New release s390-tools-2.31.0

Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>

.codespell.ignore

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
 parm
 parms
 crate
-ser
-deriver

.editorconfig

@@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ indent_size = 4
 [{Makefile,*.mak}]
 indent_style = tab
 
-[COMMIT_EDITMSG]
+[{COMMIT_EDITMSG,EDIT_DESCRIPTION}]
 max_line_length = 72

.gitignore

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ cpacfstats/cpacfstatsd
 cpumf/chcpumf
 cpumf/lscpumf
 cpumf/lshwc
+cpumf/lspai
 cpumf/pai
 cpuplugd/cpuplugd
 dasdfmt/dasdfmt

.pre-commit-config.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+exclude: \.(crt|crl)$
+repos:
+  - repo: https://github.com/pre-commit/pre-commit-hooks
+    rev: v4.1.0
+    hooks:
+      - id: check-merge-conflict
+      - id: end-of-file-fixer
+      - id: mixed-line-ending
+      - id: trailing-whitespace
+      - id: check-executables-have-shebangs
+      - id: check-shebang-scripts-are-executable
+        exclude_types: ['rust']
+  - repo: local
+    hooks:
+      - id: git-clang-format
+        name: git-clang-format
+        description: Run git-clang-format
+        entry: git
+        args: [clang-format, --staged, --]
+        pass_filenames: true
+        language: system
+        require_serial: true
+        minimum_pre_commit_version: "2.9.0"
+        types_or: [c++, c]
+  - repo: https://github.com/codespell-project/codespell
+    rev: v2.2.1
+    hooks:
+      - id: codespell
+        exclude_types: ['rust']
+  - repo: https://github.com/jumanjihouse/pre-commit-hooks
+    rev: 3.0.0
+    hooks:
+      - id: shellcheck
+        args: ["--external-sources"]

.shellcheckrc

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Search in the current script's directory by default (since 0.7.0)
+source-path=SCRIPTDIR
+
+# Allow external-sources (since 0.8.0)
+external-sources=true

AUTHORS.md

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ List of all individuals having contributed content to s390-tools
 - Eberhard Pasch
 - Eduard Shishkin
 - Einar Lueck
+- Eric Farman
 - Eric Sandeen
 - Erwin Vicari
 - Eugene Crosser
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ List of all individuals having contributed content to s390-tools
 - Farhan Ali
 - Fedor Loshakov
 - Felix Beck
+- Finn Callies
 - Frank Blaschka
 - Frank Heimes
 - Frank Munzert
@@ -56,6 +58,7 @@ List of all individuals having contributed content to s390-tools
 - Horst Hummel
 - Ingo Franzki
 - Ingo Tuchscherer
+- Jakub Čajka
 - Jan Glauber
 - Jan Höppner
 - Jan Willeke
@@ -124,6 +127,8 @@ List of all individuals having contributed content to s390-tools
 - Thomas Richter
 - Thomas Spatzier
 - Thomas Weber
+- Thorsten Winkler
+- Tobias Huschle
 - Tuan Hoang
 - Ursula Braun
 - Utz Bacher
@@ -134,3 +139,4 @@ List of all individuals having contributed content to s390-tools
 - Volker Sameske
 - Wenjia Zhang
 - Wolfgang Taphorn
+- Yaakov Selkowitz

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,6 +1,59 @@
 Release history for s390-tools (MIT version)
 --------------------------------------------
 
+* __v2.31.0 (2024-02-02)__
+
+  For Linux kernel version: 6.7
+
+  General:
+  - common.mak: Set default C/C++ standard to gnu11/gnu++11
+
+  Add new tools / libraries:
+  - pvapconfig: Tool to automatically configure APQNs in SE KVM guests
+  - s390-tools: Provide pre-commit configuration
+
+  Changes of existing tools:
+  - cpuplugd: Adjust to CPU 0 being no longer hotpluggable
+  - dbginfo.sh: Check for Dynamic Partition Mode
+  - dbginfo.sh: Update man page and copyright
+  - rust/pv: Add user-data signing and verifying
+  - rust/pvsecret: Add user defined signatures and verifications
+  - zdev/dracut: Consolidate device configuration
+
+  Bug Fixes:
+  - dbginfo.sh: Fix relative path on script copy
+  - libkmipclient: Fix build with libxml2-2.12.0
+  - pvsecret: Fix panic if empty file is used as host key document
+  - rust/pv: Fix 'elided_lifetimes_in_associated_constant' warning
+
+* __v2.30.0 (2023-12-01)__
+
+  For Linux kernel version: 6.6
+
+  Add new tools / libraries:
+  - lspai: Tool to display PAI counter sets
+  - s390-tools: Provide a ShellCheck configuration
+
+  Changes of existing tools / libraries:
+  - cpumf/pai: Add command line option for realtime scheduling
+  - dbginfo.sh: enhance ethtool collection for ROCE
+  - libutil/util_lockfile: add routine to return owning pid of file lock
+  - lszcrypt: Improve lszcrypt output on SE guests
+  - rust: Use a single workspace for all rust tools
+  - zdev: limit the derivation of ZDEV_SITE_ID
+  - zdump/df_s390: Update 'zgetdump -i' output with zlib info
+  - zdump/dfi_s390: Support reading compressed s390_ext dumps
+  - zipl/boot: Integrate zlib compression to single volume DASD dumper
+  - zipl/boot: compile the bootloaders only if HOST_ARCH is s390x
+  - zipl: Add --no-compress option to zipl command
+  - zkey: Also check for deconfigured and check-stopped cards
+  - dbginfo.sh: fix relative path on script copy
+
+  Bug Fixes:
+  - ap_tools/ap-check: handle get-attributes between pre and post event
+  - libutil: fix util_file_read_*() using wrong format specifiers
+  - rust/pv: fix Invalid write of size 1
+
 * __v2.29.0 (2023-08-04)__
 
   For Linux kernel version: 6.5

README.md

@@ -386,6 +386,24 @@ the different tools are provided:
   - Packages: blktrace, multipath-tools, sg3-utils
   - Tools: rsync, tar, lsscsi
 
+* zipl
+  For CCW-type DASD dump, zlib compression can be used to compress the dump
+  data before writing it to the DASD partition. It can benefit from
+  s390 on-chip compression accelerator (DFLTCC) and provide a faster dumping
+  process, hence lower system downtime.
+  The zlib version integrated with zipl (zipl/boot/zlib) is based on the Linux
+  kernel zlib (kernel version 6.3) which represents zlib version 1.1.3 with a
+  limited number of functions and a number of updates on top including s390
+  hardware compression (DFLTCC) support. Also, all memory allocations are
+  performed in advance, which aligns with zipl requirements.
+  The CCW-type standalone dumper is built as a single binary and must be
+  loaded to stage2 during boot. Hence, all required zlib functions must be
+  integrated into it, and its size is restricted. To limit the size, only
+  deflate-related parts are integrated (no decompression is required during
+  dumping).
+  Removing the inflate modules and function prototypes are the only major
+  modifications made to the kernel version of zlib.
+
 * zgetdump
   For building zgetdump you need OpenSSL version 1.1.0 or newer
   installed (openssl-devel.rpm). Also required is glib2

ap_tools/ap-check.c

@@ -798,12 +798,34 @@ static int ap_check_handle_get_attributes(struct ap_check_anchor *anc)
 	FILE *f;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = ap_get_lock_callout();
-	if (rc) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to acquire configuration lock %d\n", rc);
-		return -1;
+	/*
+	 * For the get-attributes callout, we are typically called without the
+	 * callout lock held.  However, there is a particular scenario (define
+	 * of an active mdev) where we may or may not be called with the lock
+	 * already held on behalf of mdevctl, depending on the mdevctl version.
+	 * Let's test for lock ownership first and, if already owned by the
+	 * parent (mdevctl) proceed rather than waiting on the file lock.
+	 */
+	rc = ap_try_lock_callout();
+	switch (rc) {
+	case 0:
+		/* Lock acquired */
+		anc->cleanup_lock = true;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		/* Lock held by parent -- trust the lock will remain held */
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Lock not acquired or held by parent -- do a normal obtain */
+		rc = ap_get_lock_callout();
+		if (rc) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+				"Failed to acquire configuration lock %d\n",
+				rc);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		anc->cleanup_lock = true;
 	}
-	anc->cleanup_lock = true;
 
 	/*
 	 * Read the 'matrix' and 'control_domains' attributes to get the

common.mak

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ endif
 # The variable "DISTRELEASE" should be overwritten in rpm spec files with:
 # "make DISTRELEASE=%{release}" and "make install DISTRELEASE=%{release}"
 VERSION            = 2
-RELEASE            = 29
+RELEASE            = 31
 PATCHLEVEL         = 0
 DISTRELEASE        = build-$(shell date +%Y%m%d)
 S390_TOOLS_RELEASE = $(VERSION).$(RELEASE).$(PATCHLEVEL)-$(DISTRELEASE)
@@ -93,19 +93,19 @@ define cmd_define_and_export
 endef
 
 define define_toolchain_variables
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,     AS$(1),"  AS$(1)          ",$(2)as))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,     CC$(1),"  CC$(1)          ",$(2)gcc))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,   LINK$(1),"  LINK$(1)        ",$$(CC$(1))))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,    CXX$(1),"  CXX$(1)         ",$(2)g++))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export, LINKXX$(1),"  LINKXX$(1)      ",$$(CXX$(1))))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,    CPP$(1),"  CPP$(1)         ",$(2)gcc -E))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,     AR$(1),"  AR$(1)          ",$(2)ar))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,     NM$(1),"  NM$(1)          ",$(2)nm))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,  STRIP$(1),"  STRIP$(1)       ",$(2)strip))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,OBJCOPY$(1),"  OBJCOPY$(1)     ",$(2)objcopy))
-	$(eval $(call cmd_define_and_export,OBJDUMP$(1),"  OBJDUMP$(1)     ",$(2)objdump))
-	$(eval PKG_CONFIG$(1) = pkg-config)
-	$(eval export PKG_CONFIG$(1))
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,     AS$(1),"  AS$(1)          ",$(2)as)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,     CC$(1),"  CC$(1)          ",$(2)gcc)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,   LINK$(1),"  LINK$(1)        ",$$(CC$(1)))
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,    CXX$(1),"  CXX$(1)         ",$(2)g++)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export, LINKXX$(1),"  LINKXX$(1)      ",$$(CXX$(1)))
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,    CPP$(1),"  CPP$(1)         ",$(2)gcc -E)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,     AR$(1),"  AR$(1)          ",$(2)ar)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,     NM$(1),"  NM$(1)          ",$(2)nm)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,  STRIP$(1),"  STRIP$(1)       ",$(2)strip)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,OBJCOPY$(1),"  OBJCOPY$(1)     ",$(2)objcopy)
+	$(call cmd_define_and_export,OBJDUMP$(1),"  OBJDUMP$(1)     ",$(2)objdump)
+	PKG_CONFIG$(1) = pkg-config
+	export PKG_CONFIG$(1)
 endef
 
 # If the host architecture is not the same as the build architecture
@@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ ifneq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(BUILD_ARCH))
   endif
 endif
 
-$(call define_toolchain_variables,_FOR_BUILD,)
-$(call define_toolchain_variables,,$(CROSS_COMPILE))
+$(eval $(call define_toolchain_variables,_FOR_BUILD,))
+$(eval $(call define_toolchain_variables,,$(CROSS_COMPILE)))
 
 
 $(eval $(call cmd_define,    RUNTEST,"  RUNTEST     ",$(S390_TEST_LIB_PATH)/s390_runtest))
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ ZFCPDUMP_FLAVOR	= zfcpdump
 export ZFCPDUMP_DIR ZFCPDUMP_IMAGE ZFCPDUMP_INITRD ZFCPDUMP_FLAVOR
 
 CFLAGS		 ?= $(DEFAULT_CFLAGS) $(OPT_FLAGS)
-CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD ?= $(DEFAULT_CFLAGS) $(OPT_FLAGS)
+CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD ?= -std=gnu11 $(DEFAULT_CFLAGS) $(OPT_FLAGS)
 CPPFLAGS	 ?= $(DEFAULT_CPPFLAGS)
 LDFLAGS		 ?= $(DEFAULT_LDFLAGS)
 
@@ -313,14 +313,14 @@ ALL_CFLAGS	= -DS390_TOOLS_RELEASE=$(S390_TOOLS_RELEASE) \
 			-DS390_TOOLS_DATADIR=$(TOOLS_DATADIR) \
 			-DS390_TOOLS_SYSCONFDIR=$(SYSCONFDIR) \
 			-DS390_TOOLS_BINDIR=$(BINDIR) \
-			$(CFLAGS)
+			-std=gnu11 $(CFLAGS)
 CXXFLAGS	?= $(DEFAULT_CFLAGS) $(OPT_FLAGS)
 ALL_CXXFLAGS	= -DS390_TOOLS_RELEASE=$(S390_TOOLS_RELEASE) \
 			-DS390_TOOLS_LIBDIR=$(TOOLS_LIBDIR) \
 			-DS390_TOOLS_DATADIR=$(TOOLS_DATADIR) \
 			-DS390_TOOLS_SYSCONFDIR=$(SYSCONFDIR) \
 			-DS390_TOOLS_BINDIR=$(BINDIR) \
-			$(CXXFLAGS)
+			-std=gnu++11 $(CXXFLAGS)
 ALL_CPPFLAGS	= -I $(rootdir)include $(CPPFLAGS)
 ALL_LDFLAGS	= $(LDFLAGS)
 

cpacfstats/cpacfstats.1

@@ -355,13 +355,13 @@ PCKMO DES,
 .IP \(bu
 PCKMO 2key TDES,
 .IP \(bu
-PCMKO TDES,
+PCKMO TDES,
 .IP \(bu
 PCKMO AES 128bit,
 .IP \(bu
 PCKMO AES 192bit,
 .IP \(bu
-PCMKO AES 256bit,
+PCKMO AES 256bit,
 .IP \(bu
 PCKMO ECC P256,
 .IP \(bu

cpacfstats/cpacfstats.c

@@ -204,10 +204,10 @@ static const char *const pai_str[] = {
 	[142] = "KDSA EdDSA Sign Ed448 protected key",
 	[143] = "PCKMO DES",
 	[144] = "PCKMO 2key TDES",
-	[145] = "PCMKO TDES",
+	[145] = "PCKMO TDES",
 	[146] = "PCKMO AES 128bit",
 	[147] = "PCKMO AES 192bit",
-	[148] = "PCMKO AES 256bit",
+	[148] = "PCKMO AES 256bit",
 	[149] = "PCKMO ECC P256",
 	[150] = "PCKMO ECC P384",
 	[151] = "PCKMO ECC P521",

cpumf/Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 include ../common.mak
 
-BIN_FILES = lscpumf chcpumf lshwc pai
-MAN_FILES = lscpumf.8 chcpumf.8 lshwc.8 pai.8
+BIN_FILES = lscpumf chcpumf lshwc pai lspai
+MAN_FILES = lscpumf.8 chcpumf.8 lshwc.8 pai.8 lspai.8
 
 all: $(BIN_FILES)
 
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ lscpumf: lscpumf.o $(libs)
 chcpumf: chcpumf.o $(libs)
 lshwc: lshwc.o $(libs)
 pai: pai.o $(libs)
+lspai: lspai.o $(libs)
 
 install: all install-man
 	$(INSTALL) -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR) $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/man8

cpumf/lspai.c

@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+/* Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+ *
+ * s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
+ */
+
+/* List available Processor Assist Instrumentation (PAI) counters.  */
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <err.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "lib/util_opt.h"
+#include "lib/util_prg.h"
+#include "lib/util_base.h"
+#include "lib/util_path.h"
+#include "lib/util_scandir.h"
+#include "lib/util_libc.h"
+#include "lib/util_file.h"
+#include "lib/util_list.h"
+#include "lib/libcpumf.h"
+
+static struct util_opt opt_vec[] = {
+	UTIL_OPT_SECTION("OPTIONS"),
+	{
+		.option = { "numeric", no_argument, NULL, 'n' },
+		.desc = "Sort PAI counters by counter number"
+	},
+	{
+		.option = { "type", required_argument, NULL, 't' },
+		.argument = "TYPE",
+		.desc = "Type of PAI counters to show: crypto, nnpa"
+	},
+	UTIL_OPT_HELP,
+	UTIL_OPT_VERSION,
+	UTIL_OPT_END
+};
+
+static const struct util_prg prg = {
+	.desc = "List Processor Assist Information counter sets",
+	.copyright_vec = {
+		{
+			.owner = "IBM Corp.",
+			.pub_first = 2023,
+			.pub_last = 2023,
+		},
+		UTIL_PRG_COPYRIGHT_END
+	}
+};
+
+static bool numsort;		/* If true sort counter numerically */
+
+#define PAI_PATH	"/bus/event_source/devices/%s"
+
+enum pai_types {		/* Bit mask for supported PAI counters */
+	pai_type_crypto = 0,	/* PAI Crypto Counters */
+	pai_type_nnpa = 1,	/* PAI NNPA Counters */
+	pai_type_max = 2,	/* PAI maximum value, must be last */
+};
+
+static int pai_types_show;
+
+struct pai_ctrname {		/* List of defined counters */
+	char *name;		/* Counter name */
+	unsigned long nr;	/* Counter number */
+};
+
+struct pai_node {		/* Head for PAI counter sets */
+	struct util_list_node node;	/* Successor in PAI counter set list */
+	enum pai_types type;	/* PAI type */
+	int pmu;		/* Assigned PMU type number */
+	const char *name;	/* Counter set name */
+	char *name_uc;		/* Counter set name upper case */
+	const char *sysfs_name;	/* Counter set name in /sysfs tree */
+	const char *filter_name;	/* Counter set name for scandir filter */
+	struct pai_ctrname *ctrlist;	/* List of counter names & numbers */
+	size_t ctrsize;		/* Total size in bytes of ctrlist */
+	int ctridx;		/* Index of last entry used in ctrlist */
+	unsigned long base;	/* Base number for counter set */
+};
+
+static struct util_list pai_list;
+
+/* Return base of counter set, this is the first counter of this set. */
+static unsigned long pai_type_base(enum pai_types t)
+{
+	switch (t) {
+	case pai_type_crypto:
+		return 0x1000;
+	case pai_type_nnpa:
+		return 0x1800;
+	case pai_type_max:
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Test PAI counter name from command line option. */
+static const char *pai_type_name(enum pai_types t)
+{
+	switch (t) {
+	case pai_type_crypto:
+		return "crypto";
+	case pai_type_nnpa:
+		return "nnpa";
+	case pai_type_max:
+		break;
+	}
+	return "unknown";
+}
+
+/* Convert PAI counter type to sysfs directory name. Only validated
+ * input at this time.
+ */
+static const char *pai_type_sysfs(enum pai_types t)
+{
+	if (t == pai_type_crypto)
+		return "pai_crypto";
+	return "pai_ext";
+}
+
+/* Convert PAI counter type to sysfs directory name filter for scandir(). */
+static const char *pai_type_filter(enum pai_types t)
+{
+	if (t == pai_type_nnpa)
+		return "^NNPA";
+	return "[^.]";		/* Matches anything but . and .. in sysfs */
+}
+
+/* Sort PAI counter names by assigned counter number. */
+static int pai_ctrcmp(const void *p1, const void *p2)
+{
+	struct pai_ctrname *l = (struct pai_ctrname *)p1;
+	struct pai_ctrname *r = (struct pai_ctrname *)p2;
+
+	return l->nr > r->nr ? 1 : -1;
+}
+
+/* Convert string to upper case. */
+static char *str2uc(const char *s)
+{
+	char *uc = util_strdup(s), *old_uc = uc;
+
+	for (; *uc; ++uc)
+		*uc = toupper(*uc);
+	return old_uc;
+}
+
+/* Read counter names and assigned event number from sysfs file tree.
+ * Exit when sysfs directory can not be scanned.
+ */
+static void read_counternames(struct pai_node *node)
+{
+	int i, more = 0, ctr = 0, count = 0;
+	struct dirent **namelist = NULL;
+	char *path, *ctrpath;
+
+	/* Read counter names and assigned event number. */
+	path = util_path_sysfs(PAI_PATH "/events", node->sysfs_name);
+	count = util_scandir(&namelist, alphasort, path, node->filter_name);
+	if (count <= 0)
+		errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot open %s", path);
+
+	node->ctrsize = count * sizeof(*node->ctrlist);
+	node->ctrlist = util_malloc(node->ctrsize);
+	for (i = 0; i < count && ctr >= 0; i++) {
+		util_asprintf(&ctrpath, "%s/%s", path, namelist[i]->d_name);
+		if (util_file_read_va(ctrpath, "event=%x", &ctr) == 1) {
+			node->ctrlist[node->ctridx].name = util_strdup(namelist[i]->d_name);
+			node->ctrlist[node->ctridx++].nr = ctr;
+			more++;
+		} else {
+			warnx("Cannot parse %s", ctrpath);
+		}
+		free(ctrpath);
+	}
+	util_scandir_free(namelist, count);
+	free(path);
+
+	if (numsort && more > 1)
+		qsort(node->ctrlist, more, sizeof(*node->ctrlist), pai_ctrcmp);
+}
+
+static void show_painode(void)
+{
+	struct pai_node *node;
+	int indent = 0;
+	int offset = 0;
+
+	util_list_iterate(&pai_list, node) {
+		for (int i = 0; i < node->ctridx; ++i)
+			indent = MAX((size_t)indent, strlen(node->ctrlist[i].name));
+	}
+
+	printf("RAW %*s NAME %*s DESCRIPTION\n", 3, "", indent - 5, "");
+	util_list_iterate(&pai_list, node) {
+		for (int i = 0; i < node->ctridx; ++i) {
+			printf("%d:%ld %s", node->pmu,
+			       node->ctrlist[i].nr, node->ctrlist[i].name);
+
+			offset = indent - strlen(node->ctrlist[i].name) + 1;
+			printf("%*s", offset, "");
+
+			printf("Counter %ld / PAI %s counter set\n",
+			       node->ctrlist[i].nr - node->base, node->name_uc);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/* Release all memory allocated at make_painode(). */
+static void free_painode(void)
+{
+	struct pai_node *next, *node;
+
+	util_list_iterate_safe(&pai_list, node, next) {
+		free(node->name_uc);
+		for (int i = 0; i < node->ctridx; ++i)
+			free(node->ctrlist[i].name);
+		free(node->ctrlist);
+		free(node);
+	}
+}
+
+static void make_painode(enum pai_types t)
+{
+	struct pai_node *node = util_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
+	char *path;
+
+	node->type = t;
+	node->sysfs_name = pai_type_sysfs(t);
+	node->name = pai_type_name(t);
+	node->name_uc = str2uc(node->name);
+	node->filter_name = pai_type_filter(t);
+	node->base = pai_type_base(t);
+
+	/* Read PMU type number. */
+	path = util_path_sysfs(PAI_PATH, node->sysfs_name);
+	node->pmu = libcpumf_pmutype(path);
+	if (node->pmu < 0)
+		errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot open %s", path);
+	free(path);
+
+	read_counternames(node);
+
+	util_list_add_tail(&pai_list, node);
+}
+
+static int painode_cmp(void *a, void *b, void *UNUSED(data))
+{
+	struct pai_node *n1 = (struct pai_node *)a;
+	struct pai_node *n2 = (struct pai_node *)b;
+
+	return n1->pmu < n2->pmu ? -1 : 1;
+}
+
+static void sort_painode(void)
+{
+	util_list_sort(&pai_list, painode_cmp, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Check for hardware support and return false if not available. */
+static bool have_support(enum pai_types t)
+{
+	const char *sysfn = pai_type_sysfs(t);
+	char *path = util_path_sysfs(PAI_PATH, sysfn);
+	bool rc = true;
+
+	if (!util_path_is_dir(path)) {
+		warnx("No support for PAI %s facility", pai_type_name(t));
+		rc = false;
+	}
+	free(path);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the argument for option -t. It must be a valid PAI counter set.
+ * Exit when an invalid PAI counter set name has been specified.
+ */
+static void check_type_name(const char *type)
+{
+	bool no_match = true;
+	enum pai_types i;
+	const char *fn;
+
+	for (i = pai_type_crypto; i < pai_type_max; ++i) {
+		fn = pai_type_name(i);
+		if (!strcasecmp(fn, type)) {
+			pai_types_show |= (1 << i);
+			no_match = false;
+		}
+	}
+	if (no_match)
+		errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Invalid argument for -t %s", type);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int ch;
+
+	util_list_init(&pai_list, struct pai_node, node);
+	util_prg_init(&prg);
+	util_opt_init(opt_vec, NULL);
+
+	while ((ch = util_opt_getopt_long(argc, argv)) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		default:
+			util_opt_print_parse_error(ch, argv);
+			return EXIT_FAILURE;
+		case 'h':
+			util_prg_print_help();
+			util_opt_print_help();
+			return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+		case 'v':
+			util_prg_print_version();
+			return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+		case 'n':
+			numsort = true;
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			check_type_name(optarg);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Nothing specified, show all PAI counters */
+	if (!pai_types_show)
+		pai_types_show = (1 << pai_type_crypto) | (1 << pai_type_nnpa);
+
+	/* Check for hardware support */
+	for (enum pai_types i = pai_type_crypto; i < pai_type_max; ++i) {
+		if ((pai_types_show & (1 << i))) {
+			if (!have_support(i))
+				pai_types_show &= ~(1 << i);
+			else
+				make_painode(i);
+		}
+	}
+	sort_painode();
+	show_painode();
+	free_painode();
+	return ch;
+}

cpumf/man/lspai.8

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+.\" lspai.8
+.\"
+.\"
+.\" Copyright IBM Corp. 2021
+.\" s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+.\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
+.\" ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+.ds c \fBlspai\fP
+.
+.TH \*c "8" "August 2023" "s390-tools" "CPU-MF management programs"
+.
+.SH NAME
+\*c \- list Processor Activity Instrumentation (PAI) counters
+.
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+\*c
+.RB [ \-n ]
+.RB [ \-t
+.IR "\ TYPE" ]
+.br
+\*c
+.BR \-h | \-\-help
+.br
+\*c
+.BR \-v | \-\-version
+.
+.
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+\*c displays the Processor Activity Instrumentation (PAI) counters
+for Linux on IBM Z.
+The output is a human-readable list of available PAI counter
+names and numbers.
+.SH OPTIONS
+.TP
+.BR \-h ", " \-\-help
+Displays help information, then exits.
+.
+.TP
+.BR \-v ", " \-\-version
+Displays version information, then exits.
+.
+.TP
+.BR \-t ", " \-\-type "\ TYPE"
+Specifies the PAI counter set to list.
+Valid counter set values are
+.I crypto
+and
+.IR nnpa .
+By default, the command lists all available PAI counter sets.
+NNPA refers to the Neural Network Processing Assist facility counter set.
+Crypto refers to the Cryptografic Processing Assist facility counter set.
+.
+.TP
+.BR \-n ", " \-\-numeric
+Shows the PAI counter sets sorted by counter number.
+Default sort order is PAI counter name.
+.
+.SH "EXAMPLE"
+The \*c invocation lists all PAI Neural Network Processing Assist Facility
+(NNPA) counters in numeric order:
+.nf
+# lspai -t nnpa -n
+RAW     NAME			DESCRIPTION
+13:6144 NNPA_ALL		Counter 0 / PAI NNPA counter set
+13:6145 NNPA_ADD		Counter 1 / PAI NNPA counter set
+13:6146 NNPA_SUB		Counter 2 / PAI NNPA counter set
+13:6147 NNPA_MUL		Counter 3 / PAI NNPA counter set
+\&...
+.fi
+The first column shows the raw event number suitable for
+.IR perf "(8)"
+raw event specification.
+The second column shows the PAI NNPA counter name,
+suitable for
+.IR perf "(8)"
+event specification by name.
+The third gives a short explanation, if available.
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.BR pai (8)
+.BR lscpumf (8)

cpumf/man/pai.8

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 .IR size ]
 .RB [ \-i | \-\-interval
 .IR ms ]
+.RB [ \-R | \-\-realtime
+.IR prio ]
 .BR  \-c | \-\-crypto [ \fIcpulist ][: \fIdata\fR "] [" \fIloops\fP ]
 .br
 \*c
@@ -25,6 +27,8 @@
 .IR size ]
 .RB [ \-i | \-\-interval
 .IR ms ]
+.RB [ \-R | \-\-realtime
+.IR prio ]
 .BR  \-n | \-\-nnpa [ \fIcpulist ][: \fIdata\fR "] [" \fIloops\fP ]
 .br
 \*c
@@ -191,6 +195,14 @@ The ring buffer is created with the
 .IR mmap (2)
 system call.
 .
+.TP
+.BR \-R ", " \-\-realtime "\ prio"
+Collect data using the RT SCHED_FIFO priority specified by
+.BR prio .
+Valid values are integers in the range 1 (low) to 99 (high).
+Use this option when gathering data from multiple CPUs
+to prevent data loss.
+.
 .SH ARGUMENT
 The command line options determine how command line
 arguments are interpreted.

