New release s390-tools-2.42.1

Signed-off by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,6 +1,24 @@
 Release history for s390-tools (MIT version)
 --------------------------------------------
 
+* __v2.42.1 (2026-05-22)__
+
+  For Linux kernel version: 7.0
+
+  Changes of existing tools:
+  - cpumf/pai: Improve -m XXX argument verification
+  - pvattest: Add -i -o option variant for check
+  - pvattest: Show perform -i & -o option in help
+  - pvebc: Disable unit logging to /boot
+  - pvsecret: Add -i -o option variants
+
+  Bug Fixes:
+  - cpumf/pai: Remove unnecessary const parameter definition
+  - pv: Fix error description
+  - pvebc: Fix dependency for non EBC guests
+  - pvebc: Fix kernel module dependencies
+  - zipl: Don't modify job->data.dump and job->data.mvdump sequentially
+
 * __v2.42.0 (2026-04-30)__
 
   For Linux kernel version: 7.0

common.mak

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ endif
 # "make DISTRELEASE=%{release}" and "make install DISTRELEASE=%{release}"
 VERSION            := 2
 RELEASE            := 42
-PATCHLEVEL         := 0
+PATCHLEVEL         := 1
 DISTRELEASE        := build-$(shell date +%Y%m%d)
 S390_TOOLS_RELEASE := $(VERSION).$(RELEASE).$(PATCHLEVEL)-$(DISTRELEASE)
 export S390_TOOLS_RELEASE

cpumf/pai.c

@@ -894,7 +894,7 @@ static int parse_event_attr(char *cp)
 }
 
 /* Parse CPU list and event specifications */
-static void parse_cpulist(int enr, const char *parm)
+static void parse_cpulist(int enr, char *parm)
 {
 	unsigned int evt_attr = 0;
 	cpu_set_t cmdlist, result;
@@ -948,33 +948,27 @@ static const struct util_prg prg = {
 	}
 };
 
-static void record_cpus_crypto(const char *cp)
+static void record_cpus_crypto(char *cp)
 {
 	if (!libcpumf_have_pai_crypto())
 		errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "No support for PAI crypto counters");
 	parse_cpulist(S390_EVT_PAI_CRYPTO, cp);
 }
 
-static void record_cpus_nnpa(const char *cp)
+static void record_cpus_nnpa(char *cp)
 {
 	if (!libcpumf_have_pai_nnpa())
 		errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "No support for PAI nnpa counters");
 	parse_cpulist(S390_EVT_PAI_NNPA, cp);
 }
 
-/* Mapsize must be power of 2 and larger than 4. Count bits in n and
- * return 0 if input is invalid and has a bit count larger than one.
+/* Mapsize must be power of 2 and larger than 4. Return true in this case.
  */
-static unsigned long check_mapsize(unsigned long n)
+static bool check_mapsize(unsigned long n)
 {
-	int bit, cnt = 0;
-
 	if (n < 4)
 		return 0;
-	for (bit = 0; bit < __BITS_PER_LONG; ++bit)
-		if (n & (1 << bit))
-			++cnt;
-	return cnt == 1 ? n : 0;
+	return (n & (n - 1)) == 0;
 }
 
 static void setprio(const char *prio)
@@ -1040,11 +1034,11 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 				errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Invalid argument for -%c", ch);
 			break;
 		case 'm':
-			errno = 0;
 			mapsize = strtoul(optarg, &slash, 0);
-			mapsize = check_mapsize(mapsize);
-			if (errno || !mapsize || *slash)
+			if (!mapsize || *slash)
 				errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Invalid argument for -%c", ch);
+			if (!check_mapsize(mapsize))
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "No power of 2 number for -%c", ch);
 			break;
 		case 'n':
 			record_cpus_nnpa(optarg);

rust/Makefile

@@ -114,8 +114,10 @@ ifneq ($(HAVE_DRACUT),0)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 755 pvebc/$(SEL_EBC_MODDIR)/module-setup.sh \
 		pvebc/$(SEL_EBC_MODDIR)/override-crypttab.sh \
 		pvebc/$(SEL_EBC_MODDIR)/pvebc-wrapper.sh \
+		pvebc/$(SEL_EBC_MODDIR)/boot-mount.sh \
+		pvebc/$(SEL_EBC_MODDIR)/sel-ebc-modules.conf \
 		$(DESTDIR)$(DRACUTMODDIR)/$(SEL_EBC_MODDIR)
-	$(INSTALL) -m 644 pvebc/$(SEL_EBC_MODDIR)/boot.mount \
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 pvebc/$(SEL_EBC_MODDIR)/sel-ebc-boot-mount.service \
 		pvebc/$(SEL_EBC_MODDIR)/sel-ebc-override-crypttab.service \
 		pvebc/$(SEL_EBC_MODDIR)/sel-ebc-paes-enforce.service \
 		pvebc/$(SEL_EBC_MODDIR)/sel-ebc-pvebc.service \

rust/pv/src/error.rs

@@ -90,11 +90,11 @@ pub enum Error {
     #[error("Input does not contain an attestation request")]
     NoArcb,
 
-    #[error("The attestation request has an unknown version (.0)")]
+    #[error("The attestation request has an unknown version {0}")]
     BinArcbInvVersion(u32),
 
     #[error(
-        "The attestation request encrypted sice is to0 small (.0). Request probably tampered with."
+        "The attestation request encrypted sice is to0 small {0}. Request probably tampered with."
     )]
     BinArcbSeaSmall(u32),
 

rust/pvattest/README.md

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Create an attestation measurement request
 
 - **perform**
 <ul>
-Send the attestation request to the Ultravisor
+Send the attestation request to the Ultravisor (s390x only.)
 </ul>
 
 - **verify**
@@ -150,11 +150,11 @@ Print help (see a summary with '-h').
 ### Synopsis
 `pvattest perform [OPTIONS] [IN] [OUT]`
 ### Description
-Send the attestation request to the Ultravisor. Run a measurement of this system
-through ’/dev/uv’. This device must be accessible and the attestation
-Ultravisor facility must be present. The input must be an attestation request
-created with ’pvattest create’. Output will contain the original request and
-the response from the Ultravisor.
+Send the attestation request to the Ultravisor (s390x only.) Run a measurement
+of this system through ’/dev/uv’. This device must be accessible and the
+attestation Ultravisor facility must be present. The input must be an
+attestation request created with ’pvattest create’. Output will contain the
+original request and the response from the Ultravisor. Only available on s390x.
 ### Arguments
 
 `<IN>`
@@ -171,6 +171,18 @@ Write the result to FILE.
 
 ### Options
 
+`-i`, `--input <FILE>`
+<ul>
+Specify the request to be sent.
+</ul>
+
+
+`-o`, `--output <FILE>`
+<ul>
+Write the result to FILE.
+</ul>
+
+
 `-u`, `--user-data <File>`
 <ul>
 Provide up to 256 bytes of user input User-data is arbitrary user-defined data
@@ -256,7 +268,7 @@ Print help (see a summary with '-h').
 
 ## pvattest check
 ### Synopsis
-`pvattest check [OPTIONS] <IN> <OUT>`
+`pvattest check [OPTIONS] [IN] [OUT]`
 ### Description
 Check if the attestation result matches defined policies. After the attestation
 verification, check whether the attestation result complies with user-defined
@@ -277,6 +289,18 @@ Specify the output file for the check result.
 
