New release s390-tools-2.31.0

Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>

.codespell.ignore

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+parm
+parms
+crate

.codespellrc

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 [codespell]
-ignore-words-list = parm,parms
-skip = ''
+ignore-words = .codespell.ignore
 count = ''
 quiet-level = 3

.editorconfig

@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@ insert_final_newline = true
 charset = utf-8
 indent_style = tab
 tab_width = 8
+trim_trailing_whitespace = true
+
+[*.rs]
+indent_style = space
+indent_size = 4
+tab_width = 4
 
 [*.sh]
 shell_variant = bash  # used by `shfmt`
@@ -19,3 +25,9 @@ indent_size = 2
 [*.py]
 indent_style = space
 indent_size = 4
+
+[{Makefile,*.mak}]
+indent_style = tab
+
+[{COMMIT_EDITMSG,EDIT_DESCRIPTION}]
+max_line_length = 72

.gitignore

@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
 tags
 TAGS
 
+# compile_commands.json
+# (https://clang.llvm.org/docs/JSONCompilationDatabase.html)
+compile_commands.json
+
 # clangd cache (https://clangd.llvm.org/design/indexing#backgroundindex)
 .cache/
 
@@ -19,6 +23,8 @@ TAGS
 #
 # Ignore generated executables and other generated files
 #
+**/.detect-openssl.dep.c
+*.debug
 ap_tools/ap-check
 cmsfs-fuse/cmsfs-fuse
 cpacfstats/cpacfstats
@@ -26,6 +32,7 @@ cpacfstats/cpacfstatsd
 cpumf/chcpumf
 cpumf/lscpumf
 cpumf/lshwc
+cpumf/lspai
 cpumf/pai
 cpuplugd/cpuplugd
 dasdfmt/dasdfmt
@@ -50,8 +57,8 @@ iucvterm/src/iucvconn
 iucvterm/src/iucvtty
 iucvterm/src/ttyrun
 iucvterm/test/test_afiucv
-libap/check-dep-lock
 libap/check-dep-json
+libap/check-dep-lock
 libekmfweb/check-dep-libekmfweb
 libekmfweb/detect-openssl-version.dep
 libekmfweb/libekmfweb.so
@@ -96,6 +103,7 @@ zdev/src/chzdev
 zdev/src/chzdev_usage.c
 zdev/src/lszdev
 zdev/src/lszdev_usage.c
+zdev/src/zdev_id
 zdsfs/zdsfs
 zdump/.check_dep_fuse
 zdump/.check_dep_zgetdump
@@ -115,7 +123,6 @@ zipl/boot/*.exec
 zipl/boot/.loaders
 zipl/boot/data.h
 zipl/src/chreipl_helper.device-mapper
-zdev/src/zdev_id
 zipl/src/zipl
 zipl/src/zipl-editenv
 zipl/src/zipl_helper.device-mapper
@@ -129,4 +136,3 @@ zkey/kmip/zkey-kmip.so
 zkey/zkey
 zkey/zkey-cryptsetup
 zpcictl/zpcictl
-**/.detect-openssl.dep.c

.pre-commit-config.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+exclude: \.(crt|crl)$
+repos:
+  - repo: https://github.com/pre-commit/pre-commit-hooks
+    rev: v4.1.0
+    hooks:
+      - id: check-merge-conflict
+      - id: end-of-file-fixer
+      - id: mixed-line-ending
+      - id: trailing-whitespace
+      - id: check-executables-have-shebangs
+      - id: check-shebang-scripts-are-executable
+        exclude_types: ['rust']
+  - repo: local
+    hooks:
+      - id: git-clang-format
+        name: git-clang-format
+        description: Run git-clang-format
+        entry: git
+        args: [clang-format, --staged, --]
+        pass_filenames: true
+        language: system
+        require_serial: true
+        minimum_pre_commit_version: "2.9.0"
+        types_or: [c++, c]
+  - repo: https://github.com/codespell-project/codespell
+    rev: v2.2.1
+    hooks:
+      - id: codespell
+        exclude_types: ['rust']
+  - repo: https://github.com/jumanjihouse/pre-commit-hooks
+    rev: 3.0.0
+    hooks:
+      - id: shellcheck
+        args: ["--external-sources"]

.rustfmt.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+edition = "2021"
+newline_style = "Unix"
+
+# Unstable options that help catching some mistakes in formatting and that we may want to enable
+# when they become stable.
+#
+# They are kept here since they are useful to run from time to time.
+#format_code_in_doc_comments = true
+#reorder_impl_items = true
+#comment_width = 100
+#wrap_comments = true
+#normalize_comments = true

.shellcheckrc

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Search in the current script's directory by default (since 0.7.0)
+source-path=SCRIPTDIR
+
+# Allow external-sources (since 0.8.0)
+external-sources=true

AUTHORS.md

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ List of all individuals having contributed content to s390-tools
 - Eberhard Pasch
 - Eduard Shishkin
 - Einar Lueck
+- Eric Farman
 - Eric Sandeen
 - Erwin Vicari
 - Eugene Crosser
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ List of all individuals having contributed content to s390-tools
 - Farhan Ali
 - Fedor Loshakov
 - Felix Beck
+- Finn Callies
 - Frank Blaschka
 - Frank Heimes
 - Frank Munzert
@@ -56,6 +58,7 @@ List of all individuals having contributed content to s390-tools
 - Horst Hummel
 - Ingo Franzki
 - Ingo Tuchscherer
+- Jakub Čajka
 - Jan Glauber
 - Jan Höppner
 - Jan Willeke
@@ -124,6 +127,8 @@ List of all individuals having contributed content to s390-tools
 - Thomas Richter
 - Thomas Spatzier
 - Thomas Weber
+- Thorsten Winkler
+- Tobias Huschle
 - Tuan Hoang
 - Ursula Braun
 - Utz Bacher
@@ -134,3 +139,4 @@ List of all individuals having contributed content to s390-tools
 - Volker Sameske
 - Wenjia Zhang
 - Wolfgang Taphorn
+- Yaakov Selkowitz

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,6 +1,85 @@
 Release history for s390-tools (MIT version)
 --------------------------------------------
 
+* __v2.31.0 (2024-02-02)__
+
+  For Linux kernel version: 6.7
+
+  General:
+  - common.mak: Set default C/C++ standard to gnu11/gnu++11
+
+  Add new tools / libraries:
+  - pvapconfig: Tool to automatically configure APQNs in SE KVM guests
+  - s390-tools: Provide pre-commit configuration
+
+  Changes of existing tools:
+  - cpuplugd: Adjust to CPU 0 being no longer hotpluggable
+  - dbginfo.sh: Check for Dynamic Partition Mode
+  - dbginfo.sh: Update man page and copyright
+  - rust/pv: Add user-data signing and verifying
+  - rust/pvsecret: Add user defined signatures and verifications
+  - zdev/dracut: Consolidate device configuration
+
+  Bug Fixes:
+  - dbginfo.sh: Fix relative path on script copy
+  - libkmipclient: Fix build with libxml2-2.12.0
+  - pvsecret: Fix panic if empty file is used as host key document
+  - rust/pv: Fix 'elided_lifetimes_in_associated_constant' warning
+
+* __v2.30.0 (2023-12-01)__
+
+  For Linux kernel version: 6.6
+
+  Add new tools / libraries:
+  - lspai: Tool to display PAI counter sets
+  - s390-tools: Provide a ShellCheck configuration
+
+  Changes of existing tools / libraries:
+  - cpumf/pai: Add command line option for realtime scheduling
+  - dbginfo.sh: enhance ethtool collection for ROCE
+  - libutil/util_lockfile: add routine to return owning pid of file lock
+  - lszcrypt: Improve lszcrypt output on SE guests
+  - rust: Use a single workspace for all rust tools
+  - zdev: limit the derivation of ZDEV_SITE_ID
+  - zdump/df_s390: Update 'zgetdump -i' output with zlib info
+  - zdump/dfi_s390: Support reading compressed s390_ext dumps
+  - zipl/boot: Integrate zlib compression to single volume DASD dumper
+  - zipl/boot: compile the bootloaders only if HOST_ARCH is s390x
+  - zipl: Add --no-compress option to zipl command
+  - zkey: Also check for deconfigured and check-stopped cards
+  - dbginfo.sh: fix relative path on script copy
+
+  Bug Fixes:
+  - ap_tools/ap-check: handle get-attributes between pre and post event
+  - libutil: fix util_file_read_*() using wrong format specifiers
+  - rust/pv: fix Invalid write of size 1
+
+* __v2.29.0 (2023-08-04)__
+
+  For Linux kernel version: 6.5
+
+  General:
+  - s390-tools now supports tools written in Rust.
+  - Add `compdb` Makefile target to create 'compile_commands.json' to LSP
+    backends in IDEs and editors
+
+  Add new tools / libraries:
+  - rust/pv: Library for pv tools written in rust
+  - rust/pvsecret: Tool to manage UV-secrets
+
+  Changes of existing tools:
+  - dbginfo.sh: Global IFS variable
+  - genprotimg: Add support for add-secret requests
+  - genprotimg: Build debuginfo files for bootloader
+  - hyptop: Add real SMT utilization field
+  - hyptop: Allow users to set speedup factor
+  - pvattest: Add yaml-output for verify command
+  - zipl: Build debuginfo files for bootloader
+
+  Bug Fixes:
+  - dump2tar: Fix truncated paths
+  - zdev/dracut: fix kdump build to integrate with site support
+
 * __v2.28.0 (2023-07-11)__
 
   For Linux kernel version: 6.4

Makefile

@@ -15,11 +15,12 @@ TOOL_DIRS = zipl zdump fdasd dasdfmt dasdview tunedasd \
 	   vmcp man mon_tools dasdinfo vmur cpuplugd ipl_tools \
 	   ziomon iucvterm hyptop cmsfs-fuse qethqoat zfcpdump zdsfs cpumf \
 	   systemd hmcdrvfs cpacfstats zdev dump2tar zkey netboot etc zpcictl \
-	   genprotimg lsstp hsci hsavmcore chreipl-fcp-mpath ap_tools pvattest
+	   genprotimg lsstp hsci hsavmcore chreipl-fcp-mpath ap_tools pvattest \
+	   rust
 else
 BASELIB_DIRS =
 LIB_DIRS = libpv
-TOOL_DIRS = genprotimg pvattest
+TOOL_DIRS = genprotimg pvattest rust
 endif
 
 SUB_DIRS = $(BASELIB_DIRS) $(LIB_DIRS) $(TOOL_DIRS)

README.md

@@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ The package also contains the following files:
 Package contents
 ----------------
 
+ * rust:
+   all s390-tools that are written in rust and require external crates.
+   Disable the compilation of all tools in `rust/` using HAVE_CARGO=0
+   See the `rust/README.md` for Details
+
  * dasdfmt:
    Low-level format ECKD DASDs with the classical Linux disk layout or the new
    z/OS compatible disk layout.
@@ -305,13 +310,14 @@ build options:
 | net-snmp       | `HAVE_SNMP`        | osasnmpd                              |
 | glibc-static   | `HAVE_LIBC_STATIC` | zfcpdump                              |
 | openssl        | `HAVE_OPENSSL`     | genprotimg, zkey, libekmfweb,         |
-|                |                    | libkmipclient, pvattest, zgetdump     |
+|                |                    | libkmipclient, pvattest, zgetdump,    |
+|                |                    | rust/pvsecret,                        |
 | cryptsetup     | `HAVE_CRYPTSETUP2` | zkey-cryptsetup                       |
 | json-c         | `HAVE_JSONC`       | zkey-cryptsetup, libekmfweb,          |
 |                |                    | libkmipclient                         |
 | glib2          | `HAVE_GLIB2`       | genprotimg, pvattest, zgetdump        |
 | libcurl        | `HAVE_LIBCURL`     | genprotimg, libekmfweb, libkmipclient,|
-|                |                    | pvattest                              |
+|                |                    | pvattest, rust/pvsecret,              |
 | libxml2        | `HAVE_LIBXML2`     | libkmipclient                         |
 | systemd        | `HAVE_SYSTEMD`     | hsavmcore                             |
 | libudev        | `HAVE_LIBUDEV`     | cpacfstatsd                           |
@@ -324,6 +330,7 @@ This table lists additional build or install options:
 |                  |                              | zipl                     |
 | initramfs-tools  | `HAVE_INITRAMFS`             | zdev, zipl               |
 |                  | `ZDEV_ALWAYS_UPDATE_INITRD`  | zdev                     |
+| rust             | `HAVE_CARGO`                 | rust/*                   |
 
 The s390-tools build process uses "pkg-config" and therefore it must be
 available.
@@ -334,6 +341,14 @@ Build and runtime requirements for specific tools
 In the following more details on the build an runtime requirements of
 the different tools are provided:
 
+* rust/pvsecret:
+  For building pvsecret you need OpenSSL version 1.1.1 or newer
+  installed (openssl-devel.rpm). Also required is cargo and libcurl.
+  Tip: you may skip the pvsecret build by adding
+  `HAVE_OPENSSL=0`, `HAVE_LIBCURL=0`, or `HAVE_CARGO=0`.
+
+  The runtime requirements are: openssl-libs (>= 1.1.1).
+
 * dbginfo.sh:
   The tar package is required to archive collected data.
 
@@ -371,6 +386,24 @@ the different tools are provided:
   - Packages: blktrace, multipath-tools, sg3-utils
   - Tools: rsync, tar, lsscsi
 
+* zipl
+  For CCW-type DASD dump, zlib compression can be used to compress the dump
+  data before writing it to the DASD partition. It can benefit from
+  s390 on-chip compression accelerator (DFLTCC) and provide a faster dumping
+  process, hence lower system downtime.
+  The zlib version integrated with zipl (zipl/boot/zlib) is based on the Linux
+  kernel zlib (kernel version 6.3) which represents zlib version 1.1.3 with a
+  limited number of functions and a number of updates on top including s390
+  hardware compression (DFLTCC) support. Also, all memory allocations are
+  performed in advance, which aligns with zipl requirements.
+  The CCW-type standalone dumper is built as a single binary and must be
+  loaded to stage2 during boot. Hence, all required zlib functions must be
+  integrated into it, and its size is restricted. To limit the size, only
+  deflate-related parts are integrated (no decompression is required during
+  dumping).
+  Removing the inflate modules and function prototypes are the only major
+  modifications made to the kernel version of zlib.
+
 * zgetdump
   For building zgetdump you need OpenSSL version 1.1.0 or newer
   installed (openssl-devel.rpm). Also required is glib2

ap_tools/ap-check.c

@@ -798,12 +798,34 @@ static int ap_check_handle_get_attributes(struct ap_check_anchor *anc)
 	FILE *f;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = ap_get_lock_callout();
-	if (rc) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to acquire configuration lock %d\n", rc);
-		return -1;
+	/*
+	 * For the get-attributes callout, we are typically called without the
+	 * callout lock held.  However, there is a particular scenario (define
+	 * of an active mdev) where we may or may not be called with the lock
+	 * already held on behalf of mdevctl, depending on the mdevctl version.
+	 * Let's test for lock ownership first and, if already owned by the
+	 * parent (mdevctl) proceed rather than waiting on the file lock.
+	 */
+	rc = ap_try_lock_callout();
+	switch (rc) {
+	case 0:
+		/* Lock acquired */
+		anc->cleanup_lock = true;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		/* Lock held by parent -- trust the lock will remain held */
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Lock not acquired or held by parent -- do a normal obtain */
+		rc = ap_get_lock_callout();
+		if (rc) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+				"Failed to acquire configuration lock %d\n",
+				rc);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		anc->cleanup_lock = true;
 	}
-	anc->cleanup_lock = true;
 
 	/*
 	 * Read the 'matrix' and 'control_domains' attributes to get the

chreipl-fcp-mpath/Makefile

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
 #   GNU awk:
 #     - gawk
 
-override SHELL		:= /bin/bash
 override .SHELLFLAGS	:= -O globstar -O nullglob -O extglob -c
 
 # Include common s390-tools definitions

common.mak

@@ -8,10 +8,14 @@ ASAN ?= 0
 ENABLE_WERROR ?= 0
 OPT_FLAGS ?=
 MAKECMDGOALS ?=
+CARGO ?= cargo
+CARGOFLAGS ?=
 
 ifeq ($(COMMON_INCLUDED),false)
 COMMON_INCLUDED := true
 
+override SHELL := /bin/bash
+
 # 'BUILD_ARCH' is the architecture of the machine where the build takes place
 BUILD_ARCH := $(shell uname -m | sed -e 's/i.86/i386/' -e 's/sun4u/sparc64/' -e 's/arm.*/arm/' -e 's/sa110/arm/')
 # 'HOST_ARCH' is the architecture of the machine that will run the compiled output
@@ -28,7 +32,7 @@ endif
 # The variable "DISTRELEASE" should be overwritten in rpm spec files with:
 # "make DISTRELEASE=%{release}" and "make install DISTRELEASE=%{release}"
 VERSION            = 2
-RELEASE            = 28
+RELEASE            = 31
 PATCHLEVEL         = 0
 DISTRELEASE        = build-$(shell date +%Y%m%d)
 S390_TOOLS_RELEASE = $(VERSION).$(RELEASE).$(PATCHLEVEL)-$(DISTRELEASE)
@@ -89,19 +93,19 @@ define cmd_define_and_export
 endef
 
 define define_toolchain_variables
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,     AS$(1),"  AS$(1)       ",$(2)as))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,     CC$(1),"  CC$(1)       ",$(2)gcc))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,   LINK$(1),"  LINK$(1)     ",$$(CC$(1))))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,    CXX$(1),"  CXX$(1)      ",$(2)g++))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export, LINKXX$(1),"  LINKXX$(1)   ",$$(CXX$(1))))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,    CPP$(1),"  CPP$(1)      ",$(2)gcc -E))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,     AR$(1),"  AR$(1)       ",$(2)ar))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,     NM$(1),"  NM$(1)       ",$(2)nm))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,   STRIP$(1),"  STRIP$(1)    ",$(2)strip))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,OBJCOPY$(1),"  OBJCOPY$(1)  ",$(2)objcopy))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,OBJDUMP$(1),"  OBJDUMP$(1)  ",$(2)objdump))
-	$(eval PKG_CONFIG$(1) = pkg-config)
-	$(eval export PKG_CONFIG$(1))
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,     AS$(1),"  AS$(1)          ",$(2)as)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,     CC$(1),"  CC$(1)          ",$(2)gcc)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,   LINK$(1),"  LINK$(1)        ",$$(CC$(1)))
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,    CXX$(1),"  CXX$(1)         ",$(2)g++)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export, LINKXX$(1),"  LINKXX$(1)      ",$$(CXX$(1)))
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,    CPP$(1),"  CPP$(1)         ",$(2)gcc -E)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,     AR$(1),"  AR$(1)          ",$(2)ar)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,     NM$(1),"  NM$(1)          ",$(2)nm)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,  STRIP$(1),"  STRIP$(1)       ",$(2)strip)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,OBJCOPY$(1),"  OBJCOPY$(1)     ",$(2)objcopy)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,OBJDUMP$(1),"  OBJDUMP$(1)     ",$(2)objdump)
+	PKG_CONFIG$(1) = pkg-config
+	export PKG_CONFIG$(1)
 endef
 
 # If the host architecture is not the same as the build architecture
@@ -115,15 +119,19 @@ ifneq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(BUILD_ARCH))
   endif
 endif
 
-$(call define_toolchain_variables,_FOR_BUILD,)
-$(call define_toolchain_variables,,$(CROSS_COMPILE))
+$(eval $(call define_toolchain_variables,_FOR_BUILD,))
+$(eval $(call define_toolchain_variables,,$(CROSS_COMPILE)))
 
-$(eval $(call cmd_define,RUNTEST,"  RUNTEST ",$(S390_TEST_LIB_PATH)/s390_runtest))
-$(eval $(call cmd_define,    CAT,"  CAT     ",cat))
-$(eval $(call cmd_define,    SED,"  SED     ",sed))
-$(eval $(call cmd_define,   GZIP,"  GZIP    ",gzip))
-$(eval $(call cmd_define,     MV,"  MV      ",mv))
-$(eval $(call cmd_define,  PERLC,"  PERLC   ",perl -c))
+
+$(eval $(call cmd_define,    RUNTEST,"  RUNTEST     ",$(S390_TEST_LIB_PATH)/s390_runtest))
+$(eval $(call cmd_define,        CAT,"  CAT         ",cat))
+$(eval $(call cmd_define,        SED,"  SED         ",sed))
+$(eval $(call cmd_define,       GZIP,"  GZIP        ",gzip))
+$(eval $(call cmd_define,         MV,"  MV          ",mv))
+$(eval $(call cmd_define,      PERLC,"  PERLC       ",perl -c))
+$(eval $(call cmd_define,CARGO_BUILD,"  CARGO BUILD ",$(CARGO) build))
+$(eval $(call cmd_define,CARGO_TEST, "  CARGO TEST  ",$(CARGO) test))
+$(eval $(call cmd_define,CARGO_CLEAN,"  CARGO CLEAN ",$(CARGO) clean))
 
 CHECK           = sparse
 CHECK_SILENT   := $(CHECK)
@@ -133,8 +141,10 @@ SKIP            = echo           "  SKIP    $(call reldir) due to"
 
 INSTALL         = install
 CP              = cp
+ALL_CARGOFLAGS := $(CARGOFLAGS)
 ifneq ("${V}","1")
 	MAKEFLAGS += --quiet
+	ALL_CARGOFLAGS += --quiet
 	echocmd=echo $1$(call reldir)$2;
 	RUNTEST += > /dev/null 2>&1
 else
@@ -294,7 +304,7 @@ ZFCPDUMP_FLAVOR	= zfcpdump
 export ZFCPDUMP_DIR ZFCPDUMP_IMAGE ZFCPDUMP_INITRD ZFCPDUMP_FLAVOR
 
 CFLAGS		 ?= $(DEFAULT_CFLAGS) $(OPT_FLAGS)
-CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD ?= $(DEFAULT_CFLAGS) $(OPT_FLAGS)
+CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD ?= -std=gnu11 $(DEFAULT_CFLAGS) $(OPT_FLAGS)
 CPPFLAGS	 ?= $(DEFAULT_CPPFLAGS)
 LDFLAGS		 ?= $(DEFAULT_LDFLAGS)
 
@@ -303,14 +313,14 @@ ALL_CFLAGS	= -DS390_TOOLS_RELEASE=$(S390_TOOLS_RELEASE) \
 			-DS390_TOOLS_DATADIR=$(TOOLS_DATADIR) \
 			-DS390_TOOLS_SYSCONFDIR=$(SYSCONFDIR) \
 			-DS390_TOOLS_BINDIR=$(BINDIR) \
-			$(CFLAGS)
+			-std=gnu11 $(CFLAGS)
 CXXFLAGS	?= $(DEFAULT_CFLAGS) $(OPT_FLAGS)
 ALL_CXXFLAGS	= -DS390_TOOLS_RELEASE=$(S390_TOOLS_RELEASE) \
 			-DS390_TOOLS_LIBDIR=$(TOOLS_LIBDIR) \
 			-DS390_TOOLS_DATADIR=$(TOOLS_DATADIR) \
 			-DS390_TOOLS_SYSCONFDIR=$(SYSCONFDIR) \
 			-DS390_TOOLS_BINDIR=$(BINDIR) \
-			$(CXXFLAGS)
+			-std=gnu++11 $(CXXFLAGS)
 ALL_CPPFLAGS	= -I $(rootdir)include $(CPPFLAGS)
 ALL_LDFLAGS	= $(LDFLAGS)
 
@@ -360,6 +370,7 @@ help:
 	@echo '  all      Build all tools (default target)'
 	@echo '  install  Install tools'
 	@echo '  clean    Delete all generated files'
+	@echo '  compdb   Generate compile_commands.json for clangd'
 	@echo ''
 	@echo 'OPTIONS'
 	@echo '  D=1      	 Build with debugging option "-Og"'
@@ -375,6 +386,32 @@ help:
 	@echo '  # make C=1 CHECK=smatch'
 .PHONY: help
 
+
+# 'compile_commands.json' generation
+#
+# Create the compilation database 'compile_commands.json'. See
+# https://clang.llvm.org/docs/JSONCompilationDatabase.html for details.
+#
+.PHONY: compdb
+compdb:
+	$(MAKE) clean
+ifneq ($(shell command -v compiledb),)
+	compiledb $(MAKE)
+else ifneq ($(shell command -v bear),)
+  ifeq ($(shell bear --help|grep -- '-- ...'),)
+	bear $(MAKE)
+  else
+	bear -- $(MAKE)
+  endif
+else
+	$(error Please install either 'compiledb' or 'bear')
+endif
+
+# Prints the s390-tools release string
+version:
+	$(info $(S390_TOOLS_RELEASE))
+.PHONY: version
+
 # Automatic dependency generation
 #
 # Create ".o.d" dependency files with the -MM compile option for all ".c" and
@@ -485,7 +522,7 @@ install_echo:
 install: install_echo install_dirs
 
 clean_echo:
-	$(call echocmd,"  CLEAN   ")
+	$(call echocmd,"  CLEAN       ")
 clean_gcov:
 	rm -f -- *.gcda *.gcno *.gcov
 clean_dep:

cpacfstats/cpacfstats.1

@@ -355,13 +355,13 @@ PCKMO DES,
 .IP \(bu
 PCKMO 2key TDES,
 .IP \(bu
-PCMKO TDES,
+PCKMO TDES,
 .IP \(bu
 PCKMO AES 128bit,
 .IP \(bu
 PCKMO AES 192bit,
 .IP \(bu
-PCMKO AES 256bit,
+PCKMO AES 256bit,
 .IP \(bu
 PCKMO ECC P256,
 .IP \(bu

cpacfstats/cpacfstats.c

@@ -204,10 +204,10 @@ static const char *const pai_str[] = {
 	[142] = "KDSA EdDSA Sign Ed448 protected key",
 	[143] = "PCKMO DES",
 	[144] = "PCKMO 2key TDES",
-	[145] = "PCMKO TDES",
+	[145] = "PCKMO TDES",
 	[146] = "PCKMO AES 128bit",
 	[147] = "PCKMO AES 192bit",
-	[148] = "PCMKO AES 256bit",
+	[148] = "PCKMO AES 256bit",
 	[149] = "PCKMO ECC P256",
 	[150] = "PCKMO ECC P384",
 	[151] = "PCKMO ECC P521",

cpumf/Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 include ../common.mak
 
-BIN_FILES = lscpumf chcpumf lshwc pai
-MAN_FILES = lscpumf.8 chcpumf.8 lshwc.8 pai.8
+BIN_FILES = lscpumf chcpumf lshwc pai lspai
+MAN_FILES = lscpumf.8 chcpumf.8 lshwc.8 pai.8 lspai.8
 
 all: $(BIN_FILES)
 