cpumf/pai.c

@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static void readmap(int fd)
  * ring buffer per event, sleep some short time and always read all
  * ring buffer for new contents.
  */
-static void collect(unsigned long cnt)
+static int collect(unsigned long cnt)
 {
 	fd_set r_fds, e_fds, a_fds;
 	struct pai_event *p;
@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ static void collect(unsigned long cnt)
 	int rc, max_fd;
 
 	do {
+		rc = -1;
 		max_fd = -1;
 		tv.tv_sec = read_interval / 1000;
 		tv.tv_usec = (1000 * read_interval) % 1000000;
@@ -357,6 +358,7 @@ static void collect(unsigned long cnt)
 			}
 		}
 	} while (rc != -1 && --cnt > 0);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static void lookup_event(__u64 evtnum, __u16 ctr, __u64 value)
@@ -449,6 +451,11 @@ static void evt_show(__u64 evtnum, const char *evtsel, struct pai_event_out *ev)
 		       ev->u.s_comm.tid);
 		break;
 
+	case PERF_RECORD_SWITCH:
+		printf("cs-%s",
+		       (ev->misc & PERF_RECORD_MISC_SWITCH_OUT) ? "out" : "in");
+		break;
+
 	case PERF_RECORD_SWITCH_CPU_WIDE:
 		if (ev->misc & PERF_RECORD_MISC_SWITCH_OUT) {
 			short p = PERF_RECORD_MISC_SWITCH_OUT_PREEMPT;
@@ -549,6 +556,9 @@ static int evt_scan(char *fn, unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
 				offset -= sizeof(__u64);
 			break;
 
+		case PERF_RECORD_SWITCH:
+			break;
+
 		case PERF_RECORD_SWITCH_CPU_WIDE:
 			memcpy(&ev.u, buf + offset, sizeof(ev.u.s_cs));
 			offset += sizeof(ev.u.s_cs);
@@ -583,7 +593,7 @@ static int evt_scan(char *fn, unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
 			break;
 
 		default:
-			printf("unknown header-type %d ", hdr->type);
+			printf("unknown header-type %d\n", hdr->type);
 			offset += hdr->size - sizeof(*hdr);
 			goto bypass;
 		}
@@ -944,6 +954,11 @@ static struct util_opt opt_vec[] = {
 		.option = { "report", no_argument, NULL, 'r' },
 		.desc = "Report file contents"
 	},
+	{
+		.option = { "realtime", required_argument, NULL, 'R' },
+		.argument = "PRIO",
+		.desc = "Collect data with this RT SCHED_FIFO priority"
+	},
 	{
 		.option = { "interval", required_argument, NULL, 'i' },
 		.argument = "NUMBER",
@@ -1007,6 +1022,19 @@ static unsigned long check_mapsize(unsigned long n)
 	return cnt == 1 ? n : 0;
 }
 
+static void setprio(const char *prio)
+{
+	struct sched_param param;
+	char *endstr;
+
+	memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
+	param.sched_priority = strtoul(prio, &endstr, 0);
+	if (*endstr)
+		errno = EINVAL;
+	if (*endstr || sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &param))
+		err(EXIT_FAILURE, "Could not set realtime priority");
+}
+
 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	bool crypto_record = false, report = false;
@@ -1061,6 +1089,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 			record_cpus_nnpa(optarg);
 			nnpa_record = true;
 			break;
+		case 'R':
+			setprio(optarg);
+			break;
 		case 'r':
 			report = true;
 			break;
@@ -1094,12 +1125,12 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 		ev_install(group);
 		ev_enable();
 
-		collect(loop_count);
+		ch = collect(loop_count);
 
 		ev_disable();
 		ev_deinstall();
 		ev_dealloc();
-		return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+		return ch < 0 ? EXIT_FAILURE : EXIT_SUCCESS;
 	}
 
 	/* Must be reporting */

cpuplugd/cpu.c

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ int get_numcpus()
 
 	for (i = 0; ; i++) {
 		/* check whether file exists and is readable */
-		sprintf(path, "/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu%d/online", i);
+		sprintf(path, "/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu%d", i);
 		if (access(path, R_OK) == 0)
 			number++;
 		else
@@ -45,11 +45,13 @@ int get_num_online_cpus()
 	int status = 0;
 	int value_of_onlinefile, rc;
 
-	for (i = 0; i <= get_numcpus(); i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < get_numcpus(); i++) {
 		/* check wether file exists and is readable */
 		sprintf(path, "/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu%d/online", i);
-		if (access(path, R_OK) != 0)
+		if (access(path, R_OK) != 0) {
+			status++;
 			continue;
+		}
 		filp = fopen(path, "r");
 		if (!filp)
 			cpuplugd_exit("Cannot open cpu online file: "
@@ -101,10 +103,8 @@ int hotplug(int cpuid)
 				      cpuid);
 			return -1;
 		}
-	} else {
-		cpuplugd_error("hotplugging cpu with id %d failed\n", cpuid);
-		return -1;
 	}
+	cpuplugd_debug("cpu with id %d cannot be hotplugged\n", cpuid);
 	return -1;
 }
 
@@ -135,9 +135,8 @@ int hotunplug(int cpuid)
 		fclose(filp);
 		if (state == 0)
 			return 1;
-	} else {
-		cpuplugd_error("unplugging cpu with id %d failed\n", cpuid);
 	}
+	cpuplugd_debug("cpu with id %d cannot be hotunplugged\n", cpuid);
 	return retval;
 }
 
@@ -163,6 +162,8 @@ int is_online(int cpuid)
 				retval = 0;
 		}
 		fclose(filp);
+	} else {
+		retval = 1;
 	}
 	return retval;
 }

dasdfmt/dasdfmt.8

@@ -15,13 +15,13 @@ dasdfmt \- formatting of DASD (ECKD) disk drives.
 
 .SH DESCRIPTION
 \fBdasdfmt\fR formats a DASD (ECKD) disk drive to prepare it
-for usage with Linux for S/390. 
+for usage with Linux for S/390.
 The \fIdevice\fR is the node of the device (e.g. '/dev/dasda').
-Any device node created by udev for kernel 2.6 can be used 
+Any device node created by udev for kernel 2.6 can be used
 (e.g. '/dev/dasd/0.0.b100/disc').
 .br
 
-\fBWARNING\fR: Careless usage of \fBdasdfmt\fR can result in 
+\fBWARNING\fR: Careless usage of \fBdasdfmt\fR can result in
 \fBLOSS OF DATA\fR.
 
 .SH OPTIONS
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Print usage and exit.
 
 .TP
 \fB-t\fR or \fB--test\fR
-Disables any modification of the disk drive. 
+Disables any modification of the disk drive.
 .br
 \fBdasdfmt\fR just prints
 out, what it \fBwould\fR do.
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ out, what it \fBwould\fR do.
 Increases verbosity.
 
 .TP
-\fB-y\fR 
+\fB-y\fR
 Start formatting without further user-confirmation.
 
 .TP
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Omit the writing of a disk label after formatting.
 .br
 This makes only sense for the 'ldl' disk layout.
 .br
-The '-L' option has to be specified after the '-d ldl' option. 
+The '-L' option has to be specified after the '-d ldl' option.
 .br
 
 e.g. dasdfmt -d ldl -L /dev/...
@@ -84,13 +84,13 @@ Formats the device with compatible disk layout or linux disk layout.
 \fIlayout\fR is either \fIcdl\fR for the compatible disk layout
 (default) or \fIldl\fR for the linux disk layout.
 .br
-Compatible disk layout means a special handling of the 
-first two tracks of the volume. This enables other S/390 or zSeries 
+Compatible disk layout means a special handling of the
+first two tracks of the volume. This enables other S/390 or zSeries
 operating systems to access this device (e.g. for backup purposes).
 
 .TP
 \fB-p\fR or \fB--progressbar\fR
-Print a progress bar while formatting. 
+Print a progress bar while formatting.
 Do not use this option if you are using a 3270 console,
 running in background or redirecting the output to a file.
 
@@ -164,30 +164,30 @@ and always be a power of two. The recommended blocksize is 4096 bytes.
 
 .TP
 \fB-l\fR \fIvolser\fR or \fB--label\fR=\fIvolser\fR
-Specify the volume serial number or volume identifier to be written 
-to disk after formatting. If no label is specified, a sensible default 
-is used. \fIvolser\fR is interpreted as ASCII string and is automatically 
+Specify the volume serial number or volume identifier to be written
+to disk after formatting. If no label is specified, a sensible default
+is used. \fIvolser\fR is interpreted as ASCII string and is automatically
 converted to uppercase and then to EBCDIC.
 .br
 
 e.g. -l LNX001 or --label=DASD01
 .br
 
-The \fIvolser\fR identifies by serial number the volume. A volume serial 
+The \fIvolser\fR identifies by serial number the volume. A volume serial
 number is 1 through 6 alphanumeric or one of the following special
-characters: $, #, @, %. Enclose a serial number that contains special 
-characters in apostrophes. If the number is shorter than six 
+characters: $, #, @, %. Enclose a serial number that contains special
+characters in apostrophes. If the number is shorter than six
 characters, it is padded with trailing blanks.
-.br 
+.br
 
-Do not code a volume serial number as SCRTCH, PRIVAT, or Lnnnnn (L with 
-five numbers); these are used in OS/390 messages to ask the operator to 
-mount a volume. Do not code a volume serial number as MIGRAT, which is 
-used by the OS/390 Hierarchical Storage Manager DFSMShsm for migrated 
+Do not code a volume serial number as SCRTCH, PRIVAT, or Lnnnnn (L with
+five numbers); these are used in OS/390 messages to ask the operator to
+mount a volume. Do not code a volume serial number as MIGRAT, which is
+used by the OS/390 Hierarchical Storage Manager DFSMShsm for migrated
 data sets.
 .br
 
-NOTE: Try to avoid using special characters in the volume serial. This may cause problems accessing a disk by volser. 
+NOTE: Try to avoid using special characters in the volume serial. This may cause problems accessing a disk by volser.
 .br
 In case you really have to use special characters, make sure you are using quotes. In addition there is a special handling for the '$' sign. Please specify it using '\\$' if necessary.
 .br
@@ -197,9 +197,8 @@ e.g. -l 'a@b\\$c#' to get A@B$C#
 
 .TP
 \fB-k\fR or \fB--keep_volser\fR
-Keeps the Volume Serial Number, when writing the Volume Label. This is
-useful, if the Serial Number has been written with a VM Tool and should not
-be overwritten.
+Keeps the Volume Serial Number when writing the Volume Label. This is useful if
+the volume already has a Serial Number that should not be overwritten.
 .br
 
 .SH SEE ALSO

dump2tar/src/Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Common definitions
 include ../../common.mak
 
-ALL_CPPFLAGS += -I../include -std=gnu99 -Wno-unused-parameter
+ALL_CPPFLAGS += -I../include -Wno-unused-parameter
 LDLIBS  += -lpthread -lrt
 ifneq ($(HAVE_ZLIB),0)
 ALL_CPPFLAGS += -DHAVE_ZLIB

fdasd/fdasd.8

@@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ help:
 .br
      \fBfdasd\fR {-h|-v}
 .SH DESCRIPTION
-\fBfdasd\fR writes a partition table to a cdl (compatible disk layout) 
+\fBfdasd\fR writes a partition table to a cdl (compatible disk layout)
 formatted DASD, in the form of
 a VTOC (volume table of contents) for usage with Linux for S/390
-or zSeries. If fdasd detects a valid \fBVOL1\fR volume label, it 
+or zSeries. If fdasd detects a valid \fBVOL1\fR volume label, it
 will use it, otherwise it asks to write a new one.
 .br
 
@@ -34,51 +34,51 @@ will use it, otherwise it asks to write a new one.
 Print usage information, then exit.
 
 .TP
-\fB-v\fR or \fB--version\fR 
+\fB-v\fR or \fB--version\fR
 Print version information, then exit.
 
 .TP
-\fB-s\fR or \fB--silent\fR  
+\fB-s\fR or \fB--silent\fR
 Suppress messages in non-interactive mode.
 
 .TP
-\fB-r\fR or \fB--verbose\fR  
+\fB-r\fR or \fB--verbose\fR
 Provide more verbose output.
 
 .TP
-\fB-a\fR or \fB--auto\fR  
-Automatically create a partition using the entire disk in non-interactive 
+\fB-a\fR or \fB--auto\fR
+Automatically create a partition using the entire disk in non-interactive
 mode.
 
 .TP
 \fB-k\fR or \fB--keep_volser\fR
-Keeps the volume serial when writing the volume label. 
+Keeps the Volume Serial Number when writing the Volume Label.
 .br
-This is useful, if the volume serial has been written before and should not
-be overwritten. This option is only applicable in non-interactive mode.
+This is useful if the volume already has a Serial Number that should not be
+overwritten. This option is only applicable in non-interactive mode.
 
 .TP
 \fB-l\fR \fIvolser\fR or \fB--label\fR \fIvolser\fR
 Specify the volume serial.
 .br
-\fIvolser\fR is interpreted as ASCII string and is automatically converted to 
+\fIvolser\fR is interpreted as ASCII string and is automatically converted to
 uppercase, padded with blanks and finally converted to EBCDIC to be written
 to disk. This option is only applicable in non-interactive mode.
 .br
 
-Do not use the following reserved volume serial: SCRTCH, PRIVAT, MIGRAT, 
-or Lnnnnn (L with five digit number); These are used as keywords by 
+Do not use the following reserved volume serial: SCRTCH, PRIVAT, MIGRAT,
+or Lnnnnn (L with five digit number); These are used as keywords by
 other operating systems (OS/390).
 .br
 
-A volume serial is 1 through 6 alphanumeric characters or one of the 
-following special characters: $, #, @, %. All other characters are simply 
-ignored. 
+A volume serial is 1 through 6 alphanumeric characters or one of the
+following special characters: $, #, @, %. All other characters are simply
+ignored.
 .br
-Try to avoid using special characters in the volume serial. 
-This may cause problems accessing a disk by volser. 
-In case you really have to use special characters, make sure you are using 
-quotes. In addition there is a special handling for the '$' sign. 
+Try to avoid using special characters in the volume serial.
+This may cause problems accessing a disk by volser.
+In case you really have to use special characters, make sure you are using
+quotes. In addition there is a special handling for the '$' sign.
 Please specify it using '\\$' if necessary.
 .br
 
@@ -124,14 +124,14 @@ partitions that use the entire disk:
 .br
 
 .TP
-\fB-i\fR or \fB--volser\fR 
+\fB-i\fR or \fB--volser\fR
 Print the volume serial, then exit.
 
 .TP
-\fB-p\fR or \fB--table\fR 
-Print partition table, then exit. 
+\fB-p\fR or \fB--table\fR
+Print partition table, then exit.
 .br
-In combination with the -s option fdasd will display a short version of the 
+In combination with the -s option fdasd will display a short version of the
 partition table.
 
 .TP
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ In case your are not using the device file system, please specify:
 .br
 
 where \fIx\fR is one or more lowercase letter(s) or any other device
-node specification configured by udev for kernel 2.6 or higher. 
+node specification configured by udev for kernel 2.6 or higher.
 
 .SH SEE ALSO
 .BR dasdfmt (8)

genprotimg/boot/Makefile

@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ stage3b.elf: head.o $(ZIPL_OBJS)
 
 %.bin.debug: %.elf
 	$(OBJCOPY) --only-keep-debug $< $@
+	@chmod a-x $@
 
 %.bin: %.elf
 	$(OBJCOPY) -O binary $< $@

genprotimg/boot/stage3b.c

@@ -61,13 +61,17 @@ void __noreturn start(void)
 	if (cmdline->size > get_kernel_cmdline_size())
 		panic(EINTERNAL, "Command line is too large\n");
 
-	/* move the kernel cmdline */
-	memmove((void *)COMMAND_LINE,
-		(void *)cmdline->src,
-		cmdline->size);
+	if (cmdline->size > 0) {
+		/* make sure the cmdline is a null-terminated string */
+		if (((char *)cmdline->src)[cmdline->size - 1] != '\0')
+			panic(EINTERNAL, "Command line needs to be null-terminated\n");
+
+		/* move the kernel cmdline */
+		memmove((void *)COMMAND_LINE, (void *)cmdline->src, cmdline->size);
+	}
 	/* the initrd does not need to be moved */
 
-	if (initrd->size != 0) {
+	if (initrd->size > 0) {
 		/* copy initrd start address and size into new kernel space */
 		*(unsigned long long *)INITRD_START = initrd->src;
 		*(unsigned long long *)INITRD_SIZE = initrd->size;

genprotimg/src/Makefile

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ $(bin_PROGRAM)_SRCS := $(bin_PROGRAM).c pv/pv_stage3.c pv/pv_image.c \
 	$(NULL)
 $(bin_PROGRAM)_OBJS := $($(bin_PROGRAM)_SRCS:.c=.o)
 
-ALL_CFLAGS += -std=gnu11 -DPKGDATADIR=$(PKGDATADIR) \
+ALL_CFLAGS += -DPKGDATADIR=$(PKGDATADIR) \
 	$(GLIB2_CFLAGS) $(LIBCRYPTO_CFLAGS) $(LIBCURL_CFLAGS) \
 	-DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L \
 	$(WARNINGS) \

genprotimg/src/pv/pv_image.c

@@ -684,7 +684,26 @@ gint pv_img_add_component(PvImage *img, const PvArg *arg, GError **err)
 {
 	g_autoptr(PvComponent) comp = NULL;
 
-	comp = pv_component_new_file(arg->type, arg->path, err);
+	switch (arg->type) {
+	case PV_COMP_TYPE_INITRD:
+	case PV_COMP_TYPE_KERNEL:
+	case PV_COMP_TYPE_STAGE3B:
+		comp = pv_component_new_file(arg->type, arg->path, err);
+		break;
+	case PV_COMP_TYPE_CMDLINE: {
+		g_autoptr(PvBuffer) buf = NULL;
+		g_autofree char *data = NULL;
+		gsize length;
+
+		if (!g_file_get_contents(arg->path, &data, &length, err))
+			return -1;
+
+		/* Add one for the null terminator */
+		buf = pv_buffer_take(g_steal_pointer(&data), length + 1);
+		comp = pv_component_new_buf(arg->type, buf, err);
+	} break;
+	}
+
 	if (!comp)
 		return -1;
 

genprotimg/src/utils/buffer.c

@@ -26,6 +26,15 @@ PvBuffer *pv_buffer_alloc(gsize size)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+PvBuffer *pv_buffer_take(char *data, gsize size)
+{
+	PvBuffer *ret = g_new0(PvBuffer, 1);
+
+	ret->data = data;
+	ret->size = size;
+	return ret;
+}
+
 PvBuffer *pv_buffer_dup(const PvBuffer *buf, gboolean page_aligned)
 {
 	PvBuffer *ret;

genprotimg/src/utils/buffer.h

@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ typedef struct PvBuffer {
 } PvBuffer;
 
 PvBuffer *pv_buffer_alloc(gsize size);
+/* After this call @data belongs to the PvBuffer and must no longer be modified
+ * by the caller.
+ */
+PvBuffer *pv_buffer_take(char *data, gsize size);
 void pv_buffer_free(PvBuffer *buf);
 void pv_buffer_clear(PvBuffer **buf);
 gint pv_buffer_write(const PvBuffer *buf, FILE *file, GError **err);

hyptop/helper.c

@@ -404,11 +404,11 @@ s64 ht_calculate_smt_util(u64 core_us, u64 thr_us, u64 mgm_us, int thread_per_co
 	s64 component1, component2, smt_us;
 	double smt_factor = g.o.smt_factor;
 
-	component1 = G0(thread_per_core * core_us - thr_us);
+	component1 = thread_per_core * core_us - thr_us;
 	if (thread_per_core > 1)
 		component1 /= smt_factor;
-	component2 = G0(thr_us - core_us);
-	smt_us = component1 + component2 + mgm_us;
+	component2 = thr_us - core_us;
+	smt_us = G0(component1 + component2 + mgm_us);
 
 	return smt_us;
 }

include/boot/loaders_layout.h

@@ -22,11 +22,19 @@
 #define STAGE2_DESC			_AC(0x78, UL)
 #define STAGE2_ENTRY			_AC(0x2018, UL)
 #define STAGE2_HEAP_ADDRESS		_AC(0x6000, UL)
+#define ECKD2DUMP_SV_HEAP_ADDRESS	_AC(0xb000, UL)
 #define STAGE2_HEAP_SIZE		_AC(0x3000, UL)
 #define STAGE2_STACK_ADDRESS		_AC(0xe400, UL)
 #define STAGE2_STACK_SIZE		_AC(0x1c00, UL)
+#define ECKD2DUMP_SV_STACK_ADDRESS	_AC(0xe000, UL)
+#define ECKD2DUMP_SV_STACK_SIZE		_AC(0x2000, UL)
 #define STAGE2_MAX_SIZE			_AC(0x3000, UL)
 
+#define STAGE2_DUMPER_SIZE_V1		_AC(0x1000, UL)
+#define STAGE2_DUMPER_SIZE_V2		_AC(0x2000, UL)
+#define STAGE2_DUMPER_SIZE_V3		_AC(0x3000, UL)
+#define STAGE2_DUMPER_SIZE_ZLIB		_AC(0x8000, UL)
+
 #define STAGE3_ENTRY			_AC(0xa000, UL)
 
 #define STAGE2_LOAD_ADDRESS		_AC(0x2000, UL)

include/boot/s390.h

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #define STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD	_AC(160, U)
 