 ### Options
 
+`-i`, `--input <FILE>`
+<ul>
+Specify the attestation response to check whether the policies are validated.
+</ul>
+
+
+`-o`, `--output <FILE>`
+<ul>
+Specify the output file for the check result.
+</ul>
+
+
 `--format <FORMAT>`
 <ul>
 Define the output format.

rust/pvattest/man/pvattest-check.1

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 .\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
 .\"
 
-.TH "PVATTEST-CHECK" "1" "2025-03-12" "s390-tools" "Attestation Manual"
+.TH "PVATTEST-CHECK" "1" "2026-05-19" "s390-tools" "Attestation Manual"
 .nh
 .ad l
 .SH NAME
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ pvattest-check \- Check if the attestation result matches defined policies
 .SH SYNOPSIS
 .nf
 .fam C
-pvattest check [OPTIONS] <IN> <OUT>
+pvattest check [OPTIONS] [IN] [OUT]
 .fam C
 .fi
 .SH DESCRIPTION
@@ -31,6 +31,18 @@ Specify the output file for the check result.
 .RE
 .RE
 
+.PP
+\-i, \-\-input <FILE>
+.RS 4
+Specify the attestation response to check whether the policies are validated.
+.RE
+.RE
+.PP
+\-o, \-\-output <FILE>
+.RS 4
+Specify the output file for the check result.
+.RE
+.RE
 .PP
 \-\-format <FORMAT>
 .RS 4

rust/pvattest/man/pvattest-create.1

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 .\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
 .\"
 
-.TH "PVATTEST-CREATE" "1" "2026-02-12" "s390-tools" "Attestation Manual"
+.TH "PVATTEST-CREATE" "1" "2026-05-20" "s390-tools" "Attestation Manual"
 .nh
 .ad l
 .SH NAME
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ Workstation. To avoid compromising the attestation do not publish the
 attestation request protection key and shred it after verification. Every
 \fBcreate\fR will generate a new, random protection key.
 .SH OPTIONS
+
 .PP
 \-k, \-\-host\-key\-document <FILE>
 .RS 4

rust/pvattest/man/pvattest-perform.1

@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@
 .\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
 .\"
 
-.TH "PVATTEST-PERFORM" "1" "2025-03-12" "s390-tools" "Attestation Manual"
+.TH "PVATTEST-PERFORM" "1" "2026-05-19" "s390-tools" "Attestation Manual"
 .nh
 .ad l
 .SH NAME
-pvattest-perform \- Send the attestation request to the Ultravisor
+pvattest-perform \- Send the attestation request to the Ultravisor (s390x only.)
 .SH SYNOPSIS
 .nf
 .fam C
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ pvattest perform [OPTIONS] [IN] [OUT]
 Run a measurement of this system through ’/dev/uv’. This device must be
 accessible and the attestation Ultravisor facility must be present. The input
 must be an attestation request created with ’pvattest create’. Output will
-contain the original request and the response from the Ultravisor.
+contain the original request and the response from the Ultravisor. Only
+available on s390x.
 .SH OPTIONS
 .PP
 <IN>
@@ -33,6 +34,18 @@ Write the result to FILE.
 .RE
 .RE
 
+.PP
+\-i, \-\-input <FILE>
+.RS 4
+Specify the request to be sent.
+.RE
+.RE
+.PP
+\-o, \-\-output <FILE>
+.RS 4
+Write the result to FILE.
+.RE
+.RE
 .PP
 \-u, \-\-user\-data <File>
 .RS 4

rust/pvattest/man/pvattest-verify.1

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 .\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
 .\"
 
-.TH "PVATTEST-VERIFY" "1" "2026-02-12" "s390-tools" "Attestation Manual"
+.TH "PVATTEST-VERIFY" "1" "2026-05-20" "s390-tools" "Attestation Manual"
 .nh
 .ad l
 .SH NAME
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ solely verifies that the Attestation measurement is correct. It does not check
 for the content of additional data or user data. See `pvattest check` for policy
 checks after you verified the Attestation measurement.
 .SH OPTIONS
+
 .PP
 \-i, \-\-input <FILE>
 .RS 4

rust/pvattest/man/pvattest.1

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 .\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
 .\"
 
-.TH "PVATTEST" "1" "2026-02-12" "s390-tools" "Attestation Manual"
+.TH "PVATTEST" "1" "2026-05-19" "s390-tools" "Attestation Manual"
 .nh
 .ad l
 .SH NAME
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Create an attestation measurement request
 
 \fBpvattest\-perform(1)\fR
 .RS 4
-Send the attestation request to the Ultravisor
+Send the attestation request to the Ultravisor (s390x only.)
 .RE
 
 .PP
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ Check if the attestation result matches defined policies
 .RE
 
 .SH OPTIONS
+
 .PP
 \-v, \-\-verbose
 .RS 4

rust/pvattest/src/cli.rs

@@ -113,20 +113,20 @@ pub enum AttAddFlags {
 #[derive(Args, Debug)]
 pub struct PerformAttOpt {
     /// Specify the request to be sent.
-    #[arg(hide=true, short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
-    pub input: Option<String>,
+    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
+    input: Option<String>,
 
     /// Specify the request to be sent.
     #[arg(value_name = "IN", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath, required_unless_present("input"), conflicts_with("input"))]
-    pub input_pos: Option<String>,
+    input_pos: Option<String>,
 
     /// Write the result to FILE.
-    #[arg(hide=true, short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
-    pub output: Option<String>,
+    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
+    output: Option<String>,
 
     /// Write the result to FILE.
     #[arg(value_name = "OUT", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath, required_unless_present("output"), conflicts_with("output"))]
-    pub output_pos: Option<String>,
+    output_pos: Option<String>,
 
     /// Provide up to 256 bytes of user input
     ///
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ pub struct PerformAttOpt {
     /// It is verified during the Attestation measurement verification.
     /// May be any arbitrary data, as long as it is less or equal to 256 bytes
     #[arg(short, long, value_name = "File", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
-    pub user_data: Option<String>,
+    user_data: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[cfg(target_arch = "s390x")]
@@ -217,12 +217,20 @@ pub enum OutputType {
 #[derive(Args, Debug)]
 pub struct CheckOpt {
     /// Specify the attestation response to check whether the policies are validated.
-    #[arg(value_name = "IN", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
-    pub input: PathBuf,
+    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
+    input: Option<PathBuf>,
+
+    /// Specify the attestation response to check whether the policies are validated.
+    #[arg(value_name = "IN", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath, required_unless_present("input"), conflicts_with("input"))]
+    input_pos: Option<PathBuf>,
 
     /// Specify the output file for the check result.
-    #[arg(value_name = "OUT", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
-    pub output: PathBuf,
+    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
+    output: Option<PathBuf>,
+
+    /// Specify the output file for the check result.
+    #[arg(value_name = "OUT", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath, required_unless_present("output"), conflicts_with("output"))]
+    output_pos: Option<PathBuf>,
 
     /// Define the output format.
     #[arg(long, value_enum, default_value_t)]
@@ -300,6 +308,30 @@ pub struct CheckOpt {
     pub firmware_verify_url: Option<String>,
 }
 
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct CheckOptIO<'a> {
+    pub input: &'a PathBuf,
+    pub output: &'a PathBuf,
+}
+
+impl<'a> From<&'a CheckOpt> for CheckOptIO<'a> {
+    fn from(value: &'a CheckOpt) -> Self {
+        let input = match (&value.input, &value.input_pos) {
+            (None, Some(i)) => i,
+            (Some(i), None) => i,
+            (Some(_), Some(_)) => unreachable!(),
+            (None, None) => unreachable!(),
+        };
+        let output = match (&value.output, &value.output_pos) {
+            (None, Some(o)) => o,
+            (Some(o), None) => o,
+            (Some(_), Some(_)) => unreachable!(),
+            (None, None) => unreachable!(),
+        };
+        Self { input, output }
+    }
+}
+
 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, ValueEnum, Debug)]
 pub enum HostKeyCheckPolicy {
     /// Check the host-key used for the attestation request.

rust/pvattest/src/cmd/check.rs

@@ -12,7 +12,12 @@ use self::{
     secret_store::secret_store_check,
     secret_store::SecretStoreCheck,
 };
-use crate::{additional::AttestationResult, cli::CheckOpt, exchange::ExchangeFormatResponse};
+use crate::{
+    additional::AttestationResult,
+    cli::{CheckOpt, CheckOptIO},
+    exchange::ExchangeFormatResponse,
+};
+
 use anyhow::Result;
 use log::{debug, info, warn};
 use pv::{
@@ -104,7 +109,8 @@ pub struct CheckResult<'a> {
 