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ lscpumf: lscpumf.o $(libs)
 chcpumf: chcpumf.o $(libs)
 lshwc: lshwc.o $(libs)
 pai: pai.o $(libs)
+lspai: lspai.o $(libs)
 
 install: all install-man
 	$(INSTALL) -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR) $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/man8

cpumf/lspai.c

@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+/* Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+ *
+ * s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
+ */
+
+/* List available Processor Assist Instrumentation (PAI) counters.  */
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <err.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "lib/util_opt.h"
+#include "lib/util_prg.h"
+#include "lib/util_base.h"
+#include "lib/util_path.h"
+#include "lib/util_scandir.h"
+#include "lib/util_libc.h"
+#include "lib/util_file.h"
+#include "lib/util_list.h"
+#include "lib/libcpumf.h"
+
+static struct util_opt opt_vec[] = {
+	UTIL_OPT_SECTION("OPTIONS"),
+	{
+		.option = { "numeric", no_argument, NULL, 'n' },
+		.desc = "Sort PAI counters by counter number"
+	},
+	{
+		.option = { "type", required_argument, NULL, 't' },
+		.argument = "TYPE",
+		.desc = "Type of PAI counters to show: crypto, nnpa"
+	},
+	UTIL_OPT_HELP,
+	UTIL_OPT_VERSION,
+	UTIL_OPT_END
+};
+
+static const struct util_prg prg = {
+	.desc = "List Processor Assist Information counter sets",
+	.copyright_vec = {
+		{
+			.owner = "IBM Corp.",
+			.pub_first = 2023,
+			.pub_last = 2023,
+		},
+		UTIL_PRG_COPYRIGHT_END
+	}
+};
+
+static bool numsort;		/* If true sort counter numerically */
+
+#define PAI_PATH	"/bus/event_source/devices/%s"
+
+enum pai_types {		/* Bit mask for supported PAI counters */
+	pai_type_crypto = 0,	/* PAI Crypto Counters */
+	pai_type_nnpa = 1,	/* PAI NNPA Counters */
+	pai_type_max = 2,	/* PAI maximum value, must be last */
+};
+
+static int pai_types_show;
+
+struct pai_ctrname {		/* List of defined counters */
+	char *name;		/* Counter name */
+	unsigned long nr;	/* Counter number */
+};
+
+struct pai_node {		/* Head for PAI counter sets */
+	struct util_list_node node;	/* Successor in PAI counter set list */
+	enum pai_types type;	/* PAI type */
+	int pmu;		/* Assigned PMU type number */
+	const char *name;	/* Counter set name */
+	char *name_uc;		/* Counter set name upper case */
+	const char *sysfs_name;	/* Counter set name in /sysfs tree */
+	const char *filter_name;	/* Counter set name for scandir filter */
+	struct pai_ctrname *ctrlist;	/* List of counter names & numbers */
+	size_t ctrsize;		/* Total size in bytes of ctrlist */
+	int ctridx;		/* Index of last entry used in ctrlist */
+	unsigned long base;	/* Base number for counter set */
+};
+
+static struct util_list pai_list;
+
+/* Return base of counter set, this is the first counter of this set. */
+static unsigned long pai_type_base(enum pai_types t)
+{
+	switch (t) {
+	case pai_type_crypto:
+		return 0x1000;
+	case pai_type_nnpa:
+		return 0x1800;
+	case pai_type_max:
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Test PAI counter name from command line option. */
+static const char *pai_type_name(enum pai_types t)
+{
+	switch (t) {
+	case pai_type_crypto:
+		return "crypto";
+	case pai_type_nnpa:
+		return "nnpa";
+	case pai_type_max:
+		break;
+	}
+	return "unknown";
+}
+
+/* Convert PAI counter type to sysfs directory name. Only validated
+ * input at this time.
+ */
+static const char *pai_type_sysfs(enum pai_types t)
+{
+	if (t == pai_type_crypto)
+		return "pai_crypto";
+	return "pai_ext";
+}
+
+/* Convert PAI counter type to sysfs directory name filter for scandir(). */
+static const char *pai_type_filter(enum pai_types t)
+{
+	if (t == pai_type_nnpa)
+		return "^NNPA";
+	return "[^.]";		/* Matches anything but . and .. in sysfs */
+}
+
+/* Sort PAI counter names by assigned counter number. */
+static int pai_ctrcmp(const void *p1, const void *p2)
+{
+	struct pai_ctrname *l = (struct pai_ctrname *)p1;
+	struct pai_ctrname *r = (struct pai_ctrname *)p2;
+
+	return l->nr > r->nr ? 1 : -1;
+}
+
+/* Convert string to upper case. */
+static char *str2uc(const char *s)
+{
+	char *uc = util_strdup(s), *old_uc = uc;
+
+	for (; *uc; ++uc)
+		*uc = toupper(*uc);
+	return old_uc;
+}
+
+/* Read counter names and assigned event number from sysfs file tree.
+ * Exit when sysfs directory can not be scanned.
+ */
+static void read_counternames(struct pai_node *node)
+{
+	int i, more = 0, ctr = 0, count = 0;
+	struct dirent **namelist = NULL;
+	char *path, *ctrpath;
+
+	/* Read counter names and assigned event number. */
+	path = util_path_sysfs(PAI_PATH "/events", node->sysfs_name);
+	count = util_scandir(&namelist, alphasort, path, node->filter_name);
+	if (count <= 0)
+		errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot open %s", path);
+
+	node->ctrsize = count * sizeof(*node->ctrlist);
+	node->ctrlist = util_malloc(node->ctrsize);
+	for (i = 0; i < count && ctr >= 0; i++) {
+		util_asprintf(&ctrpath, "%s/%s", path, namelist[i]->d_name);
+		if (util_file_read_va(ctrpath, "event=%x", &ctr) == 1) {
+			node->ctrlist[node->ctridx].name = util_strdup(namelist[i]->d_name);
+			node->ctrlist[node->ctridx++].nr = ctr;
+			more++;
+		} else {
+			warnx("Cannot parse %s", ctrpath);
+		}
+		free(ctrpath);
+	}
+	util_scandir_free(namelist, count);
+	free(path);
+
+	if (numsort && more > 1)
+		qsort(node->ctrlist, more, sizeof(*node->ctrlist), pai_ctrcmp);
+}
+
+static void show_painode(void)
+{
+	struct pai_node *node;
+	int indent = 0;
+	int offset = 0;
+
+	util_list_iterate(&pai_list, node) {
+		for (int i = 0; i < node->ctridx; ++i)
+			indent = MAX((size_t)indent, strlen(node->ctrlist[i].name));
+	}
+
+	printf("RAW %*s NAME %*s DESCRIPTION\n", 3, "", indent - 5, "");
+	util_list_iterate(&pai_list, node) {
+		for (int i = 0; i < node->ctridx; ++i) {
+			printf("%d:%ld %s", node->pmu,
+			       node->ctrlist[i].nr, node->ctrlist[i].name);
+
+			offset = indent - strlen(node->ctrlist[i].name) + 1;
+			printf("%*s", offset, "");
+
+			printf("Counter %ld / PAI %s counter set\n",
+			       node->ctrlist[i].nr - node->base, node->name_uc);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/* Release all memory allocated at make_painode(). */
+static void free_painode(void)
+{
+	struct pai_node *next, *node;
+
+	util_list_iterate_safe(&pai_list, node, next) {
+		free(node->name_uc);
+		for (int i = 0; i < node->ctridx; ++i)
+			free(node->ctrlist[i].name);
+		free(node->ctrlist);
+		free(node);
+	}
+}
+
+static void make_painode(enum pai_types t)
+{
+	struct pai_node *node = util_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
+	char *path;
+
+	node->type = t;
+	node->sysfs_name = pai_type_sysfs(t);
+	node->name = pai_type_name(t);
+	node->name_uc = str2uc(node->name);
+	node->filter_name = pai_type_filter(t);
+	node->base = pai_type_base(t);
+
+	/* Read PMU type number. */
+	path = util_path_sysfs(PAI_PATH, node->sysfs_name);
+	node->pmu = libcpumf_pmutype(path);
+	if (node->pmu < 0)
+		errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot open %s", path);
+	free(path);
+
+	read_counternames(node);
+
+	util_list_add_tail(&pai_list, node);
+}
+
+static int painode_cmp(void *a, void *b, void *UNUSED(data))
+{
+	struct pai_node *n1 = (struct pai_node *)a;
+	struct pai_node *n2 = (struct pai_node *)b;
+
+	return n1->pmu < n2->pmu ? -1 : 1;
+}
+
+static void sort_painode(void)
+{
+	util_list_sort(&pai_list, painode_cmp, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Check for hardware support and return false if not available. */
+static bool have_support(enum pai_types t)
+{
+	const char *sysfn = pai_type_sysfs(t);
+	char *path = util_path_sysfs(PAI_PATH, sysfn);
+	bool rc = true;
+
+	if (!util_path_is_dir(path)) {
+		warnx("No support for PAI %s facility", pai_type_name(t));
+		rc = false;
+	}
+	free(path);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the argument for option -t. It must be a valid PAI counter set.
+ * Exit when an invalid PAI counter set name has been specified.
+ */
+static void check_type_name(const char *type)
+{
+	bool no_match = true;
+	enum pai_types i;
+	const char *fn;
+
+	for (i = pai_type_crypto; i < pai_type_max; ++i) {
+		fn = pai_type_name(i);
+		if (!strcasecmp(fn, type)) {
+			pai_types_show |= (1 << i);
+			no_match = false;
+		}
+	}
+	if (no_match)
+		errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Invalid argument for -t %s", type);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int ch;
+
+	util_list_init(&pai_list, struct pai_node, node);
+	util_prg_init(&prg);
+	util_opt_init(opt_vec, NULL);
+
+	while ((ch = util_opt_getopt_long(argc, argv)) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		default:
+			util_opt_print_parse_error(ch, argv);
+			return EXIT_FAILURE;
+		case 'h':
+			util_prg_print_help();
+			util_opt_print_help();
+			return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+		case 'v':
+			util_prg_print_version();
+			return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+		case 'n':
+			numsort = true;
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			check_type_name(optarg);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Nothing specified, show all PAI counters */
+	if (!pai_types_show)
+		pai_types_show = (1 << pai_type_crypto) | (1 << pai_type_nnpa);
+
+	/* Check for hardware support */
+	for (enum pai_types i = pai_type_crypto; i < pai_type_max; ++i) {
+		if ((pai_types_show & (1 << i))) {
+			if (!have_support(i))
+				pai_types_show &= ~(1 << i);
+			else
+				make_painode(i);
+		}
+	}
+	sort_painode();
+	show_painode();
+	free_painode();
+	return ch;
+}

cpumf/man/lspai.8

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+.\" lspai.8
+.\"
+.\"
+.\" Copyright IBM Corp. 2021
+.\" s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+.\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
+.\" ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+.ds c \fBlspai\fP
+.
+.TH \*c "8" "August 2023" "s390-tools" "CPU-MF management programs"
+.
+.SH NAME
+\*c \- list Processor Activity Instrumentation (PAI) counters
+.
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+\*c
+.RB [ \-n ]
+.RB [ \-t
+.IR "\ TYPE" ]
+.br
+\*c
+.BR \-h | \-\-help
+.br
+\*c
+.BR \-v | \-\-version
+.
+.
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+\*c displays the Processor Activity Instrumentation (PAI) counters
+for Linux on IBM Z.
+The output is a human-readable list of available PAI counter
+names and numbers.
+.SH OPTIONS
+.TP
+.BR \-h ", " \-\-help
+Displays help information, then exits.
+.
+.TP
+.BR \-v ", " \-\-version
+Displays version information, then exits.
+.
+.TP
+.BR \-t ", " \-\-type "\ TYPE"
+Specifies the PAI counter set to list.
+Valid counter set values are
+.I crypto
+and
+.IR nnpa .
+By default, the command lists all available PAI counter sets.
+NNPA refers to the Neural Network Processing Assist facility counter set.
+Crypto refers to the Cryptografic Processing Assist facility counter set.
+.
+.TP
+.BR \-n ", " \-\-numeric
+Shows the PAI counter sets sorted by counter number.
+Default sort order is PAI counter name.
+.
+.SH "EXAMPLE"
+The \*c invocation lists all PAI Neural Network Processing Assist Facility
+(NNPA) counters in numeric order:
+.nf
+# lspai -t nnpa -n
+RAW     NAME			DESCRIPTION
+13:6144 NNPA_ALL		Counter 0 / PAI NNPA counter set
+13:6145 NNPA_ADD		Counter 1 / PAI NNPA counter set
+13:6146 NNPA_SUB		Counter 2 / PAI NNPA counter set
+13:6147 NNPA_MUL		Counter 3 / PAI NNPA counter set
+\&...
+.fi
+The first column shows the raw event number suitable for
+.IR perf "(8)"
+raw event specification.
+The second column shows the PAI NNPA counter name,
+suitable for
+.IR perf "(8)"
+event specification by name.
+The third gives a short explanation, if available.
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.BR pai (8)
+.BR lscpumf (8)

cpumf/man/pai.8

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 .IR size ]
 .RB [ \-i | \-\-interval
 .IR ms ]
+.RB [ \-R | \-\-realtime
+.IR prio ]
 .BR  \-c | \-\-crypto [ \fIcpulist ][: \fIdata\fR "] [" \fIloops\fP ]
 .br
 \*c
@@ -25,6 +27,8 @@
 .IR size ]
 .RB [ \-i | \-\-interval
 .IR ms ]
+.RB [ \-R | \-\-realtime
+.IR prio ]
 .BR  \-n | \-\-nnpa [ \fIcpulist ][: \fIdata\fR "] [" \fIloops\fP ]
 .br
 \*c
@@ -191,6 +195,14 @@ The ring buffer is created with the
 .IR mmap (2)
 system call.
 .
+.TP
+.BR \-R ", " \-\-realtime "\ prio"
+Collect data using the RT SCHED_FIFO priority specified by
+.BR prio .
+Valid values are integers in the range 1 (low) to 99 (high).
+Use this option when gathering data from multiple CPUs
+to prevent data loss.
+.
 .SH ARGUMENT
 The command line options determine how command line
 arguments are interpreted.

cpumf/pai.c

@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static void readmap(int fd)
  * ring buffer per event, sleep some short time and always read all
  * ring buffer for new contents.
  */
-static void collect(unsigned long cnt)
+static int collect(unsigned long cnt)
 {
 	fd_set r_fds, e_fds, a_fds;
 	struct pai_event *p;
@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ static void collect(unsigned long cnt)
 	int rc, max_fd;
 
 	do {
+		rc = -1;
 		max_fd = -1;
 		tv.tv_sec = read_interval / 1000;
 		tv.tv_usec = (1000 * read_interval) % 1000000;
@@ -357,6 +358,7 @@ static void collect(unsigned long cnt)
 			}
 		}
 	} while (rc != -1 && --cnt > 0);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static void lookup_event(__u64 evtnum, __u16 ctr, __u64 value)
@@ -449,6 +451,11 @@ static void evt_show(__u64 evtnum, const char *evtsel, struct pai_event_out *ev)
 		       ev->u.s_comm.tid);
 		break;
 
+	case PERF_RECORD_SWITCH:
+		printf("cs-%s",
+		       (ev->misc & PERF_RECORD_MISC_SWITCH_OUT) ? "out" : "in");
+		break;
+
 	case PERF_RECORD_SWITCH_CPU_WIDE:
 		if (ev->misc & PERF_RECORD_MISC_SWITCH_OUT) {
 			short p = PERF_RECORD_MISC_SWITCH_OUT_PREEMPT;
@@ -549,6 +556,9 @@ static int evt_scan(char *fn, unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
 				offset -= sizeof(__u64);
 			break;
 
+		case PERF_RECORD_SWITCH:
+			break;
+
 		case PERF_RECORD_SWITCH_CPU_WIDE:
 			memcpy(&ev.u, buf + offset, sizeof(ev.u.s_cs));
 			offset += sizeof(ev.u.s_cs);
@@ -583,7 +593,7 @@ static int evt_scan(char *fn, unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
 			break;
 
 		default:
-			printf("unknown header-type %d ", hdr->type);
+			printf("unknown header-type %d\n", hdr->type);
 			offset += hdr->size - sizeof(*hdr);
 			goto bypass;
 		}
@@ -944,6 +954,11 @@ static struct util_opt opt_vec[] = {
 		.option = { "report", no_argument, NULL, 'r' },
 		.desc = "Report file contents"
 	},
+	{
+		.option = { "realtime", required_argument, NULL, 'R' },
+		.argument = "PRIO",
+		.desc = "Collect data with this RT SCHED_FIFO priority"
+	},
 	{
 		.option = { "interval", required_argument, NULL, 'i' },
 		.argument = "NUMBER",
@@ -1007,6 +1022,19 @@ static unsigned long check_mapsize(unsigned long n)
 	return cnt == 1 ? n : 0;
 }
 
+static void setprio(const char *prio)
+{
+	struct sched_param param;
+	char *endstr;
+
+	memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
+	param.sched_priority = strtoul(prio, &endstr, 0);
+	if (*endstr)
+		errno = EINVAL;
+	if (*endstr || sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &param))
+		err(EXIT_FAILURE, "Could not set realtime priority");
+}
+
 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	bool crypto_record = false, report = false;
@@ -1061,6 +1089,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 			record_cpus_nnpa(optarg);
 			nnpa_record = true;
 			break;
+		case 'R':
+			setprio(optarg);
+			break;
 		case 'r':
 			report = true;
 			break;
@@ -1094,12 +1125,12 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 		ev_install(group);
 		ev_enable();
 
-		collect(loop_count);
+		ch = collect(loop_count);
 
 		ev_disable();
 		ev_deinstall();
 		ev_dealloc();
-		return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+		return ch < 0 ? EXIT_FAILURE : EXIT_SUCCESS;
 	}
 
 	/* Must be reporting */

cpuplugd/cpu.c

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ int get_numcpus()
 
 	for (i = 0; ; i++) {
 		/* check whether file exists and is readable */
-		sprintf(path, "/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu%d/online", i);
+		sprintf(path, "/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu%d", i);
 		if (access(path, R_OK) == 0)
 			number++;
 		else
@@ -45,11 +45,13 @@ int get_num_online_cpus()
 	int status = 0;
 	int value_of_onlinefile, rc;
 
-	for (i = 0; i <= get_numcpus(); i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < get_numcpus(); i++) {
 		/* check wether file exists and is readable */
 		sprintf(path, "/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu%d/online", i);
-		if (access(path, R_OK) != 0)
+		if (access(path, R_OK) != 0) {
+			status++;
 			continue;
+		}
 		filp = fopen(path, "r");
 		if (!filp)
 			cpuplugd_exit("Cannot open cpu online file: "
@@ -101,10 +103,8 @@ int hotplug(int cpuid)
 				      cpuid);
 			return -1;
 		}
-	} else {
-		cpuplugd_error("hotplugging cpu with id %d failed\n", cpuid);
-		return -1;
 	}
+	cpuplugd_debug("cpu with id %d cannot be hotplugged\n", cpuid);
 	return -1;
 }
 
@@ -135,9 +135,8 @@ int hotunplug(int cpuid)
 		fclose(filp);
 		if (state == 0)
 			return 1;
-	} else {
-		cpuplugd_error("unplugging cpu with id %d failed\n", cpuid);
 	}
+	cpuplugd_debug("cpu with id %d cannot be hotunplugged\n", cpuid);
 	return retval;
 }
 
@@ -163,6 +162,8 @@ int is_online(int cpuid)
 				retval = 0;
 		}
 		fclose(filp);
+	} else {
+		retval = 1;
 	}
 	return retval;
 }

dasdfmt/dasdfmt.8

@@ -15,13 +15,13 @@ dasdfmt \- formatting of DASD (ECKD) disk drives.
 
 .SH DESCRIPTION
 \fBdasdfmt\fR formats a DASD (ECKD) disk drive to prepare it
-for usage with Linux for S/390. 
+for usage with Linux for S/390.
 The \fIdevice\fR is the node of the device (e.g. '/dev/dasda').
-Any device node created by udev for kernel 2.6 can be used 
+Any device node created by udev for kernel 2.6 can be used
 (e.g. '/dev/dasd/0.0.b100/disc').
 .br
 
-\fBWARNING\fR: Careless usage of \fBdasdfmt\fR can result in 
+\fBWARNING\fR: Careless usage of \fBdasdfmt\fR can result in
 \fBLOSS OF DATA\fR.
 
 .SH OPTIONS
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Print usage and exit.
 
 .TP
 \fB-t\fR or \fB--test\fR
-Disables any modification of the disk drive. 
+Disables any modification of the disk drive.
 .br
 \fBdasdfmt\fR just prints
 out, what it \fBwould\fR do.
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ out, what it \fBwould\fR do.
 Increases verbosity.
 
 .TP
-\fB-y\fR 
+\fB-y\fR
 Start formatting without further user-confirmation.
 
 .TP
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Omit the writing of a disk label after formatting.
 .br
 This makes only sense for the 'ldl' disk layout.
 .br
-The '-L' option has to be specified after the '-d ldl' option. 
+The '-L' option has to be specified after the '-d ldl' option.
 .br
 
 e.g. dasdfmt -d ldl -L /dev/...
@@ -84,13 +84,13 @@ Formats the device with compatible disk layout or linux disk layout.
 \fIlayout\fR is either \fIcdl\fR for the compatible disk layout
 (default) or \fIldl\fR for the linux disk layout.
 .br
-Compatible disk layout means a special handling of the 
-first two tracks of the volume. This enables other S/390 or zSeries 
+Compatible disk layout means a special handling of the
+first two tracks of the volume. This enables other S/390 or zSeries
 operating systems to access this device (e.g. for backup purposes).
 
 .TP
 \fB-p\fR or \fB--progressbar\fR
-Print a progress bar while formatting. 
+Print a progress bar while formatting.
 Do not use this option if you are using a 3270 console,
 running in background or redirecting the output to a file.
 
@@ -164,30 +164,30 @@ and always be a power of two. The recommended blocksize is 4096 bytes.
 
 .TP
 \fB-l\fR \fIvolser\fR or \fB--label\fR=\fIvolser\fR
-Specify the volume serial number or volume identifier to be written 
-to disk after formatting. If no label is specified, a sensible default 
-is used. \fIvolser\fR is interpreted as ASCII string and is automatically 
+Specify the volume serial number or volume identifier to be written
+to disk after formatting. If no label is specified, a sensible default
+is used. \fIvolser\fR is interpreted as ASCII string and is automatically
 converted to uppercase and then to EBCDIC.
 .br
 
 e.g. -l LNX001 or --label=DASD01
 .br
 
-The \fIvolser\fR identifies by serial number the volume. A volume serial 
+The \fIvolser\fR identifies by serial number the volume. A volume serial
 number is 1 through 6 alphanumeric or one of the following special
-characters: $, #, @, %. Enclose a serial number that contains special 
-characters in apostrophes. If the number is shorter than six 
+characters: $, #, @, %. Enclose a serial number that contains special
+characters in apostrophes. If the number is shorter than six
 characters, it is padded with trailing blanks.
-.br 
+.br
 
-Do not code a volume serial number as SCRTCH, PRIVAT, or Lnnnnn (L with 
-five numbers); these are used in OS/390 messages to ask the operator to 
-mount a volume. Do not code a volume serial number as MIGRAT, which is 
-used by the OS/390 Hierarchical Storage Manager DFSMShsm for migrated 
+Do not code a volume serial number as SCRTCH, PRIVAT, or Lnnnnn (L with
+five numbers); these are used in OS/390 messages to ask the operator to
+mount a volume. Do not code a volume serial number as MIGRAT, which is
+used by the OS/390 Hierarchical Storage Manager DFSMShsm for migrated
 data sets.
 .br
 
-NOTE: Try to avoid using special characters in the volume serial. This may cause problems accessing a disk by volser. 
+NOTE: Try to avoid using special characters in the volume serial. This may cause problems accessing a disk by volser.
 .br
 In case you really have to use special characters, make sure you are using quotes. In addition there is a special handling for the '$' sign. Please specify it using '\\$' if necessary.
 .br
@@ -197,9 +197,8 @@ e.g. -l 'a@b\\$c#' to get A@B$C#
 
 .TP
 \fB-k\fR or \fB--keep_volser\fR
-Keeps the Volume Serial Number, when writing the Volume Label. This is
-useful, if the Serial Number has been written with a VM Tool and should not
-be overwritten.
+Keeps the Volume Serial Number when writing the Volume Label. This is useful if
+the volume already has a Serial Number that should not be overwritten.
 .br
 
 .SH SEE ALSO

dump2tar/src/Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Common definitions
 include ../../common.mak
 
-ALL_CPPFLAGS += -I../include -std=gnu99 -Wno-unused-parameter
+ALL_CPPFLAGS += -I../include -Wno-unused-parameter
 LDLIBS  += -lpthread -lrt
 ifneq ($(HAVE_ZLIB),0)
 ALL_CPPFLAGS += -DHAVE_ZLIB

dump2tar/src/tar.c

@@ -23,9 +23,16 @@
 
 #define BLOCKSIZE	512
 
+#if __has_attribute(nonstring)
+#  define __nonstring	__attribute__ ((nonstring))
+#else
+#  define __nonstring
+#endif
+
+
 /* Basic TAR header */
 struct tar_header {
-	char name[100];
+	char name[100] __nonstring;
 	char mode[8];
 	char uid[8];
 	char gid[8];
@@ -33,7 +40,7 @@ struct tar_header {
 	char mtime[12];
 	char chksum[8];
 	char typeflag;
-	char linkname[100];
+	char linkname[100] __nonstring;
 	char magic[6];
 	char version[2];
 	char uname[32];
@@ -78,7 +85,7 @@ static void set_time(char *dest, size_t len, time_t value)
 #define SET_TIME_FIELD(obj, name, value) \
 	set_time((obj)->name, sizeof((obj)->name), (time_t) (value))
 #define SET_STR_FIELD(obj, name, value) \
-	util_strlcpy((obj)->name, (value), sizeof((obj)->name))
+	strncpy((obj)->name, (value), sizeof((obj)->name))
 
 /* Initialize the tar file @header with the provided data */
 static void init_header(struct tar_header *header, const char *filename,

fdasd/fdasd.8

@@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ help:
 .br
      \fBfdasd\fR {-h|-v}
 .SH DESCRIPTION
-\fBfdasd\fR writes a partition table to a cdl (compatible disk layout) 
+\fBfdasd\fR writes a partition table to a cdl (compatible disk layout)
 formatted DASD, in the form of
 a VTOC (volume table of contents) for usage with Linux for S/390
-or zSeries. If fdasd detects a valid \fBVOL1\fR volume label, it 
+or zSeries. If fdasd detects a valid \fBVOL1\fR volume label, it
 will use it, otherwise it asks to write a new one.
 .br
 
@@ -34,51 +34,51 @@ will use it, otherwise it asks to write a new one.
 Print usage information, then exit.
 
 .TP
-\fB-v\fR or \fB--version\fR 
+\fB-v\fR or \fB--version\fR
 Print version information, then exit.
 
 .TP
-\fB-s\fR or \fB--silent\fR  
+\fB-s\fR or \fB--silent\fR
 Suppress messages in non-interactive mode.
 
 .TP
-\fB-r\fR or \fB--verbose\fR  
+\fB-r\fR or \fB--verbose\fR
 Provide more verbose output.
 
 .TP
-\fB-a\fR or \fB--auto\fR  
-Automatically create a partition using the entire disk in non-interactive 
+\fB-a\fR or \fB--auto\fR
+Automatically create a partition using the entire disk in non-interactive
 mode.
 
 .TP
 \fB-k\fR or \fB--keep_volser\fR
-Keeps the volume serial when writing the volume label. 
+Keeps the Volume Serial Number when writing the Volume Label.
 .br
-This is useful, if the volume serial has been written before and should not
-be overwritten. This option is only applicable in non-interactive mode.
+This is useful if the volume already has a Serial Number that should not be
+overwritten. This option is only applicable in non-interactive mode.
 
 .TP
 \fB-l\fR \fIvolser\fR or \fB--label\fR \fIvolser\fR
 Specify the volume serial.
 .br
-\fIvolser\fR is interpreted as ASCII string and is automatically converted to 
+\fIvolser\fR is interpreted as ASCII string and is automatically converted to
 uppercase, padded with blanks and finally converted to EBCDIC to be written
 to disk. This option is only applicable in non-interactive mode.
 .br
 
-Do not use the following reserved volume serial: SCRTCH, PRIVAT, MIGRAT, 
-or Lnnnnn (L with five digit number); These are used as keywords by 
+Do not use the following reserved volume serial: SCRTCH, PRIVAT, MIGRAT,
+or Lnnnnn (L with five digit number); These are used as keywords by
 other operating systems (OS/390).
 .br
 
-A volume serial is 1 through 6 alphanumeric characters or one of the 
-following special characters: $, #, @, %. All other characters are simply 
-ignored. 
+A volume serial is 1 through 6 alphanumeric characters or one of the
+following special characters: $, #, @, %. All other characters are simply
+ignored.
 .br
-Try to avoid using special characters in the volume serial. 
-This may cause problems accessing a disk by volser. 
-In case you really have to use special characters, make sure you are using 
-quotes. In addition there is a special handling for the '$' sign. 
+Try to avoid using special characters in the volume serial.
+This may cause problems accessing a disk by volser.
+In case you really have to use special characters, make sure you are using
+quotes. In addition there is a special handling for the '$' sign.
 Please specify it using '\\$' if necessary.
 .br
 
@@ -124,14 +124,14 @@ partitions that use the entire disk:
 .br
 
 .TP
-\fB-i\fR or \fB--volser\fR 
+\fB-i\fR or \fB--volser\fR
 Print the volume serial, then exit.
 
 .TP
-\fB-p\fR or \fB--table\fR 
-Print partition table, then exit. 
+\fB-p\fR or \fB--table\fR
+Print partition table, then exit.
 .br
-In combination with the -s option fdasd will display a short version of the 
+In combination with the -s option fdasd will display a short version of the
 partition table.
 
 .TP
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ In case your are not using the device file system, please specify:
 .br
 
 where \fIx\fR is one or more lowercase letter(s) or any other device
-node specification configured by udev for kernel 2.6 or higher. 
+node specification configured by udev for kernel 2.6 or higher.
 