 /* Facilities */
+#define DFLTCC_FACILITY		_AC(151, U)
 #define UNPACK_FACILITY		_AC(161, U)
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLER__

include/dump/s390_dump.h

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/*
+ * s390 related definitions and functions.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2013, 2023
+ *
+ * s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
+ */
+
+#ifndef S390_DUMP_H
+#define S390_DUMP_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "boot/page.h"
+#include "lib/zt_common.h"
+
+/*
+ * S390 dump format defines
+ */
+#define DF_S390_MAGIC		0xa8190173618f23fdULL
+#define DF_S390_MAGIC_EXT	0xa8190173618f23feULL
+#define DF_S390_HDR_SIZE	0x1000
+#define DF_S390_EM_SIZE		16
+#define DF_S390_EM_MAGIC	0x44554d505f454e44ULL
+#define DF_S390_EM_STR		"DUMP_END"
+#define DF_S390_CPU_MAX		512
+#define DF_S390_MAGIC_BLK_ECKD	3
+
+/*
+ * Architecture of dumped system
+ */
+enum df_s390_arch {
+	DF_S390_ARCH_32	= 1,
+	DF_S390_ARCH_64	= 2,
+};
+
+/*
+ * zipl parameters passed at tail of dump tools
+ */
+struct stage2dump_parm_tail {
+	char		reserved[6];
+	uint8_t		no_compress;
+	uint8_t		mvdump_force;
+	uint64_t	mem_upper_limit;
+} __packed;
+
+/*
+ * s390 dump header format
+ */
+struct df_s390_hdr {
+	uint64_t	magic;				/* 0x000 */
+	uint32_t	version;			/* 0x008 */
+	uint32_t	hdr_size;			/* 0x00c */
+	uint32_t	dump_level;			/* 0x010 */
+	uint32_t	page_size;			/* 0x014 */
+	uint64_t	mem_size;			/* 0x018 */
+	uint64_t	mem_start;			/* 0x020 */
+	uint64_t	mem_end;			/* 0x028 */
+	uint32_t	num_pages;			/* 0x030 */
+	uint32_t	pad;				/* 0x034 */
+	uint64_t	tod;				/* 0x038 */
+	uint64_t	cpu_id;				/* 0x040 */
+	uint32_t	arch;				/* 0x048 */
+	uint32_t	volnr;				/* 0x04c */
+	uint32_t	build_arch;			/* 0x050 */
+	uint64_t	mem_size_real;			/* 0x054 */
+	uint8_t		mvdump;				/* 0x05c */
+	uint16_t	cpu_cnt;			/* 0x05d */
+	uint16_t	real_cpu_cnt;			/* 0x05f */
+	uint8_t		zlib_version_s390;		/* 0x061 */
+	uint32_t	zlib_entry_size;		/* 0x062 */
+	uint8_t		end_pad1[0x200 - 0x066];	/* 0x066 */
+	uint64_t	mvdump_sign;			/* 0x200 */
+	uint64_t	mvdump_zipl_time;		/* 0x208 */
+	uint8_t		end_pad2[0x800 - 0x210];	/* 0x210 */
+	uint32_t	lc_vec[DF_S390_CPU_MAX];	/* 0x800 */
+} __packed __aligned(16);
+
+/*
+ *  End marker: Should be at the end of every valid s390 crash dump
+ */
+struct df_s390_em {
+	union {
+		uint64_t magic;
+		char str[8];
+	};
+	uint64_t tod;
+} __packed __aligned(16);
+
+/*
+ * Dump segment header
+ */
+struct df_s390_dump_segm_hdr {
+	union {
+		struct {
+			uint64_t start;				/* 0x000 */
+			uint64_t len;				/* 0x008 */
+			uint64_t stop_marker;			/* 0x010 */
+			/* Size in blocks of compressed dump segment written to disk */
+			uint32_t size_on_disk;			/* 0x018 */
+			uint8_t  reserved_pad[0x30 - 0x1c];	/* 0x01c */
+			/*
+			 * Number of compressed entries in this dump segment (up to
+			 * 1011 entries)
+			 */
+			uint32_t entry_count;			/* 0x030 */
+			/*
+			 * Offsets in blocks to compressed entries written to disk
+			 * from the start of the dump segment.
+			 * High-order bit is set if the entry has been written
+			 * uncompressed.
+			 */
+			uint32_t entry_offset[];		/* 0x034 */
+		} __packed;
+		uint8_t padding[PAGE_SIZE];
+	};
+};
+
+/* Data compression granularity (size of input data chunk for zlib deflate) */
+#define DUMP_SEGM_ZLIB_ENTSIZE   (1 * MIB)
+/* Maximum number of compressed entries in one dump segment */
+#define DUMP_SEGM_ZLIB_MAXENTS   ((sizeof(struct df_s390_dump_segm_hdr) \
+				   - offsetof(struct df_s390_dump_segm_hdr, entry_offset)) \
+				   / sizeof(uint32_t))
+/*
+ * Maximum length of compressed dump segment considering the size of
+ * a single input chunk
+ */
+#define DUMP_SEGM_ZLIB_MAXLEN    (DUMP_SEGM_ZLIB_MAXENTS * DUMP_SEGM_ZLIB_ENTSIZE)
+/* Bitmask to mark uncompressed chunks */
+#define DUMP_SEGM_ENTRY_UNCOMPRESSED    0x80000000
+
+#endif /* S390_DUMP_H */

include/lib/ap.h

@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ void ap_list_remove_all(struct util_list *list);
 /* Lock Functions */
 int ap_get_lock(void);
 int ap_get_lock_callout(void);
+int ap_try_lock_callout(void);
 int ap_release_lock(void);
 int ap_release_lock_callout(void);
 

include/lib/util_lockfile.h

@@ -23,4 +23,6 @@ int util_lockfile_parent_lock(char *lockfile, int retries);
 int util_lockfile_release(char *lockfile);
 int util_lockfile_parent_release(char *lockfile);
 
+int util_lockfile_peek_owner(char *lockfile, int *pid);
+
 #endif /** LIB_UTIL_LOCKFILE_H @} */

libap/ap.c

@@ -722,6 +722,34 @@ int ap_get_lock_callout(void)
 	return util_lockfile_parent_lock(AP_LOCKFILE, AP_LOCK_RETRIES);
 }
 
+/**
+ * Attempt to acquire the ap config lock using the Parent Process ID without
+ * waiting/retries.  Detect if the attempt was rejected because the lock is
+ * already held by the Parent Process ID.
+ *
+ * @retval         0          Lock acquired on behalf of parent process
+ * @retval         1          Lock not obtained, already held by parent
+ * @retval         != 0       Lock was not obtained, other error
+ */
+int ap_try_lock_callout(void)
+{
+	int pid, ppid, rc;
+
+	if (util_lockfile_parent_lock(AP_LOCKFILE, 0)) {
+		/* Lock is already held, let's peek at the owner */
+		ppid = getppid();
+		rc = util_lockfile_peek_owner(AP_LOCKFILE, &pid);
+		if (rc || pid != ppid) {
+			/* We didn't get the lock, unknown or other owner */
+			return 2;
+		}
+		/* Signify that the lock is already held by the caller */
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * Release the ap config lock
  *

libekmfweb/Makefile

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ check-dep-libekmfweb: detect-openssl-version.dep
 		"detect-openssl-version.dep", \
 		"openssl-devel version >= 1.1.1", \
 		"HAVE_OPENSSL=0", \
-		-I. -lcrypto -DOPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED)
+		-I. `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags --libs libcrypto` -DOPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED)
 	$(call check_dep, \
 		"libekmfweb", \
 		"json-c/json.h", \
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ check-dep-libekmfweb: detect-openssl-version.dep
 		"curl/curl.h", \
 		"libcurl-devel", \
 		"HAVE_LIBCURL=0" \
-		`$(CURL_CONFIG) --cflags` `$(CURL_CONFIG) --libs`)
+		`$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags --libs libcurl`)
 	$(CURL_CONFIG) --ssl-backends | grep OpenSSL >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "Error: libcurl is not built with the OpenSSL backend"; exit 1; }
 	touch check-dep-libekmfweb
 
@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ ekmfweb.o: check-dep-libekmfweb ekmfweb.c utilities.h cca.h $(rootdir)include/ek
 utilities.o: check-dep-libekmfweb utilities.c utilities.h $(rootdir)include/ekmfweb/ekmfweb.h
 cca.o: check-dep-libekmfweb cca.c cca.h utilities.h $(rootdir)include/ekmfweb/ekmfweb.h
 
-libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION): ALL_CFLAGS += -fPIC `$(CURL_CONFIG) --cflags`
-libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION): LDLIBS = -ljson-c -lcrypto -lssl `$(CURL_CONFIG) --libs` -ldl
+libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION): ALL_CFLAGS += -fPIC `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags json-c libcurl libcrypto libssl`
+libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION): LDLIBS = `$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs json-c libcurl libcrypto libssl` -ldl
 libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION): ALL_LDFLAGS += -shared -Wl,--version-script=libekmfweb.map \
 	-Wl,-z,defs,-Bsymbolic -Wl,-soname,libekmfweb.so.$(VERM)
 libekmfweb.so.$(VERSION): ekmfweb.o utilities.o cca.o $(libs)

libkmipclient/Makefile

@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ detect-openssl-version.dep:
 	mv $(TMPFILE) $@
 
 CURL_CONFIG ?= curl-config
-XML2_CONFIG ?= xml2-config
 
 check-dep-libkmipclient: detect-openssl-version.dep
 	$(call check_dep, \
@@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ check-dep-libkmipclient: detect-openssl-version.dep
 		"detect-openssl-version.dep", \
 		"openssl-devel version >= 1.1.1", \
 		"HAVE_OPENSSL=0", \
-		-I. -lcrypto -DOPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED)
+		-I. `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags --libs libcrypto` -DOPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED)
 	$(call check_dep, \
 		"libkmipclient", \
 		"json-c/json.h", \
@@ -70,13 +69,13 @@ check-dep-libkmipclient: detect-openssl-version.dep
 		"libxml/tree.h", \
 		"libxml2-devel", \
 		"HAVE_LIBXML2=0", \
-		`$(XML2_CONFIG) --cflags` `$(XML2_CONFIG) --libs`)
+		`$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags --libs libxml-2.0`)
 	$(call check_dep, \
 		"libkmipclient", \
 		"curl/curl.h", \
 		"libcurl-devel", \
 		"HAVE_LIBCURL=0" \
-		`$(CURL_CONFIG) --cflags` `$(CURL_CONFIG) --libs`)
+		`$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags --libs libcurl`)
 	$(CURL_CONFIG) --ssl-backends | grep OpenSSL >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "Error: libcurl is not built with the OpenSSL backend"; exit 1; }
 	touch check-dep-libkmipclient
 
@@ -107,8 +106,8 @@ tls.o: check-dep-libkmipclient tls.c kmip.h utils.h $(rootdir)include/kmipclient
 names.o: check-dep-libkmipclient names.c names.h utils.h $(rootdir)include/kmipclient/kmipclient.h
 utils.o: check-dep-libkmipclient utils.c names.h utils.h $(rootdir)include/kmipclient/kmipclient.h
 
-libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION): ALL_CFLAGS += -fPIC `$(XML2_CONFIG) --cflags` `$(CURL_CONFIG) --cflags`
-libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION): LDLIBS = -ljson-c -lcrypto -lssl `$(XML2_CONFIG) --libs` `$(CURL_CONFIG) --libs`
+libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION): ALL_CFLAGS += -fPIC `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags json-c libcrypto libssl libxml-2.0 libcurl`
+libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION): LDLIBS = `$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs json-c libcrypto libssl libxml-2.0 libcurl`
 libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION): ALL_LDFLAGS += -shared -Wl,--version-script=libkmipclient.map \
 	-Wl,-z,defs,-Bsymbolic -Wl,-soname,libkmipclient.so.$(VERM)
 libkmipclient.so.$(VERSION): kmip.o request.o response.o attribute.o key.o ttlv.o json.o \

libkmipclient/kmip.h

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
 
 #include <json-c/json.h>
+#include <libxml/parser.h>
 #include <libxml/tree.h>
 #include <curl/curl.h>
 

libpv/Makefile

@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@ WARNINGS := -Wall -Wextra -Wshadow \
 	    -Wno-unused-function -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-unused-variable \
 	    $(NULL)
 
-ALL_CFLAGS += -std=gnu11 \
-	      -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10101000L \
+ALL_CFLAGS += -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10101000L \
 	      $(GLIB2_CFLAGS) \
 	      $(LIBCRYPTO_CFLAGS) \
 	      $(LIBCURL_CFLAGS) \

libutil/util_file.c

@@ -311,13 +311,13 @@ int util_file_read_i(int *val, int base, const char *fmt, ...)
 		return -1;
 	switch (base) {
 	case 8:
-		count = sscanf(buf, "%do", val);
+		count = sscanf(buf, "%o", val);
 		break;
 	case 10:
-		count = sscanf(buf, "%dd", val);
+		count = sscanf(buf, "%d", val);
 		break;
 	case 16:
-		count = sscanf(buf, "%dx", val);
+		count = sscanf(buf, "%x", val);
 		break;
 	default:
 		util_panic("Invalid base: %d\n", base);
@@ -425,13 +425,13 @@ int util_file_read_ui(unsigned int *val, int base, const char *fmt, ...)
 		return -1;
 	switch (base) {
 	case 8:
-		count = sscanf(buf, "%uo", val);
+		count = sscanf(buf, "%o", val);
 		break;
 	case 10:
-		count = sscanf(buf, "%uu", val);
+		count = sscanf(buf, "%u", val);
 		break;
 	case 16:
-		count = sscanf(buf, "%ux", val);
+		count = sscanf(buf, "%x", val);
 		break;
 	default:
 		util_panic("Invalid base: %d\n", base);

libutil/util_lockfile.c

@@ -299,3 +299,35 @@ int util_lockfile_parent_release(char *lockfile)
 {
 	return do_lockfile_release(lockfile, getppid());
 }
+
+/**
+ * Return the pid that owns the specified lockfile.
+ *
+ * @param[in]      lockfile   Path to the lock file
+ * @param[in,out]  pid        Buffer to place owning pid
+ *
+ * @retval         0          pid provided in buffer
+ * @retval         !=0        Error, no pid provided
+ */
+int util_lockfile_peek_owner(char *lockfile, int *pid)
+{
+	char buf[BUFSIZE];
+	int fd, len;
+
+	if (!lockfile || !pid)
+		return UTIL_LOCKFILE_ERR;
+
+	/* Open lockfile, read the owning pid if it exists */
+	fd = open(lockfile, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return UTIL_LOCKFILE_ERR;
+
+	len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+	close(fd);
+	if (len <= 0)
+		return UTIL_LOCKFILE_ERR;
+	buf[len] = 0;
+	*pid = atoi(buf);
+
+	return 0;
+}

osasnmpd/ibmOSAMib.h

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 
 /* we may use header_generic and header_simple_table from the util_funcs module */
 
-config_require(util_funcs)
+config_require(util_funcs);
 
 
 /* function prototypes */

pvattest/src/Makefile

@@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ LIBCRYPTO_LIBS := $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --silence-errors --libs libcrypto)
 LIBCURL_CFLAGS := $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --silence-errors --cflags libcurl)
 LIBCURL_LIBS := $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --silence-errors --libs libcurl)
 
-ALL_CFLAGS += -std=gnu11 \
-	      -DPKGDATADIR=$(PKGDATADIR) \
+ALL_CFLAGS += -DPKGDATADIR=$(PKGDATADIR) \
 	      -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10101000L \
 	      $(GLIB2_CFLAGS) \
 	      $(LIBCRYPTO_CFLAGS) \

rust/.gitignore

@@ -9,6 +9,3 @@ target/
 # Generated during make build can be removed at any point
 .check-dep-pvtools
 .check-cargo
-
-# Ignore lock files by default
-Cargo.lock

rust/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+[workspace]
+members = [
+	"pv",
+	"pv_core",
+	"pvapconfig",
+	"pvsecret",
+	"utils",
+]
+resolver = "2"
+
+[workspace.package]
+edition = "2021"
+license = "MIT"
+
+[profile.release]
+lto = true

rust/Makefile

@@ -15,16 +15,17 @@ ifneq (${HAVE_CARGO},0)
 
 	BUILD_TARGETS = $(CARGO_TARGETS)
 	INSTALL_TARGETS := install-rust-tools install-man
-	CARGO_TEST_TARGETS = $(addsuffix, _test, $(CARGO_TARGETS))
+	CARGO_TEST_TARGETS = $(addsuffix .test, $(CARGO_TARGETS))
 
 ifneq (${HAVE_OPENSSL},0)
 ifneq (${HAVE_LIBCURL},0)
-	PV_TARGETS := pvsecret
+	PV_TARGETS := pvsecret pvapconfig
 
-	PV_BUILD_TARGETS = $(PV_TARGETS)
-	CARGO_TEST_TARGETS += $(addsuffix, _test, $(PV_TARGETS)) pv
+	PV_BUILD_TARGETS := $(PV_TARGETS)
+	CARGO_TEST_TARGETS += $(addsuffix .test,pv $(PV_TARGETS))
 endif #LIBCURL
 endif #OPENSSL
+	TEST_TARGETS := $(addsuffix _build,$(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS))
 endif #CARGO
 
 BUILD_TARGETS += $(PV_BUILD_TARGETS)
@@ -36,21 +37,18 @@ endif
 
 # the cc crate uses these variables to compile c code. It does not open a shell
 # to call the compiler, so no echo etc. allowed here, just a path to a program
-$(BUILD_TARGETS) rust-test: CC = $(CC_SILENT)
-$(BUILD_TARGETS) rust-test: AR = $(AR_SILENT)
+$(BUILD_TARGETS) $(TEST_TARGETS) rust-test: CC = $(CC_SILENT)
+$(BUILD_TARGETS) $(TEST_TARGETS) rust-test: AR = $(AR_SILENT)
 
-$(CARGO_TARGETS): .check-cargo .no-cross-compile
-	$(CARGO_BUILD) --manifest-path=$@/Cargo.toml $(ALL_CARGOFLAGS)
-.PHONY: $(CARGO_TARGETS)
+$(PV_TARGETS): .check-dep-pvtools
+$(PV_TARGETS) $(CARGO_TARGETS): .check-cargo .no-cross-compile
+	$(CARGO_BUILD) --bin $@ $(ALL_CARGOFLAGS)
+.PHONY: $(PV_TARGETS) $(CARGO_TARGETS)
 
-
-$(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS): .check-cargo .no-cross-compile
-	$(CARGO_TEST) --manifest-path=$@/Cargo.toml --all-features $(CARGOFLAGS)
-.PHONY: $(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS)
-
-$(PV_TARGETS): .check-cargo .no-cross-compile .check-dep-pvtools
-	$(CARGO_BUILD) --manifest-path=$@/Cargo.toml $(ALL_CARGOFLAGS)
-.PHONY: $(PV_TARGETS)
+$(TEST_TARGETS): ALL_CARGOFLAGS += --no-run
+$(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS) $(TEST_TARGETS): .check-cargo .no-cross-compile
+	$(CARGO_TEST) --package $(basename $@) --all-features $(ALL_CARGOFLAGS)
+.PHONY: $(TEST_TARGETS) $(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS)
 
 skip-build:
 	echo "  SKIP    rust-tools due to unresolved dependencies"
@@ -65,22 +63,17 @@ print-rust-targets:
 	echo $(BUILD_TARGETS)
 
 clean:
-	$(foreach target,$(CARGO_TARGETS),\
-		$(CARGO_CLEAN) --manifest-path=$(target)/Cargo.toml ${ALL_CARGOFLAGS} ;)
-	$(foreach target,$(PV_TARGETS),\
-		$(CARGO_CLEAN) --manifest-path=$(target)/Cargo.toml ${CARGOFLAGS} ;)
+	$(CARGO_CLEAN) ${ALL_CARGOFLAGS}
 	$(RM) -- .check-dep-pvtools .detect-openssl.dep.c .check-cargo
 
-rust-test: .check-cargo .no-cross-compile
-	$(foreach target,$(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS),\
-		$(CARGO_TEST) --manifest-path=$(target)/Cargo.toml --all-features ${ALL_CARGOFLAGS} ;)
+rust-test: $(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS)
 
 install-rust-tools: $(BUILD_TARGETS)
 	$(INSTALL) -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(USRBINDIR)
 	$(foreach target,$(CARGO_TARGETS),\
-		$(INSTALL) $(target)/target/release/$(target) $(DESTDIR)$(USRBINDIR);)
+		$(INSTALL) target/release/$(target) $(DESTDIR)$(USRBINDIR);)
 	$(foreach target,$(PV_TARGETS),\
-		$(INSTALL) $(target)/target/release/$(target) $(DESTDIR)$(USRBINDIR);)
+		$(INSTALL) target/release/$(target) $(DESTDIR)$(USRBINDIR);)
 
 install-man:
 	$(foreach target,$(CARGO_TARGETS),\
@@ -118,13 +111,13 @@ endif
 
 .check-dep-pvtools: .detect-openssl.dep.c
 	$(call check_dep, \
-		"$(BIN_PROGRAM)", \
+		"Rust-pv", \
 		$^, \
 		"openssl-devel / libssl-dev version >= 1.1.1", \
 		"HAVE_OPENSSL=0", \
 		"-I.")
 	$(call check_dep, \
-		"$(BIN_PROGRAM)", \
+		"Rust-pv", \
 		"curl/curl.h", \
 		"libcurl-devel", \
 		"HAVE_LIBCURL=0")

rust/README.md

@@ -7,34 +7,36 @@ https://www.rust-lang.org/learn/get-started
 ## Building rust code
 ### s390-tools build system
 If `cargo` is installed  a simple `make` should do the job. Note that,
-compiling rust programs take significaltly longer than C code. To closely
-monitor the prgress use `make V=1` By default release builds are made.
+compiling rust programs take significantly longer than C code. To closely
+monitor the progress use `make V=1` By default release builds are made.
 
 With `make CARGOFLAGS=<flags>` one can pass additional flags to cargo.
 With `make HAVE_CARGO=0` one can turn of any compilation that requires cargo.
 With `make CARGO=<...>` one can set the cargo binary
 
 ### cargo
-If you need to run cargo directly, cd to each project you want to build and
+If you need to run cargo directly, `cd` to each project you want to build and
 issue your cargo commands. Do **NOT** forget to specify `--release` if you are
 building tools for a release. The s390-tools expect the environment variable
 `S390_TOOLS_RELEASE` to be present at build time. This is the version string the
 rust tools provide.
 
-Tpp: You can use `make version` to get the version string.
+Tip: You can use `make version` to get the version string.
 
 ## Internal Libraries
 * __utils__ _Library for rust tools that bundles common stuff for the 390-tools_
-	* currently only provides a macro to get the `S390_TOOLS_RELEASE` string
+	* provides a macro to get the `S390_TOOLS_RELEASE` string
+	* provides macros for compile time assertions
+
+* __pv_core__ _Library for pv tools, providing uvdevice access and utilities to send, receive and interpret various UV-calls._
 
 * __pv__ _Library for pv tools, providing uvdevice access, encryption utilities, and utilities for generating UV-request_
-	* requires openssl and libcurl for the feature `request`; use `HAVE_<OPENSSL|CURL>=0` to
-	  disable build that use pv with the request feature.
-
+	* requires openssl and libcurl
+	* reexports ann symbols from __pv_core__
+	* if no encryption utilities required, use __pv_core__
 
 ## Tools
 * __pvsecret__ _Manage secrets for IBM Secure Execution guests_
-	* requires pv with the `request` feature
 
 ## Writing new tools
 We encourage to use Rust for new tools. However, for some use cases it makes
@@ -43,7 +45,7 @@ Exiting tools may be rewritten in Rust.
 
 ### What (third-party) crates can be used for s390-tools?
 A huge list of libraries are made available through Rusts' ecosystem and is one
-of many upsides. However, just like with Coding Style Guidlines, it is
+of many upsides. However, just like with Coding Style Guidelines, it is
 important to limit the usage of those libraries so that within a project,
 everyone is on the same page and that code written in Rust uses similar
 approaches. It makes it easier for code review and maintainability in general.
@@ -81,11 +83,27 @@ is a start, but can change over time.
 Dependencies used by the crates listed above can be used, too.
 
 ### Add new tool
-To add a new tool issue `cargo new <TOOLNAME>` in the `rust` directory.
+To add a new tool issue `cargo new $TOOLNAME` in the `rust` directory.
 