 /// Perform the policy checks
 pub fn check(opt: &CheckOpt) -> Result<ExitCode> {
-    let mut input = open_file(&opt.input)?;
+    let opt_io = CheckOptIO::from(opt);
+    let mut input = open_file(opt_io.input)?;
     let inp = ExchangeFormatResponse::read(&mut input)?;
     let auth = AttestationRequest::auth_bin(inp.arcb())?;
     let att_res = AttestationResult::from_exchange(&inp, auth.flags())?;
@@ -139,7 +145,7 @@ pub fn check(opt: &CheckOpt) -> Result<ExitCode> {
     };
 
     debug!("res {res:?}");
-    let output = create_file(&opt.output)?;
+    let output = create_file(opt_io.output)?;
     serde_yaml::to_writer(output, &res)?;
 
     match res.successful {

rust/pvebc/95sel-ebc/boot-mount.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+#
+# Copyright IBM Corp.
+
+set -eu
+
+mntp="/boot"
+block_dev="$(blkid -L boot)"
+
+if [[ -z "${block_dev}" ]]; then
+	echo "Unable to find partition with label boot"
+	exit 1
+elif [[ ! -b "${block_dev}" ]]; then
+	echo "Unable to find block device ${block_dev}"
+	exit 1
+else
+	echo "Found block device ${block_dev}"
+fi
+
+if [[ ! -d "${mntp}" ]]; then
+	echo "Mountpoint ${mntp} does not exist, creating..."
+	mkdir "${mntp}"
+else
+	echo "Mountpoint ${mntp} exists"
+fi
+
+echo "Mounting ${block_dev} to ${mntp}"
+mount --options ro "${block_dev}" "${mntp}"
+
+exit 0

rust/pvebc/95sel-ebc/boot.mount

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=Mount /boot early in initramfs
-
-# Initramfs requirement
-DefaultDependencies=no
-# Make absolutely sure this only runs in initramfs (and not post-pivot if the
-# unit ever appears there)
-ConditionPathExists=/etc/initrd-release
-ConditionKernelCommandLine=root
-
-# we use /dev/disk/by-label because it identifies the boot partition system
-# independently IF set up correctly
-Requires=dev-disk-by\x2dlabel-boot.device
-
-# Ordering dependencies
-After=dev-disk-by\x2dlabel-boot.device
-Before=sel-ebc-pvebc.service
-
-[Mount]
-# system independent identification of boot partition requires that the label
-# boot is set for the boot partition
-What=/dev/disk/by-label/boot
-Where=/boot
-Type=auto
-Options=defaults
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=sel-ebc-pvebc.service

rust/pvebc/95sel-ebc/module-setup.sh

@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@ depends() {
 # Called by dracut
 installkernel() {
 	# kernel modules needed for opening an encrypted rfs
-	instmods -c uvdevice
-	instmods -c paes_s390
-	instmods -c pkey_uv
-	instmods -c pkey_pckmo
-	instmods -c pkey
+	hostonly='' instmods -c uvdevice
+	hostonly='' instmods -c paes_s390
+	hostonly='' instmods -c pkey_uv
+	hostonly='' instmods -c pkey_pckmo
+	hostonly='' instmods -c pkey
 }
 
 # Called by dracut
@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ install() {
 		"$systemdsystemunitdir/sel-ebc-paes-enforce.service"
 	inst_simple "$moddir/sel-ebc-override-crypttab.service" \
 		"$systemdsystemunitdir/sel-ebc-override-crypttab.service"
-	inst_simple "$moddir/boot.mount" \
-		"$systemdsystemunitdir/boot.mount"
+	inst_simple "$moddir/sel-ebc-boot-mount.service" \
+		"$systemdsystemunitdir/sel-ebc-boot-mount.service"
 
 	# already exisitng unit we depend on for kernel modules
 	inst_simple /usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-modules-load.service \
@@ -58,6 +58,14 @@ install() {
 	inst_simple "$moddir/override-crypttab.sh" \
 		"/etc/sel-ebc/override-crypttab.sh"
 
+	# mount boot partition to /boot
+	inst_simple "$moddir/boot-mount.sh" \
+		"/etc/sel-ebc/boot-mount.sh"
+
+	# install kernel module dependencies
+	inst_simple "$moddir/sel-ebc-modules.conf" \
+		"/usr/lib/modules-load.d/sel-ebc-modules.conf"
+
 	# copy main application
 	inst_binary "/usr/bin/pvebc"
 	inst_binary "/usr/bin/pvsecret"
@@ -72,5 +80,5 @@ install() {
 	systemctl --root "$initdir" --no-reload --quiet enable sel-ebc-override-crypttab.service
 	systemctl --root "$initdir" --no-reload --quiet enable sel-ebc-paes-enforce.service
 	systemctl --root "$initdir" --no-reload --quiet enable systemd-modules-load.service
-	systemctl --root "$initdir" --no-reload --quiet enable boot.mount
+	systemctl --root "$initdir" --no-reload --quiet enable sel-ebc-boot-mount.service
 }

rust/pvebc/95sel-ebc/override-crypttab.sh

@@ -3,7 +3,20 @@
 #
 # Copyright IBM Corp.
 
+set -eu
+
 IBM_RSRC_DIR="/etc/sel-ebc"
+block_dev="$(blkid -L cryptroot)"
+
+if [[ -z "${block_dev}" ]]; then
+	echo "Unable to find partition with label cryptroot"
+	exit 1
+elif [[ ! -b "${block_dev}" ]]; then
+	echo "Unable to find block device ${block_dev}"
+	exit 1
+else
+	echo "Found block device ${block_dev}"
+fi
 
 if [[ ! -f "${IBM_RSRC_DIR}/crypttab" ]]; then
 	echo "Error: source file $IBM_RSRC_DIR/crypttab does not exist"
@@ -15,6 +28,11 @@ cp "${IBM_RSRC_DIR}/crypttab" "/etc/crypttab"
 
 systemctl daemon-reload
 
-systemctl restart systemd-cryptsetup@cryptroot_mapper.service
+udevadm trigger --subsystem-match=block --settle
+
+if ! systemctl restart systemd-cryptsetup@cryptroot_mapper.service; then
+        systemctl status systemd-cryptsetup@cryptroot_mapper.service
+        exit 1
+fi
 
 exit 0

rust/pvebc/95sel-ebc/pvebc-wrapper.sh

@@ -48,16 +48,23 @@ fi
 pvebc --toc "$EBC_TMPFS/$TOC"
 rc=$?
 if [[ $rc -ne 0 ]]; then
+	echo "pvebc failed with rc=${rc}"
 	exit $rc
 fi
 
 # Retrieve and check for dummy LUKS passphrase
 pvsecret retrieve --inform name -o "$EBC_TMPFS/$ASR_NAME" --outform bin "$ASR_NAME"
+rc=$?
+if [[ $rc -ne 0 ]]; then
+	echo "pvsecret failed with rc=${rc}"
+	exit $rc
+fi
 
 if [[ ! -f "$EBC_TMPFS/$ASR_NAME" ]]; then
 	echo "$EBC_TMPFS/$ASR_NAME does not exist"
+	exit 1
 fi
 
 chmod 400 "$EBC_TMPFS/$ASR_NAME"
 
-exit 0
+exit $?

rust/pvebc/95sel-ebc/sel-ebc-boot-mount.service

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Mount a partition identified by label boot to /boot
+
+# Ensure this runs before the handoff to the real root, if that's required:
+Before=sel-ebc-pvebc.service
+
+# Initramfs requirement
+DefaultDependencies=no
+# Make absolutely sure this only runs in initramfs
+ConditionPathExists=/etc/initrd-release
+ConditionKernelCommandLine=rd.sel-ebc
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+ExecStart=/bin/bash /etc/sel-ebc/boot-mount.sh
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+# On failure immediately abort boot
+FailureAction=poweroff-immediate
+
+[Install]
+RequiredBy=sel-ebc-pvebc.service

rust/pvebc/95sel-ebc/sel-ebc-modules.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+uvdevice
+paes_s390
+pkey_uv
+pkey_pckmo
+pkey

rust/pvebc/95sel-ebc/sel-ebc-override-crypttab.service

@@ -4,10 +4,8 @@ Description=Override crypttab
 # boot partition contains SICS
 # Loading of kernel modules is required which are needed for protected keys
 Requires=systemd-modules-load.service
-Requires=boot.mount
 
