :
print_msg_for_cca_envvars(
"secure integrity key");
rc = -EINVAL;
}
return rc;
}
}
if (tonew) {
rc = reencipher_secure_key(&g.lib, key, securekeysize,
NULL, REENCIPHER_CURRENT_TO_NEW,
&selected, g.verbose);
if (rc != 0) {
if (rc == -ENODEV) {
warnx("No APQN found that is suitable for "
"re-enciphering the secure %s key from "
"the CURRENT to the NEW master key.",
is_integrity_key ?
"integrity" : "encryption");
} else {
warnx("Failed to re-encipher the secure %s key "
"for device '%s'\n",
is_integrity_key ?
"integrity" : "encryption",
g.pos_arg);
if (!selected &&
!is_ep11_aes_key(key, securekeysize) &&
!is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(key,
securekeysize))
is_integrity_key ?
print_msg_for_cca_envvars(
"secure volume key") :
print_msg_for_cca_envvars(
"secure integrity key");
rc = -EINVAL;
}
return rc;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Return the number of active key slots in a LUKS2 volume.
*/
@@ -1772,25 +1874,27 @@ static int count_active_keyslots(struct crypt_device *cd)
*/
static int reencipher_prepare(int token)
{
int is_old_mk, is_integrity_old_mk;
struct reencipher_token reenc_tok;
size_t integrity_keysize = 0;
char *integrity_spec = NULL;
u8 *integrity_key = NULL;
int is_phmac_integrity;
struct vp_token vp_tok;
char *password = NULL;
size_t securekeysize;
size_t password_len;
u8 *key = NULL;
size_t keysize;
int is_old_mk;
bool selected;
char *prompt;
char *msg;
int rc;
if (token >= 0) {
util_asprintf(&msg, "Staged volume key re-enciphering is "
"already initiated for device '%s'. Do you want to "
"cancel the pending re-enciphering and start a "
"new re-enciphering process [y/N]?", g.pos_arg);
"already initiated for device '%s'. Do you want "
"to cancel the pending re-enciphering and start "
"a new re-enciphering process [y/N]?", g.pos_arg);
util_print_indented(msg, 0);
free(msg);
@@ -1806,16 +1910,19 @@ static int reencipher_prepare(int token)
util_asprintf(&prompt, "Enter passphrase for '%s': ", g.pos_arg);
rc = validate_keyslot(CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &key, &keysize,
&integrity_keysize, NULL,
&integrity_keysize, &integrity_spec,
&password, &password_len,
&is_old_mk, NULL, NULL, NULL, prompt, NULL, NULL);
&is_old_mk, NULL, &is_integrity_old_mk, NULL,
prompt, NULL, NULL);
free(prompt);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
is_phmac_integrity = is_integrity_phmac(integrity_spec,
integrity_keysize);
securekeysize = keysize - integrity_keysize;
if (!is_secure_key(key, securekeysize)) {
if (!is_secure_key(key, securekeysize) && !is_phmac_integrity) {
warnx("The volume key of device '%s' is of type %s and can "
"not be re-enciphered", g.pos_arg,
get_key_type(key, securekeysize));
@@ -1823,6 +1930,25 @@ static int reencipher_prepare(int token)
goto out;
}
if (is_phmac_integrity) {
integrity_key = key + securekeysize;
if (!is_secure_key(key, securekeysize) &&
!is_secure_key(integrity_key, integrity_keysize)) {
util_asprintf(&msg, "The encryption key of device '%s' "
"is of type %s, and the integrity key is "
"of type %s. Both key types can not be "
"re-enciphered", g.pos_arg,
get_key_type(key, securekeysize),
get_key_type(integrity_key,
integrity_keysize));
util_print_indented(msg, 0);
free(msg);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
reenc_tok.original_keyslot = rc;
rc = ensure_is_active_keylot(reenc_tok.original_keyslot);
@@ -1843,82 +1969,46 @@ static int reencipher_prepare(int token)
memcpy(vp_tok.verification_pattern, reenc_tok.verification_pattern,
sizeof(vp_tok.verification_pattern));
if (is_phmac_integrity) {
rc = generate_key_verification_pattern(integrity_key,
integrity_keysize,
reenc_tok.int_verification_pattern,
sizeof(reenc_tok.int_verification_pattern),
g.verbose);
if (rc != 0) {
warnx("Failed to generate the verification pattern: %s",
strerror(-rc));
warnx("Make sure that kernel module 'phmac_s390' is "
"loaded and that the 'phmac' cipher is "
"available");
goto out;
}
memcpy(vp_tok.int_verification_pattern,
reenc_tok.int_verification_pattern,
sizeof(vp_tok.int_verification_pattern));
}
token = find_token(g.cd, PAES_VP_TOKEN_NAME);
rc = put_vp_token(g.cd, token, &vp_tok);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
if (!g.fromold && !g.tonew) {
/* Autodetect reencipher mode */
if (is_old_mk) {
g.fromold = 1;
util_asprintf(&msg, "The secure volume key of device "
"'%s' is enciphered with the OLD "
"master key and is being re-enciphered "
"with the CURRENT master key.",
g.pos_arg);
util_print_indented(msg, 0);
free(msg);
} else {
g.tonew = 1;
util_asprintf(&msg, "The secure volume key of device "
"'%s' is enciphered with the CURRENT "
"master key and is being re-enciphered "
"with the NEW master key.",
g.pos_arg);
util_print_indented(msg, 0);
free(msg);
}
if (is_secure_key(key, securekeysize)) {
rc = reencipher_key(key, securekeysize, g.fromold, g.tonew,
is_old_mk, 0);
if (rc != 0)