 Add the tool to the _s390-tools_ build system:
 ```Makefile
-CARGO_TARGETS := TOOLNAME
+CARGO_TARGETS := $TOOLNAME
+```
+Add the library to the _s390-tools_ test list:
+```Makefile
+CARGO_TEST_TARGETS := $LIBNAME
+```
+
+Add the tool/library to the cargo workspace:
+```toml
+[workspace]
+members = [
+	"pv",
+	"pvsecret",
+	"$TOOLNAME",
+	"$LIBNAME"
+	"utils",
+]
 ```
 
 ### Versions
@@ -98,8 +116,8 @@ use utils::release_string;
 fn print_version() {
     println!(
         "{} version {}\nCopyright IBM Corp. 2023",
-        env!("CARGO_PKG_NAME"), // collapes into the crates name
-        release_string!() // this (very likely) collapes into a compile time constant
+        env!("CARGO_PKG_NAME"), // collapses into the crates name
+        release_string!() // this (very likely) collapses into a compile time constant
     );
 }
 ```

rust/pv/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,36 +1,24 @@
 [package]
 name = "pv"
-version = "0.9.0"
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT"
+version = "1.0.0"
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
 
 [dependencies]
-libc = "0.2"
-log = { version = "0.4", features = ["std", "release_max_level_debug"] }
-thiserror = "1"
-zerocopy = "0.6"
-cfg-if = "1.0.0"
+byteorder = "1.3"
+clap = { version ="4", features = ["derive", "wrap_help"] }
+curl = "0.4.7"
+log = { version = "0.4.6", features = ["std", "release_max_level_debug"] }
+openssl = "0.10.49"
+serde = { version = "1.0.139", features = ["derive"]  }
+thiserror = "1.0.33"
+utils = {path = "../utils"}
+zerocopy = { version="0.7", features = ["derive"] }
 
-# dependencies for request feature
-clap = { version ="4", features = ["derive", "wrap_help"], optional = true }
-curl = { version ="0.4", optional = true }
-openssl = {version = "0.10", optional = true }
-openssl_extensions = { path = "openssl_extensions", optional = true }
-serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"], optional = true  }
-
-# misc optional dependencies
-byteorder = {version = "1", optional = true }
+openssl_extensions = { path = "openssl_extensions" }
+pv_core = { path = "../pv_core" }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
-mockito = {version = "0.31", default-features = false }
+mockito = {version = "1", default-features = false }
+once_cell = "1.19"
 serde_test = "1"
-lazy_static = "1"
-
-[features]
-default = []
-request = ["dep:openssl", "dep:curl", "dep:openssl_extensions", "dep:serde", "dep:clap"]
-uvsecret = ["dep:byteorder", "dep:serde"]
-
-[profile.release]
-lto = true
-panic = "abort" # release builds now do not clean up stack after panics. .1 Mb

rust/pv/openssl_extensions/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 [package]
 name = "openssl_extensions"
 version = "0.1.0"
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT"
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
 
 [dependencies]
-foreign-types = "0.3"
-libc = {version = "0.2", features = [ "extra_traits"] }
-log = { version = "0.4", features = ["std", "release_max_level_debug"] }
-openssl = "0.10"
-openssl-sys = "0.9"
+foreign-types = "0.3.1"
+libc = {version = "0.2.49", features = [ "extra_traits"] }
+log = { version = "0.4.6", features = ["std", "release_max_level_debug"] }
+openssl = "0.10.49"
+openssl-sys = "0.9.85"

rust/pv/openssl_extensions/src/akid.rs

@@ -5,15 +5,15 @@
 use std::fmt;
 
 use foreign_types::{foreign_type, ForeignType, ForeignTypeRef};
-use libc::c_int;
 use openssl::x509::{X509CrlRef, X509Ref};
+use std::ffi::c_int;
 
 mod ffi {
     extern "C" {
         pub fn X509_check_akid(
             issuer: *const openssl_sys::X509,
             akid: *const openssl_sys::AUTHORITY_KEYID,
-        ) -> ::libc::c_int;
+        ) -> super::c_int;
     }
 }
 

rust/pv/openssl_extensions/src/crl.rs

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ mod ffi {
         pub fn X509_STORE_add_crl(
             xs: *mut openssl_sys::X509_STORE,
             x: *mut openssl_sys::X509_CRL,
-        ) -> libc::c_int;
+        ) -> std::ffi::c_int;
     }
 }
 

rust/pv/openssl_extensions/src/stackable_crl.rs

@@ -5,13 +5,13 @@
 use std::{marker::PhantomData, ptr};
 
 use foreign_types::{ForeignType, ForeignTypeRef};
-use libc::c_int;
 use openssl::{
     error::ErrorStack,
     stack::Stackable,
     x509::{X509Crl, X509CrlRef},
 };
 use openssl_sys::BIO_new_mem_buf;
+use std::ffi::c_int;
 
 pub struct StackableX509Crl(*mut openssl_sys::X509_CRL);
 

rust/pv/src/brcb.rs

@@ -8,11 +8,10 @@ use std::{
 };
 
 // (SE) boot request control block aka SE header
-use crate::{
-    assert_size, request::MagicValue, requires_feat, static_assert, Error, Result, PAGESIZE,
-};
+use crate::{assert_size, static_assert, Error, Result, PAGESIZE};
 use log::debug;
-use zerocopy::{AsBytes, BigEndian, FromBytes, U32, U64};
+use pv_core::request::MagicValue;
+use zerocopy::{AsBytes, BigEndian, FromBytes, FromZeroes, U32, U64};
 
 /// Struct containing all SE-header tags.
 ///
@@ -22,7 +21,6 @@ use zerocopy::{AsBytes, BigEndian, FromBytes, U32, U64};
 /// Tweak List Digest (tld)
 /// SE Header Tag (seht)
 ///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(request)]
 #[repr(C)]
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, AsBytes, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub struct BootHdrTags {
@@ -144,7 +142,7 @@ impl BootHdrTags {
 }
 
 #[repr(C)]
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, FromBytes)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, FromBytes, FromZeroes)]
 struct BootHdrHead {
     magic: U64<BigEndian>,
     version: U32<BigEndian>,
@@ -205,7 +203,7 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn from_se_image_hdr() {
         let bin_hdr = get_test_asset!("exp/secure_guest.hdr");
-        let hdr_tags = BootHdrTags::from_se_image(&mut Cursor::new(bin_hdr.clone())).unwrap();
+        let hdr_tags = BootHdrTags::from_se_image(&mut Cursor::new(*bin_hdr)).unwrap();
         assert_eq!(hdr_tags, EXP_HDR);
     }
 
@@ -220,7 +218,7 @@ mod tests {
         ));
 
         // mess up magic
-        let mut bin_hdr_copy = bin_hdr.clone();
+        let mut bin_hdr_copy = *bin_hdr;
         bin_hdr_copy.swap(0, 1);
         assert!(matches!(
             BootHdrTags::from_se_image(&mut Cursor::new(bin_hdr_copy)),

rust/pv/src/cli.rs

@@ -2,14 +2,12 @@
 //
 // Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
 
+use crate::misc::{create_file, open_file};
 use crate::Result;
-use crate::{create_buffered_file, open_buffered_file};
 use clap::{ArgGroup, Args, ValueHint};
 use std::io::{Read, Write};
 
 /// CLI Argument collection for handling certificates.
-///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(request)]
 #[derive(Args, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
 #[command(
     group(ArgGroup::new("pv_verify").required(true).args(["no_verify", "certs"])),
@@ -32,15 +30,15 @@ pub struct CertificateOptions {
     /// Disable the host-key document verification.
     ///
     /// Does not require the host-key documents to be valid.
-    /// Do not use for a production request unless you verified the host-key document before.
+    /// Do not use for a production request unless you verified the host-key document beforehand.
     #[arg(long)]
     pub no_verify: bool,
 
-    /// Use FILE as a certificate to verify the host-key(s).
+    /// Use FILE as a certificate to verify the host key or keys.
     ///
     /// The certificates are used to establish a chain of trust for the verification
     /// of the host-key documents. Specify this option twice to specify the IBM Z signing key and
-    /// the intermediate CA certificate (signed by the rootCA).
+    /// the intermediate CA certificate (signed by the root CA).
     #[arg(
         short= 'C',
         long = "cert",
@@ -54,7 +52,7 @@ pub struct CertificateOptions {
 
     /// Use FILE as a certificate revocation list.
     ///
-    /// That list is used to check whether a certificate of the chain of
+    /// The list is used to check whether a certificate of the chain of
     /// trust is revoked. Specify this option multiple times to use multiple CRLs.
     #[arg(
         long = "crl",
@@ -72,7 +70,7 @@ pub struct CertificateOptions {
 
     /// Use FILE as the root-CA certificate for the verification.
     ///
-    /// If omitted, the system wide root CAs installed on the system are used.
+    /// If omitted, the system wide-root CAs installed on the system are used.
     /// Use this only if you trust the specified certificate.
     #[arg(long, requires("certs"))]
     pub root_ca: Option<String>,
@@ -104,37 +102,25 @@ impl CertificateOptions {
 }
 
 /// stdout
-#[cfg(feature = "request")]
 pub const STDOUT: &str = "-";
 /// stdin
-#[cfg(feature = "request")]
 pub const STDIN: &str = "-";
 
 /// Converts an argument value into a Writer.
-///
-/// # Errors
-/// No Error will occur but function must match a signature
-///
-#[cfg(feature = "request")]
 pub fn get_writer_from_cli_file_arg(path: &str) -> Result<Box<dyn Write>> {
     if path == STDOUT {
         Ok(Box::new(std::io::stdout()))
     } else {
-        Ok(Box::new(create_buffered_file!(path)))
+        Ok(Box::new(create_file(path)?))
     }
 }
 
 /// Converts an argument value into a Reader.
-///
-/// # Errors
-/// No Error will occur but function must match a signature
-///
-#[cfg(feature = "request")]
 pub fn get_reader_from_cli_file_arg(path: &str) -> Result<Box<dyn Read>> {
     if path == STDIN {
         Ok(Box::new(std::io::stdin()))
     } else {
-        Ok(Box::new(open_buffered_file!(path)))
+        Ok(Box::new(open_file(path)?))
     }
 }
 

rust/pv/src/crypto.rs

@@ -2,29 +2,29 @@
 //
 // Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
 
-use crate::requires_feat;
 use crate::{error::Result, secret::Secret, Error};
-use openssl::rand::rand_bytes;
 use openssl::{
     derive::Deriver,
     ec::{EcGroup, EcKey},
     hash::{DigestBytes, MessageDigest},
     md::MdRef,
     nid::Nid,
-    pkey::{Id, PKey, Private, Public},
+    pkey::{HasPublic, Id, PKey, PKeyRef, Private, Public},
     pkey_ctx::{HkdfMode, PkeyCtx},
-    symm::{encrypt, encrypt_aead, Cipher},
+    rand::rand_bytes,
+    rsa::Padding,
+    sign::{Signer, Verifier},
+    symm::{encrypt_aead, Cipher},
 };
-use std::convert::TryInto;
+use std::{convert::TryInto, ops::Range};
 
 /// An AES256-key that will purge itself out of the memory when going out of scope
 ///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(request)]
 pub type Aes256Key = Secret<[u8; 32]>;
+pub(crate) const AES_256_GCM_TAG_SIZE: usize = 16;
 
 /// Types of symmetric keys, to specify during construction.
 ///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(request)]
 #[non_exhaustive]
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum SymKeyType {
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ pub enum SymKeyType {
 
 /// Types of symmetric keys
 ///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(request)]
 #[non_exhaustive]
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum SymKey {
@@ -88,7 +87,6 @@ impl From<Aes256Key> for SymKey {
 /// Performs an hkdf according to RFC 5869.
 /// See [`OpenSSL HKDF`]()
 ///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(request)]
 /// # Errors
 ///
 /// This function will return an OpenSSL error if the key could not be generated.
@@ -113,7 +111,6 @@ pub fn hkdf_rfc_5869<const COUNT: usize>(
 
 /// Derive a symmetric key from a private and a public key.
 ///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(request)]
 /// # Errors
 ///
 /// This function will return an error if something went bad in OpenSSL.
@@ -132,7 +129,6 @@ pub fn derive_key(k1: &PKey<Private>, k2: &PKey<Public>) -> Result<Aes256Key> {
 
 /// Generate a random array.
 ///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(request)]
 /// # Errors
 ///
 /// This function will return an error if the entropy source fails or is not available.
@@ -144,7 +140,6 @@ pub fn random_array<const COUNT: usize>() -> Result<[u8; COUNT]> {
 
 /// Generate a new random EC-SECP521R1 key.
 ///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(request)]
 /// # Errors
 ///
 /// This function will return an error if the key could not be generated by OpenSSL.
@@ -154,24 +149,6 @@ pub fn gen_ec_key() -> Result<PKey<Private>> {
     PKey::from_ec_key(key).map_err(Error::Crypto)
 }
 
-/// Encrypt confidential Data with a symmetric key.
-///
-/// * `key` - symmetric key used for encryption
-/// * `iv` - initialisation vector
-/// * `conf` - data to be encrypted
-///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(request)]
-/// # Errors
-///
-/// This function will return an error if the data could not be encrypted by OpenSSL.
-pub fn encrypt_aes(key: &SymKey, iv: &[u8], conf: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    match key {
-        SymKey::Aes256(key) => {
-            encrypt(Cipher::aes_256_gcm(), key.value(), Some(iv), conf).map_err(Error::Crypto)
-        }
-    }
-}
-
 /// Encrypt confidential Data with a symmetric key and provida a gcm tag.
 ///
 /// * `key` - symmetric key used for encryption
@@ -179,7 +156,6 @@ pub fn encrypt_aes(key: &SymKey, iv: &[u8], conf: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
 /// * `aad` - additional authentic data
 /// * `conf` - data to be encrypted
 ///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(request)]
 /// # Returns
 /// [`Vec<u8>`] with the following content:
 /// 1. `aad`
@@ -189,8 +165,13 @@ pub fn encrypt_aes(key: &SymKey, iv: &[u8], conf: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
 /// # Errors
 ///
 /// This function will return an error if the data could not be encrypted by OpenSSL.
-pub fn encrypt_aes_gcm(key: &SymKey, iv: &[u8], aad: &[u8], conf: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    let mut tag = vec![0xff; 16];
+pub fn encrypt_aes_gcm(
+    key: &SymKey,
+    iv: &[u8],
+    aad: &[u8],
+    conf: &[u8],
+) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Range<usize>, Range<usize>, Range<usize>)> {
+    let mut tag = vec![0xff; AES_256_GCM_TAG_SIZE];
     let encr = match key {
         SymKey::Aes256(key) => encrypt_aead(
             Cipher::aes_256_gcm(),
@@ -202,17 +183,28 @@ pub fn encrypt_aes_gcm(key: &SymKey, iv: &[u8], aad: &[u8], conf: &[u8]) -> Resu
         )?,
     };
 
-    let mut res = vec![0; aad.len() + encr.len() + 16];
-    res[0..aad.len()].copy_from_slice(aad);
-    res[aad.len()..aad.len() + encr.len()].copy_from_slice(&encr);
-    res[aad.len() + encr.len()..aad.len() + encr.len() + 16].copy_from_slice(&tag);
+    let mut res = vec![0; aad.len() + encr.len() + tag.len()];
+    let aad_range = Range {
+        start: 0,
+        end: aad.len(),
+    };
+    let encr_range = Range {
+        start: aad.len(),
+        end: aad.len() + encr.len(),
+    };
+    let tag_range = Range {
+        start: aad.len() + encr.len(),
+        end: aad.len() + encr.len() + tag.len(),
+    };
 
-    Ok(res)
+    res[aad_range.clone()].copy_from_slice(aad);
+    res[encr_range.clone()].copy_from_slice(&encr);
+    res[tag_range.clone()].copy_from_slice(&tag);
+    Ok((res, aad_range, encr_range, tag_range))
 }
 
 /// Calculate the hash of a slice.
 ///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(request)]
 /// # Errors
 ///
 /// This function will return an error if OpenSSL could not compute the hash.
@@ -220,10 +212,100 @@ pub fn hash(t: MessageDigest, data: &[u8]) -> Result<DigestBytes> {
     openssl::hash::hash(t, data).map_err(Error::Crypto)
 }
 
+/// Calculate a digital signature scheme.
+///
+/// Calculates the digital signature of the provided message using the signing key. [`Id::EC`],
+/// and [`Id::RSA`] keys are supported. For [`Id::RSA`] [`Padding::PKCS1_PSS`] is used.
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// This function will return an error if OpenSSL could not compute the signature.
+pub fn sign_msg(skey: &PKeyRef<Private>, dgst: MessageDigest, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    match skey.id() {
+        Id::EC => {
+            let mut sgn = Signer::new(dgst, skey)?;
+            sgn.sign_oneshot_to_vec(msg).map_err(Error::Crypto)
+        }
+        Id::RSA => {
+            let mut sgn = Signer::new(dgst, skey)?;
+            sgn.set_rsa_padding(Padding::PKCS1_PSS)?;
+            sgn.sign_oneshot_to_vec(msg).map_err(Error::Crypto)
+        }
+        _ => Err(Error::UnsupportedSigningKey),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Verify the digital signature of a message.
+///
+/// Verifies the digital signature of the provided message using the signing key.
+/// [`Id::EC`] and [`Id::RSA`] keys are supported. For [`Id::RSA`] [`Padding::PKCS1_PSS`] is used.
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// true if signature could be verified, false otherwise
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// This function will return an error if OpenSSL could not compute the signature.
+pub fn verify_signature<T: HasPublic>(
+    skey: &PKeyRef<T>,
+    dgst: MessageDigest,
+    msg: &[u8],
+    sign: &[u8],
+) -> Result<bool> {
+    match skey.id() {
+        Id::EC => {
+            let mut ctx = Verifier::new(dgst, skey)?;
+            ctx.update(msg)?;
+            ctx.verify(sign).map_err(Error::Crypto)
+        }
+        Id::RSA => {
+            let mut ctx = Verifier::new(dgst, skey)?;
+            ctx.set_rsa_padding(Padding::PKCS1_PSS)?;
+            ctx.verify_oneshot(sign, msg).map_err(Error::Crypto)
+        }
+        _ => Err(Error::UnsupportedVerificationKey),
+    }
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
-    use crate::test_utils::*;
+    use crate::{get_test_asset, test_utils::*};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_ec() {
+        let (ec_key, _) = get_test_keys();
+
+        let data = "sample".as_bytes();
+        let sign = sign_msg(&ec_key, MessageDigest::sha512(), data).unwrap();
+        assert!(sign.len() <= 139 && sign.len() >= 137);
+
+        assert!(verify_signature(&ec_key, MessageDigest::sha512(), data, &sign).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_rsa_2048() {
+        let keypair = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa2048key.pem");
+        let keypair = PKey::private_key_from_pem(keypair).unwrap();
+
+        let data = "sample".as_bytes();
+        let sign = sign_msg(&keypair, MessageDigest::sha512(), data).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(256, sign.len());
+
+        assert!(verify_signature(&keypair, MessageDigest::sha512(), data, &sign).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_rsa_3072() {
+        let keypair = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa3072key.pem");
+        let keypair = PKey::private_key_from_pem(keypair).unwrap();
+
+        let data = "sample".as_bytes();
+        let sign = sign_msg(&keypair, MessageDigest::sha512(), data).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(384, sign.len());
+
+        assert!(verify_signature(&keypair, MessageDigest::sha512(), data, &sign).unwrap());
+    }
 
     #[test]
     fn derive_key() {
@@ -285,7 +367,7 @@ mod tests {
             0xee, 0x62, 0x98, 0xf7, 0x7e, 0x0c,
         ];
 
-        let res = encrypt_aes_gcm(
+        let (res, ..) = encrypt_aes_gcm(
             &SymKey::Aes256(aes_gcm_key.into()),
             &aes_gcm_iv,
             &aes_gcm_aad,
@@ -294,32 +376,4 @@ mod tests {
         .unwrap();
         assert_eq!(res, aes_gcm_res);
     }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn encrypt_aes_256() {
-        let aes_gcm_key = [
-            0xee, 0xbc, 0x1f, 0x57, 0x48, 0x7f, 0x51, 0x92, 0x1c, 0x04, 0x65, 0x66, 0x5f, 0x8a,
-            0xe6, 0xd1, 0x65, 0x8b, 0xb2, 0x6d, 0xe6, 0xf8, 0xa0, 0x69, 0xa3, 0x52, 0x02, 0x93,
-            0xa5, 0x72, 0x07, 0x8f,
-        ];
-        let aes_gcm_iv = [
-            0x99, 0xaa, 0x3e, 0x68, 0xed, 0x81, 0x73, 0xa0, 0xee, 0xd0, 0x66, 0x84,
-        ];
-        let aes_gcm_plain = [
-            0xf5, 0x6e, 0x87, 0x05, 0x5b, 0xc3, 0x2d, 0x0e, 0xeb, 0x31, 0xb2, 0xea, 0xcc, 0x2b,
-            0xf2, 0xa5,
-        ];
-        let aes_gcm_res = vec![
-            0xf7, 0x26, 0x44, 0x13, 0xa8, 0x4c, 0x0e, 0x7c, 0xd5, 0x36, 0x86, 0x7e, 0xb9, 0xf2,
-            0x17, 0x36,
-        ];
-
-        let res = encrypt_aes(
-            &&SymKey::Aes256(aes_gcm_key.into()),
-            &aes_gcm_iv,
-            &aes_gcm_plain,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(res, aes_gcm_res);
-    }
 }

rust/pv/src/error.rs

@@ -10,49 +10,19 @@ pub type Result<T, E = Error> = std::result::Result<T, E>;
 #[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
 #[non_exhaustive]
 pub enum Error {
-    #[cfg_attr(debug_assertions, error("Ultravisor: '{msg}' ({rc:#06x},{rrc:#06x})"))]
-    #[cfg_attr(not(debug_assertions), error("Ultravisor: '{msg}' ({rc:#06x})"))]
-    Uv {
-        rc: u16,
-        rrc: u16,
-        msg: &'static str,
-    },
-
     #[error("Invalid SE header provided")]
-    #[cfg(feature = "request")]
     InvBootHdr,
 
-    #[error("{0}")]
-    Specification(String),
-
-    #[error("Cannot {ty} {ctx} at `{path}`")]
-    FileIo {
-        ty: FileIoErrorType,
-        ctx: String,
-        path: String,
-        source: std::io::Error,
-    },
-    #[error("Cannot {ty} `{path}`")]
-    FileAccess {
-        ty: FileAccessErrorType,
-        path: String,
-        source: std::io::Error,
-    },
-
     #[error("Host-key verification failed: {0}")]
-    #[cfg(feature = "request")]
     HkdVerify(HkdVerifyErrorType),
 
     #[error("No host-key provided")]
-    #[cfg(feature = "request")]
     NoHostkey,
 
-    #[error("To many host-keys provided")]
-    #[cfg(feature = "request")]
+    #[error("Too many host-keys provided")]
     ManyHostkeys,
 
     #[error("Cannot load {ty}  from {path}")]
-    #[cfg(feature = "request")]
     X509Load {
         path: String,
         ty: &'static str,
@@ -60,77 +30,67 @@ pub enum Error {
     },
 
     #[error("Internal (unexpected) error: {0}, caused by {1}")]
-    #[cfg(feature = "request")]
     InternalSsl(&'static str, #[source] openssl::error::ErrorStack),
 
+    #[error("Signing is only supported for EC and RSA keys")]
+    UnsupportedSigningKey,
+
+    #[error("Verifying signatures is only supported for EC and RSA keys")]
+    UnsupportedVerificationKey,
+
+    #[error("Provided binary request is too small")]
+    BinRequestSmall,
+
     #[error("No Config UID found: {0}")]
     NoCuid(String),
+
     // errors from request types
-    #[cfg(feature = "uvsecret")]
     #[error("Customer Communication Key must be 32 bytes long")]
     CckSize,
 
-    #[cfg(feature = "uvsecret")]
-    #[error("Cannot encode secrets (Too many secrets)")]
-    ManySecrets,
+    #[error("Invalid {0} user-data for signing provided. Max {} bytes allowed", .0.max())]
+    AsrcbInvSgnUserData(UserDataType),
 
-    #[cfg(feature = "uvsecret")]
-    #[error("Cannot decode secret list")]
-    InvSecretList(#[source] std::io::Error),
+    #[error("Unsupported user data signing key provided. Only EC(secp521r1) and RSA(2048 & 3072 bit) are supported")]
+    BinAsrcbUnsupportedUserDataSgnKey,
 
-    #[cfg(feature = "uvsecret")]
-    #[error("Input does not contain an add-secret request")]
-    NoAsrcb,
+    #[error("No user-key for verification provided and user-data is signed")]
+    BinAsrcbNoUserDataSgnKey,
+
+    #[error("Input does not contain an add-secret request version 1")]
+    BinAsrcbInvVersion,
+
+    #[error("Provided user-data key type ({key}) does not match with the user-data ({kind})")]
+    AsrcbUserDataKeyMismatch { key: String, kind: UserDataType },
+
+    #[error(
+        "The user-defined request signature could not be verified with the provided certificate"
+    )]
+    AsrcbUserDataSgnFail,
 
     // errors from other crates
     #[error(transparent)]
+    PvCore(#[from] pv_core::Error),
+    #[error(transparent)]
     Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
     #[error(transparent)]
-    #[cfg(feature = "request")]
     Crypto(#[from] openssl::error::ErrorStack),
     #[error(transparent)]
-    ParseInt(#[from] std::num::ParseIntError),
-    #[cfg(feature = "request")]
-    #[error(transparent)]
     Curl(#[from] curl::Error),
 }
 
 // used in macros
 #[doc(hidden)]
 impl Error {
-    pub const CRL: &str = "CRL";
-    pub const CERT: &str = "certificate";
-}
-
-/// Error cases for I/O operations
-#[allow(missing_docs)]
-#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
-#[non_exhaustive]
-pub enum FileIoErrorType {
-    #[error("read")]
-    Read,
-    #[error("write")]
-    Write,
-}
-
-/// Error cases for accessing files
-#[allow(missing_docs)]
-#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
-#[non_exhaustive]
-pub enum FileAccessErrorType {
-    #[error("open")]
-    Open,
-    #[error("create")]
-    Create,
+    pub const CRL: &'static str = "CRL";
+    pub const CERT: &'static str = "certificate";
 }
 
 /// Error cases for verifying host-key documents
 ///
-#[doc = crate::requires_feat!(request)]
 #[allow(missing_docs)]
 #[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
 #[non_exhaustive]
-#[cfg(feature = "request")]
 pub enum HkdVerifyErrorType {
     #[error("Signature verification failed")]
     Signature,
@@ -160,37 +120,11 @@ pub enum HkdVerifyErrorType {
     IbmSignInvalid(#[source] openssl::x509::X509VerifyResult, u32),
 }
 
-macro_rules! path_to_str {
-    ($path: expr) => {
-        $path.as_ref().to_str().unwrap_or("no UTF-8 path")
-    };
-}
-pub(crate) use path_to_str;
-
-macro_rules! file_error {
-    ($ty: tt, $ctx: expr, $path:expr, $src: expr) => {
-        $crate::Error::FileIo {
-            ty: $crate::FileIoErrorType::$ty,
-            ctx: $ctx.to_string(),
-            path: $path.to_string(),
-            source: $src,
-        }
-    };
-}
-pub(crate) use file_error;
-
-#[cfg(feature = "request")]
 macro_rules! bail_hkd_verify {
     ($var: tt) => {
         return Err($crate::Error::HkdVerify($crate::HkdVerifyErrorType::$var))
     };
 }
-#[cfg(feature = "request")]
 pub(crate) use bail_hkd_verify;
 
-macro_rules! bail_spec {
-    ($str: expr) => {
-        return Err($crate::Error::Specification($str.to_string()))
-    };
-}
-pub(crate) use bail_spec;
+use crate::request::uvsecret::UserDataType;

rust/pv/src/lib.rs

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 //
 // Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
 