 # Ensure this runs before the handoff to the real root, if that's required:
-After=boot.mount
 After=systemd-modules-load.service
 Before=cryptsetup-pre.target
 Before=cryptsetup.target
@@ -30,8 +28,8 @@ RemainAfterExit=yes
 FailureAction=poweroff-immediate
 # boot partition is unencrypted and contains SICS so we can get logs out this way
 # logs do not leek any sensitive information
-StandardOutput=file:/boot/sics/log
-StandardError=file:/boot/sics/log
+StandardOutput=console
+StandardError=console
 
 [Install]
 RequiredBy=sel-ebc.target

rust/pvebc/95sel-ebc/sel-ebc-paes-enforce.service

@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ FailureAction=poweroff-immediate
 RemainAfterExit=yes
 
 # logs do not leek any sensitive information
-StandardOutput=file:/boot/sics/log
-StandardError=file:/boot/sics/log
+StandardOutput=console
+StandardError=console
 
 [Install]
 RequiredBy=sel-ebc.target

rust/pvebc/95sel-ebc/sel-ebc-pvebc.service

@@ -4,14 +4,14 @@ Description=Run pvebc during early boot to process SICS
 # boot partition contains SICS
 # Loading of kernel modules is required which are needed for protected keys
 Requires=systemd-modules-load.service
-Wants=boot.mount
+Requires=sel-ebc-boot-mount.service
 
 # Ensure this runs before the handoff to the real root, if that's required:
 Before=initrd-root-device.target
 Before=cryptsetup-pre.target
 Before=cryptsetup.target
-After=boot.mount
 After=systemd-modules-load.service
+After=sel-ebc-boot-mount.service
 
 # Initramfs requirement
 DefaultDependencies=no
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ RemainAfterExit=yes
 FailureAction=poweroff-immediate
 # boot partition is unencrypted and contains SICS so we can get logs out this way
 # logs do not leek any sensitive information
-StandardOutput=file:/boot/sics/log
-StandardError=file:/boot/sics/log
+StandardOutput=console
+StandardError=console
 
 [Install]
 RequiredBy=sel-ebc.target

rust/pvsecret/README.md

@@ -253,6 +253,28 @@ Optional. No user-data by default.
 </ul>
 
 
+`--policy <FILE>`
+<ul>
+Links an Add‑Secret-Request (ASR) to a policy file. This option embeds a
+PolicyReference in the ASR user data field. The PolicyReference includes the
+relative file path and the SHA‑512 hash of the policy file, allowing the
+policy’s integrity to be verified.
+
+This option conflicts with --user-data, because both options use the same user
+data field in the ASR structure.
+</ul>
+
+
+`--toc-policy <FILE>`
+<ul>
+Adds the AES‑GCM authentication tag to a TOC policy file. This option appends
+the AES‑GCM authentication tag to the specified TOC policy file. This allows
+the TOC policy to maintain a list of all ASR MAC tags for completeness
+verification during boot. During verification, the TOC checks the MAC tags
+against this list to ensure that all expected ASRs are present and unmodified.
+</ul>
+
+
 `--user-sign-key <FILE>`
 <ul>
 Use the content of FILE as user signing key. Adds a signature calculated from
@@ -407,14 +429,14 @@ Print help (see a summary with '-h').
 
 ## pvsecret add
 ### Synopsis
-`pvsecret add [OPTIONS] <FILE>`
+`pvsecret add [OPTIONS] [INPUT]`
 ### Description
 Submit an add-secret request to the Ultravisor (s390x only). Perform an
 add-secret request using a previously generated add-secret request. Only
 available on s390x.
 ### Arguments
 
-`<FILE>`
+`<INPUT>`
 <ul>
 Specify the request to be sent.
 </ul>
@@ -422,6 +444,12 @@ Specify the request to be sent.
 
 ### Options
 
+`-i`, `--input <FILE>`
+<ul>
+Specify the request to be sent.
+</ul>
+
+
 `-f`, `--force`
 <ul>
 Force the addition of add-secret requests. Add an add-secret request even if
@@ -445,22 +473,27 @@ fail. Only available on s390x.
 
 ## pvsecret list
 ### Synopsis
-`pvsecret list [OPTIONS] [FILE]`
+`pvsecret list [OPTIONS] [OUTPUT]`
 ### Description
 List all ultravisor secrets (s390x only). Lists the IDs of all non-null secrets
 currently stored in the ultravisor for the currently running IBM Secure
 Execution guest. Only available on s390x.
 ### Arguments
 
-`<FILE>`
+`<OUTPUT>`
 <ul>
 Store the result in FILE.
-    Default value: '-'
 </ul>
 
 
 ### Options
 
+`-o`, `--output <FILE>`
+<ul>
+Store the result in FILE.
+</ul>
+
+
 `--format <FORMAT>`
 <ul>
 Define the output format of the list.
@@ -480,7 +513,7 @@ Print help (see a summary with '-h').
 
 ## pvsecret verify
 ### Synopsis
-`pvsecret verify [OPTIONS] <FILE>`
+`pvsecret verify [OPTIONS] [INPUT] [OUTPUT]`
 ### Description
 Verifies that the given request is an Add-Secret request by testing for some
 values to be present. If the request contains signed user-data, the signature
@@ -520,14 +553,27 @@ The verification process works as follows:
 
 ### Arguments
 
-`<FILE>`
+`<INPUT>`
 <ul>
 Specify the request to be checked.
 </ul>
 
 
+`<OUTPUT>`
+<ul>
+Store the result in FILE If the request contained abirtary user-data the output
+contains this user-data with padded zeros if available.
+</ul>
+
+
 ### Options
 
+`-i`, `--input <FILE>`
+<ul>
+Specify the request to be checked.
+</ul>
+
+
 `--user-cert <FILE>`
 <ul>
 Certificate containing a public key used to verify the user data signature.
@@ -540,11 +586,10 @@ curve over a 521 bit prime field (secp521r1).
 </ul>
 
 
-`-o`, `--output <FILE>`
+`-o`, `--output <OUTPUT>`
 <ul>
 Store the result in FILE If the request contained abirtary user-data the output
 contains this user-data with padded zeros if available.
-    Default value: '-'
 </ul>
 
 
@@ -556,13 +601,13 @@ Print help (see a summary with '-h').
 
 ## pvsecret retrieve
 ### Synopsis
-`pvsecret retrieve [OPTIONS] <ID>`
-`pvsecret retr [OPTIONS] <ID>`
+`pvsecret retrieve [OPTIONS] [INPUT] [OUTPUT]`
+`pvsecret retr [OPTIONS] [INPUT] [OUTPUT]`
 ### Description
 Retrieve a secret from the UV secret store (s390x only)
 ### Arguments
 
-`<ID>`
+`<INPUT>`
 <ul>
 Specify the secret ID to be retrieved. Input type depends on '--inform'. If
 `yaml` (default) is specified, it must be a yaml created by the create
@@ -574,12 +619,29 @@ retrieved.
 </ul>
 
 
+`<OUTPUT>`
+<ul>
+Specify the output path to place the secret value.
+</ul>
+
+
 ### Options
 
+`-i`, `--input <ID>`
+<ul>
+Specify the secret ID to be retrieved. Input type depends on '--inform'. If
+`yaml` (default) is specified, it must be a yaml created by the create
+subcommand of this tool. If `hex` is specified, it must be a 32 byte handle
+encodes in hexadecimal. Leading zeros are required. If there are multiple
+secrets in the store with the same Id there are no guarantees on which specific
+secret is retrieved. Use --inform=idx to make sure a specific secret is
+retrieved.
+</ul>
+
+
 `-o`, `--output <FILE>`
 <ul>
 Specify the output path to place the secret value.
-    Default value: '-'
 </ul>
 
 

rust/pvsecret/man/pvsecret-add.1

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 .\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
 .\"
 