goto out;
}
if (g.fromold) {
rc = reencipher_secure_key(&g.lib, key, securekeysize,
NULL, REENCIPHER_OLD_TO_CURRENT,
&selected, g.verbose);
if (rc != 0) {
if (rc == -ENODEV) {
warnx("No APQN found that is suitable for "
"re-enciphering the secure volume "
"key from the OLD to the CURRENT master "
"key.");
} else {
warnx("Failed to re-encipher the secure volume "
"key for device '%s'\n", g.pos_arg);
if (!selected &&
!is_ep11_aes_key(key, securekeysize) &&
!is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(key,
securekeysize))
print_msg_for_cca_envvars(
"secure volume key");
rc = -EINVAL;
}
if (is_phmac_integrity &&
is_secure_key(integrity_key, integrity_keysize)) {
rc = reencipher_key(integrity_key, integrity_keysize,
g.fromold, g.tonew,
is_old_mk, 1);
if (rc != 0)
goto out;
}
}
if (g.tonew) {
rc = reencipher_secure_key(&g.lib, key, securekeysize,
NULL, REENCIPHER_CURRENT_TO_NEW,
&selected, g.verbose);
if (rc != 0) {
if (rc == -ENODEV) {
warnx("No APQN found that is suitable for "
"re-enciphering the secure volume "
"key from the CURRENT to the NEW master "
"key.");
} else {
warnx("Failed to re-encipher the secure volume "
"key for device '%s'\n", g.pos_arg);
if (!selected &&
!is_ep11_aes_key(key, securekeysize) &&
!is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(key,
securekeysize))
print_msg_for_cca_envvars(
"secure volume key");
rc = -EINVAL;
}
goto out;
}
}
rc = crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(g.cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, (char *)key,
@@ -1978,16 +2068,18 @@ out:
*/
static int reencipher_complete(int token)
{
int is_old_mk, is_integrity_old_mk;
char vp[VERIFICATION_PATTERN_LEN];
size_t integrity_keysize = 0;
struct reencipher_token tok;
char *integrity_spec = NULL;
u8 *integrity_key = NULL;
int is_phmac_integrity;
char *password = NULL;
size_t securekeysize;
size_t password_len;
u8 *key = NULL;
size_t keysize;
int is_old_mk;
bool selected;
char *prompt;
char *msg;
int rc;
@@ -2006,9 +2098,9 @@ static int reencipher_complete(int token)
util_asprintf(&prompt, "Enter passphrase for key slot %d of '%s': ",
tok.original_keyslot, g.pos_arg);
rc = validate_keyslot(tok.unbound_keyslot, &key, &keysize,
&integrity_keysize, NULL,
&integrity_keysize, &integrity_spec,
&password, &password_len,
&is_old_mk, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&is_old_mk, NULL, &is_integrity_old_mk, NULL,
prompt, msg, NULL);
free(msg);
free(prompt);
@@ -2019,9 +2111,13 @@ static int reencipher_complete(int token)
if (rc != 0)
goto out;
is_phmac_integrity = is_integrity_phmac(integrity_spec,
integrity_keysize);
securekeysize = keysize - integrity_keysize;
if (is_phmac_integrity)
integrity_key = key + securekeysize;
if (is_old_mk) {
if (is_old_mk || is_integrity_old_mk) {
util_asprintf(&msg, "The re-enciphered secure volume key "
"of device '%s' is enciphered with the "
"master key from the OLD master key register. "
@@ -2040,27 +2136,17 @@ static int reencipher_complete(int token)
goto out;
}
rc = reencipher_secure_key(&g.lib, key, securekeysize,
NULL, REENCIPHER_OLD_TO_CURRENT,
&selected, g.verbose);
if (rc != 0) {
if (rc == -ENODEV) {
warnx("No APQN found that is suitable for "
"re-enciphering the secure volume "
"key from the OLD to the CURRENT master "
"key.");
} else {
warnx("Failed to re-encipher the secure volume "
"key for device '%s'\n", g.pos_arg);
if (!selected &&
!is_ep11_aes_key(key, securekeysize) &&
!is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(key,
securekeysize))
print_msg_for_cca_envvars(
"secure volume key");
rc = -EINVAL;
}
goto out;
if (is_old_mk) {
rc = reencipher_key(key, securekeysize, 1, 0, 1, 0);
if (rc != 0)
goto out;
}
if (is_integrity_old_mk) {
rc = reencipher_key(integrity_key, integrity_keysize,
1, 0, 1, 1);
if (rc != 0)
goto out;
}
rc = crypt_keyslot_destroy(g.cd, tok.unbound_keyslot);
@@ -2095,12 +2181,33 @@ static int reencipher_complete(int token)
}
if (strcmp(tok.verification_pattern, vp) != 0) {
warnx("The verification patterns of the new and old volume "
warnx("The verification patterns of the new and old encryption "
"keys do not match");
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (is_phmac_integrity) {
rc = generate_key_verification_pattern(integrity_key,
integrity_keysize, vp,
sizeof(vp), g.verbose);
if (rc != 0) {
warnx("Failed to generate the verification pattern: %s",
strerror(-rc));
warnx("Make sure that kernel module 'phmac_s390' is "
"loaded and that the 'phmac' cipher is "
"available");
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(tok.int_verification_pattern, vp) != 0) {
warnx("The verification patterns of the new and old "
"integrity keys do not match");
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
util_asprintf(&msg, "Re-enciphering has completed successfully for "
"device '%s'.", g.pos_arg);
rc = activate_unbound_keyslot(token, tok.unbound_keyslot, key,