-#![allow(macro_expanded_macro_exports_accessed_by_absolute_paths)]
 #![deny(missing_docs)]
 //! pv - library for pv-tools
 //!
@@ -11,155 +10,85 @@
 //! `pv` provides abstraction layers for encryption, secure memory management,
 //! logging, and accessing the uvdevice.
 //!
-//! ## Feature Flags
-//! The following feature flags are available:
-//! - `request`
-//!     - optional
-//!     - Enables generation of UV requests
-//! - `uvsecret`
-//!     - optional
-//!     - Enables support for the UV Secret API.
+//! If you do not need any OpenSSL features use `pv_core`.
+//! This crate reexports all symbols from `pv_core`
+mod brcb;
+mod cli;
+mod crypto;
 mod error;
-mod log;
+mod req;
+mod secret;
 mod utils;
-mod uvdevice;
+mod uvsecret;
+mod verify;
 
-/// Internal macro to conveninetly document required features on items
-// #[macro_export]
+/// utility functions for writing TESTS!!!
+//hide any test helpers on docs!
 #[doc(hidden)]
-macro_rules! requires_feat {
-    (request) => {
-        " Requires the feature `request`"
-    };
-    (uvsecret) => {
-        " Requires the feature `uvsecret`"
-    };
-    (reqsecret) => {
-        "Requires the features `request` & `uvsecret`"
-    };
-}
-#[allow(unused_imports)]
-use requires_feat;
-
-//only some features need this
 #[allow(dead_code)]
+pub mod test_utils;
+
+pub use ::utils::assert_size;
+pub use ::utils::static_assert;
+
 const PAGESIZE: usize = 0x1000;
 
-cfg_if::cfg_if! {
-    if #[cfg(feature = "request")] {
-        mod brcb;
-        mod cli;
-        mod crypto;
-        mod req;
-        mod secret;
-        mod uvsecret;
-        mod verify;
-
-        /// utility functions for writing TESTS!!!
-        #[allow(dead_code)]
-        //hide any test helpers on docs!
-        #[doc(hidden)]
-        pub mod test_utils;
-
-   }
-}
 /// Definitions and functions for interacting with the Ultravisor
 pub mod uv {
-    pub use crate::uvdevice::{
+    pub use pv_core::uv::{
         uv_ioctl, ConfigUid, UvCmd, UvDevice, UvDeviceInfo, UvFlags, UvcSuccess,
     };
-    #[cfg(feature = "uvsecret")]
-    pub use crate::uvsecret::{
-        secret_list::SecretList,
-        uvc::{AddCmd, ListCmd, LockCmd},
-    };
+    pub use pv_core::uv::{AddCmd, ListCmd, LockCmd};
+    pub use pv_core::uv::{ListableSecretType, SecretEntry, SecretList};
 }
 
 /// Miscellaneous functions and definitions
 pub mod misc {
-
-    #[cfg(feature = "request")]
     pub use crate::cli::{
         get_reader_from_cli_file_arg, get_writer_from_cli_file_arg, CertificateOptions, STDIN,
         STDOUT,
     };
-    pub use crate::log::PvLogger;
-    pub use crate::utils::{
-        memeq, parse_hex, pv_guest_bit_set, read, read_exact_file, read_file, to_u16, to_u32,
-        try_parse_u128, try_parse_u64, write, write_file, Flags, Lsb0Flags64, Msb0Flags64,
-    };
-    #[cfg(feature = "request")]
-    pub use crate::utils::{read_certs, read_crls};
+    pub use crate::utils::{read_certs, read_crls, read_private_key};
+    pub use pv_core::misc::*;
+    pub use pv_core::PvLogger;
 }
 
-#[cfg(feature = "request")]
 pub use crate::error::HkdVerifyErrorType;
-pub use error::{Error, FileAccessErrorType, FileIoErrorType, Result};
+pub use error::{Error, Result};
 
 /// Functionalities to build UV requests
-#[doc = requires_feat!(request)]
 pub mod request {
+    pub use crate::brcb::{BootHdrMagic, BootHdrTags};
+    pub use crate::crypto::derive_key;
+    pub use crate::crypto::random_array;
+    pub use crate::crypto::{encrypt_aes_gcm, gen_ec_key};
+    pub use crate::crypto::{hash, hkdf_rfc_5869};
+    pub use crate::crypto::{sign_msg, verify_signature};
+    pub use crate::crypto::{Aes256Key, SymKey, SymKeyType};
+    pub use crate::req::{Aad, BinReqValues, Encrypt, Keyslot, ReqEncrCtx, Request};
+    pub use crate::secret::{Secret, Zeroize};
+    pub use crate::verify::{CertVerifier, HkdVerifier, NoVerifyHkd};
 
-    cfg_if::cfg_if! {
-        if #[cfg(feature = "request")] {
-            pub use crate::brcb::{BootHdrTags, BootHdrMagic};
-            pub use crate::crypto::{
-                derive_key, encrypt_aes, encrypt_aes_gcm, gen_ec_key, hash, hkdf_rfc_5869,
-                random_array, Aes256Key, SymKey, SymKeyType,
-            };
-            pub use crate::req::{Aad, Encrypt, Keyslot, ReqEncrCtx, Request};
-            pub use crate::secret::{Secret, Zeroize};
-            pub use crate::verify::HkdVerifier;
-
-            /// Reexports some useful OpenSSL symbols
-            ///
-            #[doc = requires_feat!(request)]
-            pub mod openssl {
-                pub use openssl::error::ErrorStack;
-                pub use openssl::hash::MessageDigest;
-                pub use openssl::md::Md;
-                pub use openssl::pkey;
-            }
-
-        }
+    /// Reexports some useful OpenSSL symbols
+    pub mod openssl {
+        pub use openssl::error::ErrorStack;
+        pub use openssl::hash::MessageDigest;
+        pub use openssl::md::Md;
+        pub use openssl::pkey;
     }
 
-    cfg_if::cfg_if! {
-        if #[cfg(feature = "uvsecret")] {
-            /// Functionalities for creating add-secret requests
-            pub mod uvsecret {
-                #[cfg(feature = "request")]
-                pub use crate::uvsecret::{
-                        asrcb::{AddSecretFlags, AddSecretRequest,  AddSecretVersion,},
-                        ext_secret::ExtSecret,
-                        guest_secret::GuestSecret,
-                };
-                pub use crate::uvsecret::AddSecretMagic;
-                pub use crate::uvsecret::UserDataType;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Version number of the request in system-endian
-    pub type RequestVersion = u32;
-    /// Request magic value
-    ///
-    /// The first 8 byte of a request providing an identifier of the request type
-    /// for programs
-    pub type RequestMagic = [u8; 8];
-    /// A `MagicValue` is a bytepattern, that indicates if a byte slice contains the specified
-    /// (binary) data.
-    pub trait MagicValue<const N: usize> {
-        /// Magic value as byte array
-        const MAGIC: [u8; N];
-        /// Test whether the given slice starts with the magic value.
-        fn starts_with_magic(v: &[u8]) -> bool {
-            if v.len() < Self::MAGIC.len() {
-                return false;
-            }
-            crate::misc::memeq(&v[..Self::MAGIC.len()], &Self::MAGIC)
-        }
+    /// Functionalities for creating add-secret requests
+    pub mod uvsecret {
+        pub use crate::uvsecret::{
+            asrcb::{AddSecretFlags, AddSecretRequest, AddSecretVersion},
+            ext_secret::ExtSecret,
+            guest_secret::GuestSecret,
+            user_data::verify_asrcb_and_get_user_data,
+        };
+        pub use pv_core::request::uvsecret::AddSecretMagic;
+        pub use pv_core::request::uvsecret::UserDataType;
     }
+    pub use pv_core::request::RequestMagic;
 }
 
 /// Provides cargo version Info about this crate.
@@ -168,39 +97,3 @@ pub mod request {
 pub const fn crate_info() -> &'static str {
     concat!(env!("CARGO_PKG_NAME"), "-crate ", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"))
 }
-
-#[doc(hidden)]
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! file_acc_error {
-    ($ty: tt, $path:expr, $src: expr) => {
-        $crate::Error::FileAccess {
-            ty: $crate::FileAccessErrorType::$ty,
-            path: $path.to_string(),
-            source: $src,
-        }
-    };
-}
-
-#[macro_export]
-/// Create a file wrapped in a [BufWriter]
-///
-/// [BufWriter]: std::io#BufWriter
-macro_rules! create_buffered_file {
-    ($path: expr) => {
-        std::io::BufWriter::new(
-            std::fs::File::create($path).map_err(|e| $crate::file_acc_error!(Create, $path, e))?,
-        )
-    };
-}
-
-#[macro_export]
-/// Open a file wrapped in a [BufReader]
-///
-/// [BufReader]: std::io#BufReader
-macro_rules! open_buffered_file {
-    ($path: expr) => {
-        std::io::BufReader::new(
-            std::fs::File::open($path).map_err(|e| $crate::file_acc_error!(Open, $path, e))?,
-        )
-    };
-}

rust/pv/src/req.rs

@@ -2,19 +2,21 @@
 //
 // Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
 
+use crate::crypto::AES_256_GCM_TAG_SIZE;
 use crate::misc::to_u32;
-use crate::request::{
-    derive_key, encrypt_aes, encrypt_aes_gcm, gen_ec_key, random_array, RequestMagic,
-    RequestVersion, SymKey, SymKeyType,
-};
+use crate::request::{derive_key, encrypt_aes_gcm, gen_ec_key, random_array, SymKey, SymKeyType};
 use crate::{Error, Result};
 use openssl::bn::{BigNum, BigNumContext};
 use openssl::ec::{EcGroupRef, EcPointRef};
 use openssl::error::ErrorStack;
 use openssl::hash::{hash, MessageDigest};
 use openssl::pkey::{PKey, PKeyRef, Private, Public};
+use pv_core::request::{RequestMagic, RequestVersion};
 use std::convert::TryInto;
-use zerocopy::{AsBytes, BigEndian, FromBytes, U32};
+use std::mem::size_of;
+use std::ops::Range;
+use utils::assert_size;
+use zerocopy::{AsBytes, BigEndian, FromBytes, FromZeroes, U32};
 
 /// Encrypt a _secret_ using self and a given private key.
 pub trait Encrypt {
@@ -94,7 +96,7 @@ impl Encrypt for Keyslot {
         to: &mut Vec<u8>,
     ) -> Result<()> {
         let derived_key = derive_key(priv_key, &self.0)?;
-        let mut wrpk_and_kst = encrypt_aes_gcm(&derived_key.into(), &[0; 12], &[], prot_key)?;
+        let (mut wrpk_and_kst, ..) = encrypt_aes_gcm(&derived_key.into(), &[0; 12], &[], prot_key)?;
         let phk: EcdhPubkeyCoord = self.0.as_ref().try_into()?;
 
         to.reserve(80);
@@ -215,10 +217,11 @@ impl ReqEncrCtx {
             }
         }
 
-        let rql = to_u32(auth_data.len() + encr_size + 16)
-            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Specification("Configured request size to large".to_string()))?;
+        let rql = to_u32(auth_data.len() + encr_size + 16).ok_or_else(|| {
+            pv_core::Error::Specification("Configured request size to large".to_string())
+        })?;
         let sea = to_u32(encr_size)
-            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Specification("Encrypted size to large".to_string()))?;
+            .ok_or_else(|| pv_core::Error::Specification("Encrypted size to large".to_string()))?;
 
         let req_hdr = RequestHdr::new(version, rql, self.iv, nks, sea, magic);
         // copy request header to the start of the request
@@ -235,17 +238,6 @@ impl ReqEncrCtx {
         self.priv_key.as_ref().try_into().map_err(Error::Crypto)
     }
 
-    /// Encrypt confidential Data with  this encryption context.
-    ///
-    /// * `conf` - data to be encrypted
-    ///
-    /// # Errors
-    ///
-    /// This function will return an error if the data could not be encrypted by OpenSSL.
-    pub fn encrypt(&self, conf: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-        encrypt_aes(&self.prot_key, &self.iv, conf)
-    }
-
     /// Encrypt confidential Data with this encryption context and provide a gcm tag.
     ///
     /// * `aad` - additional authentic data
@@ -260,7 +252,11 @@ impl ReqEncrCtx {
     /// # Errors
     ///
     /// This function will return an error if the data could not be encrypted by OpenSSL.
-    pub fn encrypt_aead(&self, aad: &[u8], conf: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    pub fn encrypt_aead(
+        &self,
+        aad: &[u8],
+        conf: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Range<usize>, Range<usize>, Range<usize>)> {
         encrypt_aes_gcm(&self.prot_key, &self.iv, aad, conf)
     }
 }
@@ -309,7 +305,7 @@ ecdh_from!(Public);
 /// Representation of the shared parts of the request header.
 /// Used by [`ReqEncrCtx`]
 #[repr(C)]
-#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone, AsBytes, FromBytes)]
+#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone, AsBytes, FromBytes, FromZeroes)]
 struct RequestHdr {
     magic: [u8; 8],
     rqvn: U32<BigEndian>,
@@ -321,6 +317,7 @@ struct RequestHdr {
     reserved28: u32,
     sea: U32<BigEndian>,
 }
+assert_size!(RequestHdr, 48);
 
 impl RequestHdr {
     fn new(rqvn: u32, rql: u32, iv: [u8; 12], nks: u8, sea: u32, magic: Option<[u8; 8]>) -> Self {
@@ -379,6 +376,67 @@ pub trait Request {
     fn add_hostkey(&mut self, hostkey: PKey<Public>);
 }
 
+/// A struct to represent some parts of a binary/encrypted request.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+#[allow(unused)]
+#[allow(clippy::len_without_is_empty)]
+pub struct BinReqValues<'a> {
+    iv: &'a [u8],
+    aad: &'a [u8],
+    req_dep_aad: &'a [u8],
+    encr: &'a [u8],
+    tag: &'a [u8],
+    version: u32,
+    len: usize,
+}
+impl<'a> BinReqValues<'a> {
+    pub(crate) const TAG_LEN: usize = AES_256_GCM_TAG_SIZE;
+
+    /// Get the locations from this request.
+    ///
+    /// Does minimal sanity test, just tests to prevent panics.
+    /// `req` may be larger than the actual request.
+    pub fn get(req: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self> {
+        let hdr = RequestHdr::read_from_prefix(req).ok_or(Error::BinRequestSmall)?;
+        let rql = hdr.rql.get() as usize;
+        let sea = hdr.sea.get() as usize;
+
+        if rql < req.len() || sea + Self::TAG_LEN > rql {
+            return Err(Error::BinRequestSmall);
+        }
+        let aad_size = rql - sea - Self::TAG_LEN;
+        if aad_size < size_of::<RequestHdr>() {
+            return Err(Error::BinRequestSmall);
+        }
+
+        let iv = &req[0x10..0x1c];
+        let aad = &req[..aad_size];
+        let req_dep_aad = &req[size_of::<RequestHdr>()..aad_size];
+        let encr = &req[aad_size..(aad_size + sea)];
+        let tag = &req[rql - Self::TAG_LEN..];
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            iv,
+            aad,
+            req_dep_aad,
+            encr,
+            tag,
+            version: hdr.rqvn.get(),
+            len: rql,
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the version of this [`BinReqValues`].
+    pub fn version(&self) -> u32 {
+        self.version
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the length of this [`BinReqValues`].
+    pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
+        self.len
+    }
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -451,7 +509,7 @@ mod tests {
         let ks = vec![
             Keyslot::new(host_key.clone()),
             Keyslot::new(host_key.clone()),
-            Keyslot::new(host_key.clone()),
+            Keyslot::new(host_key),
         ];
         let mut aad = Vec::<Aad>::new();
         ks.iter().for_each(|ks| aad.push(Aad::Ks(ks)));

rust/pv/src/secret.rs

@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ impl Zeroize for Vec<u8> {
             // * Vec allocated at least capacity elements continuously
             // * dst points always to a valid location
             unsafe {
+                std::ptr::write_volatile(dst, 0);
                 dst = dst.add(1);
-                std::ptr::write_volatile(dst, 0)
             }
         }
         std::sync::atomic::compiler_fence(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);

rust/pv/src/utils.rs

@@ -1,336 +1,18 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
 //
 // Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
-
-use crate::{
-    error::{bail_spec, file_error, path_to_str},
-    Error, FileIoErrorType, Result,
+use crate::{Error, Result};
+use openssl::{
+    pkey::{PKey, Private},
+    x509::{X509Crl, X509},
 };
 
-#[cfg(feature = "request")]
-use openssl::x509::X509Crl;
-#[cfg(feature = "request")]
-use openssl::x509::X509;
-use std::io::{Read, Write};
-use std::path::Path;
-use zerocopy::{AsBytes, BigEndian, FromBytes, U64};
-
-/// Asserts a constant expression evaluates to `true`.
-///
-/// If the expression is not evaluated to `true` the compilation will fail.
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! static_assert {
-    ($condition:expr) => {
-        const _: () = core::assert!($condition);
-    };
-}
-
-/// Asserts that a type has a specific size.
-///
-/// Useful to validate structs that are passed to C code.
-/// If the expression is not evaluated to `true` the compilation will fail.
-///
-/// # Example
-/// ```rust
-/// # use pv::assert_size;
-/// # fn main() {}
-/// #[repr(C)]
-/// struct c_struct {
-///     v: u64,
-/// }
-/// assert_size!(c_struct, 8);
-/// // assert_size!(c_struct, 7);//won't compile
-/// ```
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! assert_size {
-    ($t:ty, $sz:expr ) => {
-        $crate::static_assert!(::std::mem::size_of::<$t>() == $sz);
-    };
-}
-
-/// Trait that describes bitflags, represented by `T`.
-pub trait Flags<T>: From<T> + for<'a> From<&'a T> {
-    /// Set the specified bit to one.
-    /// # Panics
-    ///Panics if bit is >= 64
-    fn set_bit(&mut self, bit: u8);
-    /// Set the specified bit to zero.
-    /// # Panics
-    ///Panics if bit is >= 64
-    fn unset_bit(&mut self, bit: u8);
-    /// Test if the specified bit is set.
-    /// # Panics
-    ///Panics if bit is >= 64
-    fn is_set(&self, bit: u8) -> bool;
-}
-
-/// Bitflags in MSB0 ordering
-///
-/// Wraps an u64 to set/get individual bits
-#[repr(C)]
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, AsBytes, FromBytes)]
-pub struct Msb0Flags64(U64<BigEndian>);
-impl Flags<u64> for Msb0Flags64 {
-    #[track_caller]
-    fn set_bit(&mut self, bit: u8) {
-        assert!(bit < 64, "Flag bit set to greater than 63");
-        let mut v = self.0.get();
-        v |= 1 << (63 - bit);
-        self.0.set(v)
-    }
-
-    #[track_caller]
-    fn unset_bit(&mut self, bit: u8) {
-        assert!(bit < 64, "Flag bit set to greater than 63");
-        let mut v = self.0.get();
-        v &= !(1 << (63 - bit));
-        self.0.set(v)
-    }
-
-    #[track_caller]
-    fn is_set(&self, bit: u8) -> bool {
-        assert!(bit < 64, "Flag bit set to greater than 63");
-        self.0.get() & (1 << (63 - bit)) > 0
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<u64> for Msb0Flags64 {
-    fn from(value: u64) -> Self {
-        Self(value.into())
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<&u64> for Msb0Flags64 {
-    fn from(value: &u64) -> Self {
-        (*value).into()
-    }
-}
-
-/// Bitflags in LSB0 ordering
-///
-/// Wraps an u64 to set/get individual bits
-#[repr(C)]
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, AsBytes, FromBytes)]
-pub struct Lsb0Flags64(U64<BigEndian>);
-impl Flags<u64> for Lsb0Flags64 {
-    #[track_caller]
-    fn set_bit(&mut self, bit: u8) {
-        assert!(bit < 64, "Flag bit set to greater than 63");
-        let mut v = self.0.get();
-        v |= 1 << bit;
-        self.0.set(v)
-    }
-
-    #[track_caller]
-    fn unset_bit(&mut self, bit: u8) {
-        assert!(bit < 64, "Flag bit set to greater than 63");
-        let mut v = self.0.get();
-        v &= !(1 << bit);
-        self.0.set(v)
-    }
-
-    #[track_caller]
-    fn is_set(&self, bit: u8) -> bool {
-        assert!(bit < 64, "Flag bit set to greater than 63");
-        self.0.get() & (1 << bit) > 0
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<u64> for Lsb0Flags64 {
-    fn from(value: u64) -> Self {
-        Self(value.into())
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<&u64> for Lsb0Flags64 {
-    fn from(value: &u64) -> Self {
-        (*value).into()
-    }
-}
-
-/// Tries to convert a BE hex string into a 128 unsigned integer
-/// The hexstring must contain 32chars of hexdigits
-///
-/// * `hex_str` - string to convert  can be prepended with "0x"
-/// * `ctx` - Error context string in case of an error
-/// ```rust
-/// # use std::error::Error;
-/// # use pv::misc::try_parse_u128;
-/// # fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error>> {
-/// let hex = "11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff";
-/// try_parse_u128(&hex, "The test")?;
-/// #     Ok(())
-/// # }
-/// ```
-///
-/// # Errors
-/// If `hex_string` is not a 32 byte hex string an Error appears
-pub fn try_parse_u128(hex_str: &str, ctx: &str) -> Result<[u8; 16]> {
-    let hex_str = if hex_str.starts_with("0x") {
-        hex_str.split_at(2).1
-    } else {
-        hex_str
-    };
-    if hex_str.len() != 32 {
-        bail_spec!(format!(
-            "{ctx} hexstring must be 32chars long to cover all 16 bytes"
-        ));
-    }
-    parse_hex(hex_str).try_into().map_err(|_| {
-        Error::Specification(format!(
-            "{ctx} hexstring must be 32chars long to cover all 16 bytes"
-        ))
-    })
-}
-
-/// Tries to convert a BE hex string into a 64 unsigned integer
-/// The hexstring must *NOT* contain 16 chars of hexdigits, but
-/// 16 chars at most.
-///
-/// * `hex_str` - string to convert  can be prepended with "0x"
-/// * `ctx` - Error context string in case of an error
-/// ```rust
-/// # use std::error::Error;
-/// # use pv::misc::try_parse_u64;
-/// # fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error>> {
-/// let hex = "1234567890abcdef";
-/// try_parse_u64(&hex, "The test")?;
-/// #     Ok(())
-/// # }
-/// ```
-///
-/// # Errors
-/// If `hex_string` is not a 32 byte hex string an Error appears
-pub fn try_parse_u64(hex_str: &str, ctx: &str) -> Result<u64> {
-    let hex_str = if hex_str.starts_with("0x") {
-        hex_str.split_at(2).1
-    } else {
-        hex_str
-    };
-    if hex_str.len() > 16 {
-        bail_spec!(format!(
-            "{ctx} hexstring {hex_str} must be max 16 chars long"
-        ));
-    }
-    Ok(u64::from_str_radix(hex_str, 16)?)
-}
-
-/// Read exactly COUNT bytes into the buffer.
-///
-/// * `path` - Path to file
-/// * `ctx` - Error context string in case of an error
-///
-/// # Errors
-/// If this function encounters an "end of file" before completely filling
-/// the buffer, it returns an error. The contents of `buf` are unspecified in this case.
-///
-/// If any other read error is encountered then this function immediately
-/// returns. The contents of `buf` are unspecified in this case.
-///
-/// If this function returns an error, it is unspecified how many bytes it
-/// has read, but it will never read more than would be necessary to
-/// completely fill the buffer.
-pub fn read_exact_file<P: AsRef<Path>, const COUNT: usize>(
-    path: P,
-    ctx: &str,
-) -> Result<[u8; COUNT]> {
-    let mut f = std::fs::File::open(&path).map_err(|e| Error::FileAccess {
-        ty: crate::FileAccessErrorType::Open,
-        path: path_to_str!(path).to_string(),
-        source: e,
-    })?;
-
-    if f.metadata()?.len() as usize != COUNT {
-        bail_spec!(format!("{ctx} must be exactly {COUNT} bytes long"));
-    }
-
-    let mut buf = [0; COUNT];
-    f.read_exact(&mut buf)
-        .map_err(|e| file_error!(Read, ctx, path_to_str!(path).to_string(), e))?;
-    Ok(buf)
-}
-
-/// Read content from a file and add context in case of an error
-///
-/// * `path` - Path to file
-/// * `ctx` - Error context string in case of an error
-///
-///
-/// # Errors
-/// Passes through any kind of error `std::fs::read` produces
-pub fn read_file<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P, ctx: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    std::fs::read(&path).map_err(|e| {
-        file_error!(
-            Read,
-            ctx,
-            path.as_ref().to_str().unwrap_or("no UTF-8 path"),
-            e
-        )
-    })
-}
-
-/// Reads all content from a [`std::io::Read`] and add context in case of an error
-///
-/// * `path` - Path to file
-/// * `ctx` - Error context string in case of an error
-///
-///
-/// # Errors
-/// Passes through any kind of error `std::fs::write` produces
-pub fn read<R: Read>(rd: &mut R, path: &str, ctx: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    let mut buf = vec![];
-    rd.read_to_end(&mut buf).map_err(|e| Error::FileIo {
-        ty: FileIoErrorType::Write,
-        ctx: ctx.to_string(),
-        path: path.to_string(),
-        source: e,
-    })?;
-    Ok(buf)
-}
-
-/// write content to a file and add context in case of an error
-///
-/// * `path` - Path to file
-/// * `ctx` - Error context string in case of an error
-///
-///
-/// # Errors
-/// Passes through any kind of error `std::fs::write` produces
-pub fn write_file<D: AsRef<[u8]>>(path: &str, data: D, ctx: &str) -> Result<()> {
-    std::fs::write(path, data.as_ref()).map_err(|e| Error::FileIo {
-        ty: FileIoErrorType::Write,
-        ctx: ctx.to_string(),
-        path: path.to_string(),
-        source: e,
-    })
-}
-
-/// Write content to a [`std::io::Write`] and add context in case of an error
-///
-/// * `path` - Path to file
-/// * `ctx` - Error context string in case of an error
-///
-///
-/// # Errors
-/// Passes through any kind of error `std::fs::write` produces
-pub fn write<D: AsRef<[u8]>, W: Write>(wr: &mut W, data: D, path: &str, ctx: &str) -> Result<()> {
-    wr.write_all(data.as_ref()).map_err(|e| Error::FileIo {
-        ty: FileIoErrorType::Write,
-        ctx: ctx.to_string(),
-        path: path.to_string(),
-        source: e,
-    })
-}
-
 /// Read all CRLs from the buffer and parse them into a vector.
 ///
 /// # Errors
 ///
-/// This function will return an error if the underlying openssl implementation cannot parse `buf`
+/// This function will return an error if the underlying OpenSSL implementation cannot parse `buf`
 /// as `DER` or `PEM`.
-///
-/// Requires the `request` feature.
-#[cfg(feature = "request")]
 pub fn read_crls(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<X509Crl>> {
     use openssl_extensions::crl::StackableX509Crl;
     X509Crl::from_der(buf)
@@ -343,11 +25,8 @@ pub fn read_crls(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<X509Crl>> {
 ///
 /// # Errors
 ///
-/// This function will return an error if the underlying openssl implementation cannot parse `buf`
-/// as `DER` or `PEM`.
-///
-/// Requires the `request` feature.
-#[cfg(feature = "request")]
+/// This function will return an error if the underlying OpenSSL implementation cannot parse `buf`
+
 pub fn read_certs(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<X509>> {
     X509::from_der(buf)
         .map(|crt| vec![crt])
@@ -355,191 +34,23 @@ pub fn read_certs(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<X509>> {
         .map_err(Error::Crypto)
 }
 
-macro_rules! usize_to_ui {
-    ($(#[$attr:meta])* => $t: ident, $name:ident) => {
-        ///Converts an [`usize`] to an [`