-.TH "PVSECRET-ADD" "1" "2026-02-12" "s390-tools" "UV\-Secret Manual"
+.TH "PVSECRET-ADD" "1" "2026-05-21" "s390-tools" "UV\-Secret Manual"
 .nh
 .ad l
 .SH NAME
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ pvsecret-add \- Submit an add-secret request to the Ultravisor (s390x only)
 .SH SYNOPSIS
 .nf
 .fam C
-pvsecret add [OPTIONS] <FILE>
+pvsecret add [OPTIONS] [INPUT]
 .fam C
 .fi
 .SH DESCRIPTION
@@ -19,12 +19,18 @@ Perform an add\-secret request using a previously generated add\-secret request.
 Only available on s390x.
 .SH OPTIONS
 .PP
-<FILE>
+<INPUT>
 .RS 4
 Specify the request to be sent.
 .RE
 .RE
 
+.PP
+\-i, \-\-input <FILE>
+.RS 4
+Specify the request to be sent.
+.RE
+.RE
 .PP
 \-f, \-\-force
 .RS 4

rust/pvsecret/man/pvsecret-create-retrievable.1

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 .\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
 .\"
 
-.TH "PVSECRET-CREATE-RETRIEVABLE" "1" "2026-02-12" "s390-tools" "UV\-Secret Manual"
+.TH "PVSECRET-CREATE-RETRIEVABLE" "1" "2026-05-20" "s390-tools" "UV\-Secret Manual"
 .nh
 .ad l
 .SH NAME
@@ -29,30 +29,30 @@ the following curves: secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1, ed25519, or ed448.
 \fBHMAC\-SHA preprocessing\fP
 
 .RS 2
-The \fBHMAC\-SHA\fP key supplied in the plain bytes file is the key \fBK_0\fP
-as of \fBFIPS\-198\-1\fP, i.e. the key \fBK\fP after any necessary
-pre\-processing. The pre\-processing must be performed by the user prior to
-creating the retrievable secret.
-.PP Pre\-processing means that if the key \fBK\fP is shorter than the block
-size of the to\-be\-used HMAC digest, then the key must be padded with binary
-zeros to the right up to the block size. The block size of SHA\-224 and
-SHA\-256 is 512 bits (64 bytes) and the bock size of SHA\-384 and SHA\-512 is
-1024 bits (128 bytes). Such padding can for example be achieved by using the
-\fBtruncate\fP command with the desired size in bytes, e.g. \fB'truncate
-\-\-size 64 <key\-file>'\fP for creating a \fBK_0\fP key for HMAC\-SHA\-224
-and HMAC\-SHA\-256.
+The \fBHMAC\-SHA\fP key supplied in the plain bytes file is the key \fBK_0\fP as
+of \fBFIPS\-198\-1\fP, i.e. the key \fBK\fP after any necessary pre\-processing.
+The pre\-processing must be performed by the user prior to creating the
+retrievable secret.
+.PP Pre\-processing means that if the key \fBK\fP is shorter than the block size
+of the to\-be\-used HMAC digest, then the key must be padded with binary zeros
+to the right up to the block size. The block size of SHA\-224 and SHA\-256 is
+512 bits (64 bytes) and the bock size of SHA\-384 and SHA\-512 is 1024 bits (128
+bytes). Such padding can for example be achieved by using the \fBtruncate\fP
+command with the desired size in bytes, e.g. \fB'truncate \-\-size 64
+<key\-file>'\fP for creating a \fBK_0\fP key for HMAC\-SHA\-224 and
+HMAC\-SHA\-256.
 .PP
 In case key \fBK\fP is longer than the block size of the to\-be\-used HMAC
-digest, then key \fBK\fP must first be hashed with the to\-be\-used HMAC
-digest, and the result must then be padded with binary zeros to the right up to
-the block size of the digest. This can be achieved by using the following
-OpenSSL command followed by the \fBtruncate\fP command: \fB'openssl sha256
-\-binary \-out <key2\-file> <key\-file>'\fP and then \fB'truncate \-\-size
-64 <key2\-file>'\fP for creating a \fBK_0\fP key for HMAC\-SHA\-256.
+digest, then key \fBK\fP must first be hashed with the to\-be\-used HMAC digest,
+and the result must then be padded with binary zeros to the right up to the
+block size of the digest. This can be achieved by using the following OpenSSL
+command followed by the \fBtruncate\fP command: \fB'openssl sha256 \-binary
+\-out <key2\-file> <key\-file>'\fP and then \fB'truncate \-\-size 64
+<key2\-file>'\fP for creating a \fBK_0\fP key for HMAC\-SHA\-256.
 .PP
 \fBATTENTION:\fP The digest used for hashing the key \fBK\fP must be the exact
-same as the later to\-be\-used HMAC digest! If the pre\-processing and the
-HMAC calculation use different digests, then a wrong MAC is calculated!
+same as the later to\-be\-used HMAC digest! If the pre\-processing and the HMAC
+calculation use different digests, then a wrong MAC is calculated!
 .RE
 
 .SH OPTIONS

rust/pvsecret/man/pvsecret-create-update-cck.1

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 .\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
 .\"
 
-.TH "PVSECRET-CREATE-UPDATE-CCK" "1" "2026-02-12" "s390-tools" "UV\-Secret Manual"
+.TH "PVSECRET-CREATE-UPDATE-CCK" "1" "2026-05-20" "s390-tools" "UV\-Secret Manual"
 .nh
 .ad l
 .SH NAME
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ pvsecret create cck \-\-secret <CCK\-FILE>
 .SH DESCRIPTION
 Insert a customer communication key into a guest.
 .SH OPTIONS
+
 .PP
 \-\-secret <CCK\-FILE>
 .RS 4

rust/pvsecret/man/pvsecret-create.1

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 .\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
 .\"
 
-.TH "PVSECRET-CREATE" "1" "2026-02-12" "s390-tools" "UV\-Secret Manual"
+.TH "PVSECRET-CREATE" "1" "2026-05-19" "s390-tools" "UV\-Secret Manual"
 .nh
 .ad l
 .SH NAME
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ Update customer communication key
 .RE
 
 .SH OPTIONS
+
 .PP
 \-k, \-\-host\-key\-document <FILE>
 .RS 4
@@ -196,23 +197,23 @@ Optional. No user\-data by default.
 .PP
 \-\-policy <FILE>
 .RS 4
-Links an add\-secret request to a policy file.
-This option embeds a reference to a policy in the add\-secret request user data field. The
-reference includes the relative file path and the SHA-512 hash of the
-policy file, enabling verification of the policy file’s integrity.
-This option conflicts with \fB\-\-user\-data\fR, because both options use the
-same user data field in the add\-secret request structure.
+Links an Add‑Secret\-Request (ASR) to a policy file. This option embeds a
+PolicyReference in the ASR user data field. The PolicyReference includes the
+relative file path and the SHA‑512 hash of the policy file, allowing the
+policy’s integrity to be verified.
+
+This option conflicts with \-\-user\-data, because both options use the same
+user data field in the ASR structure.
 .RE
 .RE
 .PP
 \-\-toc\-policy <FILE>
 .RS 4
-Adds the AES\-GCM authentication tag to a table-of-contents (TOC) policy file.
-This option appends the AES\-GCM authentication tag to the specified TOC policy
-file. This allows the TOC policy to maintain a list of all add\-secret request MAC tags for
-completeness verification during boot. During verification, the TOC checks the
-AES\-GCM tags against this list to ensure that all expected add\-secret request are present and
-unmodified.
+Adds the AES‑GCM authentication tag to a TOC policy file. This option appends
+the AES‑GCM authentication tag to the specified TOC policy file. This allows
+the TOC policy to maintain a list of all ASR MAC tags for completeness
+verification during boot. During verification, the TOC checks the MAC tags
+against this list to ensure that all expected ASRs are present and unmodified.
 .RE
 .RE
 .PP

rust/pvsecret/man/pvsecret-list.1

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 .\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
 .\"
 