 .SH SEE ALSO
 .BR dasdfmt (8)

genprotimg/Makefile

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ RECURSIVE_TARGETS := all-recursive install-recursive clean-recursive
 
 all: all-recursive
 
-install: all install-recursive
+install: install-recursive
 	$(INSTALL) -d -m 755 "$(PKGDATADIR)"
 	$(INSTALL) -g $(GROUP) -o $(OWNER) -m 755 samples/check_hostkeydoc "$(PKGDATADIR)"
 

genprotimg/boot/Makefile

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 include ../../common.mak
 
 FILES := stage3a.bin stage3b.bin stage3b_reloc.bin
+DEBUG_FILES := $(addsuffix .debug,$(FILES))
 
 ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),s390x)
 ZIPL_DIR := $(rootdir)/zipl
@@ -71,10 +72,15 @@ stage3b_reloc.o: stage3b.bin
 stage3a.elf: head.o stage3a_init.o $(ZIPL_OBJS)
 stage3b.elf: head.o $(ZIPL_OBJS)
 
+.SECONDARY: $(FILES:.bin=.lds)
 %.elf: %.lds %.o
 	$(LINK) $(NO_PIE_LDFLAGS) $(NO_WARN_RWX_SEGMENTS_LDFLAGS) -Wl,-T,$< -Wl,--build-id=none -m64 -static -nostdlib $(filter %.o, $^) -o $@
 	@chmod a-x $@
 
+%.bin.debug: %.elf
+	$(OBJCOPY) --only-keep-debug $< $@
+	@chmod a-x $@
+
 %.bin: %.elf
 	$(OBJCOPY) -O binary $< $@
 	@chmod a-x $@
@@ -89,7 +95,7 @@ else
 # `-include $(dependencies_c)` statement).
 .PHONY: $(dependencies_c)
 
-$(FILES):
+$(FILES) $(DEBUG_FILES):
 	echo "  SKIP    $@ due to HOST_ARCH != s390x"
 
 install:
@@ -97,9 +103,9 @@ install:
 endif
 
 .DEFAULT_GOAL := all
-all: $(FILES)
+all: $(FILES) $(DEBUG_FILES)
 
 clean:
-	rm -f *.o *.elf *.bin *.map .*.d *.lds
+	rm -f -- *.o *.elf *.bin *.map .*.d *.lds *.debug
 
 .PHONY: all clean

genprotimg/boot/stage3a.c

@@ -11,9 +11,10 @@
 #include "stage3a.h"
 
 #include "lib/zt_common.h"
+#include "boot/error.h"
+#include "boot/s390.h"
 #include "boot/ipl.h"
 #include "sclp.h"
-#include "error.h"
 
 
 static volatile struct stage3a_args __section(".loader_parms") loader_parms;

genprotimg/boot/stage3b.c

@@ -12,10 +12,11 @@
 
 #include "lib/zt_common.h"
 #include "boot/psw.h"
+#include "boot/error.h"
+#include "boot/s390.h"
 #include "boot/linux_layout.h"
 #include "boot/loaders_layout.h"
 #include "sclp.h"
-#include "error.h"
 
 
 static volatile struct stage3b_args __section(".loader_parms") loader_parms;
@@ -60,13 +61,17 @@ void __noreturn start(void)
 	if (cmdline->size > get_kernel_cmdline_size())
 		panic(EINTERNAL, "Command line is too large\n");
 
-	/* move the kernel cmdline */
-	memmove((void *)COMMAND_LINE,
-		(void *)cmdline->src,
-		cmdline->size);
+	if (cmdline->size > 0) {
+		/* make sure the cmdline is a null-terminated string */
+		if (((char *)cmdline->src)[cmdline->size - 1] != '\0')
+			panic(EINTERNAL, "Command line needs to be null-terminated\n");
+
+		/* move the kernel cmdline */
+		memmove((void *)COMMAND_LINE, (void *)cmdline->src, cmdline->size);
+	}
 	/* the initrd does not need to be moved */
 
-	if (initrd->size != 0) {
+	if (initrd->size > 0) {
 		/* copy initrd start address and size into new kernel space */
 		*(unsigned long long *)INITRD_START = initrd->src;
 		*(unsigned long long *)INITRD_SIZE = initrd->size;

genprotimg/man/genprotimg.1

@@ -97,18 +97,29 @@ Do not use for a production image unless you verified
 the host-key document before. Optional.
 .TP
 \fB\-\-comm\-key\fR=\fI\,FILE\/\fR
-Specifies the encryption key you want to use for the PV guest dump. Use a
-secure, random, plaintext AES-256 GCM key. Optional.
+Specifies the customer communication key (CCK). This key is used for the
+PV guest dump encryption and to derive the CCK-derived extension secret
+used for add-secret requests. Use a secure, random, plaintext AES-256
+GCM key. Optional.
 .TP
 \fB\-\-enable\-dump\fR
-Enable PV guest dumps. Requires the \fB\-\-comm-key\fR option. Optional.
+Enable PV guest dumps. Requires the \fB\-\-comm\-key\fR option. Optional.
 .TP
 \fB\-\-disable\-dump\fR
-Disable PV guest dumps. This is the default. Optional.
+Disable PV guest dumps. This is the default.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-enable\-cck\-extension\-secret\fR
+Add-secret requests must provide an extension secret that matches the
+CCK-derived extension secret. Requires the \fB\-\-comm\-key\fR option.
+Optional.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-disable\-cck\-extension\-secret\fR
+Add-secret requests don't have to provide an extension secret. This is
+the default.
 .TP
 \fB\-\-enable\-pckmo\fR
 Enable the support for the DEA, TDEA, AES, and ECC PCKMO key encryption
-functions. This is the default. Optional.
+functions. This is the default.
 .TP
 \fB\-\-disable\-pckmo\fR
 Disable the support for the DEA, TDEA, AES, and ECC PCKMO key encryption

genprotimg/src/Makefile

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ $(bin_PROGRAM)_SRCS := $(bin_PROGRAM).c pv/pv_stage3.c pv/pv_image.c \
 	$(NULL)
 $(bin_PROGRAM)_OBJS := $($(bin_PROGRAM)_SRCS:.c=.o)
 
-ALL_CFLAGS += -std=gnu11 -DPKGDATADIR=$(PKGDATADIR) \
+ALL_CFLAGS += -DPKGDATADIR=$(PKGDATADIR) \
 	$(GLIB2_CFLAGS) $(LIBCRYPTO_CFLAGS) $(LIBCURL_CFLAGS) \
 	-DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L \
 	$(WARNINGS) \

genprotimg/src/include/pv_hdr_def.h

@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@
 #define PV_PCF_PCKMO_AES	__PV_BIT(57) /* PCKMO encrypt-AES-key functions allowed */
 #define PV_PCF_PCKM_ECC	__PV_BIT(58) /* PCKMO encrypt-ECC-key functions allowed */
 
+/* Secret control flags */
+#define PV_SCF_CCK_EXTENSION_SECRET_ENFORCMENT                                                     \
+	__PV_BIT(1) /* All add-secret requests must provide an extension secret */
+
 /* maxima for the PV version 1 */
 #define PV_V1_IPIB_MAX_SIZE	PAGE_SIZE
 #define PV_V1_PV_HDR_MAX_SIZE	(2 * PAGE_SIZE)

genprotimg/src/pv/pv_args.c

@@ -62,11 +62,12 @@ static gint pv_args_set_defaults(PvArgs *args, GError **err G_GNUC_UNUSED)
 
 static gint pv_args_validate_options(PvArgs *args, GError **err)
 {
+	const PvControlFlagsArgs *cf_args = &args->cf_args;
 	PvComponentType KERNEL = PV_COMP_TYPE_KERNEL;
 
 	/* Check for mutually exclusive arguments */
-	if (args->pcf && !(args->allow_pckmo == PV_NOT_SET &&
-			   args->allow_dump == PV_NOT_SET)) {
+	if (cf_args->pcf &&
+	    !(cf_args->enable_pckmo == PV_NOT_SET && cf_args->enable_dump == PV_NOT_SET)) {
 		g_set_error(
 			err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PV_PARSE_ERROR_SYNTAX,
 			_("The '--x-pcf' option cannot be used with the '--(enable|disable)-pckmo' or"
@@ -74,6 +75,13 @@ static gint pv_args_validate_options(PvArgs *args, GError **err)
 		return -1;
 	}
 
+	if (cf_args->scf && !(cf_args->enable_cck_extension_secret_enforcement == PV_NOT_SET)) {
+		g_set_error(
+			err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PV_PARSE_ERROR_SYNTAX,
+			_("The '--x-scf' option cannot be used with the '--(enable|disable)-extension-secret-required' flags.\nUse 'genprotimg --help' for more information"));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
 	/* Check for unused arguments */
 	if (args->unused_values->len > 0) {
 		g_autofree gchar *unused = NULL;
@@ -93,12 +101,20 @@ static gint pv_args_validate_options(PvArgs *args, GError **err)
 	}
 
 	/* Check for mandatory arguments */
-	if (args->allow_dump == PV_TRUE && !args->cust_comm_key_path) {
+	if (cf_args->enable_dump == PV_TRUE && !args->cust_comm_key_path) {
 		g_set_error(err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PR_PARSE_ERROR_MISSING_ARGUMENT,
-			    _("Option '--allow-dump' requires the '--comm-key' option.\nUse 'genprotimg "
+			    _("Option '--enable-dump' requires the '--comm-key' option.\nUse 'genprotimg "
 			      "--help' for more information"));
 		return -1;
 	}
+	if (cf_args->enable_cck_extension_secret_enforcement == PV_TRUE &&
+	    !args->cust_comm_key_path) {
+		g_set_error(
+			err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PR_PARSE_ERROR_MISSING_ARGUMENT,
+			_("Option '--enable-cck-extension-secret' requires the '--comm-key' option.\nUse 'genprotimg "
+			  "--help' for more information"));
+		return -1;
+	}
 
 	if (!args->output_path) {
 		g_set_error(err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PR_PARSE_ERROR_MISSING_ARGUMENT,
@@ -178,11 +194,11 @@ static gboolean cb_set_string_option(const gchar *option, const gchar *value,
 	if (g_str_equal(option, "--x-header-key"))
 		args_option = &args->cust_root_key_path;
 	if (g_str_equal(option, "--x-pcf"))
-		args_option = &args->pcf;
+		args_option = &args->cf_args.pcf;
 	if (g_str_equal(option, "--x-psw"))
 		args_option = &args->psw_addr;
 	if (g_str_equal(option, "--x-scf"))
-		args_option = &args->scf;
+		args_option = &args->cf_args.scf;
 
 	if (!args_option) {
 		g_set_error(err, PV_PARSE_ERROR, PV_PARSE_ERROR_SYNTAX,
@@ -217,49 +233,48 @@ static gboolean cb_remaining_values(const gchar *option G_GNUC_UNUSED,
 }
 
 #define MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB_NAME(FLAG, VALUE) (cb_##FLAG##_##VALUE)
-#define DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB(FLAG, VALUE)                                        \
-	static gboolean MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB_NAME(FLAG, VALUE)(                         \
-		const gchar *option G_GNUC_UNUSED, const gchar *value G_GNUC_UNUSED,     \
-		PvArgs *args, GError **err)                                              \
-	{                                                                                \
-		if (!(args->allow_##FLAG == PV_NOT_SET ||                                \
-		      args->allow_##FLAG == VALUE)) {                                    \
-			g_set_error(err, G_OPTION_ERROR, G_OPTION_ERROR_FAILED,          \
-				    "'--enable-" #FLAG "' and '--disable-" #FLAG         \
-				    "' are mutually exclusive");                         \
-			return FALSE;                                                    \
-		}                                                                        \
-		args->allow_##FLAG = VALUE;                                              \
-		return TRUE;                                                             \
+#define DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB(FLAG, VALUE)                                                  \
+	static gboolean MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB_NAME(FLAG, VALUE)(const gchar *option G_GNUC_UNUSED, \
+								const gchar *value G_GNUC_UNUSED,  \
+								PvArgs *args, GError **err)        \
+	{                                                                                          \
+		if (!(args->cf_args.enable_##FLAG == PV_NOT_SET ||                                 \
+		      args->cf_args.enable_##FLAG == VALUE)) {                                     \
+			g_set_error(err, G_OPTION_ERROR, G_OPTION_ERROR_FAILED,                    \
+				    "'--enable-" #FLAG "' and '--disable-" #FLAG                   \
+				    "' are mutually exclusive");                                   \
+			return FALSE;                                                              \
+		}                                                                                  \
+		args->cf_args.enable_##FLAG = VALUE;                                               \
+		return TRUE;                                                                       \
 	}
 
 #define DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CBS(FLAG)                                    \
 	DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB(FLAG, PV_TRUE)                            \
 	DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB(FLAG, PV_FALSE)
 
-#define MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG(FLAG, ENABLE_DESC, DISABLE_DESC)                    \
-	{                                                                      \
-		.long_name = "enable-" #FLAG,                                  \
-		.short_name = 0,                                               \
-		.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NO_ARG,                                 \
-		.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,                                  \
-		.arg_data = MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB_NAME(FLAG, PV_TRUE),         \
-		.description = ENABLE_DESC,                                    \
-	},                                                                     \
-	{                                                                      \
-		.long_name = "disable-" #FLAG,                                 \
-		.short_name = 0,                                               \
-		.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NO_ARG,                                 \
-		.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,                                  \
-		.arg_data = MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB_NAME(FLAG, PV_FALSE),        \
-		.description = DISABLE_DESC,                                   \
+#define MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG(NAME, FLAG, ENABLE_DESC, DISABLE_DESC)                                  \
+	{                                                                                          \
+		.long_name = "enable-" #NAME,                                                      \
+		.short_name = 0,                                                                   \
+		.flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NO_ARG,                                                     \
+		.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,                                                      \
+		.arg_data = MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB_NAME(FLAG, PV_TRUE),                             \
+		.description = ENABLE_DESC,                                                        \
+	},                                                                                         \
+	{                                                                                          \
+		.long_name = "disable-" #NAME, .short_name = 0, .flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NO_ARG,     \
+		.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,                                                      \
+		.arg_data = MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CB_NAME(FLAG, PV_FALSE),                            \
+		.description = DISABLE_DESC,                                                       \
 	}
 
-#define INDENT "                                   "
+#define INDENT "                                     "
 
 /* Define the callbacks for mutually exclusive command line flags */
-DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CBS(dump)
-DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CBS(pckmo)
+DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CBS(dump);
+DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CBS(pckmo);
+DEFINE_MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG_CBS(cck_extension_secret_enforcement);
 
 gint pv_args_parse_options(PvArgs *args, gint *argc, gchar **argv[],
 			   GError **err)
@@ -280,7 +295,7 @@ gint pv_args_parse_options(PvArgs *args, gint *argc, gchar **argv[],
 		  .arg_data = &args->host_keys,
 		  .description =
 			_("FILE specifies a host-key document. At least\n" INDENT
-			  "one is required Specify this option multiple times\n" INDENT
+			  "one is required. Specify this option multiple times\n" INDENT
 			  "to enable the image to run on more than one host."),
 		  .arg_description = _("FILE") },
 		{ .long_name = "cert",
@@ -325,27 +340,31 @@ gint pv_args_parse_options(PvArgs *args, gint *argc, gchar **argv[],
 		  .description = _("Use the kernel parameters stored in PARMFILE\n" INDENT
 				   "(optional)."),
 		  .arg_description = _("PARMFILE") },
+		MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG(dump, dump,
+				   _("Enable PV guest dumps (optional). This option\n" INDENT
+				     "requires the '--comm-key' option."),
+				   _("Disable PV guest dumps (default).")),
 		MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG(
-			dump,
-			_("Enable PV guest dumps (optional). This option\n" INDENT
-			  "requires the '--comm-key' option."),
-			_("Disable PV guest dumps (default) (optional).")),
-		MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG(
-			pckmo,
-			_("Enable the support for the DEA, TDEA, AES, and\n" INDENT
-			  "ECC PCKMO key encryption functions (default)\n" INDENT
-			  "(optional)."),
-			_("Disable the support for the DEA, TDEA, AES, and\n" INDENT
-			  "ECC PCKMO key encryption functions (optional).")),
+			cck-extension-secret, cck_extension_secret_enforcement,
+			_("Add-secret requests must provide an extension\n" INDENT
+			  "secret that matches the CCK-derived extension\n" INDENT
+			  "secret (optional). This option requires the\n" INDENT
+			  "'--comm-key' option."),
+			_("Add-secret requests don't have to provide\n" INDENT
+			  "the CCK-derived extension secret (default).")),
+		MUT_EXCL_BOOL_FLAG(pckmo, pckmo,
+				   _("Enable the support for the DEA, TDEA, AES, and\n" INDENT
+				     "ECC PCKMO key encryption functions (default)."),
+				   _("Disable the support for the DEA, TDEA, AES, and\n" INDENT
+				     "ECC PCKMO key encryption functions (optional).")),
 		{ .long_name = "comm-key",
 		  .short_name = 0,
 		  .flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_FILENAME,
 		  .arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK,
 		  .arg_data = cb_set_string_option,
 		  .description = _(
-			  "FILE contains the key with which you encrypt\n" INDENT
-			  "the PV guest dump (optional). Required by\n" INDENT
-			  "the '--enable-dump' option."),
+			  "FILE contains the customer communication key\n" INDENT
+			  "(CCK) (optional)."),
 		  .arg_description = _("FILE") },
 		{ .long_name = "crl",
 		  .short_name = 0,
@@ -450,6 +469,8 @@ gint pv_args_parse_options(PvArgs *args, gint *argc, gchar **argv[],
 		  .arg_data = cb_set_string_option,
 		  .description = _("Specify the secret control flags\n" INDENT
 				   "as a hexadecimal value.\n" INDENT
+				   "Optional; mutually exclusive with\n" INDENT
+				   "'--(enable|disable)-cck-extension-secret';\n" INDENT
 				   "Optional; default: '0x0'."),
 		  .arg_description = _("VALUE") },
 		{ 0 },
@@ -487,8 +508,10 @@ PvArgs *pv_args_new(void)
 	g_autoptr(PvArgs) args = g_new0(PvArgs, 1);
 
 	args->unused_values = g_ptr_array_new_with_free_func(g_free);
-	args->allow_dump = PV_NOT_SET;
-	args->allow_pckmo = PV_NOT_SET;
+	/* `args->cf_args` is implicitly initialized with zeros since
+	 * `g_new0` is used. So there is no reason to explicitly
+	 * initialize the values as PV_NOT_SET == 0.
+	 */
 	return g_steal_pointer(&args);
 }
 
@@ -497,8 +520,8 @@ void pv_args_free(PvArgs *args)
 	if (!args)
 		return;
 
-	g_free(args->pcf);
-	g_free(args->scf);
+	g_free(args->cf_args.pcf);
+	g_free(args->cf_args.scf);
 	g_free(args->psw_addr);
 	g_free(args->cust_root_key_path);
 	g_free(args->cust_comm_key_path);

genprotimg/src/pv/pv_args.h

@@ -23,19 +23,27 @@ PvArg *pv_arg_new(PvComponentType type, const gchar *path);
 void pv_arg_free(PvArg *arg);
 
 typedef enum pv_tristate {
-		  PV_NOT_SET = 0,
-		  PV_TRUE,
-		  PV_FALSE,
+	PV_NOT_SET = 0,
+	PV_TRUE,
+	PV_FALSE,
 } PvTristate;
+/* The value of PV_NOT_SET is not allowed to be changed */
+STATIC_ASSERT(PV_NOT_SET == 0)
+
+typedef struct {
+	gchar *pcf;
+	gchar *scf;
+	/* Add-secret requests do require CCK-extension secrets */
+	PvTristate enable_cck_extension_secret_enforcement;
+	PvTristate enable_dump;
+	PvTristate enable_pckmo;
+} PvControlFlagsArgs;
 
 typedef struct {
 	gint log_level;
 	gint no_verify;
 	gboolean offline;
-	gchar *pcf;
-	gchar *scf;
-	PvTristate allow_dump;
-	PvTristate allow_pckmo;
+	PvControlFlagsArgs cf_args;
 	gchar *psw_addr; /* PSW address which will be used for the start of
 			  * the actual component (e.g. Linux kernel)
 			  */

genprotimg/src/pv/pv_image.c

@@ -228,37 +228,40 @@ static gint pv_img_set_psw_addr(PvImage *img, const gchar *psw_addr_s,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static gint pv_img_set_control_flags(PvImage *img, const gchar *pcf_s,
-				     const gchar *scf_s,
-				     PvTristate allow_dump,
-				     PvTristate allow_pckmo, GError **err)
+static void pv_img_set_control_flag(uint64_t *flags, const PvTristate option, const uint64_t flag)
+{
+	if (option == PV_TRUE)
+		*flags |= flag;
+	else if (option == PV_FALSE)
+		*flags &= ~flag;
+}
+
+static gint pv_img_set_control_flags(PvImage *img, const PvControlFlagsArgs *cf_args, GError **err)
 {
 	uint64_t flags;
 
-	if (pcf_s) {
-		if (hex_str_toull(pcf_s, &flags, err) < 0)
+	/* Set plain control flags */
+	if (cf_args->pcf) {
+		if (hex_str_toull(cf_args->pcf, &flags, err) < 0)
 			return -1;
 
 		img->pcf = flags;
 	}
 
-	if (scf_s) {
-		if (hex_str_toull(scf_s, &flags, err) < 0)
+	pv_img_set_control_flag(&img->pcf, cf_args->enable_dump, PV_PCF_ALLOW_DUMPING);
+	pv_img_set_control_flag(&img->pcf, cf_args->enable_pckmo,
+				PV_PCF_PCKM_ECC | PV_PCF_PCKMO_AES | PV_PCF_PCKMO_DEA_TDEA);
+
+	/* Set secret control flags */
+	if (cf_args->scf) {
+		if (hex_str_toull(cf_args->scf, &flags, err) < 0)
 			return -1;
 
 		img->scf = flags;
 	}
 
-	if (allow_dump == PV_TRUE)
-		img->pcf |= PV_PCF_ALLOW_DUMPING;
-	else if (allow_dump == PV_FALSE)
-		img->pcf &= ~PV_PCF_ALLOW_DUMPING;
-
-	if (allow_pckmo == PV_TRUE)
-		img->pcf |= PV_PCF_PCKM_ECC | PV_PCF_PCKMO_AES | PV_PCF_PCKMO_DEA_TDEA;
-	else if (allow_pckmo == PV_FALSE)
-		img->pcf &= ~(PV_PCF_PCKM_ECC | PV_PCF_PCKMO_AES | PV_PCF_PCKMO_DEA_TDEA);
-
+	pv_img_set_control_flag(&img->scf, cf_args->enable_cck_extension_secret_enforcement,
+				PV_SCF_CCK_EXTENSION_SECRET_ENFORCMENT);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -610,9 +613,7 @@ PvImage *pv_img_new(PvArgs *args, const gchar *stage3a_path, GError **err)
 		return NULL;
 
 	/* set the control flags: PCF and SCF */
-	if (pv_img_set_control_flags(ret, args->pcf, args->scf,
-				     args->allow_dump, args->allow_pckmo,
-				     err) < 0)
+	if (pv_img_set_control_flags(ret, &args->cf_args, err) < 0)
 		return NULL;
 
 	/* read in the keys */
@@ -683,7 +684,26 @@ gint pv_img_add_component(PvImage *img, const PvArg *arg, GError **err)
 {
 	g_autoptr(PvComponent) comp = NULL;
 
-	comp = pv_component_new_file(arg->type, arg->path, err);
+	switch (arg->type) {
+	case PV_COMP_TYPE_INITRD:
+	case PV_COMP_TYPE_KERNEL:
+	case PV_COMP_TYPE_STAGE3B:
+		comp = pv_component_new_file(arg->type, arg->path, err);
+		break;
+	case PV_COMP_TYPE_CMDLINE: {
+		g_autoptr(PvBuffer) buf = NULL;
+		g_autofree char *data = NULL;
+		gsize length;
+
+		if (!g_file_get_contents(arg->path, &data, &length, err))
+			return -1;
+
+		/* Add one for the null terminator */
+		buf = pv_buffer_take(g_steal_pointer(&data), length + 1);
+		comp = pv_component_new_buf(arg->type, buf, err);
+	} break;
+	}
+
 	if (!comp)
 		return -1;
 

genprotimg/src/pv/pv_ipib.c

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static gint pv_ipib_init(IplParameterBlock *ipib, GSList *comps,
 	ipib_size = MAX(ipl_pl_hdr_size + blk0_len, (uint32_t)PAGE_SIZE);
 	g_assert(pv_ipib_get_size(comps_length) == ipib_size);
 
-	pv->pbt = IPL_TYPE_PV;
+	pv->pbt = IPL_PBT_PV;
 	pv->len = GUINT32_TO_BE(blk0_len);
 	pv->num_comp = GUINT32_TO_BE(comps_length);
 	/* both values will be overwritten during the IPL process by

genprotimg/src/utils/buffer.c

@@ -26,6 +26,15 @@ PvBuffer *pv_buffer_alloc(gsize size)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+PvBuffer *pv_buffer_take(char *data, gsize size)
+{
+	PvBuffer *ret = g_new0(PvBuffer, 1);
+
+	ret->data = data;
+	ret->size = size;
+	return ret;
+}
+
 PvBuffer *pv_buffer_dup(const PvBuffer *buf, gboolean page_aligned)
 {
 	PvBuffer *ret;

genprotimg/src/utils/buffer.h

@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ typedef struct PvBuffer {
 } PvBuffer;
 
 PvBuffer *pv_buffer_alloc(gsize size);
+/* After this call @data belongs to the PvBuffer and must no longer be modified
+ * by the caller.
+ */
+PvBuffer *pv_buffer_take(char *data, gsize size);
 void pv_buffer_free(PvBuffer *buf);
 void pv_buffer_clear(PvBuffer **buf);
 gint pv_buffer_write(const PvBuffer *buf, FILE *file, GError **err);

hyptop/dg_debugfs_lpar.c

@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static void l_sd_cpu_fill(struct sd_cpu *cpu, struct l_x_cpu_info *cpu_info,
 			  int threads)
 {
 	sd_cpu_cpu_time_us_set(cpu, cpu_info->lp_time);
+	sd_cpu_threads_per_core_set(cpu, threads);
 	if (threads > 1)
 		sd_cpu_thread_time_us_set(cpu,
 			cpu_info->lp_time * threads - cpu_info->mt_idle_time);
@@ -297,6 +298,7 @@ static struct sd_sys_item *l_sys_item_vec[] = {
 	&sd_sys_item_thread_cnt,
 	&sd_sys_item_core_diff,
 	&sd_sys_item_thread_diff,
+	&sd_sys_item_smt_diff,
 	&sd_sys_item_mgm_diff,
 	&sd_sys_item_core,
 	&sd_sys_item_thread,
@@ -326,6 +328,7 @@ static struct sd_cpu_item *l_cpu_item_vec[] = {
 	&sd_cpu_item_type,
 	&sd_cpu_item_core_diff,
 	&sd_cpu_item_thread_diff,
+	&sd_cpu_item_smt_diff,
 	&sd_cpu_item_mgm_diff,
 	&sd_cpu_item_core,
 	&sd_cpu_item_thread,

hyptop/helper.c

@@ -391,3 +391,24 @@ void hyptop_helper_init(void)
 	if (l_iconv_ebcdic_ascii == (iconv_t) -1)
 		ERR_EXIT("Could not initialize iconv\n");
 }
+
+/*
+ * Calculate real SMT utilization
+ * @core_us: core utilization in us
+ * @thr_us: thread utilization in us
+ * @mgm_us: management utilization in us
+ * @thread_per_core: SMT thread count per core
+ */
+s64 ht_calculate_smt_util(u64 core_us, u64 thr_us, u64 mgm_us, int thread_per_core)
+{
+	s64 component1, component2, smt_us;
+	double smt_factor = g.o.smt_factor;
+
+	component1 = thread_per_core * core_us - thr_us;
+	if (thread_per_core > 1)
+		component1 /= smt_factor;
+	component2 = thr_us - core_us;
+	smt_us = G0(component1 + component2 + mgm_us);
+
+	return smt_us;
+}

hyptop/helper.h

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ extern void ht_ebcdic_to_ascii(char *in, char *out, size_t len);
 extern char *ht_mount_point_get(const char *fs_type);
 extern u64 ht_ext_tod_2_us(void *tod_ext);
 extern void ht_print_time(void);
+extern s64 ht_calculate_smt_util(u64 core_us, u64 thr_us, u64 mgm_us, int thread_per_core);
 
 /*
  * Memory alloc functions

hyptop/hyptop.8

@@ -74,6 +74,18 @@ In this mode no user input is accepted.
 .BR "\-d <SECONDS>" " or " "\-\-delay=<SECONDS>"
 Specifies the delay between screen updates.
 .TP
+.BR "\-m <FACTOR>" " or " "\-\-smt_factor=<FACTOR>"
+Specifies a workload dependent SMT speedup factor.
+For IBM z15 servers, the default value is 1.3. If the workload benefits
+from SMT, you can specify a higher value. If the workload does not benefit
+from SMT, specifying lower values results in more accurate reports of
+real CPU SMT utilization field for LPARs. There is no hard boundary except
+that it must be a positive value. Example ranges to select a sensible value
+from:
+
+ For IBM z13: [0.8, 1.3]
+ For IBM z15: [1.1, 1.5]
+.TP
 .BR "\-n <ITERATIONS>" " or " "\-\-iterations=<ITERATIONS>"
 Specifies the maximum number of iterations before ending.
 
@@ -119,6 +131,7 @@ The following fields are available under LPAR:
   In "sys_list" and "sys" window:
   'c' - Core dispatch time per second
   'e' - Thread time per second
+  'S' - Real CPU SMT utilization
   'm' - Management time per second
   'C' - Total core dispatch time
   'E' - Total thread time

hyptop/hyptop.h

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include "table.h"
 
 #define HYPTOP_OPT_DEFAULT_DELAY	2
+#define HYPTOP_OPT_DEFAULT_SMT_SCALE	1.3
 #define HYPTOP_MAX_WIN_DEPTH		4
 #define HYPTOP_MAX_LINE			512
 #define PROG_NAME			"hyptop"
@@ -60,6 +61,8 @@ struct hyptop_opts {
 
 	int				delay_s;
 	int				delay_us;
+
+	double				smt_factor;
 };
 
 /*

hyptop/opts.c

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ static char HELP_TEXT[] =
 "-t, --cpu_types TYPE[,..]       CPU types used for time calculations\n"
 "-b, --batch_mode                Use batch mode (no curses)\n"
 "-d, --delay SECONDS             Delay time between screen updates\n"
+"-m, --smt_factor FACTOR         Machine generation dependent SMT speedup factor.\n"
 "-n, --iterations NUMBER         Number of iterations before ending\n";
 
 /*
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ static void l_init_defaults(void)
 {
 	g.prog_name = PROG_NAME;
 	g.o.delay_s = HYPTOP_OPT_DEFAULT_DELAY;
+	g.o.smt_factor = HYPTOP_OPT_DEFAULT_SMT_SCALE;
 	g.w.cur = &win_sys_list;
 	g.o.cur_win = &win_sys_list;
 }
@@ -108,6 +110,20 @@ static void l_delay_set(char *delay_string)
 	g.o.delay_us = 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Set SMT factor option
+ */
+static void l_factor_set(char *value_string)
+{
+	double factor;
+
+	if (sscanf(value_string, "%lf", &factor) != 1)
+		ERR_EXIT("The SMT factor \"%s\" is invalid\n", value_string);
+	if (factor <= 0)
+		ERR_EXIT("The SMT factor \"%s\" is <= 0\n", value_string);
+	g.o.smt_factor = factor;
+}
+
 /*
  * Get number of occurrences of character 'c' in "str"
  */
@@ -299,6 +315,7 @@ void opts_parse(int argc, char *argv[])
 		{ "help",        no_argument,       NULL, 'h'},
 		{ "batch_mode",  no_argument,       NULL, 'b'},
 		{ "delay",       required_argument, NULL, 'd'},
+		{ "smt_factor",  required_argument, NULL, 'm'},
 		{ "window",      required_argument, NULL, 'w'},
 		{ "sys",         required_argument, NULL, 's'},
 		{ "iterations",  required_argument, NULL, 'n'},
@@ -307,7 +324,7 @@ void opts_parse(int argc, char *argv[])
 		{ "cpu_types",   required_argument, NULL, 't'},
 		{ NULL,          0,                 NULL, 0  }
 	};
-	static const char option_string[] = "vhbd:w:s:n:f:t:S:";
+	static const char option_string[] = "vhbd:m:w:s:n:f:t:S:";
 
 	l_init_defaults();
 	while (1) {
@@ -328,6 +345,9 @@ void opts_parse(int argc, char *argv[])
 		case 'd':
 			l_delay_set(optarg);
 			break;
+		case 'm':
+			l_factor_set(optarg);
+			break;
 		case 'w':
 			l_window_set(optarg);
 			break;

hyptop/sd.h

@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ struct sd_cpu {
 	struct sd_cpu_info	*d_cur;
 	struct sd_cpu_info	*d_prev;
 	u16			cnt;
+	int			threads_per_core;
 	enum sd_cpu_state	state;
 };
 
@@ -232,6 +233,11 @@ static inline void sd_cpu_cpu_time_us_set(struct sd_cpu *cpu, u64 value)
 	cpu->d_cur->cpu_time_us = value;
 }
 
+static inline void sd_cpu_threads_per_core_set(struct sd_cpu *cpu, int value)
+{
+	cpu->threads_per_core = value;
+}
+
 static inline void sd_cpu_thread_time_us_set(struct sd_cpu *cpu, u64 value)
 {
 	cpu->d_cur->thread_time_us = value;
@@ -335,6 +341,7 @@ extern struct sd_cpu_item sd_cpu_item_state;
 extern struct sd_cpu_item sd_cpu_item_cpu_diff;
 extern struct sd_cpu_item sd_cpu_item_core_diff;
 extern struct sd_cpu_item sd_cpu_item_thread_diff;
+extern struct sd_cpu_item sd_cpu_item_smt_diff;
 extern struct sd_cpu_item sd_cpu_item_mgm_diff;
 extern struct sd_cpu_item sd_cpu_item_wait_diff;
 extern struct sd_cpu_item sd_cpu_item_steal_diff;
@@ -398,6 +405,7 @@ static inline char *sd_sys_item_str(struct sd_sys *sys,
 extern struct sd_sys_item sd_sys_item_cpu_cnt;
 extern struct sd_sys_item sd_sys_item_core_cnt;
 extern struct sd_sys_item sd_sys_item_thread_cnt;
+extern struct sd_sys_item sd_sys_item_smt_diff;
 extern struct sd_sys_item sd_sys_item_cpu_oper_cnt;
 extern struct sd_sys_item sd_sys_item_cpu_deconf_cnt;
 extern struct sd_sys_item sd_sys_item_cpu_stop_cnt;

hyptop/sd_cpu_items.c

@@ -98,6 +98,18 @@ static u64 l_cpu_item_64(struct sd_cpu_item *item, struct sd_cpu *cpu)
 		return l_cpu_info_u64(cpu->d_cur, item->offset) / cpu->cnt;
 }
 