-        $(#[$attr])*
-        ///`] if possible
-        pub fn $name(u: usize) -> Option<$t> {
-            if u > $t::MAX as usize {
-                None
-            } else {
-                Some(u as $t)
-            }
-        }
-
-    }
-}
-
-usize_to_ui! {
-#[doc = r"u32"]
-=> u32, to_u32}
-usize_to_ui! {
-#[doc = r"u16"]
-=> u16, to_u16}
-
-/// Test if both slices contain the exact same bytes.
+/// Read+parse the first key from the buffer.
 ///
-/// Do not use this to compare cryptographic values (i.e. hashes)
-pub fn memeq(lhs: &[u8], rhs: &[u8]) -> bool {
-    let size = lhs.len();
-
-    size == rhs.len()
-        && unsafe {
-            let l = lhs as *const _ as _;
-            let r = rhs as *const _ as _;
-            (l as usize) == (r as usize) || libc::memcmp(l, r, size) == 0
-        }
-}
-
-/// Converts the hexstring into a byte vector.
+/// # Errors
 ///
-/// Stops if the end or until a non hex chat is found
-pub fn parse_hex(hex_str: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let mut hex_bytes = hex_str.as_bytes().iter().map_while(|b| match b {
-        b'0'..=b'9' => Some(b - b'0'),
-        b'a'..=b'f' => Some(b - b'a' + 10),
-        b'A'..=b'F' => Some(b - b'A' + 10),
-        _ => None,
-    });
-
-    let mut bytes = Vec::new();
-    while let (Some(h), Some(l)) = (hex_bytes.next(), hex_bytes.next()) {
-        bytes.push(h << 4 | l)
-    }
-    bytes
-}
-/// Report if the `prot_virt_guest` sysfs entry is one.
-///
-/// If the entry does not exist returns false.
-///
-/// for non-s390-architectures:
-/// Returns always false
-/// A non-s390 system cannot be a secure execution guest.
-#[allow(unreachable_code)]
-pub fn pv_guest_bit_set() -> bool {
-    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "s390x"))]
-    return false;
-    //s390 branch
-    let v = std::fs::read("/sys/firmware/uv/prot_virt_guest").unwrap_or_else(|_| vec![0]);
-    let v: u8 = String::from_utf8_lossy(&v[..1]).parse().unwrap_or(0);
-    v == 1
+/// This function will return an error if the underlying OpenSSL implementation cannot parse `buf`
+/// as `DER` or `PEM`.
+pub fn read_private_key(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<PKey<Private>> {
+    PKey::private_key_from_der(buf)
+        .or_else(|_| PKey::private_key_from_pem(buf))
+        .map_err(Error::Crypto)
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-    use std::usize;
-
-    use super::*;
-    #[cfg(feature = "request")]
-    use crate::test_utils::*;
+    use crate::{get_test_asset, test_utils::*};
 
     #[test]
-    fn msb_flags() {
-        let v = 17;
-        let v_flag: Msb0Flags64 = v.into();
-        assert_eq!(v, v_flag.0.get());
-
-        let mut v: Msb0Flags64 = 4.into();
-        v.unset_bit(61);
-        assert_eq!(v.0.get(), 0);
-        v.set_bit(61);
-        assert_eq!(4, v.0.get());
-
-        let mut v = Msb0Flags64::default();
-        v.set_bit(0);
-        assert_eq!(&[0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
-        v.set_bit(0);
-        assert_eq!(&[0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
-        v.set_bit(1);
-        assert_eq!(&[0xc0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
-        v.set_bit(2);
-        assert_eq!(&[0xe0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
-        v.set_bit(3);
-        assert_eq!(&[0xf0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
-
-        v.unset_bit(3);
-        assert_eq!(&[0xe0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
-        v.unset_bit(3);
-        assert_eq!(&[0xe0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
-
-        v.set_bit(16);
-        assert_eq!(&[0xe0, 0, 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    #[should_panic]
-    fn msb_flags_set_panic() {
-        Msb0Flags64::default().set_bit(64)
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    #[should_panic]
-    fn msb_flags_unset_panic() {
-        Msb0Flags64::default().unset_bit(64)
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn lsb_flags() {
-        let v = 17;
-        let v_flag: Lsb0Flags64 = v.into();
-        assert_eq!(v, v_flag.0.get());
-
-        let mut v: Lsb0Flags64 = 4.into();
-        v.unset_bit(2);
-        assert_eq!(v.0.get(), 0);
-        v.set_bit(2);
-        assert_eq!(4, v.0.get());
-
-        let mut v = Lsb0Flags64::default();
-        v.set_bit(0);
-        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1], v.as_bytes());
-        v.set_bit(0);
-        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1], v.as_bytes());
-        v.set_bit(1);
-        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3], v.as_bytes());
-        v.set_bit(2);
-        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7], v.as_bytes());
-        v.set_bit(3);
-        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xf], v.as_bytes());
-
-        v.unset_bit(3);
-        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7], v.as_bytes());
-        v.unset_bit(3);
-        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7], v.as_bytes());
-
-        v.set_bit(16);
-        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 7], v.as_bytes());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    #[should_panic]
-    fn lsb_flags_set_panic() {
-        Lsb0Flags64::default().set_bit(64)
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    #[should_panic]
-    fn lsb_flags_unset_panic() {
-        Lsb0Flags64::default().unset_bit(64)
-    }
-    #[test]
-    fn parse_hex() {
-        let s = "123456acbef0";
-        let exp = vec![0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0xac, 0xbe, 0xf0];
-        assert_eq!(super::parse_hex(s), exp);
-
-        let s = "00123456acbef0";
-        let exp = vec![0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0xac, 0xbe, 0xf0];
-        assert_eq!(super::parse_hex(s), exp);
-
-        let s = "00123456acbef0ii90";
-        let exp = vec![0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0xac, 0xbe, 0xf0];
-        assert_eq!(super::parse_hex(s), exp);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    #[cfg(feature = "request")]
     fn read_crls() {
         let crl = get_cert_asset("ibm.crl");
         let crl_der = get_cert_asset("der.crl");
@@ -550,7 +61,6 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[test]
-    #[cfg(feature = "request")]
     fn read_certs() {
         let crt = get_cert_asset("ibm.crt");
         let crt_der = get_cert_asset("der.crt");
@@ -561,98 +71,16 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn to_u32() {
-        assert_eq!(Some(17), super::to_u32(17));
-        assert_eq!(Some(0), super::to_u32(0));
-        assert_eq!(Some(u32::MAX), super::to_u32(u32::MAX as usize));
-        assert_eq!(None, super::to_u32(u32::MAX as usize + 1));
-        assert_eq!(None, super::to_u32(usize::MAX));
+    fn read_private_key() {
+        let key = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa3072key.pem");
+        let key = super::read_private_key(key).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(key.rsa().unwrap().size(), 384);
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn parse_u128() {
-        assert!(matches!(
-            try_parse_u128("123456", ""),
-            Err(Error::Specification(_))
-        ));
-        assert!(matches!(
-            try_parse_u128("-1234", ""),
-            Err(Error::Specification(_))
-        ));
-        assert!(matches!(
-            try_parse_u128("0011223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", ""),
-            Err(Error::Specification(_))
-        ));
-        assert!(matches!(
-            try_parse_u128("dd11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", ""),
-            Err(Error::Specification(_))
-        ));
-        assert!(matches!(
-            try_parse_u128("-1223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", ""),
-            Err(Error::Specification(_))
-        ));
-
-        assert!(matches!(
-            try_parse_u128("0x123456", ""),
-            Err(Error::Specification(_))
-        ));
-        assert!(matches!(
-            try_parse_u128("-0x1234", ""),
-            Err(Error::Specification(_))
-        ));
-        assert!(matches!(
-            try_parse_u128("0x0011223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", ""),
-            Err(Error::Specification(_))
-        ));
-        assert!(matches!(
-            try_parse_u128("0xdd11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", ""),
-            Err(Error::Specification(_))
-        ));
-        assert!(matches!(
-            try_parse_u128("0x-1223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", ""),
-            Err(Error::Specification(_))
-        ));
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            [
-                0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0x00, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd,
-                0xee, 0xff
-            ],
-            try_parse_u128("11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", "").unwrap()
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            [
-                0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0x00, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd,
-                0xee, 0xff
-            ],
-            try_parse_u128("0x11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", "").unwrap()
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            [
-                0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd,
-                0xee, 0xff
-            ],
-            try_parse_u128("00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff", "").unwrap()
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            [
-                0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd,
-                0xee, 0xff
-            ],
-            try_parse_u128("00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff", "").unwrap()
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn memeq() {
-        let a = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0];
-        let b = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1];
-        let c = [0, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4];
-
-        assert!(super::memeq(&a, &a));
-        assert!(super::memeq(&a, &a.clone()));
-        assert!(!super::memeq(&b, &a));
-        assert!(!super::memeq(&b, &c));
-        assert!(!super::memeq(&b, &[]));
+    fn read_private_key_fail() {
+        let key = get_test_asset!("exp/secure_guest.hdr");
+        let key = super::read_private_key(key);
+        assert!(key.is_err());
     }
 }

rust/pv/src/uvsecret.rs

@@ -2,79 +2,12 @@
 //
 // Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
 
-#![cfg(feature = "uvsecret")]
 //! Provides functionality to manage the UV secret store.
 //!
 //! Provides functionality to build `add-secret` requests.
 //! Also provides interfaces, to dispatch `Add Secret`, `Lock Secret Store`,
 //! and `List Secrets` requests,
-#[cfg(feature = "request")]
 pub mod asrcb;
-#[cfg(feature = "request")]
 pub mod ext_secret;
-#[cfg(feature = "request")]
 pub mod guest_secret;
-pub mod secret_list;
-pub mod uvc;
-
-use crate::request::MagicValue;
-use crate::requires_feat;
-
-#[allow(unused_imports)] //used for more convenient docstring
-use asrcb::AddSecretRequest;
-/// Types of (non architectured) user data for [`AddSecretRequest`]
-///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(uvsecret)]
-#[repr(u16)]
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, zerocopy::AsBytes)]
-pub enum UserDataType {
-    /// Marker that the request does not contain any user data
-    Null = 0x0000,
-}
-
-/// The magic value used to identify an [`AddSecretRequest`]
-///
-/// The magic value is ASCII:
-/// ```rust
-/// # use pv::request::uvsecret::AddSecretMagic;
-/// # use pv::request::MagicValue;
-/// # fn main() {
-/// # let magic =
-/// # b"asrcbM"
-/// # ;
-/// # assert!(AddSecretMagic::starts_with_magic(magic));
-/// # }
-///```
-///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(uvsecret)]
-#[repr(C)]
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, zerocopy::AsBytes)]
-pub struct AddSecretMagic {
-    magic: [u8; 6], // [0x61, 0x73, 0x72, 0x63, 0x62, 0x4D]
-    tp: UserDataType,
-}
-
-impl MagicValue<6> for AddSecretMagic {
-    // "asrcbM"
-    const MAGIC: [u8; 6] = [0x61, 0x73, 0x72, 0x63, 0x62, 0x4D];
-}
-
-impl From<UserDataType> for AddSecretMagic {
-    fn from(tp: UserDataType) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            magic: Self::MAGIC,
-            tp,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-const SECRET_ID_SIZE: usize = 32;
-fn ser_gsid<S>(id: &[u8; SECRET_ID_SIZE], ser: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
-where
-    S: serde::Serializer,
-{
-    let mut s = String::with_capacity(32 * 2 + 2);
-    s.push_str("0x");
-    let s = id.iter().fold(s, |acc, e| acc + &format!("{e:02x}"));
-    ser.serialize_str(&s)
-}
+pub mod user_data;

rust/pv/src/uvsecret/asrcb.rs

@@ -2,23 +2,23 @@
 //
 // Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
 
-use super::{AddSecretMagic, UserDataType};
-use crate::requires_feat;
+use super::user_data::UserData;
 use crate::{
     assert_size,
     misc::Flags,
     request::{
         hkdf_rfc_5869,
         openssl::{
-            pkey::{PKey, Public},
+            pkey::{PKey, Private, Public},
             Md,
         },
         uvsecret::{ExtSecret, GuestSecret},
-        Aad, BootHdrTags, Keyslot, ReqEncrCtx, Request, RequestVersion, Secret,
+        Aad, BootHdrTags, Keyslot, ReqEncrCtx, Request, Secret,
     },
     uv::{ConfigUid, UvFlags},
     Result,
 };
+use pv_core::request::RequestVersion;
 use zerocopy::AsBytes;
 
 /// Internal wrapper for Guest Secret, so that we can dump it in the form the UV wants it to be
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ impl From<GuestSecret> for BinGuestSecret {
     }
 }
 
+/// Authenticated data w/o user data
 #[repr(C)]
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, AsBytes)]
 struct ReqAuthData {
@@ -59,9 +60,8 @@ struct ReqAuthData {
     boot_tags: BootHdrTags,
     cuid: ConfigUid,
     reserved90: [u8; 0x100],
-    prog_res190: [u8; 0x200],
 }
-assert_size!(ReqAuthData, 0x3e8);
+assert_size!(ReqAuthData, 0x1e8);
 
 impl ReqAuthData {
     fn new<F: Into<UvFlags>>(boot_tags: BootHdrTags, flags: F) -> Self {
@@ -70,7 +70,6 @@ impl ReqAuthData {
             boot_tags,
             cuid: [0; 0x10],
             reserved90: [0; 0x100],
-            prog_res190: [0; 0x200],
         }
     }
 }
@@ -96,8 +95,6 @@ impl ReqConfData {
 }
 
 /// Flags for [`AddSecretRequest`]
-///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(reqsecret)]
 #[derive(Default, Clone, Copy, Debug)]
 pub struct AddSecretFlags(UvFlags);
 impl AddSecretFlags {
@@ -123,8 +120,6 @@ impl From<AddSecretFlags> for UvFlags {
 }
 
 /// Versions for [`AddSecretRequest`]
-///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(reqsecret)]
 #[repr(u32)]
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum AddSecretVersion {
@@ -143,12 +138,6 @@ impl From<AddSecretVersion> for RequestVersion {
     }
 }
 
-impl AddSecretMagic {
-    fn get(&self) -> crate::request::RequestMagic {
-        self.as_bytes().try_into().unwrap()
-    }
-}
-
 /// Add-secret request Control Block
 ///
 /// An ASRCB wraps a secret to transport it securely to the Ultravisor.
@@ -158,6 +147,7 @@ impl AddSecretMagic {
 /// _______________________________________________________________
 /// |                   generic header (48)
 /// |     ---------------------------------------------------     |
+/// |  Plaintext Add-Secret flags (8)                             |
 /// |  SE header tags: PLD(64) ALD(64) TLD(64) HeaderTag(16)      |
 /// |  Configuration unique ID(16) (Attestation)                  |
 /// |       Optional, defaults to 0                               |
@@ -173,18 +163,19 @@ impl AddSecretMagic {
 /// |                   AES GCM Tag (16)                          |
 /// |_____________________________________________________________|
 ///```
-///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(reqsecret)]
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct AddSecretRequest {
-    magic: AddSecretMagic,
     version: AddSecretVersion,
     aad: ReqAuthData,
     keyslots: Vec<Keyslot>,
     conf: ReqConfData,
+    user_data: UserData,
 }
 
 impl AddSecretRequest {
+    /// Offset of the user-data in the add-secret request in bytes
+    pub(super) const V1_USER_DATA_OFFS: usize = 0x218;
+
     /// Create a new add-secret request.
     ///
     /// The request has no extension secret, no configuration UID, no host-keys,
@@ -204,7 +195,7 @@ impl AddSecretRequest {
             aad: ReqAuthData::new(boot_tags, flags),
             keyslots: vec![],
             version,
-            magic: UserDataType::Null.into(),
+            user_data: UserData::Null,
         }
     }
 
@@ -238,18 +229,41 @@ impl AddSecretRequest {
         &self.conf.secret.0
     }
 
+    /// Add user-data to the Add-Secret request
+    ///
+    /// (Signed) user-data is a non-architectual feature. It allows to add arbitrary
+    /// data (message) to the request, that is signed optionally with an user defined key.
+    /// Allowed keys are:
+    /// - no key (up to 512 bytes of message)
+    /// - EC SECP521R1 (up to 256 byte message)
+    /// - RSA 2048 bit (up to 256 byte message)
+    /// - RSA 3072 bit (up to 128 byte message)
+    ///
+    /// The signature can be verified during the verification of the secret-request  on the target machine.
+    pub fn set_user_data(&mut self, msg: Vec<u8>, skey: Option<PKey<Private>>) -> Result<()> {
+        self.user_data = UserData::new(skey, msg)?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
     /// compiles the authenticated area of this request
     fn aad(&self, ctx: &ReqEncrCtx, conf_len: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
         let cust_pub_key = ctx.key_coords()?;
         let secr_auth = self.conf.secret.dump_auth();
+        let user_data = self.user_data.data();
 
-        let mut aad: Vec<Aad> = Vec::with_capacity(3 + self.keyslots.len());
+        let mut aad: Vec<Aad> = Vec::with_capacity(5 + self.keyslots.len());
         aad.push(Aad::Plain(self.aad.as_bytes()));
+        if let Some(data) = user_data.0 {
+            aad.push(Aad::Plain(data));
+        }
+        if let Some(data) = &user_data.1 {
+            aad.push(Aad::Plain(data));
+        }
         aad.push(Aad::Plain(cust_pub_key.as_ref()));
         self.keyslots.iter().for_each(|k| aad.push(Aad::Ks(k)));
         aad.push(Aad::Plain(&secr_auth));
 
-        ctx.build_aad(self.version.into(), &aad, conf_len, self.magic.get())
+        ctx.build_aad(self.version.into(), &aad, conf_len, self.user_data.magic())
     }
 
     #[doc(hidden)]
@@ -268,13 +282,41 @@ impl AddSecretRequest {
         res.append(&mut vec![0x24; 32]);
         Ok(res)
     }
+
+    /// encrypt data, sign request with user-provided signing key, insert signature into aad,
+    /// calculate request tag
+    fn encrypt_with_signed_user_data(&self, ctx: &ReqEncrCtx) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        //encrypt data w/o aead
+        let conf = self.conf.to_bytes();
+        let aad = self.aad(ctx, conf.value().len())?;
+        let (mut buf, aad_range, encr_range, _) = ctx.encrypt_aead(&aad, conf.value())?;
+
+        drop(aad);
+
+        // sign aad+encrypted data (w/o tag) with user signning key
+        // add signature to authenticated data starting with USER_DATA_OFFS
+        self.user_data.sign(
+            &mut buf[aad_range.start..encr_range.end],
+            Self::V1_USER_DATA_OFFS,
+        )?;
+
+        // encrypt again with signed data
+        buf[encr_range.clone()].copy_from_slice(conf.value());
+        ctx.encrypt_aead(&buf[aad_range], &buf[encr_range])
+            .map(|(buf, ..)| buf)
+    }
 }
 
 impl Request for AddSecretRequest {
     fn encrypt(&self, ctx: &ReqEncrCtx) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-        let conf = self.conf.to_bytes();
-        let aad = self.aad(ctx, conf.value().len())?;
-        ctx.encrypt_aead(&aad, conf.value())
+        match self.user_data {
+            UserData::Null | UserData::Unsigned(_) => {
+                let conf = self.conf.to_bytes();
+                let aad = self.aad(ctx, conf.value().len())?;
+                ctx.encrypt_aead(&aad, conf.value()).map(|(buf, ..)| buf)
+            }
+            _ => self.encrypt_with_signed_user_data(ctx),
+        }
     }
 
     fn add_hostkey(&mut self, hostkey: PKey<Public>) {

rust/pv/src/uvsecret/ext_secret.rs

@@ -2,11 +2,9 @@
 //
 // Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
 
-use crate::{request::Secret, requires_feat};
+use crate::request::Secret;
 
 /// Extension Secret for [`crate::request::uvsecret::AddSecretRequest`]
-///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(reqsecret)]
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub enum ExtSecret {
     /// A bytepattern that must be equal for each request targeting the same SE-guest instance

rust/pv/src/uvsecret/guest_secret.rs

@@ -4,18 +4,16 @@
 
 #[allow(unused_imports)] //used for more convenient docstring
 use super::asrcb::AddSecretRequest;
-use super::{ser_gsid, SECRET_ID_SIZE};
 use crate::{
     request::{hash, openssl::MessageDigest, random_array, Secret},
-    requires_feat, Result,
+    Result,
 };
+use pv_core::for_pv::{ser_gsid, SECRET_ID_SIZE};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::convert::TryInto;
 
 const SECRET_SIZE: usize = 32;
 /// A Secret to be added in [`AddSecretRequest`]
-///
-#[doc = requires_feat!(reqsecret)]
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum GuestSecret {
     /// No guest secret
@@ -105,7 +103,7 @@ mod test {
             0xef, 0xc7, 0x3c, 0x62,
         ];
         let name = "association secret".to_string();
-        let secret = GuestSecret::association("association secret", secret_value.clone()).unwrap();
+        let secret = GuestSecret::association("association secret", secret_value).unwrap();
         let exp = GuestSecret::Association {
             name,
             id: exp_id,

rust/pv/src/uvsecret/secret_list.rs

@@ -1,224 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-//
-// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
-
-use crate::{misc::to_u16, uv::ListCmd, uvdevice::UvCmd, Error, Result};
-use byteorder::{BigEndian, ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};
-use serde::{Serialize, Serializer};
-use std::usize;
-use std::{
-    fmt::Display,
-    io::{Cursor, Read, Seek, Write},
-};
-use zerocopy::{AsBytes, FromBytes, U16, U32};
-
-use super::ser_gsid;
-
-/// List of secrets used to parse the [`crate::uv::ListCmd`] result
-///
-/// Requires the `uvsecret` feature.
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
-pub struct SecretList {
-    total_num_secrets: u16,
-    secrets: Vec<SecretEntry>,
-}
-
-impl SecretList {
-    /// Encodes the list in the same binary format the UV would do
-    pub fn encode<T: Write>(&self, w: &mut T) -> Result<()> {
-        let num_s = to_u16(self.secrets.len()).ok_or(Error::ManySecrets)?;
-        w.write_u16::<BigEndian>(num_s)?;
-        w.write_u16::<BigEndian>(self.total_num_secrets)?;
-        w.write_all(&[0u8; 12])?;
-        for secret in &self.secrets {
-            w.write_all(secret.as_bytes())?;
-        }
-        w.flush().map_err(Error::Io)
-    }
-
-    /// Decodes the list from the binary format of the UV into this internal representation
-    pub fn decode<R: Read + Seek>(r: &mut R) -> std::io::Result<Self> {
-        let num_s = r.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?;
-        let total_num_secrets = r.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?;
-        let mut v: Vec<SecretEntry> = Vec::with_capacity(num_s as usize);
-        r.seek(std::io::SeekFrom::Current(12))?; //skip reserved bytes
-        let mut buf = [0u8; SECRET_ENTRY_SIZE];
-        for _ in 0..num_s {
-            r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
-            //cannot fail. buffer has the same size as the secret entry
-            let secr = SecretEntry::read_from(buf.as_slice()).unwrap();
-            v.push(secr);
-        }
-        Ok(Self {
-            total_num_secrets,
-            secrets: v,
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<ListCmd> for SecretList {
-    type Error = Error;
-    fn try_from(mut list: ListCmd) -> Result<SecretList> {
-        SecretList::decode(&mut Cursor::new(list.data().unwrap())).map_err(Error::InvSecretList)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Display for SecretList {
-    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
-        writeln!(f, "Total number of secrets: {}", self.total_num_secrets)?;
-        if !self.secrets.is_empty() {
-            writeln!(f)?;
-        }
-        for s in &self.secrets {
-            writeln!(f, "{s}")?;
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-fn ser_u32<S: Serializer>(v: &U32<BigEndian>, ser: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error> {
-    ser.serialize_u32(v.get())
-}
-
-fn ser_u16<S: Serializer>(v: &U16<BigEndian>, ser: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error> {
-    ser.serialize_u16(v.get())
-}
-
-/// A secret in a [`SecretList`]
-///
-/// Fields are in big endian
-#[repr(C)]
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, AsBytes, FromBytes, Serialize)]
-pub struct SecretEntry {
-    #[serde(serialize_with = "ser_u16")]
-    index: U16<BigEndian>,
-    #[serde(serialize_with = "ser_u16")]
-    stype: U16<BigEndian>,
-    #[serde(serialize_with = "ser_u32")]
-    len: U32<BigEndian>,
-    #[serde(skip)]
-    res_8: u64,
-    #[serde(serialize_with = "ser_gsid")]
-    id: [u8; 32],
-}
-const SECRET_ENTRY_SIZE: usize = 0x30;
-
-fn stype_str(stype: u16) -> String {
-    match stype {
-        // should never match (not incl in list), but here for completeness
-        1 => "Null".to_string(),
-        2 => "Association".to_string(),
-        n => format!("Unknown {n}"),
-    }
-}
-
-impl Display for SecretEntry {
-    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