-.TH "PVSECRET-LIST" "1" "2024-12-19" "s390-tools" "UV-Secret Manual"
+.TH "PVSECRET-LIST" "1" "2026-05-21" "s390-tools" "UV\-Secret Manual"
 .nh
 .ad l
 .SH NAME
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ pvsecret-list \- List all ultravisor secrets (s390x only)
 .SH SYNOPSIS
 .nf
 .fam C
-pvsecret list [OPTIONS] [FILE]
+pvsecret list [OPTIONS] [OUTPUT]
 .fam C
 .fi
 .SH DESCRIPTION
@@ -19,13 +19,18 @@ Lists the IDs of all non\-null secrets currently stored in the ultravisor for
 the currently running IBM Secure Execution guest. Only available on s390x.
 .SH OPTIONS
 .PP
-<FILE>
+<OUTPUT>
 .RS 4
 Store the result in FILE.
-[default: '-']
 .RE
 .RE
 
+.PP
+\-o, \-\-output <FILE>
+.RS 4
+Store the result in FILE.
+.RE
+.RE
 .PP
 \-\-format <FORMAT>
 .RS 4

rust/pvsecret/man/pvsecret-retrieve.1

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 .\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
 .\"
 
-.TH "PVSECRET-RETRIEVE" "1" "2026-02-12" "s390-tools" "UV\-Secret Manual"
+.TH "PVSECRET-RETRIEVE" "1" "2026-05-21" "s390-tools" "UV\-Secret Manual"
 .nh
 .ad l
 .SH NAME
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ pvsecret-retrieve \- Retrieve a secret from the UV secret store (s390x only)
 .SH SYNOPSIS
 .nf
 .fam C
-pvsecret retrieve [OPTIONS] <ID>
-pvsecret retr [OPTIONS] <ID>
+pvsecret retrieve [OPTIONS] [INPUT] [OUTPUT]
+pvsecret retr [OPTIONS] [INPUT] [OUTPUT]
 .fam C
 .fi
 .SH DESCRIPTION
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ keys the PEM name \fBIBM PROTECTED KEY\fP is used.
 
 .SH OPTIONS
 .PP
-<ID>
+<INPUT>
 .RS 4
 Specify the secret ID to be retrieved. Input type depends on \fB\-\-inform\fR.
 If `yaml` (default) is specified, it must be a yaml created by the create
@@ -35,12 +35,29 @@ secret is retrieved. Use \-\-inform=idx to make sure a specific secret is
 retrieved.
 .RE
 .RE
+.PP
+<OUTPUT>
+.RS 4
+Specify the output path to place the secret value.
+.RE
+.RE
 
+.PP
+\-i, \-\-input <ID>
+.RS 4
+Specify the secret ID to be retrieved. Input type depends on \fB\-\-inform\fR.
+If `yaml` (default) is specified, it must be a yaml created by the create
+subcommand of this tool. If `hex` is specified, it must be a 32 byte handle
+encodes in hexadecimal. Leading zeros are required. If there are multiple
+secrets in the store with the same Id there are no guarantees on which specific
+secret is retrieved. Use \-\-inform=idx to make sure a specific secret is
+retrieved.
+.RE
+.RE
 .PP
 \-o, \-\-output <FILE>
 .RS 4
 Specify the output path to place the secret value.
-[default: '-']
 .RE
 .RE
 .PP

rust/pvsecret/man/pvsecret-verify.1

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 .\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
 .\"
 
-.TH "PVSECRET-VERIFY" "1" "2026-02-12" "s390-tools" "UV\-Secret Manual"
+.TH "PVSECRET-VERIFY" "1" "2026-05-21" "s390-tools" "UV\-Secret Manual"
 .nh
 .ad l
 .SH NAME
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ pvsecret-verify \- Verify that an add-secret request is sane
 .SH SYNOPSIS
 .nf
 .fam C
-pvsecret verify [OPTIONS] <FILE>
+pvsecret verify [OPTIONS] [INPUT] [OUTPUT]
 .fam C
 .fi
 .SH DESCRIPTION
@@ -81,12 +81,25 @@ verify the signature of the request but the last 16 bytes
 
 .SH OPTIONS
 .PP
-<FILE>
+<INPUT>
 .RS 4
 Specify the request to be checked.
 .RE
 .RE
+.PP
+<OUTPUT>
+.RS 4
+Store the result in FILE If the request contained abirtary user\-data the output
+contains this user\-data with padded zeros if available.
+.RE
+.RE
 
+.PP
+\-i, \-\-input <FILE>
+.RS 4
+Specify the request to be checked.
+.RE
+.RE
 .PP
 \-\-user\-cert <FILE>
 .RS 4
@@ -100,11 +113,10 @@ curve over a 521 bit prime field (secp521r1).
 .RE
 .RE
 .PP
-\-o, \-\-output <FILE>
+\-o, \-\-output <OUTPUT>
 .RS 4
 Store the result in FILE If the request contained abirtary user\-data the output
 contains this user\-data with padded zeros if available.
-[default: '-']
 .RE
 .RE
 .PP

rust/pvsecret/man/pvsecret.1

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 .\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
 .\"
 
-.TH "PVSECRET" "1" "2026-02-12" "s390-tools" "UV\-Secret Manual"
+.TH "PVSECRET" "1" "2026-05-20" "s390-tools" "UV\-Secret Manual"
 .nh
 .ad l
 .SH NAME
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ Retrieve a secret from the UV secret store (s390x only)
 .RE
 
 .SH OPTIONS
+
 .PP
 \-v, \-\-verbose
 .RS 4

rust/pvsecret/src/cli.rs

@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ use std::fmt::Display;
 
 use clap::error::ErrorKind::ValueValidation;
 use clap::{ArgGroup, Args, CommandFactory, Parser, Subcommand, ValueEnum, ValueHint};
-use utils::{CertificateOptions, DeprecatedVerbosityOptions, STDOUT};
+use utils::{
+    combined_path_opt, combined_path_req, CertificateOptions, DeprecatedVerbosityOptions, STDOUT,
+};
 
 /// Manage secrets for IBM Secure Execution guests.
 ///
@@ -292,8 +294,12 @@ impl Display for RetrieveableSecretInpKind {
 #[derive(Args, Debug)]
 pub struct AddSecretOpt {
     /// Specify the request to be sent.
-    #[arg(value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
-    pub input: String,
+    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
+    input: Option<String>,
+
+    /// Specify the request to be sent.
+    #[arg(value_name = "INPUT", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath, required_unless_present("input"), conflicts_with("input"))]
+    input_pos: Option<String>,
 
     /// Force the addition of add-secret requests.
     ///
@@ -303,6 +309,22 @@ pub struct AddSecretOpt {
     pub force: bool,
 }
 
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct AddSecretOptComb<'a> {
+    pub input: &'a str,
+    pub force: bool,
+}
+
+impl<'a> From<&'a AddSecretOpt> for AddSecretOptComb<'a> {
+    fn from(value: &'a AddSecretOpt) -> Self {
+        let input = combined_path_req(&value.input, &value.input_pos);
+        Self {
+            input,
+            force: value.force,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, ValueEnum, Debug, Default)]
 pub enum ListSecretOutputType {
     /// Human-focused, non-parsable output format
@@ -317,19 +339,43 @@ pub enum ListSecretOutputType {
 #[derive(Args, Debug)]
 pub struct ListSecretOpt {
     /// Store the result in FILE
-    #[arg(value_name = "FILE", default_value = STDOUT, value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
-    pub output: String,
+    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
+    output: Option<String>,
+
+    /// Store the result in FILE
+    #[arg(value_name = "OUTPUT", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath, conflicts_with("output"))]
+    output_pos: Option<String>,
 
     /// Define the output format of the list.
     #[arg(long, value_enum, default_value_t)]
     pub format: ListSecretOutputType,
 }
 