+static u64 l_cpu_smt_util(struct sd_cpu_item *item, struct sd_cpu *cpu)
+{
+	u64 core_us, thr_us, mgm_us;
+	(void)item;
+
+	core_us = sd_cpu_item_u64(&sd_cpu_item_core_diff, cpu);
+	thr_us = sd_cpu_item_u64(&sd_cpu_item_thread_diff, cpu);
+	mgm_us = sd_cpu_item_u64(&sd_cpu_item_mgm_diff, cpu);
+
+	return ht_calculate_smt_util(core_us, thr_us, mgm_us, cpu->threads_per_core);
+}
+
 /*
  * CPU item definitions
  */
@@ -139,6 +151,13 @@ struct sd_cpu_item sd_cpu_item_thread_diff = {
 	.fn_u64	= l_cpu_diff_u64,
 };
 
+struct sd_cpu_item sd_cpu_item_smt_diff = {
+	.table_col = TABLE_COL_TIME_DIFF_SUM(table_col_unit_perc, 'S', "smt"),
+	.type	= SD_TYPE_U64,
+	.desc	= "Real CPU SMT utilization",
+	.fn_u64	= l_cpu_smt_util,
+};
+
 struct sd_cpu_item sd_cpu_item_mgm_diff = {
 	.table_col = TABLE_COL_TIME_DIFF_SUM(table_col_unit_perc, 'm', "mgm"),
 	.type	= SD_TYPE_U64,

hyptop/sd_sys_items.c

@@ -208,6 +208,18 @@ static s64 l_sys_cpu_info_diff_s64(struct sd_sys_item *item, struct sd_sys *sys)
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static u64 l_sys_smt_util(struct sd_sys_item *item, struct sd_sys *sys)
+{
+	u64 core_us, thr_us, mgm_us;
+	(void)item;
+
+	core_us = sd_sys_item_u64(sys, &sd_sys_item_core_diff);
+	thr_us = sd_sys_item_u64(sys, &sd_sys_item_thread_diff);
+	mgm_us = sd_sys_item_u64(sys, &sd_sys_item_mgm_diff);
+
+	return ht_calculate_smt_util(core_us, thr_us, mgm_us, sys->threads_per_core);
+}
+
 /*
  * System item definitions
  */
@@ -277,6 +289,13 @@ struct sd_sys_item sd_sys_item_thread_diff = {
 	.fn_u64	= l_sys_cpu_info_diff_u64,
 };
 
+struct sd_sys_item sd_sys_item_smt_diff = {
+	.table_col = TABLE_COL_TIME_DIFF_SUM(table_col_unit_perc, 'S', "smt"),
+	.type	= SD_TYPE_U64,
+	.desc	= "Real CPU SMT utilization",
+	.fn_u64	= l_sys_smt_util,
+};
+
 struct sd_sys_item sd_sys_item_mgm_diff = {
 	.table_col = TABLE_COL_TIME_DIFF_SUM(table_col_unit_perc, 'm', "mgm"),
 	.offset = SD_CPU_INFO_OFFSET(mgm_time_us),

include/boot/error.h

@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
 /* Secure IPL error */
 #define ESECUREBOOT		0x00004512
 
-/* kdump: No operating system information was found */
+/* os_info error: No operating system information was found */
 #define EOS_INFO_MISSING	0x00004520
 
-/* kdump: The checksum of the operating system information is incorrect */
+/* os_info error: The checksum of the operating system information is incorrect */
 #define EOS_INFO_CSUM_FAILED	0x00004521
 
 /* kdump: The major version of the operating system information is too high */

include/boot/ipl.h

@@ -21,10 +21,6 @@
 #define IPL_MAX_SUPPORTED_VERSION	0
 #define IPL_PARM_BLOCK_VERSION		0x1
 
-/* IPL Types */
-#define IPL_TYPE_PV			0x5
-
-
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
 
 #include <stdint.h>
@@ -43,6 +39,16 @@ struct ipl_pb_hdr {
 	uint8_t  pbt;
 } __packed;
 
+/* IPL Parameter Block types */
+enum ipl_pbt {
+	IPL_PBT_FCP = 0,
+	IPL_PBT_SCP_DATA = 1,
+	IPL_PBT_CCW = 2,
+	IPL_PBT_ECKD = 3,
+	IPL_PBT_NVME = 4,
+	IPL_PBT_PV = 5,
+};
+
 /* IPL Parameter Block 0 with common fields */
 struct ipl_pb0_common {
 	uint32_t len;

include/boot/loaders_layout.h

@@ -22,11 +22,19 @@
 #define STAGE2_DESC			_AC(0x78, UL)
 #define STAGE2_ENTRY			_AC(0x2018, UL)
 #define STAGE2_HEAP_ADDRESS		_AC(0x6000, UL)
+#define ECKD2DUMP_SV_HEAP_ADDRESS	_AC(0xb000, UL)
 #define STAGE2_HEAP_SIZE		_AC(0x3000, UL)
 #define STAGE2_STACK_ADDRESS		_AC(0xe400, UL)
 #define STAGE2_STACK_SIZE		_AC(0x1c00, UL)
+#define ECKD2DUMP_SV_STACK_ADDRESS	_AC(0xe000, UL)
+#define ECKD2DUMP_SV_STACK_SIZE		_AC(0x2000, UL)
 #define STAGE2_MAX_SIZE			_AC(0x3000, UL)
 
+#define STAGE2_DUMPER_SIZE_V1		_AC(0x1000, UL)
+#define STAGE2_DUMPER_SIZE_V2		_AC(0x2000, UL)
+#define STAGE2_DUMPER_SIZE_V3		_AC(0x3000, UL)
+#define STAGE2_DUMPER_SIZE_ZLIB		_AC(0x8000, UL)
+
 #define STAGE3_ENTRY			_AC(0xa000, UL)
 
 #define STAGE2_LOAD_ADDRESS		_AC(0x2000, UL)

include/boot/os_info.h

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/*
+ * zipl - zSeries Initial Program Loader tool
+ *
+ * os-info definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2013, 2023
+ *
+ * s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OS_INFO_H
+#define OS_INFO_H
+
+#include "lib/zt_common.h"
+#include "boot/error.h"
+#include "boot/s390.h"
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#define OS_INFO_MAGIC			0x4f53494e464f535aULL /* OSINFOSZ */
+#define OS_INFO_CSUM_SIZE		(sizeof(struct os_info) - offsetof(struct os_info, version_major))
+#define OS_INFO_FLAGS_ENTRY_SIZE	(sizeof(unsigned long))
+
+#define OS_INFO_VMCOREINFO		0
+#define OS_INFO_REIPL_BLOCK		1
+#define OS_INFO_FLAGS_ENTRY		2
+
+#define OS_INFO_FLAG_REIPL_CLEAR	(1UL << 0)
+
+struct os_info_entry {
+	uint64_t addr;
+	uint64_t size;
+	uint32_t csum;
+} __packed;
+
+struct os_info {
+	uint64_t magic;
+	uint32_t csum;
+	uint16_t version_major;
+	uint16_t version_minor;
+	uint64_t crashkernel_addr;
+	uint64_t crashkernel_size;
+	struct os_info_entry entry[3];
+	uint8_t reserved[4004];
+} __packed;
+
+/*
+ * Return 0 in case of valid os_info
+ * Return -EOS_INFO_MISSING if os_info address is not page aligned or page is
+ * not accessible or os_info magic value is missing.
+ * Return -EOS_INFO_CSUM_FAILED if os_info checksum is invalid.
+ */
+static inline int os_info_check(const struct os_info *os_info)
+{
+	if (!os_info ||
+	    (unsigned long)os_info % PAGE_SIZE ||
+	    !page_is_valid((unsigned long)os_info) ||
+	    os_info->magic != OS_INFO_MAGIC)
+		return -EOS_INFO_MISSING;
+	if (os_info->csum != csum_partial(&os_info->version_major, OS_INFO_CSUM_SIZE, 0))
+		return -EOS_INFO_CSUM_FAILED;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 in case of valid os_info_entry, otherwise 0
+ * Make sure that the entire os_info structure is checked first with os_info_check().
+ */
+static inline int os_info_entry_is_valid(const struct os_info_entry *entry)
+{
+	return (entry &&
+		entry->addr &&
+		entry->size &&
+		page_is_valid(entry->addr) &&
+		entry->csum == csum_partial((void *)entry->addr, entry->size, 0));
+}
+
+#endif /* OS_INFO_H */

include/boot/s390.h

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #define STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD	_AC(160, U)
 
 /* Facilities */
+#define DFLTCC_FACILITY		_AC(151, U)
 #define UNPACK_FACILITY		_AC(161, U)
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
@@ -285,18 +286,21 @@ static __always_inline void __ctl_set_bit(unsigned int cr, unsigned int bit)
  * DIAG 308 support
  */
 enum diag308_subcode {
-	DIAG308_REL_HSA	  = 2,
-	DIAG308_IPL	  = 3,
-	DIAG308_DUMP	  = 4,
-	DIAG308_SET	  = 5,
-	DIAG308_STORE	  = 6,
+	DIAG308_CLEAR_RESET = 0,
+	DIAG308_LOAD_NORMAL_RESET = 1,
+	DIAG308_REL_HSA = 2,
+	DIAG308_LOAD_CLEAR = 3,
+	DIAG308_LOAD_NORMAL_DUMP = 4,
+	DIAG308_SET = 5,
+	DIAG308_STORE = 6,
+	DIAG308_LOAD_NORMAL = 7,
 	DIAG308_SET_PV	  = 8,
 	DIAG308_UNPACK_PV = 10,
 };
 
 enum diag308_rc {
 	DIAG308_RC_OK	      = 0x0001,
-	DIAG308_RC_NO_CONF    = 0x0102,
+	DIAG308_RC_NOCONFIG   = 0x0102,
 };
 
 static __always_inline unsigned long diag308(unsigned long subcode, void *addr)

include/dump/s390_dump.h

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/*
+ * s390 related definitions and functions.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2013, 2023
+ *
+ * s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
+ */
+
+#ifndef S390_DUMP_H
+#define S390_DUMP_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "boot/page.h"
+#include "lib/zt_common.h"
+
+/*
+ * S390 dump format defines
+ */
+#define DF_S390_MAGIC		0xa8190173618f23fdULL
+#define DF_S390_MAGIC_EXT	0xa8190173618f23feULL
+#define DF_S390_HDR_SIZE	0x1000
+#define DF_S390_EM_SIZE		16
+#define DF_S390_EM_MAGIC	0x44554d505f454e44ULL
+#define DF_S390_EM_STR		"DUMP_END"
+#define DF_S390_CPU_MAX		512
+#define DF_S390_MAGIC_BLK_ECKD	3
+
+/*
+ * Architecture of dumped system
+ */
+enum df_s390_arch {
+	DF_S390_ARCH_32	= 1,
+	DF_S390_ARCH_64	= 2,
+};
+
+/*
+ * zipl parameters passed at tail of dump tools
+ */
+struct stage2dump_parm_tail {
+	char		reserved[6];
+	uint8_t		no_compress;
+	uint8_t		mvdump_force;
+	uint64_t	mem_upper_limit;
+} __packed;
+
+/*
+ * s390 dump header format
+ */
+struct df_s390_hdr {
+	uint64_t	magic;				/* 0x000 */
+	uint32_t	version;			/* 0x008 */
+	uint32_t	hdr_size;			/* 0x00c */
+	uint32_t	dump_level;			/* 0x010 */
+	uint32_t	page_size;			/* 0x014 */
+	uint64_t	mem_size;			/* 0x018 */
+	uint64_t	mem_start;			/* 0x020 */
+	uint64_t	mem_end;			/* 0x028 */
+	uint32_t	num_pages;			/* 0x030 */
+	uint32_t	pad;				/* 0x034 */
+	uint64_t	tod;				/* 0x038 */
+	uint64_t	cpu_id;				/* 0x040 */
+	uint32_t	arch;				/* 0x048 */
+	uint32_t	volnr;				/* 0x04c */
+	uint32_t	build_arch;			/* 0x050 */
+	uint64_t	mem_size_real;			/* 0x054 */
+	uint8_t		mvdump;				/* 0x05c */
+	uint16_t	cpu_cnt;			/* 0x05d */
+	uint16_t	real_cpu_cnt;			/* 0x05f */
+	uint8_t		zlib_version_s390;		/* 0x061 */
+	uint32_t	zlib_entry_size;		/* 0x062 */
+	uint8_t		end_pad1[0x200 - 0x066];	/* 0x066 */
+	uint64_t	mvdump_sign;			/* 0x200 */
+	uint64_t	mvdump_zipl_time;		/* 0x208 */
+	uint8_t		end_pad2[0x800 - 0x210];	/* 0x210 */
+	uint32_t	lc_vec[DF_S390_CPU_MAX];	/* 0x800 */
+} __packed __aligned(16);
+
+/*
+ *  End marker: Should be at the end of every valid s390 crash dump
+ */
+struct df_s390_em {
+	union {
+		uint64_t magic;
+		char str[8];
+	};
+	uint64_t tod;
+} __packed __aligned(16);
+
+/*
+ * Dump segment header
+ */
+struct df_s390_dump_segm_hdr {
+	union {
+		struct {
+			uint64_t start;				/* 0x000 */
+			uint64_t len;				/* 0x008 */
+			uint64_t stop_marker;			/* 0x010 */
+			/* Size in blocks of compressed dump segment written to disk */
+			uint32_t size_on_disk;			/* 0x018 */
+			uint8_t  reserved_pad[0x30 - 0x1c];	/* 0x01c */
+			/*
+			 * Number of compressed entries in this dump segment (up to
+			 * 1011 entries)
+			 */
+			uint32_t entry_count;			/* 0x030 */
+			/*
+			 * Offsets in blocks to compressed entries written to disk
+			 * from the start of the dump segment.
+			 * High-order bit is set if the entry has been written
+			 * uncompressed.
+			 */
+			uint32_t entry_offset[];		/* 0x034 */
+		} __packed;
+		uint8_t padding[PAGE_SIZE];
+	};
+};
+
+/* Data compression granularity (size of input data chunk for zlib deflate) */
+#define DUMP_SEGM_ZLIB_ENTSIZE   (1 * MIB)
+/* Maximum number of compressed entries in one dump segment */
+#define DUMP_SEGM_ZLIB_MAXENTS   ((sizeof(struct df_s390_dump_segm_hdr) \
+				   - offsetof(struct df_s390_dump_segm_hdr, entry_offset)) \
+				   / sizeof(uint32_t))
+/*
+ * Maximum length of compressed dump segment considering the size of
+ * a single input chunk
+ */
+#define DUMP_SEGM_ZLIB_MAXLEN    (DUMP_SEGM_ZLIB_MAXENTS * DUMP_SEGM_ZLIB_ENTSIZE)
+/* Bitmask to mark uncompressed chunks */
+#define DUMP_SEGM_ENTRY_UNCOMPRESSED    0x80000000
+
+#endif /* S390_DUMP_H */

include/lib/ap.h

@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ void ap_list_remove_all(struct util_list *list);
 /* Lock Functions */
 int ap_get_lock(void);
 int ap_get_lock_callout(void);
+int ap_try_lock_callout(void);
 int ap_release_lock(void);
 int ap_release_lock_callout(void);
 

include/lib/util_lockfile.h

@@ -23,4 +23,6 @@ int util_lockfile_parent_lock(char *lockfile, int retries);
 int util_lockfile_release(char *lockfile);
 int util_lockfile_parent_release(char *lockfile);
 
+int util_lockfile_peek_owner(char *lockfile, int *pid);
+
 #endif /** LIB_UTIL_LOCKFILE_H @} */

iucvterm/Makefile

@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ RECURSIVE_TARGETS = all-recursive install-recursive clean-recursive \
 
 
 all: all-recursive
-check: check-recursive
-install: all install-recursive
+install: install-recursive
 clean: clean-recursive
 
 

libap/ap.c

@@ -722,6 +722,34 @@ int ap_get_lock_callout(void)
 	return util_lockfile_parent_lock(AP_LOCKFILE, AP_LOCK_RETRIES);
 }
 
+/**
+ * Attempt to acquire the ap config lock using the Parent Process ID without
+ * waiting/retries.  Detect if the attempt was rejected because the lock is
+ * already held by the Parent Process ID.
+ *
+ * @retval         0          Lock acquired on behalf of parent process
+ * @retval         1          Lock not obtained, already held by parent
+ * @retval         != 0       Lock was not obtained, other error
+ */
+int ap_try_lock_callout(void)
+{
+	int pid, ppid, rc;
+
+	if (util_lockfile_parent_lock(AP_LOCKFILE, 0)) {
+		/* Lock is already held, let's peek at the owner */
+		ppid = getppid();
+		rc = util_lockfile_peek_owner(AP_LOCKFILE, &pid);
+		if (rc || pid != ppid) {
+			/* We didn't get the lock, unknown or other owner */
+			return 2;
+		}
+		/* Signify that the lock is already held by the caller */
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * Release the ap config lock
  *

libekmfweb/Makefile

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ check-dep-libekmfweb: detect-openssl-version.dep
 		"detect-openssl-version.dep", \
 		"openssl-devel version >= 1.1.1", \
 		"HAVE_OPENSSL=0", \
-		-I. -lcrypto -DOPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED)
+		-I. `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags --libs libcrypto` -DOPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED)
 	$(call check_dep, \
 		"libekmfweb", \
 		"json-c/json.h", \
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ check-dep-libekmfweb: detect-openssl-version.dep
 		"curl/curl.h", \
 		"libcurl-devel", \
 		"HAVE_LIBCURL=0" \
-		`$(CURL_CONFIG) --cflags` `$(CURL_CONFIG) --libs`)
+		`$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags --libs libcurl`)
 	$(CURL_CONFIG) --ssl-backends | grep OpenSSL >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "Error: libcurl is not built with the OpenSSL backend"; exit 1; }
 	touch check-dep-libekmfweb
 
@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ ekmfweb.o: check-dep-libekmfweb ekmfweb.c utilities.h cca.h $(rootdir)include/ek
 utilities.o: check-dep-libekmfweb utilities.c utilities.h $(rootdir)include/ekmfweb/ekmfweb.h
 cca.o: check-dep-libekmfweb cca.c cca.h utilities.h $(rootdir)include/ekmfweb/ekmfweb.h
 
-libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION): ALL_CFLAGS += -fPIC `$(CURL_CONFIG) --cflags`
-libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION): LDLIBS = -ljson-c -lcrypto -lssl `$(CURL_CONFIG) --libs` -ldl
+libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION): ALL_CFLAGS += -fPIC `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags json-c libcurl libcrypto libssl`
+libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION): LDLIBS = `$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs json-c libcurl libcrypto libssl` -ldl
 libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION): ALL_LDFLAGS += -shared -Wl,--version-script=libekmfweb.map \
 	-Wl,-z,defs,-Bsymbolic -Wl,-soname,libekmfweb.so.$(VERM)
 libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION): ekmfweb.o utilities.o cca.o $(libs)
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ install-libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION): libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION)
 	$(INSTALL) -g $(GROUP) -o $(OWNER) -m 755 -T libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION) $(DESTDIR)$(SOINSTALLDIR)/libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION)
 	ln -srf $(DESTDIR)$(SOINSTALLDIR)/libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION) $(DESTDIR)$(SOINSTALLDIR)/libekmfweb.so.$(VERM)
 	ln -srf $(DESTDIR)$(SOINSTALLDIR)/libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION) $(DESTDIR)$(SOINSTALLDIR)/libekmfweb.so
-	$(INSTALL) -d -m 770 $(DESTDIR)$(USRINCLUDEDIR)/ekmfweb
+	$(INSTALL) -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(USRINCLUDEDIR)/ekmfweb
 	$(INSTALL) -g $(GROUP) -o $(OWNER) -m 644 $(rootdir)include/ekmfweb/ekmfweb.h $(DESTDIR)$(USRINCLUDEDIR)/ekmfweb
 
 install: all $(INSTALL_TARGETS)

libkmipclient/Makefile

@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ detect-openssl-version.dep:
 	mv $(TMPFILE) $@
 
 CURL_CONFIG ?= curl-config
-XML2_CONFIG ?= xml2-config
 
 check-dep-libkmipclient: detect-openssl-version.dep
 	$(call check_dep, \
@@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ check-dep-libkmipclient: detect-openssl-version.dep
 		"detect-openssl-version.dep", \
 		"openssl-devel version >= 1.1.1", \
 		"HAVE_OPENSSL=0", \
-		-I. -lcrypto -DOPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED)
+		-I. `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags --libs libcrypto` -DOPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED)
 	$(call check_dep, \
 		"libkmipclient", \
 		"json-c/json.h", \
@@ -70,13 +69,13 @@ check-dep-libkmipclient: detect-openssl-version.dep
 		"libxml/tree.h", \
 		"libxml2-devel", \
 		"HAVE_LIBXML2=0", \
-		`$(XML2_CONFIG) --cflags` `$(XML2_CONFIG) --libs`)
+		`$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags --libs libxml-2.0`)
 	$(call check_dep, \
 		"libkmipclient", \
 		"curl/curl.h", \
 		"libcurl-devel", \
 		"HAVE_LIBCURL=0" \
-		`$(CURL_CONFIG) --cflags` `$(CURL_CONFIG) --libs`)
+		`$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags --libs libcurl`)
 	$(CURL_CONFIG) --ssl-backends | grep OpenSSL >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "Error: libcurl is not built with the OpenSSL backend"; exit 1; }
 	touch check-dep-libkmipclient
 
@@ -107,8 +106,8 @@ tls.o: check-dep-libkmipclient tls.c kmip.h utils.h $(rootdir)include/kmipclient
 names.o: check-dep-libkmipclient names.c names.h utils.h $(rootdir)include/kmipclient/kmipclient.h
 utils.o: check-dep-libkmipclient utils.c names.h utils.h $(rootdir)include/kmipclient/kmipclient.h
 
-libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION): ALL_CFLAGS += -fPIC `$(XML2_CONFIG) --cflags` `$(CURL_CONFIG) --cflags`
-libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION): LDLIBS = -ljson-c -lcrypto -lssl `$(XML2_CONFIG) --libs` `$(CURL_CONFIG) --libs`
+libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION): ALL_CFLAGS += -fPIC `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags json-c libcrypto libssl libxml-2.0 libcurl`
+libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION): LDLIBS = `$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs json-c libcrypto libssl libxml-2.0 libcurl`
 libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION): ALL_LDFLAGS += -shared -Wl,--version-script=libkmipclient.map \
 	-Wl,-z,defs,-Bsymbolic -Wl,-soname,libkmipclient.so.$(VERM)
 libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION): kmip.o request.o response.o attribute.o key.o ttlv.o json.o \
@@ -121,7 +120,7 @@ install-libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION): libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION)
 	$(INSTALL) -g $(GROUP) -o $(OWNER) -m 755 -T libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION) $(DESTDIR)$(SOINSTALLDIR)/libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION)
 	ln -srf $(DESTDIR)$(SOINSTALLDIR)/libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION) $(DESTDIR)$(SOINSTALLDIR)/libkmipclient.so.$(VERM)
 	ln -srf $(DESTDIR)$(SOINSTALLDIR)/libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION) $(DESTDIR)$(SOINSTALLDIR)/libkmipclient.so
-	$(INSTALL) -d -m 770 $(DESTDIR)$(USRINCLUDEDIR)/kmipclient
+	$(INSTALL) -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(USRINCLUDEDIR)/kmipclient
 	$(INSTALL) -g $(GROUP) -o $(OWNER) -m 644 $(rootdir)include/kmipclient/kmipclient.h $(DESTDIR)$(USRINCLUDEDIR)/kmipclient
 
 install: all $(INSTALL_TARGETS)

libkmipclient/kmip.h

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
 
 #include <json-c/json.h>
+#include <libxml/parser.h>
 #include <libxml/tree.h>
 #include <curl/curl.h>
 

libpv/Makefile

@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@ WARNINGS := -Wall -Wextra -Wshadow \
 	    -Wno-unused-function -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-unused-variable \
 	    $(NULL)
 
-ALL_CFLAGS += -std=gnu11 \
-	      -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10101000L \
+ALL_CFLAGS += -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10101000L \
 	      $(GLIB2_CFLAGS) \
 	      $(LIBCRYPTO_CFLAGS) \
 	      $(LIBCURL_CFLAGS) \

libutil/util_file.c

@@ -311,13 +311,13 @@ int util_file_read_i(int *val, int base, const char *fmt, ...)
 		return -1;
 	switch (base) {
 	case 8:
-		count = sscanf(buf, "%do", val);
+		count = sscanf(buf, "%o", val);
 		break;
 	case 10:
-		count = sscanf(buf, "%dd", val);
+		count = sscanf(buf, "%d", val);
 		break;
 	case 16:
-		count = sscanf(buf, "%dx", val);
+		count = sscanf(buf, "%x", val);
 		break;
 	default:
 		util_panic("Invalid base: %d\n", base);
@@ -425,13 +425,13 @@ int util_file_read_ui(unsigned int *val, int base, const char *fmt, ...)
 		return -1;
 	switch (base) {
 	case 8:
-		count = sscanf(buf, "%uo", val);
+		count = sscanf(buf, "%o", val);
 		break;
 	case 10:
-		count = sscanf(buf, "%uu", val);
+		count = sscanf(buf, "%u", val);
 		break;
 	case 16:
-		count = sscanf(buf, "%ux", val);
+		count = sscanf(buf, "%x", val);
 		break;
 	default:
 		util_panic("Invalid base: %d\n", base);

libutil/util_lockfile.c

@@ -299,3 +299,35 @@ int util_lockfile_parent_release(char *lockfile)
 {
 	return do_lockfile_release(lockfile, getppid());
 }
+
+/**
+ * Return the pid that owns the specified lockfile.
+ *
+ * @param[in]      lockfile   Path to the lock file
+ * @param[in,out]  pid        Buffer to place owning pid
+ *
+ * @retval         0          pid provided in buffer
+ * @retval         !=0        Error, no pid provided
+ */
+int util_lockfile_peek_owner(char *lockfile, int *pid)
+{
+	char buf[BUFSIZE];
+	int fd, len;
+
+	if (!lockfile || !pid)
+		return UTIL_LOCKFILE_ERR;
+
+	/* Open lockfile, read the owning pid if it exists */
+	fd = open(lockfile, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return UTIL_LOCKFILE_ERR;
+
+	len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+	close(fd);
+	if (len <= 0)
+		return UTIL_LOCKFILE_ERR;
+	buf[len] = 0;
+	*pid = atoi(buf);
+
+	return 0;
+}

osasnmpd/ibmOSAMib.h

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 
 /* we may use header_generic and header_simple_table from the util_funcs module */
 
-config_require(util_funcs)
+config_require(util_funcs);
 
 
 /* function prototypes */

pvattest/Makefile

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ RECURSIVE_TARGETS := all-recursive clean-recursive install-recursive
 
 all: all-recursive
 
-install: all install-recursive
+install: install-recursive
 
 clean: clean-recursive
 

pvattest/man/pvattest-verify.1

@@ -24,12 +24,27 @@ Show help options
 \fBFILE\fP specifies the attestation result as input.
 .TP
 .B
+\fB-o\fP, \fB--ouput\fP=\fBFILE\fP
+\fBFILE\fP specifies the output for the verification result.
+.TP
+.B
 \fB--hdr\fP=\fBFILE\fP
 Specify the header of the guest image. Exactly one is required.
 .TP
 .B
 \fB-a\fP, \fB--arpk\fP=\fBFILE\fP
 Use \fBFILE\fP to specify the GCM-AES256 key to decrypt the attestation request. Delete this key after verification.
+.TP
+.B
+\fB--format\fP=\fByaml\fP
+Define the output format.
+Default value: 'yaml'
+
+Possible values:
+.RS 4
+- \fByaml\fP: Use YAML format
+.RE
+
 .TP
 .B
 \fB-V\fP, \fB--verbose\fP

pvattest/src/Makefile

@@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ LIBCRYPTO_LIBS := $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --silence-errors --libs libcrypto)
 LIBCURL_CFLAGS := $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --silence-errors --cflags libcurl)
 LIBCURL_LIBS := $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --silence-errors --libs libcurl)
 
-ALL_CFLAGS += -std=gnu11 \
-	      -DPKGDATADIR=$(PKGDATADIR) \
+ALL_CFLAGS += -DPKGDATADIR=$(PKGDATADIR) \
 	      -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10101000L \
 	      $(GLIB2_CFLAGS) \
 	      $(LIBCRYPTO_CFLAGS) \

pvattest/src/argparse.c

@@ -49,8 +49,10 @@ static pvattest_config_t pvattest_config = {
 	},
 	.verify = {
 		.input_path = NULL,
+		.output_path = NULL,
 		.hdr_path = NULL,
 		.arp_key_in_path = NULL,
+		.output_fmt = VERIFY_FMT_YAML,
 	},
 };
 typedef gboolean (*verify_options_fn_t)(GError **);
@@ -329,6 +331,15 @@ static gboolean hex_str_toull(const char *nptr, uint64_t *dst, GError **error)
 		.description = "Use FILE to specify the user data.\n", .arg_description = "FILE", \
 	}
 
+#define _entry__verify_format(__indent)                                                            \
+	{                                                                                          \
+		.long_name = "format", .short_name = 0, .flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NONE,               \
+		.arg = G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK, .arg_data = &set_verify_output_format,               \
+		.description = "Define the output format.\n" __indent                              \
+			       "Defaults to 'yaml'. (possible values: 'yaml')\n",                  \
+		.arg_description = "FORMAT",                                                       \
+	}
+
 static gboolean increase_log_lvl(G_GNUC_UNUSED const char *option_name,
 				 G_GNUC_UNUSED const char *value, G_GNUC_UNUSED void *data,
 				 G_GNUC_UNUSED GError **error)
@@ -337,6 +348,20 @@ static gboolean increase_log_lvl(G_GNUC_UNUSED const char *option_name,
 	return TRUE;
 }
 