-        writeln!(f, "{} {}:", self.index, stype_str(self.stype.get()))?;
-        write!(f, "  ")?;
-        for b in self.id {
-            write!(f, "{:02x}", b)?;
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod test {
-    use super::*;
-    use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter, Cursor};
-
-    #[test]
-    fn secret_entry_size() {
-        assert_eq!(::std::mem::size_of::<SecretEntry>(), SECRET_ENTRY_SIZE);
-    }
-    #[test]
-    fn dump_secret_entry() {
-        const EXP: &[u8] = &[
-            0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, //idx + type
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, //len
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // reserved
-            // id
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        ];
-        let s = SecretEntry {
-            index: 1.into(),
-            stype: 2.into(),
-            len: 32.into(),
-            res_8: 0,
-            id: [0; 32],
-        };
-
-        assert_eq!(s.as_bytes(), EXP);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn secret_list_dec() {
-        let buf = [
-            0x00u8, 0x01, // num secr stored
-            0x01, 0x12, // total num secrets
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, //reserved
-            // secret
-            0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, //idx + type
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, //len
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // reserved
-            // id
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        ];
-
-        let exp = SecretList {
-            total_num_secrets: 0x112,
-            secrets: vec![SecretEntry {
-                index: 1.into(),
-                stype: 2.into(),
-                len: 32.into(),
-                res_8: 0,
-                id: [0; 32],
-            }],
-        };
-
-        let mut br = BufReader::new(Cursor::new(buf));
-        let sl = SecretList::decode(&mut br).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(sl, exp);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn secret_list_enc() {
-        const EXP: &[u8] = &[
-            0x00, 0x01, // num secr stored
-            0x01, 0x12, // total num secrets
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, //reserved
-            // secret
-            0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, //idx + type
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, //len
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // reserved
-            // id
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        ];
-
-        let sl = SecretList {
-            total_num_secrets: 0x112,
-            secrets: vec![SecretEntry {
-                index: 1.into(),
-                stype: 2.into(),
-                len: 32.into(),
-                res_8: 0,
-                id: [0; 32],
-            }],
-        };
-
-        let mut buf = [0u8; 0x40];
-        {
-            let mut bw = BufWriter::new(&mut buf[..]);
-            sl.encode(&mut bw).unwrap();
-        }
-        println!("list: {sl:?}");
-        assert_eq!(buf, EXP);
-    }
-}

rust/pv/src/uvsecret/user_data.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,611 @@
+use crate::{
+    crypto::{sign_msg, verify_signature},
+    req::BinReqValues,
+    request::{
+        openssl::{
+            pkey::{PKey, Private},
+            MessageDigest,
+        },
+        uvsecret::{AddSecretRequest, AddSecretVersion},
+        RequestMagic,
+    },
+    Error, Result,
+};
+use openssl::{
+    nid::Nid,
+    pkey::{HasParams, HasPublic, Id, PKeyRef, Public},
+};
+use pv_core::request::uvsecret::AddSecretMagic;
+use pv_core::request::uvsecret::UserDataType;
+use utils::assert_size;
+use zerocopy::{AsBytes, BigEndian, FromBytes, FromZeroes, U16};
+
+/// User data.
+///
+/// User defined data can be:
+/// - 512 bytes arbitrary data
+/// - 256 bytes arbitrary data + EC(secp521r1) signature
+/// ```none
+/// LAYOUT
+/// |------------------------|
+/// | user-data (256)        |
+/// | ec signature (139)     |
+/// | reserved (5)           |
+/// | signature size (2) (BE)|
+/// | reserved (110)         |
+/// |------------------------|
+/// ```
+/// - 256 bytes arbitrary data + RSA2048 signature
+/// ```none
+/// LAYOUT
+/// |---------------------|
+/// | user-data (256)     |
+/// | rsa signature (256) |
+/// |---------------------|
+/// ```
+/// - 128 bytes arbitrary data + RSA3072 signature
+/// ```none
+/// LAYOUT
+/// |---------------------|
+/// | user-data (128)     |
+/// | rsa signature (384) |
+/// |---------------------|
+/// ```
+///
+/// Ensures that the data+signature fits into 512 bytes
+/// must be created via functions!
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub(super) enum UserData {
+    Null,
+    Unsigned(Vec<u8>),
+    Signed(SignedUserData),
+}
+
+#[repr(C)]
+#[derive(Debug, AsBytes, FromBytes, FromZeroes)]
+struct EcUserData {
+    data: [u8; 256],
+    signature: [u8; EC_SIGN_MAX_SIZE],
+    res_18b: [u8; 5],
+    sgn_size: U16<BigEndian>,
+    res_192: [u8; 110],
+}
+assert_size!(EcUserData, USER_DATA_SIZE);
+const USER_DATA_SIZE: usize = 0x200;
+const EC_SIGN_MAX_SIZE: usize = 139;
+
+impl EcUserData {
+    // Sets the signature to this data.
+    //
+    //# Panic
+    // Panics if `sgn` is longer than 139 bytes
+    fn set_signature(&mut self, sgn: &[u8]) {
+        debug_assert!(sgn.len() <= EC_SIGN_MAX_SIZE);
+        self.signature.fill(0);
+        self.signature[..sgn.len()].copy_from_slice(sgn);
+
+        self.res_18b.fill(0);
+        self.sgn_size = (sgn.len() as u16).into();
+        self.res_192.fill(0);
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub(super) struct SignedUserData {
+    sign_key: PKey<Private>,
+    data: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl UserData {
+    const USER_DATA_SIZE: usize = 0x200;
+
+    fn user_data_type<P: HasPublic>(sign_key: &PKeyRef<P>) -> Result<UserDataType> {
+        fn check_curve<P: HasParams>(pkey: &PKeyRef<P>) -> Result<bool> {
+            let nid = pkey.ec_key()?.group().curve_name();
+            match nid {
+                Some(nid) => Ok(nid == Nid::SECP521R1),
+                None => Ok(false),
+            }
+        }
+        match sign_key.id() {
+            Id::EC if check_curve(sign_key)? => Ok(UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1),
+            Id::RSA if sign_key.rsa()?.size() == 2048 / 8 => Ok(UserDataType::SgnRsa2048),
+            Id::RSA if sign_key.rsa()?.size() == 3072 / 8 => Ok(UserDataType::SgnRsa3072),
+            _ => Err(Error::BinAsrcbUnsupportedUserDataSgnKey),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub(super) fn magic(&self) -> RequestMagic {
+        let magic: AddSecretMagic = self.data_type().into();
+        magic.get()
+    }
+    /// Creates new user data
+    ///
+    /// Verifies that the provided data + signature fits into 512 bytes
+    ///
+    /// #Error
+    /// An error is reported if the provided data and the signature would not fit into 512 bytes
+    /// An error is reported if the key is not of type RSA (2048|3072) or EC(specp521r1)
+    pub(super) fn new(sign_key: Option<PKey<Private>>, data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self> {
+        let sign_key = match sign_key {
+            None => {
+                return match data.len() > UserDataType::Unsigned.max() {
+                    true => Err(Error::AsrcbInvSgnUserData(UserDataType::Unsigned)),
+                    false => Ok(Self::Unsigned(data)),
+                };
+            }
+            Some(skey) => skey,
+        };
+
+        let kind = Self::user_data_type(&sign_key)?;
+
+        // does the data fit into the arbitrary buffer?
+        if data.len() > kind.max() {
+            return Err(Error::AsrcbInvSgnUserData(kind));
+        }
+
+        Ok(Self::Signed(SignedUserData { sign_key, data }))
+    }
+
+    /// Signs data in buf, writes signature to buf+user_data_offset+sign_offset if applicable.
+    ///
+    /// Uses [`MessageDigest::sha512`] as digest. Does not modify the abritary user data buffer.
+    ///
+    /// * buf: user data buffer, must be at least 512 bytes long
+    ///
+    /// # Panic
+    /// panics if `buf` is smaller than 512 bytes
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///  Returns an error if signature could not be calculated.
+    ///  It is considered no error if no signature is required by user data type
+    pub(super) fn sign(&self, buf: &mut [u8], user_data_offset: usize) -> Result<()> {
+        // get signing info or return if no signature is required
+        let signed_data = match self {
+            UserData::Null | UserData::Unsigned(_) => return Ok(()),
+            UserData::Signed(s) => s,
+        };
+        debug_assert!(buf.len() >= USER_DATA_SIZE);
+
+        // clear the signature area
+        let sgn_offset = user_data_offset + self.data_type().max();
+        buf[sgn_offset..user_data_offset + USER_DATA_SIZE].fill(0);
+
+        // calculate signature
+        let sgn = sign_msg(&signed_data.sign_key, MessageDigest::sha512(), buf)?;
+
+        // insert signature
+        if let UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1 = self.data_type() {
+            // Panic: will not panic buffer is 512+ bytes long
+            let buf_ec = EcUserData::mut_from_prefix(&mut buf[user_data_offset..]).unwrap();
+            buf_ec.set_signature(&sgn);
+        } else {
+            // Panic: will not panic buffer is 512+ bytes long
+            buf[sgn_offset..sgn_offset + sgn.len()].copy_from_slice(&sgn);
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn data_type(&self) -> UserDataType {
+        match self {
+            Self::Null => UserDataType::Null,
+            Self::Unsigned(_) => UserDataType::Unsigned,
+            Self::Signed(data) => Self::user_data_type(&data.sign_key).unwrap(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// returns a slice for the abitraty user data as first tuple part if User data is available
+    /// the second part contains a vector, created on the fly, which contains enough zeros to fill
+    /// the missing bytes to fill 512 bytes of space or None if the first slice already contains
+    /// 512 bytes
+    pub(super) fn data(&self) -> (Option<&[u8]>, Option<Vec<u8>>) {
+        let buf = match self {
+            UserData::Null => None,
+            UserData::Unsigned(d) => Some(d),
+            UserData::Signed(SignedUserData { data, .. }) => Some(data),
+        };
+
+        let remaining_size = Self::USER_DATA_SIZE - buf.map(|b| b.len()).unwrap_or(0);
+        let remaining = match remaining_size > 0 {
+            true => Some(vec![0; remaining_size]),
+            false => None,
+        };
+
+        (buf.map(|b| b.as_ref()), remaining)
+    }
+}
+
+fn format_vrfy_key(key: &PKeyRef<Public>) -> String {
+    let id = key.id();
+    match key.rsa() {
+        Ok(key) => format!("RSA {}", key.size() * 8),
+        Err(_) if id == Id::EC => "EC".to_string(),
+        Err(_) => "Unknown".to_string(),
+    }
+}
+
+fn check_key_format(kind: UserDataType, key: &PKeyRef<Public>) -> Result<()> {
+    let other_kind =
+        UserData::user_data_type(key).map_err(|_| Error::AsrcbUserDataKeyMismatch {
+            key: format_vrfy_key(key),
+            kind,
+        })?;
+    if other_kind == kind {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(Error::AsrcbUserDataKeyMismatch {
+            key: format_vrfy_key(key),
+            kind,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+/// Verify the user data contained in the add-secret request.
+///
+/// First checks that the provided data contains a sound add-secret request.
+/// Then performs the inverse action that happened during the add-secret generation with user-data
+/// signature:
+/// - extract and replace the signature with zeros
+/// - verify the signature of the request until, but not including the request tag
+///
+/// # Returns
+///
+/// Extracrted user-data if available
+///
+/// #Errors
+///
+/// returns an error if
+/// - No sound add-secret request presented
+/// - Sinned user-data indicated, but no key provided
+/// - Another keytype provided than indicated in the request
+/// - Signature could not be verified by the provided key
+/// - any OpenSSL error that might happen during the verification process
+pub fn verify_asrcb_and_get_user_data(
+    mut asrcb: Vec<u8>,
+    key: Option<PKey<Public>>,
+) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
+    // check that the provided buffer contains an Add Secret request
+    let magic = AddSecretMagic::try_from_bytes(&asrcb)?;
+    let req = BinReqValues::get(&asrcb)?;
+    if req.version() != AddSecretVersion::One as u32 {
+        return Err(Error::BinAsrcbInvVersion);
+    }
+
+    //preventing the two lines after the truncate from panicking
+    let req_len = req.len();
+    if asrcb.len() < req_len
+        || req_len < AddSecretRequest::V1_USER_DATA_OFFS + UserData::USER_DATA_SIZE
+    {
+        return Err(pv_core::Error::NoAsrcb.into());
+    }
+    // forget the tag (and all additional data that might be behind the tag)
+    asrcb.truncate(req_len - BinReqValues::TAG_LEN);
+    // get a mutable refrenence on the 512 bytes of user data
+    let (_, user_data) = asrcb.split_at_mut(AddSecretRequest::V1_USER_DATA_OFFS);
+    let user_data = &mut user_data[..UserData::USER_DATA_SIZE];
+
+    // depending on the user_data_type do:
+    // Null -> exit w/o user data
+    // Unsigned -> exit return all user data
+    // Signed ->
+    //     - check that provided key matches user data keytype
+    //     - extract user data& signature
+    let (key, user_data) = match (key, magic.kind()) {
+        (_, UserDataType::Null) => return Ok(None),
+        (None, UserDataType::Unsigned) => return Ok(Some(user_data.to_vec())),
+        (Some(key), UserDataType::Unsigned) => {
+            return Err(Error::AsrcbUserDataKeyMismatch {
+                key: format_vrfy_key(&key),
+                kind: UserDataType::Unsigned,
+            })
+        }
+        (Some(key), _) => {
+            check_key_format(magic.kind(), &key)?;
+            (key, VerifiedUserData::new(user_data, magic.kind()))
+        }
+        (None, _) => return Err(Error::BinAsrcbNoUserDataSgnKey),
+    };
+
+    match verify_signature(&key, MessageDigest::sha512(), &asrcb, user_data.signature())? {
+        false => Err(Error::AsrcbUserDataSgnFail),
+        true => Ok(Some(user_data.into())),
+    }
+}
+
+// Internal representation of the 512 bytes of user-data, signing-algorithm agnostic
+struct VerifiedUserData {
+    data: Vec<u8>,
+    signature: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl VerifiedUserData {
+    /// Reads user-data from buf depending on the indicated user data type.
+    /// Overwrites the signature in the buf with zeros.
+    ///
+    /// #Panics
+    /// Panics it provided buffer is smaller that 512 bytes or kind is Null or Unsigned
+    fn new(buf: &mut [u8], kind: UserDataType) -> Self {
+        assert!(buf.len() >= 0x200);
+
+        let (ret, sgn) = match kind {
+            UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1 => {
+                let EcUserData {
+                    data,
+                    signature,
+                    sgn_size,
+                    ..
+                } = EcUserData::mut_from_prefix(buf).unwrap();
+                let data_len: usize = data.len();
+                let data = data.to_vec();
+                let mut signature = signature.to_vec();
+                signature.truncate(sgn_size.get() as usize);
+                (Self { data, signature }, &mut buf[data_len..])
+            }
+            UserDataType::SgnRsa2048 => (
+                Self {
+                    data: buf[..0x100].to_vec(),
+                    signature: buf[0x100..].to_vec(),
+                },
+                &mut buf[0x100..],
+            ),
+            UserDataType::SgnRsa3072 => (
+                Self {
+                    data: buf[..0x80].to_vec(),
+                    signature: buf[0x80..].to_vec(),
+                },
+                &mut buf[0x80..],
+            ),
+            UserDataType::Null => unreachable!(),
+            UserDataType::Unsigned => unreachable!(),
+        };
+
+        //overwrite signature field with zeros
+        sgn.fill(0);
+        ret
+    }
+
+    fn signature(&self) -> &[u8] {
+        self.signature.as_ref()
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<VerifiedUserData> for Vec<u8> {
+    fn from(value: VerifiedUserData) -> Self {
+        value.data
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::{get_test_asset, test_utils::get_test_keys};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_null() {
+        let mut buf = vec![17; 0x200];
+
+        let user_data = UserData::Null;
+        let (data, _) = user_data.data();
+        assert!(data.is_none());
+
+        user_data.sign(&mut buf, 0).unwrap();
+
+        // sign should not touch the buffer
+        assert_eq!(buf, vec![17; 0x200]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_unsigned() {
+        let user_data = UserData::Unsigned(vec![0x11; 0x200]);
+        let (data, _) = user_data.data();
+        assert_eq!(data.unwrap(), &[0x11; 0x200]);
+
+        let mut buf = vec![17; 0x200];
+        user_data.sign(&mut buf, 0).unwrap();
+
+        // sign should not touch the buffer
+        assert_eq!(buf, vec![17; 0x200]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_rsa2048() {
+        let rsa = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa2048key.pem");
+        let rsa = PKey::private_key_from_pem(rsa).unwrap();
+
+        let mut buf = vec![0x17; 0x200];
+
+        let user_data = UserData::new(Some(rsa.clone()), vec![0x11; 0x100]).unwrap();
+        let (data, _) = user_data.data();
+        let data = data.unwrap();
+        buf[..0x100].copy_from_slice(data);
+
+        user_data.sign(&mut buf, 0).unwrap();
+
+        let vrf_user_data = VerifiedUserData::new(&mut buf, UserDataType::SgnRsa2048);
+        let res = verify_signature(
+            &rsa,
+            MessageDigest::sha512(),
+            &buf,
+            vrf_user_data.signature(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(res);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_rsa3072() {
+        let rsa = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa3072key.pem");
+        let rsa = PKey::private_key_from_pem(rsa).unwrap();
+
+        let mut buf = vec![0x17; 0x200];
+
+        let user_data = UserData::new(Some(rsa.clone()), vec![0x11; 0x80]).unwrap();
+        let (data, _) = user_data.data();
+        let data = data.unwrap();
+        buf[..0x80].copy_from_slice(data);
+
+        user_data.sign(&mut buf, 0).unwrap();
+
+        let vrf_user_data = VerifiedUserData::new(&mut buf, UserDataType::SgnRsa3072);
+        let res = verify_signature(
+            &rsa,
+            MessageDigest::sha512(),
+            &buf,
+            vrf_user_data.signature(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(res);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_rsa4096_fail() {
+        let rsa = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa4096key.pem");
+        let rsa = PKey::private_key_from_pem(rsa).unwrap();
+
+        let user_data = UserData::new(Some(rsa.clone()), vec![]);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            user_data.unwrap_err(),
+            Error::BinAsrcbUnsupportedUserDataSgnKey
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_ec() {
+        let (ec, _) = get_test_keys();
+
+        let mut buf = vec![0x11; 0x200];
+
+        let user_data = UserData::new(Some(ec.clone()), vec![0x11; 0x80]).unwrap();
+        let (data, _) = user_data.data();
+        let data = data.unwrap();
+        buf[..0x80].copy_from_slice(data);
+
+        user_data.sign(&mut buf, 0).unwrap();
+        let buf_ec = EcUserData::mut_from(&mut buf).unwrap();
+        let EcUserData {
+            data,
+            signature,
+            res_18b,
+            sgn_size,
+            res_192,
+        } = buf_ec;
+        assert_eq!(data, &[0x11u8; 256]);
+        assert_ne!(signature, &[0x11u8; 139]);
+        assert_eq!(res_18b, &[0u8; 5]);
+        assert!(sgn_size.get() <= 139);
+        assert_eq!(res_192, &[0u8; 110]);
+
+        let vrf_user_data = VerifiedUserData::new(&mut buf, UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1);
+        let res = verify_signature(
+            &ec,
+            MessageDigest::sha512(),
+            &buf,
+            vrf_user_data.signature(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(res);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_ec_fail() {
+        let ec = get_test_asset!("keys/ecsecp256k1.pem");
+        let ec = PKey::private_key_from_pem(ec).unwrap();
+
+        let user_data = UserData::new(Some(ec.clone()), vec![]);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            user_data.unwrap_err(),
+            Error::BinAsrcbUnsupportedUserDataSgnKey
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_format() {
+        let (_, ec) = get_test_keys();
+        check_key_format(UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1, &ec).unwrap();
+        let res = check_key_format(UserDataType::SgnRsa2048, &ec);
+        assert!(matches!(res, Err(Error::AsrcbUserDataKeyMismatch { .. })));
+
+        let rsa = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa2048key.pub.pem");
+        let rsa = PKey::public_key_from_pem(rsa).unwrap();
+        check_key_format(UserDataType::SgnRsa2048, &rsa).unwrap();
+
+        let rsa = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa3072key.pub.pem");
+        let rsa = PKey::public_key_from_pem(rsa).unwrap();
+        check_key_format(UserDataType::SgnRsa3072, &rsa).unwrap();
+        let res = check_key_format(UserDataType::SgnRsa2048, &rsa);
+        assert!(matches!(res, Err(Error::AsrcbUserDataKeyMismatch { .. })));
+
+        let rsa = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa4096key.pem");
+        let rsa = PKey::private_key_from_pem(rsa).unwrap();
+        let rsa = PKey::public_key_from_pem(&rsa.public_key_to_pem().unwrap()).unwrap();
+        let res = check_key_format(UserDataType::SgnRsa2048, &rsa);
+        assert!(matches!(res, Err(Error::AsrcbUserDataKeyMismatch { .. })));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn kind() {
+        let (ec, _) = get_test_keys();
+        let kind = UserData::user_data_type(&ec).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(kind, UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1);
+
+        let rsa = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa2048key.pem");
+        let rsa = PKey::private_key_from_pem(rsa).unwrap();
+        let kind = UserData::user_data_type(&rsa).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(kind, UserDataType::SgnRsa2048);
+
+        let rsa = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa3072key.pem");
+        let rsa = PKey::private_key_from_pem(rsa).unwrap();
+        let kind = UserData::user_data_type(&rsa).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(kind, UserDataType::SgnRsa3072);
+
+        let rsa = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa4096key.pem");
+        let rsa = PKey::private_key_from_pem(rsa).unwrap();
+        let kind = UserData::user_data_type(&rsa).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(kind, Error::BinAsrcbUnsupportedUserDataSgnKey));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn new() {
+        let (ec, _) = get_test_keys();
+        let user_data = UserData::new(
+            Some(ec.clone()),
+            vec![1; UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1.max()],
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(user_data, UserData::Signed(_)));
+
+        let user_data = UserData::new(Some(ec), vec![1; UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1.max() + 1]);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            user_data,
+            Err(Error::AsrcbInvSgnUserData(UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1))
+        ));
+
+        let user_data = UserData::new(None, vec![1; UserDataType::Unsigned.max()]).unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(user_data, UserData::Unsigned(_)));
+
+        let user_data = UserData::new(None, vec![1; UserDataType::Unsigned.max() + 1]);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            user_data,
+            Err(Error::AsrcbInvSgnUserData(UserDataType::Unsigned))
+        ));
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn data() {
+        let (ec, _) = get_test_keys();
+        let data_in = vec![1; UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1.max()];
+        let user_data = UserData::new(Some(ec.clone()), data_in.clone()).unwrap();
+        let exp_pad = Some(vec![0; UserData::USER_DATA_SIZE - data_in.len()]);
+
+        let (data_out, pad) = user_data.data();
+        assert_eq!(data_out, Some(data_in.as_ref()));
+        assert_eq!(pad, exp_pad);
+
+        let data_in = vec![1; UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1.max() - 1];
+        let user_data = UserData::new(Some(ec.clone()), data_in.clone()).unwrap();
+        let exp_pad = Some(vec![0; UserData::USER_DATA_SIZE - data_in.len()]);
+
+        let (data_out, pad) = user_data.data();
+        assert_eq!(data_out, Some(data_in.as_ref()));
+        assert_eq!(pad, exp_pad);
+    }
+}

rust/pv/src/uvsecret/uvc.rs

@@ -2,13 +2,12 @@
 //
 // Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
 
-use super::AddSecretMagic;
 use crate::{
-    request::MagicValue,
     requires_feat,
     uv::{uv_ioctl, UvCmd, UvDevice},
     Error, Result, PAGESIZE,
 };
+use pv_core::request::{uvsecret::AddSecretMagic, MagicValue};
 use std::io::Read;
 use std::usize;
 
@@ -64,7 +63,7 @@ impl AddCmd {
         let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(PAGESIZE);
         bin_add_secret_req.read_to_end(&mut data)?;
 
-        if !AddSecretMagic::starts_with_magic(&data[..6]) {
+        if !AddSecretMagic::starts_with_magic(&data) {
             return Err(Error::NoAsrcb);
         }
         Ok(Self(data))

rust/pv/src/verify.rs

@@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ pub struct CertVerifier {