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct ListSecretOptComb<'a> {
+    pub output: &'a str,
+    pub format: ListSecretOutputType,
+}
+
+impl<'a> From<&'a ListSecretOpt> for ListSecretOptComb<'a> {
+    fn from(value: &'a ListSecretOpt) -> Self {
+        let output = combined_path_opt(&value.output, &value.output_pos, STDOUT);
+        Self {
+            output,
+            format: value.format,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 #[derive(Args, Debug)]
 pub struct VerifyOpt {
     /// Specify the request to be checked.
-    #[arg(value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
-    pub input: String,
+    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
+    input: Option<String>,
+
+    /// Specify the request to be checked.
+    #[arg(value_name = "INPUT", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath, required_unless_present("input"), conflicts_with("input"))]
+    input_pos: Option<String>,
 
     /// Certificate containing a public key used to verify the user data signature.
     ///
@@ -345,8 +391,34 @@ pub struct VerifyOpt {
     ///
     /// If the request contained abirtary user-data the output contains this user-data with padded
     /// zeros if available.
-    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", default_value = STDOUT, value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
-    pub output: String,
+    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "OUTPUT", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,)]
+    output: Option<String>,
+
+    /// Store the result in FILE
+    ///
+    /// If the request contained abirtary user-data the output contains this user-data with padded
+    /// zeros if available.
+    #[arg(value_name = "OUTPUT", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath, conflicts_with("output"))]
+    output_pos: Option<String>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct VerifyOptComb<'a> {
+    pub input: &'a str,
+    pub user_cert: Option<&'a str>,
+    pub output: &'a str,
+}
+
+impl<'a> From<&'a VerifyOpt> for VerifyOptComb<'a> {
+    fn from(value: &'a VerifyOpt) -> Self {
+        let input = combined_path_req(&value.input, &value.input_pos);
+        let output = combined_path_opt(&value.output, &value.output_pos, STDOUT);
+        Self {
+            input,
+            user_cert: value.user_cert.as_deref(),
+            output,
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 #[derive(Args, Debug)]
@@ -358,12 +430,26 @@ pub struct RetrSecretOptions {
     /// handle encodes in hexadecimal. Leading zeros are required. If there are multiple secrets in
     /// the store with the same Id there are no guarantees on which specific secret is retrieved.
     /// Use --inform=idx to make sure a specific secret is retrieved.
-    #[arg(value_name = "ID", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath)]
-    pub input: String,
+    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "ID", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath)]
+    input: Option<String>,
+
+    /// Specify the secret ID to be retrieved.
+    ///
+    /// Input type depends on '--inform'. If `yaml` (default) is specified, it must be a yaml
+    /// created by the create subcommand of this tool. If `hex` is specified, it must be a 32 byte
+    /// handle encodes in hexadecimal. Leading zeros are required. If there are multiple secrets in
+    /// the store with the same Id there are no guarantees on which specific secret is retrieved.
+    /// Use --inform=idx to make sure a specific secret is retrieved.
+    #[arg(value_name = "INPUT", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath, required_unless_present("input"), conflicts_with("input"))]
+    input_pos: Option<String>,
 
     /// Specify the output path to place the secret value
-    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", default_value = STDOUT, value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath)]
-    pub output: String,
+    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath)]
+    output: Option<String>,
+
+    /// Specify the output path to place the secret value
+    #[arg(value_name = "OUTPUT", value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath, conflicts_with("output"))]
+    output_pos: Option<String>,
 
     /// Define input type for the Secret ID
     #[arg(long, value_enum, default_value_t)]
@@ -400,6 +486,25 @@ pub enum RetrOutFmt {
     Bin,
 }
 
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct RetrSecretOptionsComb<'a> {
+    pub input: &'a str,
+    pub output: &'a str,
+    pub inform: RetrInpFmt,
+}
+
+impl<'a> From<&'a RetrSecretOptions> for RetrSecretOptionsComb<'a> {
+    fn from(value: &'a RetrSecretOptions) -> Self {
+        let input = combined_path_req(&value.input, &value.input_pos);
+        let output = combined_path_opt(&value.output, &value.output_pos, STDOUT);
+        Self {
+            input,
+            output,
+            inform: value.inform,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 #[derive(Subcommand, Debug)]
 pub enum Command {
     /// Create a new add-secret request.

rust/pvsecret/src/cmd/add.rs

@@ -2,7 +2,10 @@
 //
 // Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
 
-use crate::{cli::AddSecretOpt, cmd::list::list_uvc};
+use crate::{
+    cli::{AddSecretOpt, AddSecretOptComb},
+    cmd::list::list_uvc,
+};
 use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
 use log::warn;
 use pv::{
@@ -13,15 +16,16 @@ use utils::get_reader_from_cli_file_arg;
 
 /// Do an Add Secret UVC
 pub fn add(opt: &AddSecretOpt) -> Result<()> {
+    let opt_comb = AddSecretOptComb::from(opt);
     let uv = UvDevice::open()?;
-    let mut rd_in = get_reader_from_cli_file_arg(&opt.input)?;
+    let mut rd_in = get_reader_from_cli_file_arg(opt_comb.input)?;
     let mut cmd =
-        AddCmd::new(&mut rd_in).context(format!("Processing input file {}", opt.input))?;
+        AddCmd::new(&mut rd_in).context(format!("Processing input file {}", opt_comb.input))?;
 
     if let Some(id) = AddSecretRequest::bin_id(cmd.data().unwrap())? {
         if list_uvc(&uv)?.iter().any(|e| e.id() == id.as_ref()) {
             warn!("There is already a secret in the secret store with that id.");
-            match opt.force {
+            match opt_comb.force {
                 true => warn!("'--force' specified: Adding the secret anyways."),
                 false => bail!("Unable to add the secret due to duplicated IDs"),
             }

rust/pvsecret/src/cmd/create.rs

@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ fn write_yaml<P: AsRef<Path>>(
     write_out(&yaml_path, secret_info, "secret information")?;
     warn!(
         "Successfully wrote secret info to '{}'",
-        yaml_path.display().to_string()
+        yaml_path.display()
     );
     Ok(())
 }

rust/pvsecret/src/cmd/list.rs

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 use std::io::ErrorKind;
 
-use crate::cli::{ListSecretOpt, ListSecretOutputType};
+use crate::cli::{ListSecretOpt, ListSecretOptComb, ListSecretOutputType};
 use anyhow::{Context, Error, Result};
 use log::{info, warn};
 use pv::uv::{ListCmd, SecretList, UvDevice};
@@ -34,11 +34,12 @@ pub fn list_uvc(uv: &UvDevice) -> Result<SecretList> {
 
 /// Do a List Secrets UVC and output the list in the requested format
 pub fn list(opt: &ListSecretOpt) -> Result<()> {
+    let opt_comb = ListSecretOptComb::from(opt);
     let uv = UvDevice::open()?;
     let secret_list = list_uvc(&uv)?;
-    let mut wr_out = get_writer_from_cli_file_arg(&opt.output)?;
+    let mut wr_out = get_writer_from_cli_file_arg(opt_comb.output)?;
 
-    match &opt.format {
+    match opt_comb.format {
         ListSecretOutputType::Human => {
             write!(wr_out, "{secret_list}").context("Cannot generate output")?
         }
@@ -50,10 +51,10 @@ pub fn list(opt: &ListSecretOpt) -> Result<()> {
     }
     wr_out.flush()?;
 
-    if opt.output != STDOUT {
+    if opt_comb.output != STDOUT {
         warn!(
             "Successfully wrote the list of secrets to '{}'",
-            &opt.output
+            opt_comb.output
         );
     }
     Ok(())

rust/pvsecret/src/cmd/retr.rs

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ use pv::{
 use utils::get_writer_from_cli_file_arg;
 
 use super::list::list_uvc;
-use crate::cli::{RetrInpFmt, RetrOutFmt, RetrSecretOptions};
+use crate::cli::{RetrInpFmt, RetrOutFmt, RetrSecretOptions, RetrSecretOptionsComb};
 
 enum Value {
     Id(SecretId),
@@ -31,19 +31,19 @@ impl Display for Value {
     }
 }
 
-impl TryFrom<&RetrSecretOptions> for Value {
+impl TryFrom<&RetrSecretOptionsComb<'_>> for Value {
     type Error = anyhow::Error;
 