+static gboolean set_verify_output_format(const char *option_name, const char *value,
+					 G_GNUC_UNUSED void *data, GError **error)
+{
+	if (!g_strcmp0(value, "yaml")) {
+		pvattest_config.verify.output_fmt = VERIFY_FMT_YAML;
+	} else {
+		g_set_error(error, G_OPTION_ERROR, G_OPTION_ERROR_FAILED,
+			    _("Found value '%s' for option '%s', but only 'yaml' is allowed."),
+			    value, option_name);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	return TRUE;
+}
+
 static gboolean create_set_paf(G_GNUC_UNUSED const char *option_name, const char *value,
 			       G_GNUC_UNUSED void *data, GError **error)
 {
@@ -445,13 +470,16 @@ static gboolean verify_perform(GError **error)
 }
 
 /************************* VERIFY OPTIONS ************************************/
-#define verify_indent "                       "
+#define verify_indent "                        "
 
 static GOptionEntry verify_options[] = {
 	_entry_input(&pvattest_config.verify.input_path, "attestation result", verify_indent),
+	_entry_output(&pvattest_config.verify.output_path,
+		      "verification result.\n" verify_indent "(optional)", verify_indent),
 	_entry_guest_hdr(&pvattest_config.verify.hdr_path, verify_indent),
 	_entry_att_prot_key_load(&pvattest_config.verify.arp_key_in_path, verify_indent),
 	_entry_verbose(verify_indent),
+	_entry__verify_format(verify_indent),
 	{ NULL },
 };
 
@@ -631,6 +659,7 @@ static void pvattest_parse_clear_verify_config(pvattest_verify_config_t *config)
 	if (!config)
 		return;
 	g_free(config->input_path);
+	g_free(config->output_path);
 	g_free(config->hdr_path);
 	g_free(config->arp_key_in_path);
 }

pvattest/src/argparse.h

@@ -58,8 +58,15 @@ typedef struct {
 	char *user_data_path; /* default NULL */
 } pvattest_perform_config_t;
 
+enum verify_output_format {
+	VERIFY_FMT_HUMAN,
+	VERIFY_FMT_YAML,
+};
+
 typedef struct {
 	char *input_path;
+	char *output_path;
+	enum verify_output_format output_fmt;
 	char *hdr_path;
 	char *arp_key_in_path;
 } pvattest_verify_config_t;

pvattest/src/exchange_format.c

@@ -455,8 +455,7 @@ static void print_entry(const char *name, GBytes *data, const gboolean print_dat
 	fprintf(stream, _("%s (%#lx bytes)"), name, g_bytes_get_size(data));
 	if (print_data) {
 		fprintf(stream, ":\n");
-		pvattest_hexdump(g_bytes_get_data(data, NULL), g_bytes_get_size(data), 16, "      ",
-				 stream);
+		pvattest_hexdump(stream, data, 16, "      ", TRUE);
 	}
 	fprintf(stream, "\n");
 }

pvattest/src/log.c

@@ -159,24 +159,47 @@ void pvattest_log_bytes(const void *data, size_t size, size_t width, const char
 	g_log(PVATTEST_BYTES_LOG_DOMAIN, log_lvl, "\n");
 }
 
-void pvattest_hexdump(const void *data, size_t size, size_t width, const char *prefix, FILE *stream)
+int pvattest_hexdump(FILE *stream, GBytes *bytes, const size_t width, const char *prefix,
+		     const gboolean beautify)
 {
-	const uint8_t *data_b = data;
+	const uint8_t *data;
+	size_t size;
 
-	pv_wrapped_g_assert(data);
+	pv_wrapped_g_assert(bytes);
 	pv_wrapped_g_assert(stream);
 
-	fprintf(stream, "%s0x0000  ", prefix);
+	data = g_bytes_get_data(bytes, &size);
+	pv_wrapped_g_assert(data);
+
+	if (beautify) {
+		if (fprintf(stream, "%s0x0000  ", prefix) < 0)
+			return -1;
+	} else {
+		if (fprintf(stream, "%s", prefix) < 0)
+			return -1;
+	}
 	for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-		fprintf(stream, "%02x", data_b[i]);
-		if (i % 2 == 1)
-			fprintf(stream, " ");
+		if (fprintf(stream, "%02x", data[i]) < 0)
+			return -1;
+		if (i % 2 == 1 && beautify) {
+			if (fprintf(stream, " ") < 0)
+				return -1;
+		}
 		if (i == size - 1)
 			break;
-		if (i % width == width - 1)
-			fprintf(stream, "\n%s0x%04lx  ", prefix, i + 1);
+		if (width == 0)
+			continue;
+		if (i % width == width - 1) {
+			if (beautify) {
+				if (fprintf(stream, "\n%s0x%04lx  ", prefix, i + 1) < 0)
+					return -1;
+			} else {
+				if (fprintf(stream, "\n%s", prefix) < 0)
+					return -1;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-	fprintf(stream, "\n");
+	return 0;
 }
 
 void pvattest_log_GError(const char *info, GError *error)

pvattest/src/log.h

@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ void pvattest_log_plain_logger(const char *log_domain, GLogLevelFlags level, con
 	}
 void pvattest_log_bytes(const void *data, size_t size, size_t width, const char *prefix,
 			gboolean beautify, GLogLevelFlags log_lvl) PV_NONNULL(1);
-void pvattest_hexdump(const void *data, size_t size, size_t width, const char *prefix, FILE *stream)
-	PV_NONNULL(1, 5);
+int pvattest_hexdump(FILE *stream, GBytes *bytes, const size_t width, const char *prefix,
+		     const gboolean beautify) PV_NONNULL(1, 2);
 void pvattest_log_GError(const char *info, GError *error) PV_NONNULL(1);
 
 #endif /* PVATTEST_LOG_H */

pvattest/src/pvattest.c

@@ -257,14 +257,63 @@ err_exit:
 }
 #endif /* PVATTEST_COMPILE_PERFORM */
 
+static int fprint_verify_result(FILE *stream, const enum verify_output_format fmt,
+				GBytes *config_uid, GBytes *additional_data)
+{
+	switch (fmt) {
+	case VERIFY_FMT_HUMAN:
+		if (fprintf(stream, _("Attestation measurement verified\n")) < 0)
+			return -1;
+		if (fprintf(stream, _("Config UID:\n")) < 0)
+			return -1;
+		if (pvattest_hexdump(stream, config_uid, 0x10L, "0x", FALSE) < 0)
+			return -1;
+		if (fprintf(stream, _("\n")) < 0)
+			return -1;
+
+		if (additional_data) {
+			if (fprintf(stream, _("Additional Data:\n")) < 0)
+				return -1;
+			if (pvattest_hexdump(stream, additional_data, 0x60L, "0x", FALSE) < 0)
+				return -1;
+			if (fprintf(stream, _("\n")) < 0)
+				return -1;
+		}
+		break;
+	case VERIFY_FMT_YAML:
+		if (fprintf(stream, "cuid: ") < 0)
+			return -1;
+		if (pvattest_hexdump(stream, config_uid, 0L, "'0x", FALSE) < 0)
+			return -1;
+		if (fprintf(stream, _("'\n")) < 0)
+			return -1;
+
+		if (additional_data) {
+			if (fprintf(stream, "add: ") < 0)
+				return -1;
+
+			if (pvattest_hexdump(stream, additional_data, 0x0L, "'0x", FALSE) < 0)
+				return -1;
+			if (fprintf(stream, _("'\n")) < 0)
+				return -1;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		g_assert_not_reached();
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #define __PVATTEST_VERIFY_ERROR_MSG _("Attestation measurement verification failed")
-static int do_verify(pvattest_verify_config_t *verify_config)
+static int do_verify(const pvattest_verify_config_t *verify_config, const int appl_log_lvl)
 {
 	g_autoptr(GBytes) user_data = NULL, uv_measurement = NULL, additional_data = NULL,
 			  image_hdr = NULL, calc_measurement = NULL, config_uid = NULL,
 			  meas_key = NULL, arp_key = NULL, nonce = NULL, serialized_arcb = NULL;
 	g_autofree att_meas_ctx_t *measurement_hdr = NULL;
 	g_autoptr(exchange_format_ctx_t) input_ctx = NULL;
+	const char *err_prefix = __PVATTEST_VERIFY_ERROR_MSG;
 	g_autoptr(GError) error = NULL;
 	gboolean rc;
 
@@ -322,21 +371,37 @@ static int do_verify(pvattest_verify_config_t *verify_config)
 		return PVATTEST_EXIT_MEASURE_NOT_VERIFIED;
 	}
 
-	pvattest_log_info(_("Attestation measurement verified"));
-	pvattest_log_info(_("Config UID:"));
-	pvattest_log_bytes(g_bytes_get_data(config_uid, NULL), g_bytes_get_size(config_uid), 16L,
-			   "", FALSE, PVATTEST_LOG_LVL_INFO);
+	/* Write human-readable output to stdout */
+	if (appl_log_lvl >= PVATTEST_LOG_LVL_INFO) {
+		if (fprint_verify_result(stdout, VERIFY_FMT_HUMAN, config_uid, additional_data) <
+		    0) {
+			g_set_error(&error, PV_GLIB_HELPER_ERROR, PV_GLIB_HELPER_FILE_ERROR,
+				    "stdout: %s", g_strerror(errno));
+			err_prefix = "Failed to write output";
+			goto err_exit;
+		}
+	}
 
-	if (additional_data) {
-		pvattest_log_info(_("\nAdditional Data:"));
-		pvattest_log_bytes(g_bytes_get_data(additional_data, NULL),
-				   g_bytes_get_size(additional_data), 16L, "", FALSE,
-				   PVATTEST_LOG_LVL_INFO);
+	/* Write to file */
+	if (verify_config->output_path) {
+		g_autoptr(FILE) output = pv_file_open(verify_config->output_path, "wx", &error);
+
+		if (!output) {
+			err_prefix = "Failed to write output";
+			goto err_exit;
+		}
+		if (fprint_verify_result(output, verify_config->output_fmt, config_uid,
+					 additional_data) < 0) {
+			g_set_error(&error, PV_GLIB_HELPER_ERROR, PV_GLIB_HELPER_FILE_ERROR,
+				    "'%s': %s", verify_config->output_path, g_strerror(errno));
+			err_prefix = "Failed to write output";
+			goto err_exit;
+		}
 	}
 	return EXIT_SUCCESS;
 
 err_exit:
-	pvattest_log_GError(__PVATTEST_VERIFY_ERROR_MSG, error);
+	pvattest_log_GError(err_prefix, error);
 	return EXIT_FAILURE;
 }
 
@@ -389,7 +454,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		break;
 #endif /* PVATTEST_COMPILE_PERFORM */
 	case PVATTEST_SUBC_VERIFY:
-		rc = do_verify(&config->verify);
+		rc = do_verify(&config->verify, appl_log_lvl);
 		break;
 	default:
 		g_return_val_if_reached(EXIT_FAILURE);

rust/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# Generated by Cargo
+# will have compiled files and executables
+debug/
+target/
+
+# These are backup files generated by rustfmt
+*.rs.bk
+
+# Generated during make build can be removed at any point
+.check-dep-pvtools
+.check-cargo

rust/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+[workspace]
+members = [
+	"pv",
+	"pv_core",
+	"pvapconfig",
+	"pvsecret",
+	"utils",
+]
+resolver = "2"
+
+[workspace.package]
+edition = "2021"
+license = "MIT"
+
+[profile.release]
+lto = true

rust/Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+include ../common.mak
+HAVE_CARGO ?= 1
+HAVE_OPENSSL ?= 1
+HAVE_LIBCURL ?= 1
+
+INSTALL_TARGETS := skip-build
+BUILD_TARGETS := skip-build
+PV_BUILD_TARGETS := skip-pv-build
+CARGO_TARGETS :=
+PV_TARGETS :=
+CARGO_TEST_TARGETS :=
+
+ifneq (${HAVE_CARGO},0)
+	CARGO_TARGETS :=
+
+	BUILD_TARGETS = $(CARGO_TARGETS)
+	INSTALL_TARGETS := install-rust-tools install-man
+	CARGO_TEST_TARGETS = $(addsuffix .test, $(CARGO_TARGETS))
+
+ifneq (${HAVE_OPENSSL},0)
+ifneq (${HAVE_LIBCURL},0)
+	PV_TARGETS := pvsecret pvapconfig
+
+	PV_BUILD_TARGETS := $(PV_TARGETS)
+	CARGO_TEST_TARGETS += $(addsuffix .test,pv $(PV_TARGETS))
+endif #LIBCURL
+endif #OPENSSL
+	TEST_TARGETS := $(addsuffix _build,$(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS))
+endif #CARGO
+
+BUILD_TARGETS += $(PV_BUILD_TARGETS)
+
+# build release targets by default
+ifeq ("${D}","0")
+	ALL_CARGOFLAGS += --release
+endif
+
+# the cc crate uses these variables to compile c code. It does not open a shell
+# to call the compiler, so no echo etc. allowed here, just a path to a program
+$(BUILD_TARGETS) $(TEST_TARGETS) rust-test: CC = $(CC_SILENT)
+$(BUILD_TARGETS) $(TEST_TARGETS) rust-test: AR = $(AR_SILENT)
+
+$(PV_TARGETS): .check-dep-pvtools
+$(PV_TARGETS) $(CARGO_TARGETS): .check-cargo .no-cross-compile
+	$(CARGO_BUILD) --bin $@ $(ALL_CARGOFLAGS)
+.PHONY: $(PV_TARGETS) $(CARGO_TARGETS)
+
+$(TEST_TARGETS): ALL_CARGOFLAGS += --no-run
+$(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS) $(TEST_TARGETS): .check-cargo .no-cross-compile
+	$(CARGO_TEST) --package $(basename $@) --all-features $(ALL_CARGOFLAGS)
+.PHONY: $(TEST_TARGETS) $(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS)
+
+skip-build:
+	echo "  SKIP    rust-tools due to unresolved dependencies"
+
+skip-pv-build:
+	echo "  SKIP    rust-pv-tools due to unresolved dependencies"
+
+all: $(BUILD_TARGETS)
+install: $(INSTALL_TARGETS)
+
+print-rust-targets:
+	echo $(BUILD_TARGETS)
+
+clean:
+	$(CARGO_CLEAN) ${ALL_CARGOFLAGS}
+	$(RM) -- .check-dep-pvtools .detect-openssl.dep.c .check-cargo
+
+rust-test: $(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS)
+
+install-rust-tools: $(BUILD_TARGETS)
+	$(INSTALL) -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(USRBINDIR)
+	$(foreach target,$(CARGO_TARGETS),\
+		$(INSTALL) target/release/$(target) $(DESTDIR)$(USRBINDIR);)
+	$(foreach target,$(PV_TARGETS),\
+		$(INSTALL) target/release/$(target) $(DESTDIR)$(USRBINDIR);)
+
+install-man:
+	$(foreach target,$(CARGO_TARGETS),\
+		$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(target)/man/*.1 -t $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/man1;)
+	$(foreach target,$(PV_TARGETS),\
+		$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(target)/man/*.1 -t $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/man1;)
+
+.PHONY: all install clean skip-build install-rust-tools print-rust-targets install-man rust-test
+
+.check-cargo:
+ifeq ($(shell command -v $(CARGO)),)
+	$(call check_dep, \
+		"rust/cargo", \
+		"invalid-incl", \
+		"cargo", \
+		"HAVE_CARGO=0")
+endif
+	touch $@
+
+.no-cross-compile:
+ifneq ($(HOST_ARCH), $(BUILD_ARCH))
+	$(error Cross compiling is not supported for rust code. Specify HAVE_CARGO=0 to disable rust compilation)
+endif
+.PHONY: .no-cross-compile
+
+.detect-openssl.dep.c:
+	echo "#include <openssl/evp.h>" > $@
+	echo "#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10101000L" >> $@
+	echo "  #error openssl version 1.1.1 is required" >> $@
+	echo "#endif" >> $@
+	echo "static void __attribute__((unused)) test(void) {" >> $@
+	echo "    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();" >> $@
+	echo "    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);" >> $@
+	echo "}" >> $@
+
+.check-dep-pvtools: .detect-openssl.dep.c
+	$(call check_dep, \
+		"Rust-pv", \
+		$^, \
+		"openssl-devel / libssl-dev version >= 1.1.1", \
+		"HAVE_OPENSSL=0", \
+		"-I.")
+	$(call check_dep, \
+		"Rust-pv", \
+		"curl/curl.h", \
+		"libcurl-devel", \
+		"HAVE_LIBCURL=0")
+	touch $@

rust/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+# s390-tools tools written in rust
+
+## Setting up rust development and build environment
+Please refer to the official documentation to set up a working rust environment:
+https://www.rust-lang.org/learn/get-started
+
+## Building rust code
+### s390-tools build system
+If `cargo` is installed  a simple `make` should do the job. Note that,
+compiling rust programs take significantly longer than C code. To closely
+monitor the progress use `make V=1` By default release builds are made.
+
+With `make CARGOFLAGS=<flags>` one can pass additional flags to cargo.
+With `make HAVE_CARGO=0` one can turn of any compilation that requires cargo.
+With `make CARGO=<...>` one can set the cargo binary
+
+### cargo
+If you need to run cargo directly, `cd` to each project you want to build and
+issue your cargo commands. Do **NOT** forget to specify `--release` if you are
+building tools for a release. The s390-tools expect the environment variable
+`S390_TOOLS_RELEASE` to be present at build time. This is the version string the
+rust tools provide.
+
+Tip: You can use `make version` to get the version string.
+
+## Internal Libraries
+* __utils__ _Library for rust tools that bundles common stuff for the 390-tools_
+	* provides a macro to get the `S390_TOOLS_RELEASE` string
+	* provides macros for compile time assertions
+
+* __pv_core__ _Library for pv tools, providing uvdevice access and utilities to send, receive and interpret various UV-calls._
+
+* __pv__ _Library for pv tools, providing uvdevice access, encryption utilities, and utilities for generating UV-request_
+	* requires openssl and libcurl
+	* reexports ann symbols from __pv_core__
+	* if no encryption utilities required, use __pv_core__
+
+## Tools
+* __pvsecret__ _Manage secrets for IBM Secure Execution guests_
+
+## Writing new tools
+We encourage to use Rust for new tools. However, for some use cases it makes
+sense to use C and C is still allowed to be used for a new tool/library.
+Exiting tools may be rewritten in Rust.
+
+### What (third-party) crates can be used for s390-tools?
+A huge list of libraries are made available through Rusts' ecosystem and is one
+of many upsides. However, just like with Coding Style Guidelines, it is
+important to limit the usage of those libraries so that within a project,
+everyone is on the same page and that code written in Rust uses similar
+approaches. It makes it easier for code review and maintainability in general.
+
+The following list of crates should cover a wide variety of use cases. This list
+is a start, but can change over time.
+
+* [anyhow](https://crates.io/crates/anyhow)
+    * Flexible concrete Error type built on std::error::Error
+* [byteorder](https://crates.io/crates/byteorder)
+    * Library for reading/writing numbers in big-endian and little-endian.
+* [cfg-if](https://crates.io/crates/cfg-if)
+    * A macro to ergonomically define an item depending on a large number of
+      #[cfg] parameters. Structured like an if-else chain, the first matching
+      branch is the item that gets emitted.
+* [clap](https://crates.io/crates/clap)
+    * A simple to use, efficient, and full-featured Command Line Argument Parser
+* [curl](https://crates.io/crates/curl)
+    * Rust bindings to libcurl for making HTTP requests
+* [libc](https://crates.io/crates/libc)
+    * Raw FFI bindings to platform libraries like libc.
+* [log](https://crates.io/crates/log)
+    * A lightweight logging facade for Rust
+* [openssl](https://crates.io/crates/openssl)
+    * OpenSSL bindings
+* [serde](https://crates.io/crates/serde)
+    * A generic serialization/deserialization framework
+* [serde_yaml](https://crates.io/crates/serde_yaml)
+    * YAML data format for Serde
+* [thiserror](https://crates.io/crates/thiserror)
+    * derive(Error)
+* [zerocopy](https://crates.io/crates/zerocopy)
+    * Utilities for zero-copy parsing and serialization
+
+Dependencies used by the crates listed above can be used, too.
+
+### Add new tool
+To add a new tool issue `cargo new $TOOLNAME` in the `rust` directory.
+
+Add the tool to the _s390-tools_ build system:
+```Makefile
+CARGO_TARGETS := $TOOLNAME
+```
+Add the library to the _s390-tools_ test list:
+```Makefile
+CARGO_TEST_TARGETS := $LIBNAME
+```
+
+Add the tool/library to the cargo workspace:
+```toml
+[workspace]
+members = [
+	"pv",
+	"pvsecret",
+	"$TOOLNAME",
+	"$LIBNAME"
+	"utils",
+]
+```
+
+### Versions
+Do not communicate the version defined in the `toml` file by default. Use
+`release_string` from the `rust/utils` crate instead:
+
+```rust
+use utils::release_string;
+
+fn print_version() {
+    println!(
+        "{} version {}\nCopyright IBM Corp. 2023",
+        env!("CARGO_PKG_NAME"), // collapses into the crates name
+        release_string!() // this (very likely) collapses into a compile time constant
+    );
+}
+```
+
+### Unsafe rust
+rust allows you to write unsafe rust. Try to avoid it, it can make rust
+_unsafe_.  If you need to, e.g. interacting with other languages like C, keep
+the `unsafe` block as small as possible and add a reasoning using `// SAFETY:
+`why this code is safe. Example:
+
+```rust
+// Get the raw pointer and do an ioctl.
+//
+// SAFETY: the passed pointer points to a valid memory region that
+// contains the expected C-struct. The struct outlives this function.
+unsafe {
+    let ptr: *mut ffi::uvio_ioctl_cb = cb as *mut _;
+    rc = ioctl(raw_fd, cmd, ptr);
+}
+```
+
+### Coding style
+Make `cargo fmt` and `cargo clippy` happy!
+
+### Testing
+Prefer writing tests using rustdoc. Use explicit rust tests for more edge case tests.

rust/pv/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+[package]
+name = "pv"
+version = "1.0.0"
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+byteorder = "1.3"
+clap = { version ="4", features = ["derive", "wrap_help"] }
+curl = "0.4.7"
+log = { version = "0.4.6", features = ["std", "release_max_level_debug"] }
+openssl = "0.10.49"
+serde = { version = "1.0.139", features = ["derive"]  }
+thiserror = "1.0.33"
+utils = {path = "../utils"}
+zerocopy = { version="0.7", features = ["derive"] }
+
+openssl_extensions = { path = "openssl_extensions" }
+pv_core = { path = "../pv_core" }
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+mockito = {version = "1", default-features = false }
+once_cell = "1.19"
+serde_test = "1"

rust/pv/openssl_extensions/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+[package]
+name = "openssl_extensions"
+version = "0.1.0"
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+foreign-types = "0.3.1"
+libc = {version = "0.2.49", features = [ "extra_traits"] }
+log = { version = "0.4.6", features = ["std", "release_max_level_debug"] }
+openssl = "0.10.49"
+openssl-sys = "0.9.85"

rust/pv/openssl_extensions/build.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+#![allow(
+    clippy::inconsistent_digit_grouping,
+    clippy::uninlined_format_args,
+    clippy::unusual_byte_groupings
+)]
+
+use std::env;
+
+fn main() {
+    if let Ok(vars) = env::var("DEP_OPENSSL_CONF") {
+        for var in vars.split(',') {
+            println!("cargo:rustc-cfg=osslconf=\"{}\"", var);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if let Ok(version) = env::var("DEP_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER") {
+        let version = u64::from_str_radix(&version, 16).unwrap();
+
+        if version >= 0x1_00_01_00_0 {
+            println!("cargo:rustc-cfg=ossl101");
+        }
+        if version >= 0x1_00_02_00_0 {
+            println!("cargo:rustc-cfg=ossl102");
+        }
+        if version >= 0x1_01_00_00_0 {
+            println!("cargo:rustc-cfg=ossl110");
+        }
+        if version >= 0x1_01_00_07_0 {
+            println!("cargo:rustc-cfg=ossl110g");
+        }
+        if version >= 0x1_01_00_08_0 {
+            println!("cargo:rustc-cfg=ossl110h");
+        }
+        if version >= 0x1_01_01_00_0 {
+            println!("cargo:rustc-cfg=ossl111");
+        }
+        if version >= 0x3_00_00_00_0 {
+            println!("cargo:rustc-cfg=ossl300");
+        }
+    }
+}

rust/pv/openssl_extensions/src/akid.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+use std::fmt;
+
+use foreign_types::{foreign_type, ForeignType, ForeignTypeRef};
+use openssl::x509::{X509CrlRef, X509Ref};
+use std::ffi::c_int;
+
+mod ffi {
+    extern "C" {
+        pub fn X509_check_akid(
+            issuer: *const openssl_sys::X509,
+            akid: *const openssl_sys::AUTHORITY_KEYID,
+        ) -> super::c_int;
+    }
+}
+
+foreign_type! {
+    type CType = openssl_sys::AUTHORITY_KEYID;
+    fn drop = openssl_sys::AUTHORITY_KEYID_free;
+
+    /// An `Authority Key Identifier`.
+    pub struct Akid;
+    /// Reference to `Akid`
+    pub struct AkidRef;
+}
+
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct AkidCheckResult(c_int);
+
+impl fmt::Debug for AkidCheckResult {
+    fn fmt(&self, fmt: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        fmt.debug_struct("AkidCheckResult")
+            .field("code", &self.0)
+            .finish()
+    }
+}
+
+impl AkidCheckResult {
+    /// Creates an `AkidCheckResult` from a raw error number.
+    unsafe fn from_raw(err: c_int) -> AkidCheckResult {
+        AkidCheckResult(err)
+    }
+
+    pub const OK: AkidCheckResult = AkidCheckResult(openssl_sys::X509_V_OK);
+    pub const ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH: AkidCheckResult =
+        AkidCheckResult(openssl_sys::X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH);
+    pub const ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH: AkidCheckResult =
+        AkidCheckResult(openssl_sys::X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH);
+}
+
+impl AkidRef {
+    ///Check if the `Akid` matches the issuer
+    ///
+    pub fn check(&self, issuer: &X509Ref) -> AkidCheckResult {
+        unsafe {
+            let res = ffi::X509_check_akid(issuer.as_ptr(), self.as_ptr());
+            AkidCheckResult::from_raw(res)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub trait AkidExtension {
+    fn akid(&self) -> Option<Akid>;
+}
+
+impl AkidExtension for X509Ref {
+    fn akid(&self) -> Option<Akid> {
+        unsafe {
+            let ptr = openssl_sys::X509_get_ext_d2i(
+                self.as_ptr(),
+                openssl_sys::NID_authority_key_identifier,
+                std::ptr::null_mut(),
+                std::ptr::null_mut(),
+            );
+            if ptr.is_null() {
+                None
+            } else {
+                Some(Akid::from_ptr(ptr as *mut _))
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl AkidExtension for X509CrlRef {
+    fn akid(&self) -> Option<Akid> {
+        unsafe {
+            let ptr = openssl_sys::X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(
+                self.as_ptr(),
+                openssl_sys::NID_authority_key_identifier,
+                std::ptr::null_mut(),
+                std::ptr::null_mut(),
+            );
+            if ptr.is_null() {
+                None
+            } else {
+                Some(Akid::from_ptr(ptr as *mut _))
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+    use crate::test_utils::load_gen_cert;
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn akid() {
+        let cert = load_gen_cert("ibm.crt");
+        let ca = load_gen_cert("root_ca.crt");
+
+        let akid = cert.akid().unwrap();
+        let res = akid.check(&ca);
+        assert_eq!(res, AkidCheckResult::OK);
+    }
+}

rust/pv/openssl_extensions/src/crl.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+pub use crate::stackable_crl::*;
+use foreign_types::{ForeignType, ForeignTypeRef};
+use openssl::{
+    error::ErrorStack,
+    stack::{Stack, StackRef},
+    x509::{
+        store::{X509StoreBuilderRef, X509StoreRef},
+        X509CrlRef, X509NameRef, X509Ref, X509StoreContextRef, X509,
+    },
+};
+
+pub fn opt_to_ptr<T: ForeignTypeRef>(o: Option<&T>) -> *mut T::CType {
+    match o {
+        None => std::ptr::null_mut(),
+        Some(p) => p.as_ptr(),
+    }
+}
+
+mod ffi {
+    extern "C" {
+        #[cfg(ossl110)]
+        pub fn X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(
+            ctx: *mut openssl_sys::X509_STORE_CTX,
+            nm: *mut openssl_sys::X509_NAME,
+        ) -> *mut openssl_sys::stack_st_X509_CRL;
+        pub fn X509_STORE_add_crl(
+            xs: *mut openssl_sys::X509_STORE,
+            x: *mut openssl_sys::X509_CRL,
+        ) -> std::ffi::c_int;
+    }
+}
+
+pub trait X509StoreExtension {
+    fn add_crl(&mut self, crl: &X509CrlRef) -> Result<(), ErrorStack>;
+}
+
+impl X509StoreExtension for X509StoreBuilderRef {
+    fn add_crl(&mut self, crl: &X509CrlRef) -> Result<(), ErrorStack> {
+        unsafe {
+            {
+                let r = ffi::X509_STORE_add_crl(self.as_ptr(), crl.as_ptr());
+                if r <= 0 {
+                    Err(ErrorStack::get())
+                } else {
+                    Ok(())
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub trait X509StoreContextExtension {
+    fn init_opt<F, T>(
+        &mut self,
+        trust: &X509StoreRef,
+        cert: Option<&X509Ref>,
+        cert_chain: Option<&StackRef<X509>>,
+        with_context: F,
+    ) -> Result<T, ErrorStack>
+    where
+        F: FnOnce(&mut X509StoreContextRef) -> std::result::Result<T, ErrorStack>;
+    fn crls(
+        &mut self,
+        subj: &X509NameRef,
+    ) -> std::result::Result<Stack<StackableX509Crl>, ErrorStack>;
+}
+
+impl X509StoreContextExtension for X509StoreContextRef {
+    fn init_opt<F, T>(
+        &mut self,
+        trust: &X509StoreRef,
+        cert: Option<&X509Ref>,
+        cert_chain: Option<&StackRef<X509>>,
+        with_context: F,
+    ) -> Result<T, ErrorStack>
+    where
+        F: FnOnce(&mut X509StoreContextRef) -> std::result::Result<T, ErrorStack>,
+    {
+        struct Cleanup<'a>(&'a mut X509StoreContextRef);
+
+        impl<'a> Drop for Cleanup<'a> {
+            fn drop(&mut self) {
+                unsafe {
+                    openssl_sys::X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(self.0.as_ptr());
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        unsafe {
+            {
+                let r = openssl_sys::X509_STORE_CTX_init(
+                    self.as_ptr(),
+                    trust.as_ptr(),
+                    opt_to_ptr(cert),
+                    opt_to_ptr(cert_chain),
+                );
+                if r <= 0 {
+                    Err(ErrorStack::get())
+                } else {
+                    Ok(r)
+                }
+            }?;
+        }
+        let cleanup = Cleanup(self);
+        with_context(cleanup.0)
+    }
+    /// Get all Certificate Revocation Lists with the subject currently stored
+    #[cfg(ossl110)]
+    fn crls(
+        &mut self,
+        subj: &X509NameRef,
+    ) -> std::result::Result<Stack<StackableX509Crl>, ErrorStack> {
+        unsafe {
+            {
+                let r = ffi::X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(self.as_ptr(), subj.as_ptr());
+                if r.is_null() {
+                    Err(ErrorStack::get())
+                } else {
+                    Ok(Stack::from_ptr(r))
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}

rust/pv/openssl_extensions/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+#![doc(hidden)]
+
+/// Extensions to the rust-openssl crate, that are not upstream yet
+/// Upstreaming mostly work in progress
+pub mod akid;
+pub mod crl;
+mod stackable_crl;
+
+/// Test if two CRLs are equal.
+///
+/// relates to X509_CRL_match
+/// (Upstream is missing that functionality)
+pub fn x509_crl_eq(a: &openssl::x509::X509CrlRef, b: &openssl::x509::X509CrlRef) -> bool {
+    use foreign_types::ForeignTypeRef;
+    let cmp = unsafe { openssl_sys::X509_CRL_match(a.as_ptr(), b.as_ptr()) };
+    cmp == 0
+}
+
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+mod test_utils {
+    include!("../../src/test_utils.rs");
+}

rust/pv/openssl_extensions/src/stackable_crl.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+use std::{marker::PhantomData, ptr};
+
+use foreign_types::{ForeignType, ForeignTypeRef};
+use openssl::{
+    error::ErrorStack,
+    stack::Stackable,
+    x509::{X509Crl, X509CrlRef},
+};
+use openssl_sys::BIO_new_mem_buf;
+use std::ffi::c_int;
+
+pub struct StackableX509Crl(*mut openssl_sys::X509_CRL);
+
+impl ForeignType for StackableX509Crl {
+    type CType = openssl_sys::X509_CRL;
+    type Ref = X509CrlRef;
+    unsafe fn from_ptr(ptr: *mut openssl_sys::X509_CRL) -> StackableX509Crl {
+        StackableX509Crl(ptr)
+    }
+    fn as_ptr(&self) -> *mut openssl_sys::X509_CRL {
+        self.0
+    }
+}
+impl Drop for StackableX509Crl {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        unsafe { (openssl_sys::X509_CRL_free)(self.0) }
+    }
+}
+impl ::std::ops::Deref for StackableX509Crl {
+    type Target = X509CrlRef;
+    fn deref(&self) -> &X509CrlRef {
+        unsafe { ForeignTypeRef::from_ptr(self.0) }
+    }
+}
+impl ::std::ops::DerefMut for StackableX509Crl {
+    fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut X509CrlRef {
+        unsafe { ForeignTypeRef::from_ptr_mut(self.0) }
+    }
+}
+#[allow(clippy::explicit_auto_deref)]
+impl ::std::borrow::Borrow<X509CrlRef> for StackableX509Crl {
+    fn borrow(&self) -> &X509CrlRef {
+        &**self
+    }
+}
+#[allow(clippy::explicit_auto_deref)]
+impl ::std::convert::AsRef<X509CrlRef> for StackableX509Crl {
+    fn as_ref(&self) -> &X509CrlRef {
+        &**self
+    }
+}
+
+impl Stackable for StackableX509Crl {
+    type StackType = openssl_sys::stack_st_X509_CRL;
+}
+
+pub struct MemBioSlice<'a>(*mut openssl_sys::BIO, PhantomData<&'a [u8]>);
+impl<'a> Drop for MemBioSlice<'a> {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        unsafe {
+            openssl_sys::BIO_free_all(self.0);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'a> MemBioSlice<'a> {
+    pub fn new(buf: &'a [u8]) -> Result<MemBioSlice<'a>, ErrorStack> {
+        openssl_sys::init();
+
+        assert!(buf.len() <= c_int::max_value() as usize);
+        let bio = unsafe {
+            {
+                let r = BIO_new_mem_buf(buf.as_ptr() as *const _, buf.len() as c_int);
+                if r.is_null() {
+                    Err(ErrorStack::get())
+                } else {
+                    Ok(r)
+                }
+            }?
+        };
+
+        Ok(MemBioSlice(bio, PhantomData))
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_ptr(&self) -> *mut openssl_sys::BIO {
+        self.0
+    }
+}
+
+impl StackableX509Crl {
+    pub fn stack_from_pem(pem: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<X509Crl>, ErrorStack> {
+        unsafe {
+            openssl_sys::init();
+            let bio = MemBioSlice::new(pem)?;
+
+            let mut crls = vec![];
+            loop {
+                let r = openssl_sys::PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(
+                    bio.as_ptr(),
+                    ptr::null_mut(),
+                    None,
+                    ptr::null_mut(),
+                );
+                if r.is_null() {
+                    let err = openssl_sys::ERR_peek_last_error();
+                    if openssl_sys::ERR_GET_LIB(err) as c_int == openssl_sys::ERR_LIB_PEM
+                        && openssl_sys::ERR_GET_REASON(err) == openssl_sys::PEM_R_NO_START_LINE
+                    {
+                        openssl_sys::ERR_clear_error();
+                        break;
+                    }
+
+                    return Err(ErrorStack::get());
+                } else {
+                    crls.push(X509Crl::from_ptr(r));
+                }
+            }
+
+            Ok(crls)
+        }
+    }
+}
+impl From<X509Crl> for StackableX509Crl {
+    fn from(value: X509Crl) -> Self {
+        unsafe {
+            openssl_sys::X509_CRL_up_ref(value.as_ptr());
+            StackableX509Crl::from_ptr(value.as_ptr())
+        }
+    }
+}
+impl From<StackableX509Crl> for X509Crl {
+    fn from(value: StackableX509Crl) -> Self {
+        unsafe {
+            openssl_sys::X509_CRL_up_ref(value.as_ptr());
+            X509Crl::from_ptr(value.as_ptr())
+        }
+    }
+}

rust/pv/openssl_extensions/tests/assets

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+../../tests/assets

rust/pv/src/brcb.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+use std::{
+    io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom::Current},
+    mem::size_of,
+};
+
+// (SE) boot request control block aka SE header
+use crate::{assert_size, static_assert, Error, Result, PAGESIZE};
+use log::debug;
+use pv_core::request::MagicValue;
+use zerocopy::{AsBytes, BigEndian, FromBytes, FromZeroes, U32, U64};
+
+/// Struct containing all SE-header tags.
+///
+/// Contains:
+/// Page List Digest (pld)
+/// Address List Digest (ald)
+/// Tweak List Digest (tld)
+/// SE Header Tag (seht)
+///
+#[repr(C)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, AsBytes, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct BootHdrTags {
+    pld: [u8; BootHdrHead::DIGEST_SIZE],
+    ald: [u8; BootHdrHead::DIGEST_SIZE],
+    tld: [u8; BootHdrHead::DIGEST_SIZE],
+    seht: [u8; BootHdrHead::SEHT_SIZE],
+}
+
+/// Magiv value for a SE-(boot)header
+pub struct BootHdrMagic;
+impl MagicValue<8> for BootHdrMagic {
+    const MAGIC: [u8; 8] = [0x49, 0x42, 0x4d, 0x53, 0x65, 0x63, 0x45, 0x78];
+}
+
+impl BootHdrTags {
+    /// Returns a reference to the SE-hdr tag of this [`BootHdrTags`].
+    pub fn seht(&self) -> &[u8; 16] {
+        &self.seht
+    }
+
+    /// Creates a new [`BootHdrTags`]. Useful for writing tests.
+    #[doc(hidden)]
+    pub const fn new(pld: [u8; 64], ald: [u8; 64], tld: [u8; 64], seht: [u8; 16]) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            ald,
+            tld,
+            pld,
+            seht,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// returns false if no hdr found, true otherwise
+    /// in the very unlikel case an IO error can appear
+    /// when seeking to the beginning of  the header
+    fn seek_se_hdr_start<R>(img: &mut R) -> Result<bool>
+    where
+        R: Read + Seek,
+    {
+        const MAX_ITER: usize = 0x15;
+        const BUF_SIZE: i64 = 8;
+        static_assert!(BootHdrMagic::MAGIC.len() == BUF_SIZE as usize);
+
+        let mut buf = [0; BUF_SIZE as usize];
+        for _ in [0; MAX_ITER] {
+            match img.read_exact(&mut buf) {
+                Ok(it) => it,
+                Err(_) => return Ok(false),
+            };
+
+            if BootHdrMagic::starts_with_magic(&buf) {
+                // go back to the beginning of the header
+                img.seek(Current(-BUF_SIZE))?;
+
+                return Ok(true);
+            }
+            // goto next page start
+            // or report invalid file format if file ends "early"
+            match img.seek(Current(PAGESIZE as i64 - BUF_SIZE)) {
+                Ok(it) => it,
+                Err(_) => return Ok(false),
+            };
+        }
+        Ok(false)
+    }
+
+    /// Deserializes a (SE) boot header and extracts the tags.
+    ///
+    /// Searches for the header; if found extracts the tags.
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// This function will return an error if `hdr` is not at least as long as the header specifies
+    /// in bytes 12-15 or the first 8 bytes do not contain the magic value.
+    pub fn from_se_image<R>(img: &mut R) -> Result<Self>
+    where
+        R: Read + Seek,
+    {
+        if !Self::seek_se_hdr_start(img)? {
+            debug!("No boot hdr found");
+            return Err(Error::InvBootHdr);
+        }
+        // read in the header
+        let mut hdr = vec![0u8; size_of::<BootHdrHead>()];
+        img.read_exact(&mut hdr)?;
+
+        let hdr_head = match BootHdrHead::read_from_prefix(hdr.as_mut_slice()) {
+            Some(hdr) => hdr,
+            None => {
+                debug!("Boot hdr is to small");
+                return Err(Error::InvBootHdr);
+            }
+        };
+
+        //Some sanity checks
+        if !BootHdrMagic::starts_with_magic(&hdr) || hdr_head.version.get() != 0x100 {
+            debug!("Inv magic or size");
+            return Err(Error::InvBootHdr);
+        }
+
+        //go to the Bot header tag
+        img.seek(Current(
+            hdr_head.size.get() as i64
+                - size_of::<BootHdrHead>() as i64
+                - BootHdrHead::SEHT_SIZE as i64,
+        ))?;
+
+        // read in the tag
+        let mut seht = [0u8; BootHdrHead::SEHT_SIZE];
+        img.read_exact(seht.as_mut_slice())?;
+
+        Ok(BootHdrTags {
+            pld: hdr_head.pld,
+            ald: hdr_head.ald,
+            tld: hdr_head.tld,
+            seht,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+#[repr(C)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, FromBytes, FromZeroes)]
+struct BootHdrHead {
+    magic: U64<BigEndian>,
+    version: U32<BigEndian>,
+    size: U32<BigEndian>,
+    iv: [u8; 12],
+    res1: u32,
+    nks: U64<BigEndian>,
+    sea: U64<BigEndian>,
+    nep: U64<BigEndian>,
+    pcf: U64<BigEndian>,
+    user_pubkey: [u8; 160],
+    pld: [u8; Self::DIGEST_SIZE],
+    ald: [u8; Self::DIGEST_SIZE],
+    tld: [u8; Self::DIGEST_SIZE],
+}
+assert_size!(BootHdrHead, 0x1A0);
+impl BootHdrHead {
+    const DIGEST_SIZE: usize = 0x40;
+    const SEHT_SIZE: usize = 0x10;
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use std::io::Cursor;
+
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::get_test_asset;
+    use crate::Error;
+
+    const EXP_HDR: BootHdrTags = BootHdrTags {
+        pld: [
+            0xbe, 0x94, 0xb5, 0xea, 0xb3, 0xc1, 0xb1, 0x18, 0xc7, 0x57, 0xd7, 0xdb, 0x7e, 0xa0,
+            0xf6, 0x5d, 0x9b, 0x64, 0x82, 0x3a, 0x8d, 0xc5, 0x5b, 0xf8, 0xa8, 0x72, 0x5b, 0x58,
+            0x07, 0x2d, 0x9d, 0x42, 0x58, 0xc5, 0x3e, 0x8a, 0x5d, 0xa8, 0x2d, 0xfb, 0x21, 0x92,
+            0xd9, 0x1d, 0x07, 0xbc, 0x1c, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x5d, 0x63, 0x21, 0xd3, 0xba, 0x16, 0xa7,
+            0x51, 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x3e, 0x01, 0x61,
+        ],
+        ald: [
+            0x28, 0x58, 0xc3, 0x36, 0x8b, 0x2a, 0x0a, 0xf0, 0xc5, 0xea, 0x0f, 0xde, 0x79, 0x05,
+            0xeb, 0x15, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xd1, 0xdd, 0x73, 0x71, 0x65, 0x93, 0x3c, 0xda, 0xa2, 0xb8,
+            0x50, 0xb6, 0xa8, 0xe2, 0xf0, 0xf4, 0x2c, 0x7b, 0x36, 0xdd, 0x53, 0x81, 0x09, 0x62,
+            0x88, 0xdc, 0x09, 0x2d, 0xaa, 0x8a, 0x6f, 0xac, 0xec, 0x25, 0x34, 0x13, 0x7b, 0xc9,
+            0x4c, 0xa8, 0x0b, 0xda, 0x4f, 0xcb, 0x93, 0x28,
+        ],
+        tld: [
+            0x48, 0x60, 0xeb, 0xcf, 0x7b, 0x9d, 0x24, 0xeb, 0x90, 0x9a, 0x79, 0x53, 0x56, 0xad,
+            0x32, 0xc9, 0x36, 0xb6, 0x21, 0x65, 0x98, 0x8a, 0x9f, 0xfc, 0xd6, 0x61, 0x70, 0xdb,
+            0xc5, 0x90, 0xc2, 0x30, 0x10, 0xd7, 0x95, 0x2f, 0xa8, 0x82, 0xd1, 0xbb, 0x79, 0x55,
+            0x8f, 0x9b, 0xe0, 0xa5, 0x49, 0xd8, 0xd7, 0xa9, 0x4a, 0xe7, 0x20, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0x76,
+            0x0a, 0x82, 0x5d, 0x47, 0x9f, 0xe6, 0x7a, 0xf5,
+        ],
+        seht: [
+            0x92, 0x30, 0x9d, 0x45, 0x89, 0xb9, 0xa8, 0x5b, 0x42, 0x7f, 0x87, 0x53, 0x17, 0x1d,
+            0x15, 0x20,
+        ],
+    };
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_se_image_hdr() {
+        let bin_hdr = get_test_asset!("exp/secure_guest.hdr");
+        let hdr_tags = BootHdrTags::from_se_image(&mut Cursor::new(*bin_hdr)).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(hdr_tags, EXP_HDR);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_se_image_fail() {
+        let bin_hdr = get_test_asset!("exp/secure_guest.hdr");
+        let short_hdr = &bin_hdr[1..];
+
+        assert!(matches!(
+            BootHdrTags::from_se_image(&mut Cursor::new(short_hdr)),
+            Err(Error::InvBootHdr)
+        ));
+
+        // mess up magic
+        let mut bin_hdr_copy = *bin_hdr;
+        bin_hdr_copy.swap(0, 1);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            BootHdrTags::from_se_image(&mut Cursor::new(bin_hdr_copy)),
+            Err(Error::InvBootHdr)
+        ));
+
+        //header is at a non expected position
+        let mut img = vec![0u8; PAGESIZE];
+        img[0x008..0x288].copy_from_slice(bin_hdr);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            BootHdrTags::from_se_image(&mut Cursor::new(img)),
+            Err(Error::InvBootHdr)
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_se_image_img() {
+        let mut img = vec![0u8; 0x13000];
+        let bin_hdr = get_test_asset!("exp/secure_guest.hdr");
+        img[0x12000..0x12280].copy_from_slice(bin_hdr);
+        let hdr_tags = BootHdrTags::from_se_image(&mut Cursor::new(img)).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(hdr_tags, EXP_HDR);
+    }
+}

rust/pv/src/cli.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+use crate::misc::{create_file, open_file};
+use crate::Result;
+use clap::{ArgGroup, Args, ValueHint};
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+
+/// CLI Argument collection for handling certificates.
+#[derive(Args, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
+#[command(
+    group(ArgGroup::new("pv_verify").required(true).args(["no_verify", "certs"])),
+    )]
+pub struct CertificateOptions {
+    /// Use FILE as a host-key document.
+    ///
+    /// Can be specified multiple times and must be used at least once.
+    #[arg(
+        short = 'k',
+        long = "host-key-document",
+        value_name = "FILE",
+        required = true,
+        value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,
+        use_value_delimiter = true,
+        value_delimiter = ',',
+        )]
+    pub host_key_documents: Vec<String>,
+
+    /// Disable the host-key document verification.
+    ///
+    /// Does not require the host-key documents to be valid.
+    /// Do not use for a production request unless you verified the host-key document beforehand.
+    #[arg(long)]
+    pub no_verify: bool,
+
+    /// Use FILE as a certificate to verify the host key or keys.
+    ///
+    /// The certificates are used to establish a chain of trust for the verification
+    /// of the host-key documents. Specify this option twice to specify the IBM Z signing key and
+    /// the intermediate CA certificate (signed by the root CA).
+    #[arg(
+        short= 'C',
+        long = "cert",
+        value_name = "FILE",
+        alias("crt"),
+        value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,
+        use_value_delimiter = true,
+        value_delimiter = ',',
+    )]
+    pub certs: Vec<String>,
+
+    /// Use FILE as a certificate revocation list.
+    ///
+    /// The list is used to check whether a certificate of the chain of
+    /// trust is revoked. Specify this option multiple times to use multiple CRLs.
+    #[arg(
+        long = "crl",
+        requires("certs"),
+        value_name = "FILE",
+        value_hint = ValueHint::FilePath,
+        use_value_delimiter = true,
+        value_delimiter = ',',
+    )]
+    pub crls: Vec<String>,
+
+    /// Make no attempt to download CRLs.
+    #[arg(long, requires("certs"))]
+    pub offline: bool,
+
+    /// Use FILE as the root-CA certificate for the verification.
+    ///
+    /// If omitted, the system wide-root CAs installed on the system are used.
+    /// Use this only if you trust the specified certificate.
+    #[arg(long, requires("certs"))]
+    pub root_ca: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl CertificateOptions {
+    /// Returns the verifier of this [`CertificateOptions`] based on the given CLI options.
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// This function will return an error if [`crate::request::HkdVerifier`] cannot be created.
+    pub fn verifier(&self) -> Result<Box<dyn crate::verify::HkdVerifier>> {
+        use crate::verify::{CertVerifier, NoVerifyHkd};
+        match self.no_verify {
+            true => {
+                log::warn!(
+                    "Host-key document verification is disabled. The secret may not be protected."
+                );
+                Ok(Box::new(NoVerifyHkd))
+            }
+            false => Ok(Box::new(CertVerifier::new(
+                &self.certs,
+                &self.crls,
+                &self.root_ca,
+                self.offline,
+            )?)),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// stdout
+pub const STDOUT: &str = "-";
+/// stdin
+pub const STDIN: &str = "-";
+
+/// Converts an argument value into a Writer.
+pub fn get_writer_from_cli_file_arg(path: &str) -> Result<Box<dyn Write>> {
+    if path == STDOUT {
+        Ok(Box::new(std::io::stdout()))
+    } else {
+        Ok(Box::new(create_file(path)?))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Converts an argument value into a Reader.
+pub fn get_reader_from_cli_file_arg(path: &str) -> Result<Box<dyn Read>> {
+    if path == STDIN {
+        Ok(Box::new(std::io::stdin()))
+    } else {
+        Ok(Box::new(open_file(path)?))
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+    use clap::Parser;
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    #[rustfmt::skip]
+    fn cli_args() {
+        //Verify only that some arguments are optional, we do not want to test clap, only the
+        //configuration
+        let valid_args = [vec!["pgr", "-k", "hkd.crt", "--no-verify"], vec!["pgr", "-k", "hkd.crt", "--crt", "abc.crt"]];
+        // Test for the minimal amount of flags to yield an invalid combination
+        let invalid_args = [
+            vec!["pgr", "-k", "hkd.crt"],
+            vec!["pgr", "--no-verify", "--crt", "abc.crt"],
+            vec!["pgr", "--no-verify", "--crt", "abc.crt", "--offline"],
+            vec!["pgr", "--no-verify", "--crt", "abc.crt", "--crl", "abc.crl"],
+            vec!["pgr", "--no-verify", "--crt", "abc.crt", "--root-ca", "root.crt"],
+            vec!["pgr", "--offline"],
+            vec!["pgr", "--crl", "abc.crl"],
+            vec!["pgr", "--root-ca", "root.crt"],
+        ];
+        #[derive(Parser, Debug)]
+        struct TestParser {
+            #[command(flatten)]
+            pub verify_args: CertificateOptions,
+        }
+
+        for arg in valid_args {
+            let res = TestParser::try_parse_from(&arg);
+            assert!(res.is_ok());
+        }
+
+        for arg in invalid_args {
+            let res = TestParser::try_parse_from(&arg);
+            assert!(res.is_err());
+        }
+    }
+}

rust/pv/src/crypto.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+use crate::{error::Result, secret::Secret, Error};
+use openssl::{
+    derive::Deriver,
+    ec::{EcGroup, EcKey},
+    hash::{DigestBytes, MessageDigest},
+    md::MdRef,
+    nid::Nid,
+    pkey::{HasPublic, Id, PKey, PKeyRef, Private, Public},
+    pkey_ctx::{HkdfMode, PkeyCtx},
+    rand::rand_bytes,
+    rsa::Padding,
+    sign::{Signer, Verifier},
+    symm::{encrypt_aead, Cipher},
+};
+use std::{convert::TryInto, ops::Range};
+
+/// An AES256-key that will purge itself out of the memory when going out of scope
+///
+pub type Aes256Key = Secret<[u8; 32]>;
+pub(crate) const AES_256_GCM_TAG_SIZE: usize = 16;
+
+/// Types of symmetric keys, to specify during construction.
+///
+#[non_exhaustive]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum SymKeyType {
+    /// AES 256 key (32 bytes)
+    Aes256,
+}
+
+/// Types of symmetric keys
+///
+#[non_exhaustive]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum SymKey {
+    /// AES 256 key (32 bytes)
+    Aes256(Aes256Key),
+}
+
+impl SymKey {
+    /// Generates a random symmetric key.
+    ///
+    /// * `key_tp` - type of the symmetric key
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// This function will return an error if the Key cannot be generated.
+    pub fn random(key_tp: SymKeyType) -> Result<Self> {
+        match key_tp {
+            SymKeyType::Aes256 => Ok(Self::Aes256(random_array().map(|v| v.into())?)),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Returns a reference to the value of this [`SymKey`].
+    pub fn value(&self) -> &[u8] {
+        match self {
+            Self::Aes256(key) => key.value(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl Aes256Key {
+    /// Generates an AES256 key from an digest (hash).
+    ///
+    /// # Panics
+    ///
+    /// Panics if `digset` is not 32 bytes long.
+    fn from_digest(digest: DigestBytes) -> Self {
+        let key: [u8; 32] = digest
+            .as_ref()
+            .try_into()
+            .expect("Unexpected OpenSSl Error. Sha256 hash not 32 bytes long");
+        key.into()
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<Aes256Key> for SymKey {
+    fn from(value: Aes256Key) -> Self {
+        Self::Aes256(value)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Performs an hkdf according to RFC 5869.
+/// See [`OpenSSL HKDF`]()
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// This function will return an OpenSSL error if the key could not be generated.
+pub fn hkdf_rfc_5869<const COUNT: usize>(
+    md: &MdRef,
+    ikm: &[u8],
+    salt: &[u8],
+    info: &[u8],
+) -> Result<[u8; COUNT]> {
+    let mut ctx = PkeyCtx::new_id(Id::HKDF)?;
+    ctx.derive_init()?;
+    ctx.set_hkdf_mode(HkdfMode::EXTRACT_THEN_EXPAND)?;
+    ctx.set_hkdf_md(md)?;
+    ctx.set_hkdf_salt(salt)?;
+    ctx.set_hkdf_key(ikm)?;
+    ctx.add_hkdf_info(info)?;
+
+    let mut res = [0; COUNT];
+    ctx.derive(Some(&mut res))?;
+    Ok(res)
+}
+
+/// Derive a symmetric key from a private and a public key.
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// This function will return an error if something went bad in OpenSSL.
+pub fn derive_key(k1: &PKey<Private>, k2: &PKey<Public>) -> Result<Aes256Key> {
+    let mut der = Deriver::new(k1)?;
+    der.set_peer(k2)?;
+    let mut key = der.derive_to_vec()?;
+    key.extend([0, 0, 0, 1]);
+    let secr = Secret::new(key);
+
+    Ok(Aes256Key::from_digest(hash(
+        MessageDigest::sha256(),
+        secr.value(),
+    )?))
+}
+
+/// Generate a random array.
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// This function will return an error if the entropy source fails or is not available.
+pub fn random_array<const COUNT: usize>() -> Result<[u8; COUNT]> {
+    let mut rand = [0; COUNT];
+    rand_bytes(&mut rand)?;
+    Ok(rand)
+}
+
+/// Generate a new random EC-SECP521R1 key.
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// This function will return an error if the key could not be generated by OpenSSL.
+pub fn gen_ec_key() -> Result<PKey<Private>> {
+    let group = EcGroup::from_curve_name(Nid::SECP521R1)?;
+    let key: EcKey<Private> = EcKey::generate(&group)?;
+    PKey::from_ec_key(key).map_err(Error::Crypto)
+}
+
+/// Encrypt confidential Data with a symmetric key and provida a gcm tag.
+///
+/// * `key` - symmetric key used for encryption
+/// * `iv` - initialisation vector
+/// * `aad` - additional authentic data
+/// * `conf` - data to be encrypted
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// [`Vec<u8>`] with the following content:
+/// 1. `aad`
+/// 2. `encr(conf)`
+/// 3. `aes gcm tag`
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// This function will return an error if the data could not be encrypted by OpenSSL.
+pub fn encrypt_aes_gcm(
+    key: &SymKey,
+    iv: &[u8],
+    aad: &[u8],
+    conf: &[u8],
+) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Range<usize>, Range<usize>, Range<usize>)> {
+    let mut tag = vec![0xff; AES_256_GCM_TAG_SIZE];
+    let encr = match key {
+        SymKey::Aes256(key) => encrypt_aead(
+            Cipher::aes_256_gcm(),
+            key.value(),
+            Some(iv),
+            aad,
+            conf,
+            &mut tag,
+        )?,
+    };
+
+    let mut res = vec![0; aad.len() + encr.len() + tag.len()];
+    let aad_range = Range {
+        start: 0,
+        end: aad.len(),
+    };
+    let encr_range = Range {
+        start: aad.len(),
+        end: aad.len() + encr.len(),
+    };
+    let tag_range = Range {
+        start: aad.len() + encr.len(),
+        end: aad.len() + encr.len() + tag.len(),
+    };
+
+    res[aad_range.clone()].copy_from_slice(aad);
+    res[encr_range.clone()].copy_from_slice(&encr);
+    res[tag_range.clone()].copy_from_slice(&tag);
+    Ok((res, aad_range, encr_range, tag_range))
+}
+
+/// Calculate the hash of a slice.
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// This function will return an error if OpenSSL could not compute the hash.
+pub fn hash(t: MessageDigest, data: &[u8]) -> Result<DigestBytes> {
+    openssl::hash::hash(t, data).map_err(Error::Crypto)
+}
+
+/// Calculate a digital signature scheme.
+///
+/// Calculates the digital signature of the provided message using the signing key. [`Id::EC`],
+/// and [`Id::RSA`] keys are supported. For [`Id::RSA`] [`Padding::PKCS1_PSS`] is used.
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// This function will return an error if OpenSSL could not compute the signature.
+pub fn sign_msg(skey: &PKeyRef<Private>, dgst: MessageDigest, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    match skey.id() {
+        Id::EC => {
+            let mut sgn = Signer::new(dgst, skey)?;
+            sgn.sign_oneshot_to_vec(msg).map_err(Error::Crypto)
+        }
+        Id::RSA => {
+            let mut sgn = Signer::new(dgst, skey)?;
+            sgn.set_rsa_padding(Padding::PKCS1_PSS)?;
+            sgn.sign_oneshot_to_vec(msg).map_err(Error::Crypto)
+        }
+        _ => Err(Error::UnsupportedSigningKey),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Verify the digital signature of a message.
+///
+/// Verifies the digital signature of the provided message using the signing key.
+/// [`Id::EC`] and [`Id::RSA`] keys are supported. For [`Id::RSA`] [`Padding::PKCS1_PSS`] is used.
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// true if signature could be verified, false otherwise
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// This function will return an error if OpenSSL could not compute the signature.
+pub fn verify_signature<T: HasPublic>(
+    skey: &PKeyRef<T>,
+    dgst: MessageDigest,
+    msg: &[u8],
+    sign: &[u8],
+) -> Result<bool> {
+    match skey.id() {
+        Id::EC => {
+            let mut ctx = Verifier::new(dgst, skey)?;
+            ctx.update(msg)?;
+            ctx.verify(sign).map_err(Error::Crypto)
+        }
+        Id::RSA => {
+            let mut ctx = Verifier::new(dgst, skey)?;
+            ctx.set_rsa_padding(Padding::PKCS1_PSS)?;
+            ctx.verify_oneshot(sign, msg).map_err(Error::Crypto)
+        }
+        _ => Err(Error::UnsupportedVerificationKey),
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::{get_test_asset, test_utils::*};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_ec() {
+        let (ec_key, _) = get_test_keys();
+
+        let data = "sample".as_bytes();
+        let sign = sign_msg(&ec_key, MessageDigest::sha512(), data).unwrap();
+        assert!(sign.len() <= 139 && sign.len() >= 137);
+
+        assert!(verify_signature(&ec_key, MessageDigest::sha512(), data, &sign).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_rsa_2048() {
+        let keypair = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa2048key.pem");
+        let keypair = PKey::private_key_from_pem(keypair).unwrap();
+
+        let data = "sample".as_bytes();
+        let sign = sign_msg(&keypair, MessageDigest::sha512(), data).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(256, sign.len());
+
+        assert!(verify_signature(&keypair, MessageDigest::sha512(), data, &sign).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_rsa_3072() {
+        let keypair = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa3072key.pem");
+        let keypair = PKey::private_key_from_pem(keypair).unwrap();
+
+        let data = "sample".as_bytes();
+        let sign = sign_msg(&keypair, MessageDigest::sha512(), data).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(384, sign.len());
+
+        assert!(verify_signature(&keypair, MessageDigest::sha512(), data, &sign).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn derive_key() {
+        let (cust_key, host_key) = get_test_keys();
+
+        let exp_key: Aes256Key = [
+            0x75, 0x32, 0x77, 0x55, 0x8f, 0x3b, 0x60, 0x3, 0x41, 0x9e, 0xf2, 0x49, 0xae, 0x3c,
+            0x4b, 0x55, 0xaa, 0xd7, 0x7d, 0x9, 0xd9, 0x7f, 0xdd, 0x1f, 0xc8, 0x8f, 0xd8, 0xf0,
+            0xcf, 0x22, 0xf1, 0x49,
+        ]
+        .into();
+
+        let calc_key = super::derive_key(&cust_key, &host_key).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(&calc_key, &exp_key);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn hkdf_rfc_5869() {
+        use openssl::md::Md;
+        // RFC 6869 test vector 1
+        let ikm = [0x0bu8; 22];
+        let salt: [u8; 13] = [
+            0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c,
+        ];
+        let info: [u8; 10] = [0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9];
+        let exp: [u8; 42] = [
+            0x3c, 0xb2, 0x5f, 0x25, 0xfa, 0xac, 0xd5, 0x7a, 0x90, 0x43, 0x4f, 0x64, 0xd0, 0x36,
+            0x2f, 0x2a, 0x2d, 0x2d, 0x0a, 0x90, 0xcf, 0x1a, 0x5a, 0x4c, 0x5d, 0xb0, 0x2d, 0x56,
+            0xec, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xbf, 0x34, 0x00, 0x72, 0x08, 0xd5, 0xb8, 0x87, 0x18, 0x58, 0x65,
+        ];
+        let res: [u8; 42] = super::hkdf_rfc_5869(Md::sha256(), &ikm, &salt, &info).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(exp, res);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn encrypt_aes_256_gcm() {
+        let aes_gcm_key = [
+            0xee, 0xbc, 0x1f, 0x57, 0x48, 0x7f, 0x51, 0x92, 0x1c, 0x04, 0x65, 0x66, 0x5f, 0x8a,
+            0xe6, 0xd1, 0x65, 0x8b, 0xb2, 0x6d, 0xe6, 0xf8, 0xa0, 0x69, 0xa3, 0x52, 0x02, 0x93,
+            0xa5, 0x72, 0x07, 0x8f,
+        ];
+        let aes_gcm_iv = [
+            0x99, 0xaa, 0x3e, 0x68, 0xed, 0x81, 0x73, 0xa0, 0xee, 0xd0, 0x66, 0x84,
+        ];
+        let aes_gcm_plain = [
+            0xf5, 0x6e, 0x87, 0x05, 0x5b, 0xc3, 0x2d, 0x0e, 0xeb, 0x31, 0xb2, 0xea, 0xcc, 0x2b,
+            0xf2, 0xa5,
+        ];
+        let aes_gcm_aad = [
+            0x4d, 0x23, 0xc3, 0xce, 0xc3, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x9b, 0xdb, 0x37, 0x0c, 0x43, 0x7f, 0xec,
+            0x78, 0xde,
+        ];
+        let aes_gcm_res = vec![
+            0x4d, 0x23, 0xc3, 0xce, 0xc3, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x9b, 0xdb, 0x37, 0x0c, 0x43, 0x7f, 0xec,
+            0x78, 0xde, 0xf7, 0x26, 0x44, 0x13, 0xa8, 0x4c, 0x0e, 0x7c, 0xd5, 0x36, 0x86, 0x7e,
+            0xb9, 0xf2, 0x17, 0x36, 0x67, 0xba, 0x05, 0x10, 0x26, 0x2a, 0xe4, 0x87, 0xd7, 0x37,
+            0xee, 0x62, 0x98, 0xf7, 0x7e, 0x0c,
+        ];
+
+        let (res, ..) = encrypt_aes_gcm(
+            &SymKey::Aes256(aes_gcm_key.into()),
+            &aes_gcm_iv,
+            &aes_gcm_aad,
+            &aes_gcm_plain,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(res, aes_gcm_res);
+    }
+}