-    fn try_from(opt: &RetrSecretOptions) -> Result<Self> {
+    fn try_from(opt: &RetrSecretOptionsComb) -> Result<Self> {
         match opt.inform {
-            RetrInpFmt::Yaml => match serde_yaml::from_reader(&mut open_file(&opt.input)?)? {
+            RetrInpFmt::Yaml => match serde_yaml::from_reader(&mut open_file(opt.input)?)? {
                 GuestSecret::Retrievable { id, .. } => Ok(Self::Id(id)),
                 gs => bail!("The file contains a {gs}-secret, which is not retrievable."),
             },
-            RetrInpFmt::Hex => serde_yaml::from_str(&opt.input)
+            RetrInpFmt::Hex => serde_yaml::from_str(opt.input)
                 .context("Cannot parse SecretId information")
                 .map(Self::Id),
-            RetrInpFmt::Name => Ok(Self::Id(SecretId::from_string(&opt.input))),
+            RetrInpFmt::Name => Ok(Self::Id(SecretId::from_string(opt.input))),
             RetrInpFmt::Idx => opt
                 .input
                 .parse()
@@ -104,8 +104,9 @@ fn retrieve(value: Value) -> Result<RetrievedSecret> {
 }
 
 pub fn retr(opt: &RetrSecretOptions) -> Result<()> {
-    let mut output = get_writer_from_cli_file_arg(&opt.output)?;
-    let retr_secret = retrieve(opt.try_into()?)
+    let opt_comb = RetrSecretOptionsComb::from(opt);
+    let mut output = get_writer_from_cli_file_arg(opt_comb.output)?;
+    let retr_secret = retrieve((&opt_comb).try_into()?)
         .context("Could not retrieve the secret from the UV secret store.")?;
 
     let out_data = match opt.outform {
@@ -115,7 +116,7 @@ pub fn retr(opt: &RetrSecretOptions) -> Result<()> {
     write(
         &mut output,
         out_data.value(),
-        &opt.output,
+        opt_comb.output,
         "IBM Protected Key",
     )?;
     Ok(())

rust/pvsecret/src/cmd/verify.rs

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 //
 // Copyright IBM Corp. 2024
 
-use crate::cli::VerifyOpt;
+use crate::cli::{VerifyOpt, VerifyOptComb};
 use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
 use log::warn;
 use pv::misc::{read_certs, read_file};
@@ -22,16 +22,16 @@ fn read_sgn_key(path: &str) -> Result<PKey<Public>> {
 }
 
 pub fn verify(opt: &VerifyOpt) -> Result<()> {
-    let mut rd_in = get_reader_from_cli_file_arg(&opt.input)?;
+    let opt_comb = VerifyOptComb::from(opt);
+    let mut rd_in = get_reader_from_cli_file_arg(opt_comb.input)?;
     let mut data_in = Vec::with_capacity(0x1000);
     rd_in
         .read_to_end(&mut data_in)
-        .with_context(|| format!("Cannot read input file {}", opt.input))?;
+        .with_context(|| format!("Cannot read input file {}", opt_comb.input))?;
 
-    let verify_cert = opt
+    let verify_cert = opt_comb
         .user_cert
-        .as_ref()
-        .map(|p| read_sgn_key(p))
+        .map(read_sgn_key)
         .transpose()
         .context("Cannot read user-verification certificate.")?;
 
@@ -39,9 +39,9 @@ pub fn verify(opt: &VerifyOpt) -> Result<()> {
         .context("Could not verify the the Add-secret request")?;
 
     if let Some(user_data) = user_data {
-        get_writer_from_cli_file_arg(&opt.output)?
+        get_writer_from_cli_file_arg(opt_comb.output)?
             .write_all(&user_data)
-            .with_context(|| format!("Cannot write user data to {}", opt.output))?;
+            .with_context(|| format!("Cannot write user data to {}", opt_comb.output))?;
     }
     warn!("Successfully verified the request.");
     Ok(())

rust/utils/src/cli.rs

@@ -276,6 +276,29 @@ impl DeprecatedVerbosityOptions {
         )
     }
 }
+pub fn combined_path_opt<'a, N: AsRef<str>, P: AsRef<str>>(
+    named: &'a Option<N>,
+    positional: &'a Option<P>,
+    default: &'a str,
+) -> &'a str {
+    match (named, positional) {
+        (None, Some(i)) => i.as_ref(),
+        (Some(i), None) => i.as_ref(),
+        (Some(_), Some(_)) => unreachable!(),
+        (None, None) => default,
+    }
+}
+pub fn combined_path_req<'a, N: AsRef<str>, P: AsRef<str>>(
+    named: &'a Option<N>,
+    positional: &'a Option<P>,
+) -> &'a str {
+    match (named, positional) {
+        (None, Some(i)) => i.as_ref(),
+        (Some(i), None) => i.as_ref(),
+        (Some(_), Some(_)) => unreachable!(),
+        (None, None) => unreachable!(),
+    }
+}
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod test {

rust/utils/src/lib.rs

@@ -16,8 +16,9 @@ pub use ::log::LevelFilter;
 
 pub use crate::{
     cli::{
-        get_reader_from_cli_file_arg, get_writer_from_cli_file_arg, print_cli_error, print_error,
-        CertificateOptions, DeprecatedVerbosityOptions, VerbosityOptions, STDIN, STDOUT,
+        combined_path_opt, combined_path_req, get_reader_from_cli_file_arg,
+        get_writer_from_cli_file_arg, print_cli_error, print_error, CertificateOptions,
+        DeprecatedVerbosityOptions, VerbosityOptions, STDIN, STDOUT,
     },
     exit_code::{docstring, ExitCodeDoc, ExitCodeTrait, ExitCodeVariantDoc},
     file::{AtomicFile, AtomicFileOperation},

scripts/pvics.8

@@ -34,6 +34,21 @@ All operations preserve the original base image. Logs are written to a
 temporary file, with the filename logged as the first message during runtime.
 Temporary artifacts are automatically cleaned up on completion or failure.
 
+.SH Base Image Prerequisites
+The following prerequisites have to be fulfilled by the base image:
+.IP \(bu 2
+label of boot partition set to boot
+.IP \(bu 2
+label of root partition set to root
+.IP \(bu 2
+guest is to be backed by a qcow2 image
+.IP \(bu 2
+an initramfs containing the dracut module 95sel-ebc which is part of s390-tools
+.IP \(bu 2
+a boot loader specifying that initramfs and a kernel parameter line on which root is specified by label
+.IP \(bu 2
+any line starting with default= should be removed from /etc/zipl.conf
+
 .SH ACTIONS
 .TP
 .B list

zipl/include/job.h

@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ struct job_data {
 	int command_line;
 	int is_secure;
 	int is_ldipl_dump;
+	int no_compress;
+	int force;
 };
 
 static inline struct target *target_at(struct job_target_data *data,

zipl/src/job.c

@@ -1548,6 +1548,7 @@ get_job_from_section_data(char* data[], struct job_data* job, char* section)
 		}
 		else
 			job->data.dump.mem = -1LL;
+		job->data.dump.no_compress = job->no_compress;
 		break;
 	case section_mvdump:
 		/* DUMP TO MULTI-VOLUME job */
@@ -1570,6 +1571,7 @@ get_job_from_section_data(char* data[], struct job_data* job, char* section)
 			       		(1024LL * 1024LL));
 		} else
 			job->data.mvdump.mem = -1LL;
+		job->data.mvdump.force = job->force;
 		break;
 	default:
 		/* Should not happen */
@@ -2021,8 +2023,8 @@ job_get(int argc, char* argv[], struct job_data** data)
 	job->noninteractive = cmdline.noninteractive;
 	job->verbose = cmdline.verbose;
 	job->add_files = cmdline.add_files;
-	job->data.dump.no_compress = cmdline.no_compress;
-	job->data.mvdump.force = cmdline.force;
+	job->no_compress = cmdline.no_compress;
+	job->force = cmdline.force;
 	job->dry_run = cmdline.dry_run;
 	job->is_secure =  SECURE_BOOT_UNDEFINED;
 	job->is_ldipl_dump = cmdline.is_ldipl_dump;