rust/pv/src/error.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+/// Result type for this crate
+pub type Result<T, E = Error> = std::result::Result<T, E>;
+
+/// Error cases for this crate
+#[allow(missing_docs)]
+#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
+#[non_exhaustive]
+pub enum Error {
+    #[error("Invalid SE header provided")]
+    InvBootHdr,
+
+    #[error("Host-key verification failed: {0}")]
+    HkdVerify(HkdVerifyErrorType),
+
+    #[error("No host-key provided")]
+    NoHostkey,
+
+    #[error("Too many host-keys provided")]
+    ManyHostkeys,
+
+    #[error("Cannot load {ty}  from {path}")]
+    X509Load {
+        path: String,
+        ty: &'static str,
+        source: openssl::error::ErrorStack,
+    },
+
+    #[error("Internal (unexpected) error: {0}, caused by {1}")]
+    InternalSsl(&'static str, #[source] openssl::error::ErrorStack),
+
+    #[error("Signing is only supported for EC and RSA keys")]
+    UnsupportedSigningKey,
+
+    #[error("Verifying signatures is only supported for EC and RSA keys")]
+    UnsupportedVerificationKey,
+
+    #[error("Provided binary request is too small")]
+    BinRequestSmall,
+
+    #[error("No Config UID found: {0}")]
+    NoCuid(String),
+
+    // errors from request types
+    #[error("Customer Communication Key must be 32 bytes long")]
+    CckSize,
+
+    #[error("Invalid {0} user-data for signing provided. Max {} bytes allowed", .0.max())]
+    AsrcbInvSgnUserData(UserDataType),
+
+    #[error("Unsupported user data signing key provided. Only EC(secp521r1) and RSA(2048 & 3072 bit) are supported")]
+    BinAsrcbUnsupportedUserDataSgnKey,
+
+    #[error("No user-key for verification provided and user-data is signed")]
+    BinAsrcbNoUserDataSgnKey,
+
+    #[error("Input does not contain an add-secret request version 1")]
+    BinAsrcbInvVersion,
+
+    #[error("Provided user-data key type ({key}) does not match with the user-data ({kind})")]
+    AsrcbUserDataKeyMismatch { key: String, kind: UserDataType },
+
+    #[error(
+        "The user-defined request signature could not be verified with the provided certificate"
+    )]
+    AsrcbUserDataSgnFail,
+
+    // errors from other crates
+    #[error(transparent)]
+    PvCore(#[from] pv_core::Error),
+    #[error(transparent)]
+    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
+    #[error(transparent)]
+    Crypto(#[from] openssl::error::ErrorStack),
+    #[error(transparent)]
+    Curl(#[from] curl::Error),
+}
+
+// used in macros
+#[doc(hidden)]
+impl Error {
+    pub const CRL: &'static str = "CRL";
+    pub const CERT: &'static str = "certificate";
+}
+
+/// Error cases for verifying host-key documents
+///
+#[allow(missing_docs)]
+#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[non_exhaustive]
+pub enum HkdVerifyErrorType {
+    #[error("Signature verification failed")]
+    Signature,
+    #[error("No valid CRL found")]
+    NoCrl,
+    #[error("Host-key document is revoked.")]
+    HdkRevoked,
+    #[error("Not enough bits of security. ({0}, {1} expected)")]
+    SecurityBits(u32, u32),
+    #[error("Authority Key Id mismatch")]
+    Akid,
+    #[error("CRL has no validity period")]
+    NoValidityPeriod,
+    #[error("Specify one IBM Z signing key")]
+    NoIbmSignKey,
+    #[error("Specify only one IBM Z signing key")]
+    ManyIbmSignKeys,
+    #[error("Before validity period")]
+    BeforeValidity,
+    #[error("After validity period")]
+    AfterValidity,
+    #[error("Issuer mismatch")]
+    IssuerMismatch,
+    #[error("No CRL distribution points found")]
+    NoCrlDP,
+    #[error("The IBM Z signing key could not be verified. Error occurred at level {1}")]
+    IbmSignInvalid(#[source] openssl::x509::X509VerifyResult, u32),
+}
+
+macro_rules! bail_hkd_verify {
+    ($var: tt) => {
+        return Err($crate::Error::HkdVerify($crate::HkdVerifyErrorType::$var))
+    };
+}
+pub(crate) use bail_hkd_verify;
+
+use crate::request::uvsecret::UserDataType;

rust/pv/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+//! pv - library for pv-tools
+//!
+//! This library is intened to be used by tools and libraries that
+//! are used for creating and managing IBM Secure Execution guests.
+//! `pv` provides abstraction layers for encryption, secure memory management,
+//! logging, and accessing the uvdevice.
+//!
+//! If you do not need any OpenSSL features use `pv_core`.
+//! This crate reexports all symbols from `pv_core`
+mod brcb;
+mod cli;
+mod crypto;
+mod error;
+mod req;
+mod secret;
+mod utils;
+mod uvsecret;
+mod verify;
+
+/// utility functions for writing TESTS!!!
+//hide any test helpers on docs!
+#[doc(hidden)]
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub mod test_utils;
+
+pub use ::utils::assert_size;
+pub use ::utils::static_assert;
+
+const PAGESIZE: usize = 0x1000;
+
+/// Definitions and functions for interacting with the Ultravisor
+pub mod uv {
+    pub use pv_core::uv::{
+        uv_ioctl, ConfigUid, UvCmd, UvDevice, UvDeviceInfo, UvFlags, UvcSuccess,
+    };
+    pub use pv_core::uv::{AddCmd, ListCmd, LockCmd};
+    pub use pv_core::uv::{ListableSecretType, SecretEntry, SecretList};
+}
+
+/// Miscellaneous functions and definitions
+pub mod misc {
+    pub use crate::cli::{
+        get_reader_from_cli_file_arg, get_writer_from_cli_file_arg, CertificateOptions, STDIN,
+        STDOUT,
+    };
+    pub use crate::utils::{read_certs, read_crls, read_private_key};
+    pub use pv_core::misc::*;
+    pub use pv_core::PvLogger;
+}
+
+pub use crate::error::HkdVerifyErrorType;
+pub use error::{Error, Result};
+
+/// Functionalities to build UV requests
+pub mod request {
+    pub use crate::brcb::{BootHdrMagic, BootHdrTags};
+    pub use crate::crypto::derive_key;
+    pub use crate::crypto::random_array;
+    pub use crate::crypto::{encrypt_aes_gcm, gen_ec_key};
+    pub use crate::crypto::{hash, hkdf_rfc_5869};
+    pub use crate::crypto::{sign_msg, verify_signature};
+    pub use crate::crypto::{Aes256Key, SymKey, SymKeyType};
+    pub use crate::req::{Aad, BinReqValues, Encrypt, Keyslot, ReqEncrCtx, Request};
+    pub use crate::secret::{Secret, Zeroize};
+    pub use crate::verify::{CertVerifier, HkdVerifier, NoVerifyHkd};
+
+    /// Reexports some useful OpenSSL symbols
+    pub mod openssl {
+        pub use openssl::error::ErrorStack;
+        pub use openssl::hash::MessageDigest;
+        pub use openssl::md::Md;
+        pub use openssl::pkey;
+    }
+
+    /// Functionalities for creating add-secret requests
+    pub mod uvsecret {
+        pub use crate::uvsecret::{
+            asrcb::{AddSecretFlags, AddSecretRequest, AddSecretVersion},
+            ext_secret::ExtSecret,
+            guest_secret::GuestSecret,
+            user_data::verify_asrcb_and_get_user_data,
+        };
+        pub use pv_core::request::uvsecret::AddSecretMagic;
+        pub use pv_core::request::uvsecret::UserDataType;
+    }
+    pub use pv_core::request::RequestMagic;
+}
+
+/// Provides cargo version Info about this crate.
+///
+/// Produces `pv-crate <version>`
+pub const fn crate_info() -> &'static str {
+    concat!(env!("CARGO_PKG_NAME"), "-crate ", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"))
+}

rust/pv/src/req.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,586 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+use crate::crypto::AES_256_GCM_TAG_SIZE;
+use crate::misc::to_u32;
+use crate::request::{derive_key, encrypt_aes_gcm, gen_ec_key, random_array, SymKey, SymKeyType};
+use crate::{Error, Result};
+use openssl::bn::{BigNum, BigNumContext};
+use openssl::ec::{EcGroupRef, EcPointRef};
+use openssl::error::ErrorStack;
+use openssl::hash::{hash, MessageDigest};
+use openssl::pkey::{PKey, PKeyRef, Private, Public};
+use pv_core::request::{RequestMagic, RequestVersion};
+use std::convert::TryInto;
+use std::mem::size_of;
+use std::ops::Range;
+use utils::assert_size;
+use zerocopy::{AsBytes, BigEndian, FromBytes, FromZeroes, U32};
+
+/// Encrypt a _secret_ using self and a given private key.
+pub trait Encrypt {
+    /// Encrypts `secret` using `self` and `priv_key` the encryption.
+    ///
+    /// # Returns
+    /// the encrypted data.
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// This function will return an error if OpenSSL could not encrypt the secret.
+    fn encrypt(&self, secret: &[u8], priv_key: &PKey<Private>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(80);
+        self.encrypt_to(secret, priv_key, &mut res)?;
+        Ok(res)
+    }
+
+    /// Encrypts `secret` using `self` and `priv_key` the encryption.
+    /// Appends the encrypted data to `to`
+    ///
+    /// # Returns
+    /// The encrypted data.
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// This function will return an error if OpenSSL could not encrypt the secret.
+    fn encrypt_to(&self, secret: &[u8], priv_key: &PKey<Private>, to: &mut Vec<u8>) -> Result<()>;
+}
+
+/// Types of Authenticated Data
+pub enum Aad<'a> {
+    /// Authenticated Keyslot
+    Ks(&'a Keyslot),
+    /// Unchanged authenticated data
+    Plain(&'a [u8]),
+    /// Authenticated  data that has to be encrypted in beforehand
+    Encr(&'a dyn Encrypt),
+}
+
+/// IBM Z Host key-slot
+///
+/// Layout in binary format:
+/// ```none
+/// _______________________________________________________________
+/// |   Public Host Key Hash (32)                                 |
+/// |   Wrapped(=Encrypted) Request Protection Key(32)            |
+/// |   Key Slot Tag (16)                                         |
+/// |_____________________________________________________________|
+/// ```
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct Keyslot(PKey<Public>);
+
+impl Keyslot {
+    /// Size of a host-key hash
+    pub const PHKH_SIZE: u32 = 0x20;
+
+    /// Creates a new Keyslot from the provided public key
+    pub fn new(hostkey: PKey<Public>) -> Self {
+        Self(hostkey)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Encrypt for Keyslot {
+    /// Encrypts the given request protection key `prot_key`.
+    ///
+    /// The AES256 encryption key is derived from `self` as public key, and `priv_key` as private key.
+    /// # Returns
+    /// The encrypted Keyslot.
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// This function will return an error if OpenSSL could not encrypt the secret.
+    fn encrypt_to(
+        &self,
+        prot_key: &[u8],
+        priv_key: &PKey<Private>,
+        to: &mut Vec<u8>,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let derived_key = derive_key(priv_key, &self.0)?;
+        let (mut wrpk_and_kst, ..) = encrypt_aes_gcm(&derived_key.into(), &[0; 12], &[], prot_key)?;
+        let phk: EcdhPubkeyCoord = self.0.as_ref().try_into()?;
+
+        to.reserve(80);
+        to.extend_from_slice(&hash(MessageDigest::sha256(), phk.as_ref())?);
+        to.append(&mut wrpk_and_kst);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+/// Context used to mange the encryption of requests.
+/// Intended to be used by [`Request`] implementations
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct ReqEncrCtx {
+    iv: [u8; 12],
+    priv_key: PKey<Private>,
+    prot_key: SymKey,
+}
+impl ReqEncrCtx {
+    /// Create a new encryption context that uses AES256.
+    ///
+    /// * `iv` - Initialization vector for the request encryption
+    /// * `priv_key` - Private key to wrap [`Keyslot`]
+    /// * `prot_key` - Symmetric key for request encryption. Part of [`Keyslot`]
+    ///
+    /// If an argument is set to `None` a ranom is generated
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// This function will return an error if OpenSSL could not generate a random value.
+    pub fn new_aes_256<I, P, S>(iv: I, priv_key: P, prot_key: S) -> Result<Self>
+    where
+        I: Into<Option<[u8; 12]>>,
+        P: Into<Option<PKey<Private>>>,
+        S: Into<Option<SymKey>>,
+    {
+        let iv = iv.into().unwrap_or(random_array()?);
+        let priv_key = priv_key.into().unwrap_or(gen_ec_key()?);
+        let prot_key = prot_key
+            .into()
+            .unwrap_or(SymKey::random(SymKeyType::Aes256)?);
+        Ok(ReqEncrCtx {
+            iv,
+            priv_key,
+            prot_key,
+        })
+    }
+    ///
+    /// Create a new encryption context with random input values.
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// This function will return an error if OpenSSL could not generate a random value.
+    pub fn random(ket_tp: SymKeyType) -> Result<Self> {
+        match ket_tp {
+            SymKeyType::Aes256 => Self::new_aes_256(None, None, None),
+        }
+    }
+
+    ///Panics if data does not fit into bin_aad+offs
+    // #[track_caller]
+    // pub fn copy_to_bin_aad(_bin_aad: &mut [u8], _aad_offs: usize, _data: &[u8]) {
+    //     todo!();
+    // }
+
+    /// Build the authenticated data for a request.
+    /// # Returns
+    /// ```none
+    /// _______________________________________________________________
+    /// | MAGIC (8)                       Version Number (4)  Size (4)|
+    /// |                     IV (12)                     Reserved (4)|
+    /// | Reserved (7) Num keyslots (1)   Reserved(4)    Encr Size (4)|
+    /// |     ---------------------------------------------------     |
+    /// |                Request type dependent AAD data              |
+    /// |-------------------------------------------------------------|
+    /// ```
+    ///
+    pub fn build_aad<O>(
+        &self,
+        version: RequestVersion,
+        aad: &Vec<Aad>,
+        encr_size: usize,
+        magic: O,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>>
+    where
+        O: Into<Option<RequestMagic>>,
+    {
+        self.build_aad_impl(version, aad, encr_size, magic.into())
+    }
+
+    /// Concrete implementation for [`ReqEncrCtx::build_aad`].
+    fn build_aad_impl(
+        &self,
+        version: RequestVersion,
+        aad: &Vec<Aad>,
+        encr_size: usize,
+        magic: Option<RequestMagic>,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let nks = aad.iter().filter(|a| matches!(a, Aad::Ks(_))).count();
+        let nks: u8 = match nks {
+            0 => Err(Error::NoHostkey),
+            n if n > u8::MAX as usize => Err(Error::ManyHostkeys),
+            n => Ok(n as u8),
+        }?;
+        let mut auth_data: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(2048);
+
+        //reserve space for the request header
+        auth_data.resize(std::mem::size_of::<RequestHdr>(), 0);
+
+        for a in aad {
+            match a {
+                Aad::Plain(p) => auth_data.extend_from_slice(p),
+                Aad::Ks(ks) => {
+                    ks.encrypt_to(self.prot_key.value(), &self.priv_key, &mut auth_data)?
+                }
+                Aad::Encr(e) => {
+                    e.encrypt_to(self.prot_key.value(), &self.priv_key, &mut auth_data)?
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        let rql = to_u32(auth_data.len() + encr_size + 16).ok_or_else(|| {
+            pv_core::Error::Specification("Configured request size to large".to_string())
+        })?;
+        let sea = to_u32(encr_size)
+            .ok_or_else(|| pv_core::Error::Specification("Encrypted size to large".to_string()))?;
+
+        let req_hdr = RequestHdr::new(version, rql, self.iv, nks, sea, magic);
+        // copy request header to the start of the request
+        auth_data[..std::mem::size_of::<RequestHdr>()].copy_from_slice(req_hdr.as_bytes());
+        Ok(auth_data)
+    }
+
+    /// get the public coordinates from the private key (Customer private key)
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// This function will return an error if the public key could not be extracted by OpenSSL.
+    /// Very unlikely.
+    pub fn key_coords(&self) -> Result<EcdhPubkeyCoord> {
+        self.priv_key.as_ref().try_into().map_err(Error::Crypto)
+    }
+
+    /// Encrypt confidential Data with this encryption context and provide a gcm tag.
+    ///
+    /// * `aad` - additional authentic data
+    /// * `conf` - data to be encrypted
+    ///
+    /// # Returns
+    /// [`Vec<u8>`] with the following content:
+    /// 1. `aad`
+    /// 2. `encr(conf)`
+    /// 3. `aes gcm tag`
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// This function will return an error if the data could not be encrypted by OpenSSL.
+    pub fn encrypt_aead(
+        &self,
+        aad: &[u8],
+        conf: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Range<usize>, Range<usize>, Range<usize>)> {
+        encrypt_aes_gcm(&self.prot_key, &self.iv, aad, conf)
+    }
+}
+
+#[repr(C)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct EcdhPubkeyCoord([u8; 160]);
+impl AsRef<[u8]> for EcdhPubkeyCoord {
+    fn as_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
+        self.0.as_slice()
+    }
+}
+
+/// Get the pub ecdh coordinates in the format the Ultravisor expects it:
+/// The two coordinates are pdadded to 80 bytes each.
+fn get_pub_ecdh_points(pkey: &EcPointRef, grp: &EcGroupRef) -> Result<[u8; 160], ErrorStack> {
+    const ECDH_PUB_KEY_COORD_POINT_SIZE: i32 = 0x50;
+    let mut x = BigNum::new()?;
+    let mut y = BigNum::new()?;
+    let mut bn_ctx = BigNumContext::new()?;
+    pkey.affine_coordinates(grp, &mut x, &mut y, &mut bn_ctx)?;
+    let mut coord: Vec<u8> = x.to_vec_padded(ECDH_PUB_KEY_COORD_POINT_SIZE)?;
+    coord.append(&mut y.to_vec_padded(ECDH_PUB_KEY_COORD_POINT_SIZE)?);
+    Ok(coord.try_into().unwrap())
+}
+
+macro_rules! ecdh_from {
+    ($type: ty) => {
+        impl TryFrom<&PKeyRef<$type>> for EcdhPubkeyCoord {
+            type Error = ErrorStack;
+            fn try_from(key: &PKeyRef<$type>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+                let k = key.ec_key()?;
+                k.check_key()?;
+                let grp = k.group();
+                let pub_key = k.public_key();
+                let coord = get_pub_ecdh_points(pub_key, grp)?;
+                Ok(EcdhPubkeyCoord(coord))
+            }
+        }
+    };
+}
+
+ecdh_from!(Private);
+ecdh_from!(Public);
+
+/// Representation of the shared parts of the request header.
+/// Used by [`ReqEncrCtx`]
+#[repr(C)]
+#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone, AsBytes, FromBytes, FromZeroes)]
+struct RequestHdr {
+    magic: [u8; 8],
+    rqvn: U32<BigEndian>,
+    rql: U32<BigEndian>,
+    iv: [u8; 12],
+    reserved1c: [u8; 4],
+    reserved20: [u8; 7],
+    nks: u8,
+    reserved28: u32,
+    sea: U32<BigEndian>,
+}
+assert_size!(RequestHdr, 48);
+
+impl RequestHdr {
+    fn new(rqvn: u32, rql: u32, iv: [u8; 12], nks: u8, sea: u32, magic: Option<[u8; 8]>) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            magic: magic.unwrap_or_default(),
+            rqvn: rqvn.into(),
+            rql: rql.into(),
+            iv,
+            reserved1c: [0; 4],
+            reserved20: [0; 7],
+            nks,
+            reserved28: 0,
+            sea: sea.into(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// A trait representing a request for the Ultravisor.
+///
+/// All requests share a few things:
+/// * All requests need to be encrypted on a trusted machine
+/// * All requests have at least one Hostkeyslot
+///
+/// The encryption setup is handled by [`ReqEncrCtx`]. Implementers need to pass the data to the
+/// `ReqEncrCtx` when implementing `encrypt`. A hostkey should be represented by [`Keyslot`] during
+/// encryption.
+///
+/// An UV request consists of an authenticated area (AAD), an encrypted area (Encr) and a 16 byte tag.
+/// The AAD contains a general header and Request type defined data (including Keyslots).
+/// It is encrypted with an Request protection key (symmetric). This key is encrypted with a
+/// (generated) private key and the public key of the host system (Host key)
+/// ```none
+///  _______________________________________________________________
+///  | MAGIC (8)                       Version Number (4)  Size (4)|
+///  |                     IV (12)                     Reserved (4)|
+///  | Reserved (7) Num keyslots (1)   Reserved(4)    Encr Size (4)|
+///  |     ---------------------------------------------------     |
+///  |                Request type dependent AAD data              |
+///  |     ----------------------------------------------------    |
+///  |            Encrypted (request type dependent) data          |
+///  |     ----------------------------------------------------    |
+///  |                   AES GCM Tag (16)                          |
+///  |_____________________________________________________________|
+///```
+pub trait Request {
+    /// Encrypt the request into its binary format
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// This function will return an error if the encryption fails, the request does not have at
+    /// least a hostkey, or other implementation dependent contracts are not met.
+    fn encrypt(&self, ctx: &ReqEncrCtx) -> Result<Vec<u8>>;
+    /// Add a host-key to this request
+    ///
+    /// Must be called at least once, otherwise {`Request::encrypt`} will fail
+    fn add_hostkey(&mut self, hostkey: PKey<Public>);
+}
+
+/// A struct to represent some parts of a binary/encrypted request.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+#[allow(unused)]
+#[allow(clippy::len_without_is_empty)]
+pub struct BinReqValues<'a> {
+    iv: &'a [u8],
+    aad: &'a [u8],
+    req_dep_aad: &'a [u8],
+    encr: &'a [u8],
+    tag: &'a [u8],
+    version: u32,
+    len: usize,
+}
+impl<'a> BinReqValues<'a> {
+    pub(crate) const TAG_LEN: usize = AES_256_GCM_TAG_SIZE;
+
+    /// Get the locations from this request.
+    ///
+    /// Does minimal sanity test, just tests to prevent panics.
+    /// `req` may be larger than the actual request.
+    pub fn get(req: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self> {
+        let hdr = RequestHdr::read_from_prefix(req).ok_or(Error::BinRequestSmall)?;
+        let rql = hdr.rql.get() as usize;
+        let sea = hdr.sea.get() as usize;
+
+        if rql < req.len() || sea + Self::TAG_LEN > rql {
+            return Err(Error::BinRequestSmall);
+        }
+        let aad_size = rql - sea - Self::TAG_LEN;
+        if aad_size < size_of::<RequestHdr>() {
+            return Err(Error::BinRequestSmall);
+        }
+
+        let iv = &req[0x10..0x1c];
+        let aad = &req[..aad_size];
+        let req_dep_aad = &req[size_of::<RequestHdr>()..aad_size];
+        let encr = &req[aad_size..(aad_size + sea)];
+        let tag = &req[rql - Self::TAG_LEN..];
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            iv,
+            aad,
+            req_dep_aad,
+            encr,
+            tag,
+            version: hdr.rqvn.get(),
+            len: rql,
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the version of this [`BinReqValues`].
+    pub fn version(&self) -> u32 {
+        self.version
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the length of this [`BinReqValues`].
+    pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
+        self.len
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::get_test_asset;
+    use crate::request::SymKey;
+    use crate::test_utils::*;
+    use openssl::ec::EcGroup;
+    use openssl::nid::Nid;
+
+    static TEST_MAGIC: [u8; 8] = 0x12345689abcdef00u64.to_be_bytes();
+
+    #[test]
+    fn encr_build_aad() {
+        let (cust_key, host_key) = get_test_keys();
+        let ks = Keyslot::new(host_key);
+        let ctx = ReqEncrCtx::new_aes_256(
+            Some([0x11; 12]),
+            Some(cust_key),
+            Some(SymKey::Aes256([0x17; 32].into())),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let v = [0x55; 8];
+        let aad = Aad::Plain(&v);
+        let aad = ctx
+            .build_aad(0x200, &vec![aad, Aad::Ks(&ks)], 16, Some(TEST_MAGIC))
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let mut aad_exp = vec![
+            0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0, //progr
+            0, 0, 2, 0, // vers
+            0, 0, 0, 168, //size
+            0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, // iv
+            0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //res
+            1, //nks
+            0, 0, 0, 0, // res
+            0, 0, 0, 16, // sea
+            0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, //aad
+        ];
+        aad_exp.extend_from_slice(get_test_asset!("exp/keyslot.bin"));
+        assert_eq!(&aad, &aad_exp);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn encr_build_aad_nks_no() {
+        let ctx = ReqEncrCtx::new_aes_256(Some([0x11; 12]), None, None).unwrap();
+
+        let aad = Vec::<Aad>::new();
+
+        let aad = ctx.build_aad(0x200, &aad, 16, Some(TEST_MAGIC));
+        assert!(matches!(aad, Err(Error::NoHostkey)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn encr_build_aad_nks_many() {
+        let (_, host_key) = get_test_keys();
+        let ctx = ReqEncrCtx::new_aes_256(Some([0x11; 12]), None, None).unwrap();
+
+        let ks: Vec<Keyslot> = (0..257).map(|_| Keyslot::new(host_key.clone())).collect();
+        let mut aad = Vec::<Aad>::new();
+        ks.iter().for_each(|ks| aad.push(Aad::Ks(ks)));
+
+        let aad = ctx.build_aad(0x200, &aad, 16, Some(TEST_MAGIC));
+        assert!(matches!(aad, Err(Error::ManyHostkeys)));
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn encr_build_aad_nks() {
+        let (_, host_key) = get_test_keys();
+        let ctx = ReqEncrCtx::new_aes_256(Some([0x11; 12]), None, None).unwrap();
+
+        let ks = vec![
+            Keyslot::new(host_key.clone()),
+            Keyslot::new(host_key.clone()),
+            Keyslot::new(host_key),
+        ];
+        let mut aad = Vec::<Aad>::new();
+        ks.iter().for_each(|ks| aad.push(Aad::Ks(ks)));
+
+        let aad = ctx.build_aad(0x200, &aad, 16, Some(TEST_MAGIC)).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(aad.get(39).unwrap(), &3u8);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn req_hdr() {
+        let hdr = RequestHdr::new(0x200, 22, [0x11; 12], 15, 44, None);
+        let hdr_bin = hdr.as_bytes();
+        let hdr_bin_exp = [
+            0u8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //magic
+            0, 0, 2, 0, // vers
+            0, 0, 0, 22, //size
+            0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, // iv
+            0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,  //res
+            15, //nks
+            0, 0, 0, 0, // res
+            0, 0, 0, 44, // sea
+        ];
+        assert_eq!(hdr_bin, &hdr_bin_exp);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn req_hdr2() {
+        let mut hdr = RequestHdr::new(0x200, 0x1234, [0x11; 12], 15, 44, Some(TEST_MAGIC));
+        let hdr_bin = hdr.as_bytes_mut();
+        let hdr_bin_exp = [
+            0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0, //magic
+            0, 0, 2, 0, // vers
+            0, 0, 0x12, 0x34, //size
+            0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, // iv
+            0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,  //res
+            15, //nks
+            0, 0, 0, 0, // res
+            0, 0, 0, 44, // sea
+        ];
+        assert_eq!(hdr_bin, &hdr_bin_exp);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn keyslot() {
+        let (cust_key, host_key) = get_test_keys();
+        let exp_keyslot = get_test_asset!("exp/keyslot.bin").to_vec();
+
+        let keyslot = Keyslot::new(host_key);
+        let encr_ks = keyslot.encrypt(&[0x17u8; 32], &cust_key).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(exp_keyslot, encr_ks);
+
+        let encr_ks = keyslot.encrypt(&[0x16u8; 32], &cust_key).unwrap();
+        assert_ne!(exp_keyslot, encr_ks);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn get_pub_ecdh_points() {
+        let (cust_key, _) = get_test_keys();
+
+        let pub_key = get_test_asset!("keys/public_cust.bin");
+
+        assert_eq!(pub_key.len(), 160);
+
+        let points = cust_key.ec_key().unwrap();
+        let points = points.public_key();
+        let grp = EcGroup::from_curve_name(Nid::SECP521R1).unwrap();
+
+        let points = super::get_pub_ecdh_points(points, &grp).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(&points, pub_key);
+    }
+}

rust/pv/src/secret.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+use std::fmt::Debug;
+
+/// Trait for securely zeroizing  memory.
+///
+/// To be used with [`Secret`]
+pub trait Zeroize {
+    /// Reliably overwrites the given buffer with zeros,
+    fn zeroize(&mut self);
+}
+
+/* Automatically impl Zeroize for u8 arrays */
+impl<const COUNT: usize> Zeroize for [u8; COUNT] {
+    /// Reliably overwrites the given buffer with zeros,
+    /// by performing a volatile write followed by a memory barrier
+    fn zeroize(&mut self) {
+        // SAFETY: given buffer(self) has the correct (compile time) size
+        unsafe { std::ptr::write_volatile(self, [0u8; COUNT]) };
+        std::sync::atomic::compiler_fence(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
+    }
+}
+
+impl Zeroize for Vec<u8> {
+    /// Reliably overwrites the given buffer with zeros,
+    /// by overwriting the whole vector's capacity with zeros.
+    fn zeroize(&mut self) {
+        //TODO use `volatile_set_memory` when stabilized
+        let mut dst = self.as_mut_ptr();
+        for _ in 0..self.capacity() {
+            // SAFETY:
+            // * Vec allocated at least capacity elements continuously
+            // * dst points always to a valid location
+            unsafe {
+                std::ptr::write_volatile(dst, 0);
+                dst = dst.add(1);
+            }
+        }
+        std::sync::atomic::compiler_fence(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
+    }
+}
+
+/// Thin wrapper around an type implementing Zeroize.
+///
+/// A `Secret` represents a confidential value that must be securely overwritten during drop.
+/// Will never leak its wrapped value during [`Debug`]
+///
+/// ```rust
+/// use pv::request::Secret;
+/// fn foo(value: Secret<[u8; 2]>) {
+///     println!("value: {value:?}");
+/// }
+/// # fn main() {
+/// foo([1,2].into());
+/// // prints:
+/// // in debug builds:
+/// //     value: Secret([1, 2])
+/// // in release builds:
+/// //     value: Secret(***)
+/// # }
+/// ```
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
+pub struct Secret<C: Zeroize>(C);
+impl<C: Zeroize> Secret<C> {
+    /// Convert a type into a self overwriting one.
+    ///
+    /// Prefer using [`Into`]
+    pub fn new(v: C) -> Self {
+        Secret(v)
+    }
+
+    /// Get a reference to the contained value
+    pub fn value(&self) -> &C {
+        &self.0
+    }
+    /// Get a imutable reference to the contained value
+    ///
+    /// NOTE that modifications to a mutable reference can trigger reallocation.
+    /// e.g. a [`Vec`] might expand if more space needed. -> preallocate enough space
+    /// or operate on slices. The old locations can and will **NOT** be zeroized.
+    pub fn value_mut(&mut self) -> &mut C {
+        &mut self.0
+    }
+}
+
+impl<C: Zeroize + Debug> Debug for Secret<C> {
+    #[allow(unreachable_code)]
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        // do NOT leak secrets in production builds
+        #[cfg(not(debug_assertions))]
+        return write!(f, "Secret(***)");
+
+        let mut b = f.debug_tuple("Secret");
+        b.field(&self.0);
+        b.finish()
+    }
+}
+
+impl<C: Zeroize> From<C> for Secret<C> {
+    fn from(v: C) -> Secret<C> {
+        Secret(v)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<C: Zeroize> Zeroize for Secret<C> {
+    fn zeroize(&mut self) {
+        self.0.zeroize();
+    }
+}
+
+impl<C: Zeroize> Drop for Secret<C> {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        self.0.zeroize();
+    }
+}

rust/pv/src/test_utils.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+// DO NOT USE ANY OF THESE ITEMS IN PRODUCTION CODE
+// USED FOR INTERNAL UNIT AND FVT TESTING ONLY!!!
+use openssl::{
+    bn::BigNum,
+    ec::{EcGroup, EcKey},
+    error::ErrorStack,
+    nid::Nid,
+    pkey::{PKey, Private, Public},
+    x509::{X509Crl, X509},
+};
+use std::{
+    fs,
+    path::{Path, PathBuf},
+};
+
+/// TEST ONLY! Loads the specified asset into the binary at compile time.
+///
+/// For testing-assets only!
+/// The asset must be present at `{crate}/test/assets/{file}`
+#[doc(hidden)]
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! get_test_asset {
+    ($file:expr) => {
+        include_bytes!(concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/tests/assets/", $file))
+    };
+}
+
+pub fn get_cert_asset_path<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> PathBuf {
+    let mut p = std::path::PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"));
+    p.push("tests");
+    p.push("assets");
+    p.push("cert");
+    p.push(path);
+    println!("CERT path: {}", p.to_str().unwrap());
+    p
+}
+
+pub fn get_cert_asset_path_string(path: &'static str) -> String {
+    get_cert_asset_path(path)
+        .into_os_string()
+        .into_string()
+        .unwrap()
+}
+/// TEST ONLY! Load an cert
+///
+/// panic on errors
+pub fn get_cert_asset(path: &'static str) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let p = get_cert_asset_path(path);
+    fs::read(p).unwrap()
+}
+
+/// TEST ONLY! Load cert found in the asset path
+///
+/// panic on errors
+pub fn load_gen_cert(asset_path: &'static str) -> X509 {
+    let buf = get_cert_asset(asset_path);
+    let mut cert = X509::from_der(&buf)
+        .map(|crt| vec![crt])
+        .or_else(|_| X509::stack_from_pem(&buf))
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(cert.len(), 1);
+    cert.pop().unwrap()
+}
+
+/// TEST ONLY! Load the crl found in the asset path
+///
+/// panic on errors
+pub fn load_gen_crl(asset_path: &'static str) -> X509Crl {
+    let buf = get_cert_asset(asset_path);
+
+    X509Crl::from_der(&buf)
+        .or_else(|_| X509Crl::from_pem(&buf))
+        .unwrap()
+}
+
+/// TEST ONLY! Get a fixed private/public pair and a fixed public key
+///
+/// Intened for TESTING only. All parts of the key including the private key are checked in git and
+/// visible for the public
+pub fn get_test_keys() -> (PKey<Private>, PKey<Public>) {
+    let pub_key = get_test_asset!("keys/public_cust.bin");
+    let priv_key = get_test_asset!("keys/private_cust.bin");
+    let host_key = get_test_asset!("keys/host.pem.crt");
+
+    assert_eq!(pub_key.len(), 160);
+    assert_eq!(priv_key.len(), 80);
+
+    let cust_key = get_keypair(pub_key, priv_key).unwrap();
+    let host_key = X509::from_pem(host_key).unwrap().public_key().unwrap();
+
+    (cust_key, host_key)
+}
+
+fn read_ecdh_pubkey(coords: &[u8]) -> Result<PKey<Public>, ErrorStack> {
+    assert!(coords.len() == 160);
+    let x = BigNum::from_slice(&coords[..80])?;
+    let y = BigNum::from_slice(&coords[80..])?;
+    let group = EcGroup::from_curve_name(Nid::SECP521R1)?;
+
+    let key = EcKey::from_public_key_affine_coordinates(&group, &x, &y)?;
+    PKey::from_ec_key(key)
+}
+
+fn get_keypair(pub_coords: &[u8], priv_num: &[u8]) -> Result<PKey<Private>, ErrorStack> {
+    assert!(pub_coords.len() == 160);
+    assert!(priv_num.len() == 80);
+    let pub_key = read_ecdh_pubkey(pub_coords)?;
+    let pub_key = pub_key.ec_key()?;
+    let pub_key = pub_key.public_key();
+    let priv_key = BigNum::from_slice(priv_num)?;
+    let group = EcGroup::from_curve_name(Nid::SECP521R1)?;
+
+    let key = EcKey::from_private_components(&group, &priv_key, pub_key)?;
+    key.check_key()?;
+    PKey::from_ec_key(key)
+}

rust/pv/src/utils.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+use crate::{Error, Result};
+use openssl::{
+    pkey::{PKey, Private},
+    x509::{X509Crl, X509},
+};
+
+/// Read all CRLs from the buffer and parse them into a vector.
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// This function will return an error if the underlying OpenSSL implementation cannot parse `buf`
+/// as `DER` or `PEM`.
+pub fn read_crls(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<X509Crl>> {
+    use openssl_extensions::crl::StackableX509Crl;
+    X509Crl::from_der(buf)
+        .map(|crl| vec![crl])
+        .or_else(|_| StackableX509Crl::stack_from_pem(buf))
+        .map_err(Error::Crypto)
+}
+
+/// Read all certificates from the buffer and parse them into a vector.
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// This function will return an error if the underlying OpenSSL implementation cannot parse `buf`
+
+pub fn read_certs(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<X509>> {
+    X509::from_der(buf)
+        .map(|crt| vec![crt])
+        .or_else(|_| X509::stack_from_pem(buf))
+        .map_err(Error::Crypto)
+}
+
+/// Read+parse the first key from the buffer.
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// This function will return an error if the underlying OpenSSL implementation cannot parse `buf`
+/// as `DER` or `PEM`.
+pub fn read_private_key(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<PKey<Private>> {
+    PKey::private_key_from_der(buf)
+        .or_else(|_| PKey::private_key_from_pem(buf))
+        .map_err(Error::Crypto)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use crate::{get_test_asset, test_utils::*};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn read_crls() {
+        let crl = get_cert_asset("ibm.crl");
+        let crl_der = get_cert_asset("der.crl");
+        let fail = get_cert_asset("ibm.crt");
+        assert_eq!(super::read_crls(&crl).unwrap().len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(super::read_crls(&crl_der).unwrap().len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(super::read_crls(&fail).unwrap().len(), 0);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn read_certs() {
+        let crt = get_cert_asset("ibm.crt");
+        let crt_der = get_cert_asset("der.crt");
+        let fail = get_cert_asset("ibm.crl");
+        assert_eq!(super::read_certs(&crt).unwrap().len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(super::read_certs(&crt_der).unwrap().len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(super::read_certs(&fail).unwrap().len(), 0);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn read_private_key() {
+        let key = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa3072key.pem");
+        let key = super::read_private_key(key).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(key.rsa().unwrap().size(), 384);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn read_private_key_fail() {
+        let key = get_test_asset!("exp/secure_guest.hdr");
+        let key = super::read_private_key(key);
+        assert!(key.is_err());
+    }
+}

rust/pv/src/uvsecret.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+//! Provides functionality to manage the UV secret store.
+//!
+//! Provides functionality to build `add-secret` requests.
+//! Also provides interfaces, to dispatch `Add Secret`, `Lock Secret Store`,
+//! and `List Secrets` requests,
+pub mod asrcb;
+pub mod ext_secret;
+pub mod guest_secret;
+pub mod user_data;

rust/pv/src/uvsecret/asrcb.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+use super::user_data::UserData;
+use crate::{
+    assert_size,
+    misc::Flags,
+    request::{
+        hkdf_rfc_5869,
+        openssl::{
+            pkey::{PKey, Private, Public},
+            Md,
+        },
+        uvsecret::{ExtSecret, GuestSecret},
+        Aad, BootHdrTags, Keyslot, ReqEncrCtx, Request, Secret,
+    },
+    uv::{ConfigUid, UvFlags},
+    Result,
+};
+use pv_core::request::RequestVersion;
+use zerocopy::AsBytes;
+
+/// Internal wrapper for Guest Secret, so that we can dump it in the form the UV wants it to be
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+struct BinGuestSecret(GuestSecret);
+impl BinGuestSecret {
+    /// Reference to the confidential data
+    fn confidential(&self) -> &[u8] {
+        match &self.0 {
+            GuestSecret::Null => &[],
+            GuestSecret::Association { secret, .. } => secret.value().as_slice(),
+        }
+    }
+    fn dump_auth(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        match &self.0 {
+            GuestSecret::Null => vec![0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
+            GuestSecret::Association { id, .. } => {
+                let mut buf = vec![0; 48];
+                buf[3] = 2;
+                buf[7] = 0x20;
+                buf[16..48].copy_from_slice(id.as_slice());
+                buf
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<GuestSecret> for BinGuestSecret {
+    fn from(secret: GuestSecret) -> Self {
+        BinGuestSecret(secret)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Authenticated data w/o user data
+#[repr(C)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, AsBytes)]
+struct ReqAuthData {
+    flags: UvFlags,
+    boot_tags: BootHdrTags,
+    cuid: ConfigUid,
+    reserved90: [u8; 0x100],
+}
+assert_size!(ReqAuthData, 0x1e8);
+
+impl ReqAuthData {
+    fn new<F: Into<UvFlags>>(boot_tags: BootHdrTags, flags: F) -> Self {
+        ReqAuthData {
+            flags: flags.into(),
+            boot_tags,
+            cuid: [0; 0x10],
+            reserved90: [0; 0x100],
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+struct ReqConfData {
+    secret: BinGuestSecret,
+    extension_secret: Secret<[u8; 32]>,
+}
+
+impl ReqConfData {
+    fn to_bytes(&self) -> Secret<Vec<u8>> {
+        let secret = self.secret.confidential();
+
+        let mut v = vec![0; secret.len() + 32];
+        if !secret.is_empty() {
+            v[..secret.len()].copy_from_slice(secret);
+        }
+        v[secret.len()..32 + secret.len()]
+            .copy_from_slice(self.extension_secret.value().as_slice());
+        v.into()
+    }
+}
+
+/// Flags for [`AddSecretRequest`]
+#[derive(Default, Clone, Copy, Debug)]
+pub struct AddSecretFlags(UvFlags);
+impl AddSecretFlags {
+    /// Enables the disable-dump flag
+    ///
+    /// After the request was dispatched successfully,
+    /// the UV will not provide any dump decryption information for the SE-guest anymore.
+    pub fn set_disable_dump(&mut self) {
+        self.0.set_bit(0)
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<&u64> for AddSecretFlags {
+    fn from(v: &u64) -> Self {
+        Self(v.into())
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<AddSecretFlags> for UvFlags {
+    fn from(f: AddSecretFlags) -> Self {
+        f.0
+    }
+}
+
+/// Versions for [`AddSecretRequest`]
+#[repr(u32)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum AddSecretVersion {
+    /// Version 1 (= 0x0100)
+    One = 0x0100,
+
+    #[cfg(not(doc))]
+    #[cfg(any(debug_assertions, test))]
+    /// Only for testing
+    Inv = 0,
+}
+
+impl From<AddSecretVersion> for RequestVersion {
+    fn from(val: AddSecretVersion) -> Self {
+        val as RequestVersion
+    }
+}
+
+/// Add-secret request Control Block
+///
+/// An ASRCB wraps a secret to transport it securely to the Ultravisor.
+///
+/// Layout:
+///```none
+/// _______________________________________________________________
+/// |                   generic header (48)
+/// |     ---------------------------------------------------     |
+/// |  Plaintext Add-Secret flags (8)                             |
+/// |  SE header tags: PLD(64) ALD(64) TLD(64) HeaderTag(16)      |
+/// |  Configuration unique ID(16) (Attestation)                  |
+/// |       Optional, defaults to 0                               |
+/// |  Reserved(256)                                              |
+/// |  User Data(512) (reserved)                                  |
+/// |  Customer Public Key (160) generated for each request       |
+/// |  N Keyslots(80 each)                                        |
+/// |  Secret header (Secret dependent)                           |
+/// |     ---------------------------------------------------     |
+/// |  Secret to add (Secret type dependent)(may be 0 bytes)      | Encrypted
+/// |  Extension secret(32) Optional, defaults to 0               | Encrypted
+/// |     ---------------------------------------------------     |
+/// |                   AES GCM Tag (16)                          |
+/// |_____________________________________________________________|
+///```
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct AddSecretRequest {
+    version: AddSecretVersion,
+    aad: ReqAuthData,
+    keyslots: Vec<Keyslot>,
+    conf: ReqConfData,
+    user_data: UserData,
+}
+
+impl AddSecretRequest {
+    /// Offset of the user-data in the add-secret request in bytes
+    pub(super) const V1_USER_DATA_OFFS: usize = 0x218;
+
+    /// Create a new add-secret request.
+    ///
+    /// The request has no extension secret, no configuration UID, no host-keys,
+    /// and no user data
+    ///
+    pub fn new(
+        version: AddSecretVersion,
+        secret: GuestSecret,
+        boot_tags: BootHdrTags,
+        flags: AddSecretFlags,
+    ) -> Self {
+        AddSecretRequest {
+            conf: ReqConfData {
+                extension_secret: Secret::new([0; 32]),
+                secret: secret.into(),
+            },
+            aad: ReqAuthData::new(boot_tags, flags),
+            keyslots: vec![],
+            version,
+            user_data: UserData::Null,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Sets the Configuration Unique Id of this [`AddSecretRequest`].
+    pub fn set_cuid(&mut self, cuid: ConfigUid) {
+        self.aad.cuid = cuid;
+    }
+
+    /// Sets the extension secret of this [`AddSecretRequest`].
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// This function will return an error if the key derivation fails for a [`ExtSecret::Derived`].
+    pub fn set_ext_secret(&mut self, ext_secret: ExtSecret) -> Result<()> {
+        const DER_EXT_SECRET_INFO: &[u8] = "IBM Z Ultravisor Add-Secret".as_bytes();
+        self.conf.extension_secret = match ext_secret {
+            ExtSecret::Simple(s) => s,
+            ExtSecret::Derived(cck) => hkdf_rfc_5869(
+                Md::sha512(),
+                cck.value(),
+                self.aad.boot_tags.seht(),
+                DER_EXT_SECRET_INFO,
+            )?
+            .into(),
+        };
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Returns a reference to the guest secret of this [`AddSecretRequest`].
+    pub fn guest_secret(&self) -> &GuestSecret {
+        &self.conf.secret.0
+    }
+
+    /// Add user-data to the Add-Secret request
+    ///
+    /// (Signed) user-data is a non-architectual feature. It allows to add arbitrary
+    /// data (message) to the request, that is signed optionally with an user defined key.
+    /// Allowed keys are:
+    /// - no key (up to 512 bytes of message)
+    /// - EC SECP521R1 (up to 256 byte message)
+    /// - RSA 2048 bit (up to 256 byte message)
+    /// - RSA 3072 bit (up to 128 byte message)
+    ///
+    /// The signature can be verified during the verification of the secret-request  on the target machine.
+    pub fn set_user_data(&mut self, msg: Vec<u8>, skey: Option<PKey<Private>>) -> Result<()> {
+        self.user_data = UserData::new(skey, msg)?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// compiles the authenticated area of this request
+    fn aad(&self, ctx: &ReqEncrCtx, conf_len: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let cust_pub_key = ctx.key_coords()?;
+        let secr_auth = self.conf.secret.dump_auth();
+        let user_data = self.user_data.data();
+
+        let mut aad: Vec<Aad> = Vec::with_capacity(5 + self.keyslots.len());
+        aad.push(Aad::Plain(self.aad.as_bytes()));
+        if let Some(data) = user_data.0 {
+            aad.push(Aad::Plain(data));
+        }
+        if let Some(data) = &user_data.1 {
+            aad.push(Aad::Plain(data));
+        }
+        aad.push(Aad::Plain(cust_pub_key.as_ref()));
+        self.keyslots.iter().for_each(|k| aad.push(Aad::Ks(k)));
+        aad.push(Aad::Plain(&secr_auth));
+
+        ctx.build_aad(self.version.into(), &aad, conf_len, self.user_data.magic())
+    }
+
+    #[doc(hidden)]
+    #[cfg(any(debug_assertions, test))]
+    pub fn aad_and_conf(&self, ctx: &ReqEncrCtx) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>)> {
+        let conf = self.conf.to_bytes();
+        let aad = self.aad(ctx, conf.value().len())?;
+        Ok((aad, conf.value().to_owned()))
+    }
+
+    #[doc(hidden)]
+    #[cfg(any(debug_assertions, test))]
+    pub fn no_encrypt(&self, ctx: &ReqEncrCtx) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let (mut res, mut conf) = self.aad_and_conf(ctx)?;
+        res.append(&mut conf);
+        res.append(&mut vec![0x24; 32]);
+        Ok(res)
+    }
+
+    /// encrypt data, sign request with user-provided signing key, insert signature into aad,
+    /// calculate request tag
+    fn encrypt_with_signed_user_data(&self, ctx: &ReqEncrCtx) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        //encrypt data w/o aead
+        let conf = self.conf.to_bytes();
+        let aad = self.aad(ctx, conf.value().len())?;
+        let (mut buf, aad_range, encr_range, _) = ctx.encrypt_aead(&aad, conf.value())?;
+
+        drop(aad);
+
+        // sign aad+encrypted data (w/o tag) with user signning key
+        // add signature to authenticated data starting with USER_DATA_OFFS
+        self.user_data.sign(
+            &mut buf[aad_range.start..encr_range.end],
+            Self::V1_USER_DATA_OFFS,
+        )?;
+
+        // encrypt again with signed data
+        buf[encr_range.clone()].copy_from_slice(conf.value());
+        ctx.encrypt_aead(&buf[aad_range], &buf[encr_range])
+            .map(|(buf, ..)| buf)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Request for AddSecretRequest {
+    fn encrypt(&self, ctx: &ReqEncrCtx) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        match self.user_data {
+            UserData::Null | UserData::Unsigned(_) => {
+                let conf = self.conf.to_bytes();
+                let aad = self.aad(ctx, conf.value().len())?;
+                ctx.encrypt_aead(&aad, conf.value()).map(|(buf, ..)| buf)
+            }
+            _ => self.encrypt_with_signed_user_data(ctx),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn add_hostkey(&mut self, hostkey: PKey<Public>) {
+        self.keyslots.push(Keyslot::new(hostkey))
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn guest_secret_bin_null() {
+        let gs: BinGuestSecret = GuestSecret::Null.into();
+        let gs_bytes = gs.dump_auth();
+        let exp = vec![0u8, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0];
+
+        assert_eq!(exp, gs_bytes);
+        assert_eq!(&Vec::<u8>::new(), gs.confidential())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn guest_secret_bin_ap() {
+        let gs: BinGuestSecret = GuestSecret::Association {
+            name: "test".to_string(),
+            id: [1; 32],
+            secret: [2; 32].into(),
+        }
+        .into();
+        let gs_bytes_auth = gs.dump_auth();
+        let mut exp = vec![0u8, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0x20, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0];
+        exp.extend([1; 32]);
+
+        assert_eq!(exp, gs_bytes_auth);
+        assert_eq!(&[2; 32], gs.confidential());
+    }
+}

rust/pv/src/uvsecret/ext_secret.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+use crate::request::Secret;
+
+/// Extension Secret for [`crate::request::uvsecret::AddSecretRequest`]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub enum ExtSecret {
+    /// A bytepattern that must be equal for each request targeting the same SE-guest instance
+    Simple(Secret<[u8; 32]>), // contains the secret
+    /// A secret that is derived from the Customer communication key from the SE-header
+    Derived(Secret<[u8; 32]>), // contains the cck
+}

rust/pv/src/uvsecret/guest_secret.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+#[allow(unused_imports)] //used for more convenient docstring
+use super::asrcb::AddSecretRequest;
+use crate::{
+    request::{hash, openssl::MessageDigest, random_array, Secret},
+    Result,
+};
+use pv_core::for_pv::{ser_gsid, SECRET_ID_SIZE};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::convert::TryInto;
+
+const SECRET_SIZE: usize = 32;
+/// A Secret to be added in [`AddSecretRequest`]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum GuestSecret {
+    /// No guest secret
+    Null,
+    /// Association secret used to associate an extension card to a SE guest
+    ///
+    /// Create Associations using [`GuestSecret::association`]
+    Association {
+        /// Name of the secret
+        name: String,
+        #[serde(serialize_with = "ser_gsid", deserialize_with = "de_gsid")]
+        /// SHA256 hash of [`GuestSecret::Association::name`]
+        id: [u8; SECRET_ID_SIZE],
+        /// Confidential actual assocuiation secret (32 bytes)
+        #[serde(skip)]
+        secret: Secret<[u8; SECRET_SIZE]>,
+    },
+}
+
+impl GuestSecret {
+    /// Create a new [`GuestSecret::Association`].
+    ///
+    /// * `name` - Name of the secret. Will be hashed into a 32 byte id
+    /// * `secret` - Value of the secret. Ranom if [`Option::None`]
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// This function will return an error if OpenSSL cannot create a hash.
+    pub fn association<O>(name: &str, secret: O) -> Result<GuestSecret>
+    where
+        O: Into<Option<[u8; SECRET_SIZE]>>,
+    {
+        let id = hash(MessageDigest::sha256(), name.as_bytes())?.to_vec();
+        let secret = match secret.into() {
+            Some(s) => s,
+            None => random_array()?,
+        };
+
+        Ok(GuestSecret::Association {
+            name: name.to_string(),
+            id: id.try_into().unwrap(),
+            secret: secret.into(),
+        })
+    }
+}
+fn de_gsid<'de, D>(de: D) -> Result<[u8; 32], D::Error>
+where
+    D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
+{
+    struct FieldVisitor;
+
+    impl<'de> serde::de::Visitor<'de> for FieldVisitor {
+        type Value = [u8; SECRET_ID_SIZE];
+        fn expecting(&self, formatter: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> std::fmt::Result {
+            formatter.write_str("a `32 bytes long hexstring` prepended with 0x")
+        }
+        fn visit_str<E>(self, s: &str) -> Result<Self::Value, E>
+        where
+            E: serde::de::Error,
+        {
+            if s.len() != SECRET_ID_SIZE * 2 + 2 {
+                return Err(serde::de::Error::invalid_length(s.len(), &self));
+            }
+            let nb = s.strip_prefix("0x").ok_or_else(|| {
+                serde::de::Error::invalid_value(serde::de::Unexpected::Str(s), &self)
+            })?;
+            crate::misc::parse_hex(nb)
+                .try_into()
+                .map_err(|_| serde::de::Error::invalid_value(serde::de::Unexpected::Str(s), &self))
+        }
+    }
+    de.deserialize_identifier(FieldVisitor)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+    use super::*;
+    use serde_test::{assert_tokens, Token};
+
+    //todo test GuestSecret::association
+    #[test]
+    fn association() {
+        let secret_value = [0x11; 32];
+        let exp_id = [
+            0x75, 0xad, 0x01, 0xb4, 0x03, 0xa9, 0xe4, 0x59, 0x5d, 0xf0, 0x7a, 0xce, 0x38, 0x12,
+            0x97, 0x99, 0xdd, 0xad, 0x90, 0x8a, 0x8f, 0x82, 0xf9, 0xc3, 0x2c, 0xdd, 0x7d, 0x53,
+            0xef, 0xc7, 0x3c, 0x62,
+        ];
+        let name = "association secret".to_string();
+        let secret = GuestSecret::association("association secret", secret_value).unwrap();
+        let exp = GuestSecret::Association {
+            name,
+            id: exp_id,
+            secret: secret_value.into(),
+        };
+        assert_eq!(secret, exp);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ap_asc_parse() {
+        let id = [
+            0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab,
+            0xcd, 0xef, 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67,
+            0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef,
+        ];
+        let asc = GuestSecret::Association {
+            name: "test123".to_string(),
+            id,
+            secret: [0; 32].into(),
+        };
+
+        assert_tokens(
+            &asc,
+            &[
+                Token::StructVariant {
+                    name: "GuestSecret",
+                    variant: "Association",
+                    len: 2,
+                },
+                Token::String("name"),
+                Token::String("test123"),
+                Token::String("id"),
+                Token::String("0x0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"),
+                Token::StructVariantEnd,
+            ],
+        );
+    }
+}