     offline: bool,
 }
 
+impl std::fmt::Debug for CertVerifier {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.write_str("CertVerifier")
+    }
+}
+
 impl HkdVerifier for CertVerifier {
     /// This function verifies a host-key
     /// document. To do so multiple steps are required:

rust/pv/src/verify/helper.rs

@@ -3,11 +3,10 @@
 // Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
 
 use crate::error::bail_hkd_verify;
-use crate::misc::{memeq, read_crls};
+use crate::misc::read_crls;
 use crate::HkdVerifyErrorType::*;
 use crate::{Error, Result};
 use curl::easy::{Easy2, Handler, WriteError};
-use libc::c_int;
 use log::debug;
 use openssl::{
     asn1::{Asn1Time, Asn1TimeRef},
@@ -26,9 +25,7 @@ use openssl_extensions::{
     akid::{AkidCheckResult, AkidExtension},
     crl::X509StoreExtension,
 };
-use std::cmp::Ordering;
-use std::time::Duration;
-use std::usize;
+use std::{cmp::Ordering, ffi::c_int, time::Duration, usize};
 
 /// Minimum security level for the keys/certificates used to establish a chain of
 /// trust (see https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level.html
@@ -219,7 +216,7 @@ fn name_data_eq(entries: &X509NameRef, nid: Nid, rhs: &[u8]) -> bool {
     let mut it = entries.entries_by_nid(nid);
     match it.next() {
         None => false,
-        Some(entry) => memeq(entry.data().as_slice(), rhs),
+        Some(entry) => entry.data().as_slice() == rhs,
     }
 }
 
@@ -376,11 +373,12 @@ fn check_x509_name_equal(lhs: &X509NameRef, rhs: &X509NameRef) -> Result<()> {
     }
 
     for l in lhs.entries() {
-        let ldata = l.data().as_slice();
-
         // search for the matching value in the rhs names
         // found none? -> names are not equal
-        if !rhs.entries().any(|r| memeq(ldata, r.data().as_slice())) {
+        if !rhs
+            .entries()
+            .any(|r| l.data().as_slice() == r.data().as_slice())
+        {
             bail_hkd_verify!(IssuerMismatch);
         }
     }
@@ -484,20 +482,20 @@ mod test {
         let ibm_wrong_subj = load_gen_cert("ibm_wrong_subject.crt");
         let no_sign_crt = load_gen_cert("inter_ca.crt");
 
-        assert!(super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&vec!(ibm_crt.clone())).is_ok());
+        assert!(super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&[ibm_crt.clone()]).is_ok());
         assert!(matches!(
-            super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&vec!(ibm_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone())),
+            super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&[ibm_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()]),
             Err(Error::HkdVerify(ManyIbmSignKeys))
         ));
         assert!(matches!(
-            super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&vec!(ibm_wrong_subj)),
+            super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&[ibm_wrong_subj]),
             Err(Error::HkdVerify(NoIbmSignKey))
         ));
         assert!(matches!(
-            super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&vec!(no_sign_crt.clone())),
+            super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&[no_sign_crt.clone()]),
             Err(Error::HkdVerify(NoIbmSignKey))
         ));
-        assert!(super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&vec!(ibm_crt.clone(), no_sign_crt.clone())).is_ok(),);
+        assert!(super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&[ibm_crt, no_sign_crt]).is_ok(),);
     }
 
     #[test]

rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs

@@ -7,43 +7,30 @@
 use super::{helper, helper::*, *};
 use crate::{Error, HkdVerifyErrorType::*};
 use core::slice;
+use once_cell::sync::OnceCell;
 use openssl::stack::Stack;
+use std::sync::Mutex;
 
 use crate::test_utils::*;
 
 pub fn mock_endpt(res: &str) -> mockito::Mock {
+    static MOCK_SERVER: OnceCell<Mutex<mockito::Server>> = OnceCell::new();
+
     let res_path = get_cert_asset_path(res);
 
-    mockito::mock("GET", format!("/crl/{res}").as_str())
+    MOCK_SERVER
+        .get_or_init(|| mockito::Server::new_with_port(1234).into())
+        .lock()
+        .expect("COULD NOT GET THE MOCK_SERVER LOCK")
+        .mock("GET", format!("/crl/{res}").as_str())
         .with_header("content-type", "application/pkix-crl")
         .with_body_from_file(res_path)
         .create()
 }
 
-#[track_caller]
-fn verify_sign_error(exp_raw: libc::c_int, obs: Error) {
-    verify_sign_error_slice(&[exp_raw], obs)
-}
-fn verify_sign_error_slice(exp_raw: &[libc::c_int], obs: Error) {
-    if exp_raw
-        .into_iter()
-        .filter(|e| match &obs {
-            Error::HkdVerify(ty) => match ty {
-                IbmSignInvalid(err, _d) => &&err.as_raw() == e,
-                _ => false,
-            },
-            e => panic!("Unexpected error type: {e:?}"),
-        })
-        .count()
-        == 0
-    {
-        panic!("Error {obs:?} did not match one of the expected {exp_raw:?}");
-    }
-}
-impl std::fmt::Debug for CertVerifier {
-    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
-        f.write_str("CertVerifier")
-    }
+#[test]
+fn mockito_server_available() {
+    let _mock = mock_endpt("ibm.crt");
 }
 
 #[test]
@@ -51,7 +38,7 @@ fn store_setup() {
     let ibm_str = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm.crt");
     let inter_str = get_cert_asset_path_string("inter.crt");
 
-    let store = helper::store_setup(&None, &vec![], &vec![ibm_str, inter_str]);
+    let store = helper::store_setup(&None, &[], &[ibm_str, inter_str]);
     assert!(store.is_ok());
 }
 
@@ -63,7 +50,7 @@ fn verify_chain_online() {
 
     let mock_inter = mock_endpt("inter_ca.crl");
 
-    let mut store = helper::store_setup(&Some(root_crt), &vec![], &vec![]).unwrap();
+    let mut store = helper::store_setup(&Some(root_crt), &[], &[]).unwrap();
     download_crls_into_store(&mut store, slice::from_ref(&ibm_crt)).unwrap();
     let store = store.build();
 
@@ -71,8 +58,8 @@ fn verify_chain_online() {
 
     let mut sk = Stack::<X509>::new().unwrap();
     sk.push(inter_crt).unwrap();
-    verify_chain(&store, &sk, &vec![ibm_crt.clone()]).unwrap();
-    assert!(verify_chain(&store, &sk, &vec!(ibm_crt)).is_ok());
+    verify_chain(&store, &sk, &[ibm_crt.clone()]).unwrap();
+    assert!(verify_chain(&store, &sk, &[ibm_crt]).is_ok());
 }
 
 #[test]
@@ -82,13 +69,13 @@ fn verify_chain_offline() {
     let inter_crt = load_gen_cert("inter_ca.crt");
     let root_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("root_ca.chained.crt");
 
-    let store = helper::store_setup(&Some(root_crt), &vec![inter_crl], &vec![])
+    let store = helper::store_setup(&Some(root_crt), &[inter_crl], &[])
         .unwrap()
         .build();
 
     let mut sk = Stack::<X509>::new().unwrap();
     sk.push(inter_crt).unwrap();
-    assert!(verify_chain(&store, &sk, &vec![ibm_crt]).is_ok());
+    assert!(verify_chain(&store, &sk, &[ibm_crt]).is_ok());
 }
 
 #[test]
@@ -107,8 +94,8 @@ fn verify_online() {
     let inter_crl = get_cert_asset_path_string("inter_ca.crl");
     let ibm_crl = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm.crl");
     let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
-        &vec![ibm_crt, inter_crt],
-        &vec![ibm_crl, inter_crl],
+        &[ibm_crt, inter_crt],
+        &[ibm_crl, inter_crl],
         &Some(root_crt),
         false,
     )
@@ -148,8 +135,8 @@ fn verify_offline() {
     let hkd = load_gen_cert("host.crt");
 
     let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
-        &vec![ibm_crt, inter_crt],
-        &vec![ibm_crl, inter_crl],
+        &[ibm_crt, inter_crt],
+        &[ibm_crl, inter_crl],
         &Some(root_crt),
         true,
     )
@@ -172,107 +159,6 @@ fn verify_offline() {
     ));
 }
 
-#[test]
-fn verifier_new() {
-    let root_chn_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("root_ca.chained.crt");
-    let root_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("root_ca.crt");
-    let inter_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("inter_ca.crt");
-    let inter_fake_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("fake_inter_ca.crt");
-    let inter_fake_crl = get_cert_asset_path_string("fake_inter_ca.crl");
-    let inter_crl = get_cert_asset_path_string("inter_ca.crl");
-    let ibm_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm.crt");
-    let ibm_early_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm_outdated_early.crl");
-    let ibm_late_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm_outdated_late.crl");
-    let ibm_rev_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm_rev.crt");
-
-    // To many signing keys
-    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
-        &vec![ibm_crt.clone(), ibm_rev_crt.clone()],
-        &vec![],
-        &None,
-        true,
-    );
-    assert!(matches!(verifier, Err(Error::HkdVerify(ManyIbmSignKeys))));
-
-    // no CRL for each X509
-    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
-        &vec![inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
-        &vec![inter_crl.clone()],
-        &Some(root_crt.clone()),
-        false,
-    );
-    verify_sign_error(3, verifier.unwrap_err());
-    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
-        &vec![inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
-        &vec![],
-        &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
-        false,
-    );
-    verify_sign_error(3, verifier.unwrap_err());
-
-    // wrong intermediate (or ibm key)
-    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
-        &vec![inter_fake_crt, ibm_crt.clone()],
-        &vec![inter_fake_crl],
-        &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
-        true,
-    );
-    //Depending on the OpenSSL version different error codes can appear
-    verify_sign_error_slice(&[20, 30], verifier.unwrap_err());
-
-    //wrong root ca
-    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
-        &vec![inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
-        &vec![inter_crl.clone()],
-        &None,
-        true,
-    );
-    verify_sign_error(20, verifier.unwrap_err());
-
-    //correct signing key + intermediate cert
-    let _verifier = CertVerifier::new(
-        &vec![inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
-        &vec![inter_crl.clone()],
-        &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
-        false,
-    )
-    .unwrap();
-
-    // no intermediate key
-    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
-        &vec![ibm_crt.clone()],
-        &vec![],
-        &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
-        false,
-    );
-    verify_sign_error(20, verifier.unwrap_err());
-
-    //Ibm Sign outdated
-    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
-        &vec![inter_crt.clone(), ibm_early_crt.clone()],
-        &vec![inter_crl.clone()],
-        &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
-        false,
-    );
-    assert!(matches!(verifier, Err(Error::HkdVerify(NoIbmSignKey))));
-    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
-        &vec![inter_crt.clone(), ibm_late_crt.clone()],
-        &vec![inter_crl.clone()],
-        &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
-        false,
-    );
-    assert!(matches!(verifier, Err(Error::HkdVerify(NoIbmSignKey))));
-
-    // revoked
-    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
-        &vec![inter_crt.clone(), ibm_rev_crt.clone()],
-        &vec![inter_crl.clone()],
-        &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
-        false,
-    );
-    verify_sign_error(23, verifier.unwrap_err());
-}
-
 #[test]
 fn dist_points() {
     let crt = load_gen_cert("ibm.crt");

rust/pv/tests/add_secret_request.rs

@@ -1,13 +1,19 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
 //
 // Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
-
-#![cfg(all(feature = "request", feature = "uvsecret"))]
+use openssl::{
+    ec::{EcGroup, EcKey},
+    nid::Nid,
+    pkey::Private,
+};
 use pv::{
     get_test_asset,
     request::{
         openssl::pkey::{PKey, Public},
-        uvsecret::{AddSecretFlags, AddSecretRequest, AddSecretVersion, ExtSecret, GuestSecret},
+        uvsecret::{
+            verify_asrcb_and_get_user_data, AddSecretFlags, AddSecretRequest, AddSecretVersion,
+            ExtSecret, GuestSecret,
+        },
         BootHdrTags, ReqEncrCtx, Request, SymKey,
     },
     test_utils::get_test_keys,
@@ -18,7 +24,7 @@ use pv::{
 const TAGS: BootHdrTags = BootHdrTags::new([1; 64], [2; 64], [3; 64], [4; 16]);
 const CUID: ConfigUid = [0x42u8; 16];
 const ASSOC_SECRET: [u8; 32] = [0x11; 32];
-const ASSOC_ID: &'static str = "add_secret_request";
+const ASSOC_ID: &str = "add_secret_request";
 
 fn create_asrcb(
     guest_secret: GuestSecret,
@@ -38,7 +44,7 @@ fn create_asrcb(
     };
 
     asrcb.add_hostkey(hkd);
-    Ok(asrcb.encrypt(ctx)?)
+    asrcb.encrypt(ctx)
 }
 
 fn get_crypto() -> (PKey<Public>, ReqEncrCtx) {
@@ -63,17 +69,10 @@ where
 {
     let (host_key, ctx) = get_crypto();
     let cuid = match cuid {
-        true => Some(CUID.into()),
+        true => Some(CUID),
         false => None,
     };
-    create_asrcb(
-        guest_secret,
-        ext_secret.into(),
-        flags,
-        cuid.into(),
-        host_key,
-        &ctx,
-    )
+    create_asrcb(guest_secret, ext_secret.into(), flags, cuid, host_key, &ctx)
 }
 
 fn association() -> GuestSecret {
@@ -92,6 +91,93 @@ fn no_flag() -> AddSecretFlags {
     AddSecretFlags::default()
 }
 
+fn create_signed_asrcb(skey: PKey<Private>, user_data: Vec<u8>) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let (host_key, ctx) = get_crypto();
+    let mut asrcb =
+        AddSecretRequest::new(AddSecretVersion::One, GuestSecret::Null, TAGS, no_flag());
+
+    asrcb.add_hostkey(host_key);
+    asrcb.set_user_data(user_data, Some(skey)).unwrap();
+    asrcb.encrypt(&ctx).unwrap()
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn null_none_default_ncuid_one_user_unsgn() {
+    let user_data_orig = vec![0x56; 0x183];
+    let (host_key, ctx) = get_crypto();
+    let mut asrcb =
+        AddSecretRequest::new(AddSecretVersion::One, GuestSecret::Null, TAGS, no_flag());
+
+    asrcb.add_hostkey(host_key);
+    asrcb.set_user_data(user_data_orig.clone(), None).unwrap();
+    let asrcb = asrcb.encrypt(&ctx).unwrap();
+
+    let user_data = verify_asrcb_and_get_user_data(asrcb, None).unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        user_data_orig.as_slice(),
+        &user_data.as_ref().unwrap()[..user_data_orig.len()]
+    );
+}
+#[test]
+fn null_none_default_ncuid_one_user_ec() {
+    let (usr_sgn_key, _) = get_test_keys();
+
+    let usr_vrfy_key = usr_sgn_key.ec_key().unwrap();
+    let usr_vrfy_key = usr_vrfy_key.public_key();
+    let usr_vrfy_key = PKey::from_ec_key(
+        EcKey::from_public_key(
+            &EcGroup::from_curve_name(Nid::SECP521R1).unwrap(),
+            usr_vrfy_key,
+        )
+        .unwrap(),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+
+    let user_data_orig = vec![0x56; 0x100];
+    let asrcb = create_signed_asrcb(usr_sgn_key, user_data_orig.clone());
+
+    let user_data = verify_asrcb_and_get_user_data(asrcb, Some(usr_vrfy_key)).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        user_data_orig.as_slice(),
+        &user_data.as_ref().unwrap()[..user_data_orig.len()]
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn null_none_default_ncuid_one_user_rsa2048() {
+    let usr_sgn_key = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa2048key.pem");
+    let usr_sgn_key = PKey::private_key_from_pem(usr_sgn_key).unwrap();
+    let user_data_orig = vec![0x56; 0x100];
+    let asrcb = create_signed_asrcb(usr_sgn_key, user_data_orig.clone());
+
+    let usr_vrfy_key = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa2048key.pub.pem");
+    let usr_vrfy_key = PKey::public_key_from_pem(usr_vrfy_key).unwrap();
+
+    let user_data = verify_asrcb_and_get_user_data(asrcb, Some(usr_vrfy_key)).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        user_data_orig.as_slice(),
+        &user_data.as_ref().unwrap()[..user_data_orig.len()]
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn null_none_default_ncuid_one_user_rsa3072() {
+    let usr_sgn_key = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa3072key.pem");
+    let usr_sgn_key = PKey::private_key_from_pem(usr_sgn_key).unwrap();
+    let user_data_orig = vec![0x56; 0x80];
+    let asrcb = create_signed_asrcb(usr_sgn_key, user_data_orig.clone());
+
+    let usr_vrfy_key = get_test_asset!("keys/rsa3072key.pub.pem");
+    let usr_vrfy_key = PKey::public_key_from_pem(usr_vrfy_key).unwrap();
+
+    let user_data = verify_asrcb_and_get_user_data(asrcb, Some(usr_vrfy_key)).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        user_data_orig.as_slice(),
+        &user_data.as_ref().unwrap()[..user_data_orig.len()]
+    );
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn null_none_default_cuid_one() {
     let asrcb = gen_asrcb(GuestSecret::Null, None, no_flag(), true).unwrap();
@@ -156,9 +242,18 @@ fn null_none_default_cuid_seven() {
     let mut asrcb =
         AddSecretRequest::new(AddSecretVersion::One, GuestSecret::Null, TAGS, no_flag());
     (0..7).for_each(|_| asrcb.add_hostkey(hkd.clone()));
-    asrcb.set_cuid(CUID.into());
+    asrcb.set_cuid(CUID);
     let asrcb = asrcb.encrypt(&ctx).unwrap();
 
     let exp = get_test_asset!("exp/asrcb/null_none_default_cuid_seven");
     assert_eq!(asrcb, exp);
 }
+
+#[test]
+fn verify_no_user_data() {
+    let req = get_test_asset!("exp/asrcb/null_none_default_ncuid_one");
+    assert!(matches!(
+        verify_asrcb_and_get_user_data(req.to_vec(), None),
+        Ok(None)
+    ))
+}

rust/pv/tests/assets/keys/ecsecp256k1.pem

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PARAMETERS-----
+BgUrgQQACg==
+-----END EC PARAMETERS-----
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHQCAQEEIAiQERmhEIwksExNpW2CsaQeFPKFEN6PIdMWUiX3Mu7FoAcGBSuBBAAK
+oUQDQgAEO9U+NDdHcIZ59RzTq/6lDH2RA7sEyRlvFVQsj7feiuXh4Q4qeZNCb2sn
+s7Hd1lUjFexH+Cp97/ggwSa3q2y/0Q==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----

rust/pv/tests/assets/keys/rsa2048.crt

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----

rust/pv/tests/assets/keys/rsa2048key.pem

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----

rust/pv/tests/assets/keys/rsa2048key.pub.pem

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

rust/pv/tests/assets/keys/rsa3072.crt

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----

rust/pv/tests/assets/keys/rsa3072key.pem

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----

rust/pv/tests/assets/keys/rsa3072key.pub.pem

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

rust/pv/tests/assets/keys/rsa4096key.pem

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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+mGYH3ZFnuJ+pMS1MJyPlyVFO8V1zgxNS5DpYkvZtfsPlnW/6v8V5McF9XwzkBNwo
+yKUQgwpd8xPiJ1uaxTs3rIdEIXUA2VhomY+VATQQk0QNWf7Kl3+xQ8Efw8rsM5SR
++xws+xhQvhPhYzR7fc2OwFhTWxF8jtGkQ2Hac9nxkxNN+/0vJTzdjl7ZLq6vzNzD
+FRECggEACyj3OwkbDMnyCtCH9Wp/fLpARkpHN+LZecUL0V6Zt2Iy9aVLSZuVLe92
+dA2UWcOEenMmMzON5bL+d9Nt+beyZaU8tQZYFXLLZ4j+mZZhWX6O5rHdZhlIEN4S
+NSO72c9ikcp7+PPYh07hAKEFlGnv0WwvTsdCWovv9CrPrj/vkBUevKWSWRkff+pW
+9kMmFgTpA2/9z5Cys45jVpUM5M5clTzNCUPBrVVVmpcTOwKUrwemy5m4PirNJgjg
+YRfenxGajQkp/ypi8eh1m7ceYnOxa4Mk9YctaIym3lkGBqn/9hgoOrI0nPEDM+qQ
+io4wIYBrX/SPmp7tQvWI18Ike/IDtA==
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----

rust/pv/tests/cert_verifier.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+use pv::request::CertVerifier;
+use pv::test_utils::*;
+use pv::{Error, HkdVerifyErrorType::*};
+use std::ffi::c_int;
+
+#[track_caller]
+fn verify_sign_error(exp_raw: c_int, obs: Error) {
+    verify_sign_error_slice(&[exp_raw], obs)
+}
+fn verify_sign_error_slice(exp_raw: &[c_int], obs: Error) {
+    if exp_raw
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|e| match &obs {
+            Error::HkdVerify(ty) => match ty {
+                IbmSignInvalid(err, _d) => &&err.as_raw() == e,
+                _ => false,
+            },
+            e => panic!("Unexpected error type: {e:?}"),
+        })
+        .count()
+        == 0
+    {
+        panic!("Error {obs:?} did not match one of the expected {exp_raw:?}");
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn verifier_new() {
+    let root_chn_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("root_ca.chained.crt");
+    let root_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("root_ca.crt");
+    let inter_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("inter_ca.crt");
+    let inter_fake_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("fake_inter_ca.crt");
+    let inter_fake_crl = get_cert_asset_path_string("fake_inter_ca.crl");
+    let inter_crl = get_cert_asset_path_string("inter_ca.crl");
+    let ibm_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm.crt");
+    let ibm_early_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm_outdated_early.crl");
+    let ibm_late_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm_outdated_late.crl");
+    let ibm_rev_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm_rev.crt");
+
+    // Too many signing keys
+    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(&[ibm_crt.clone(), ibm_rev_crt.clone()], &[], &None, true);
+    assert!(matches!(verifier, Err(Error::HkdVerify(ManyIbmSignKeys))));
+
+    // No CRL for each X509
+    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
+        &[inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
+        &[inter_crl.clone()],
+        &Some(root_crt),
+        false,
+    );
+    verify_sign_error(3, verifier.unwrap_err());
+    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
+        &[inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
+        &[],
+        &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
+        false,
+    );
+    verify_sign_error(3, verifier.unwrap_err());
+
+    // Wrong intermediate (or ibm key)
+    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
+        &[inter_fake_crt, ibm_crt.clone()],
+        &[inter_fake_crl],
+        &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
+        true,
+    );
+    // Depending on the OpenSSL version different error codes can appear
+    verify_sign_error_slice(&[20, 30], verifier.unwrap_err());
+
+    // Wrong root ca
+    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
+        &[inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
+        &[inter_crl.clone()],
+        &None,
+        true,
+    );
+    verify_sign_error(20, verifier.unwrap_err());
+
+    // Correct signing key + intermediate cert
+    let _verifier = CertVerifier::new(
+        &[inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
+        &[inter_crl.clone()],
+        &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
+        false,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+
+    // No intermediate key
+    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(&[ibm_crt], &[], &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()), false);
+    verify_sign_error(20, verifier.unwrap_err());
+
+    // IBM Sign outdated
+    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
+        &[inter_crt.clone(), ibm_early_crt],
+        &[inter_crl.clone()],
+        &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
+        false,
+    );
+    assert!(matches!(verifier, Err(Error::HkdVerify(NoIbmSignKey))));
+    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
+        &[inter_crt.clone(), ibm_late_crt],
+        &[inter_crl.clone()],
+        &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
+        false,
+    );
+    assert!(matches!(verifier, Err(Error::HkdVerify(NoIbmSignKey))));
+
+    // Revoked
+    let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
+        &[inter_crt, ibm_rev_crt],
+        &[inter_crl],
+        &Some(root_chn_crt),
+        false,
+    );
+    verify_sign_error(23, verifier.unwrap_err());
+}

rust/pv_core/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+[package]
+name = "pv_core"
+version = "1.0.0"
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+
+# See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html
+
+[dependencies]
+libc = "0.2.49"
+log = { version = "0.4.6", features = ["std", "release_max_level_debug"] }
+thiserror = "1.0.33"
+utils = {path = "../utils"}
+zerocopy = {version = "0.7", features = ["derive"]}
+serde = { version = "1.0.139", features = ["derive"]}
+byteorder = "1.3"
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+serde_test = "1"
+mockito = {version = "1", default-features = false }
+lazy_static = "1.1"

rust/pv_core/src/error.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+/// Result type for this crate
+pub type Result<T, E = Error> = std::result::Result<T, E>;
+
+/// Error cases for this crate
+#[allow(missing_docs)]
+#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
+#[non_exhaustive]
+pub enum Error {
+    #[cfg_attr(debug_assertions, error("Ultravisor: '{msg}' ({rc:#06x},{rrc:#06x})"))]
+    #[cfg_attr(not(debug_assertions), error("Ultravisor: '{msg}' ({rc:#06x})"))]
+    Uv {
+        rc: u16,
+        rrc: u16,
+        msg: &'static str,
+    },
+
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    Specification(String),
+
+    #[error("Cannot {ty} {ctx} at `{path}`")]
+    FileIo {
+        ty: FileIoErrorType,
+        ctx: String,
+        path: String,
+        source: std::io::Error,
+    },
+    #[error("Cannot {ty} `{path}`")]
+    FileAccess {
+        ty: FileAccessErrorType,
+        path: String,
+        source: std::io::Error,
+    },
+
+    #[error("Cannot encode secrets (Too many secrets)")]
+    ManySecrets,
+
+    #[error("Cannot decode secret list")]
+    InvSecretList(#[source] std::io::Error),
+
+    #[error("Input does not contain an add-secret request")]
+    NoAsrcb,
+
+    #[error("Input contains unsupported user-data type: {0:#06x}")]
+    UnsupportedUserData(u16),
+
+    // errors from other crates
+    #[error(transparent)]
+    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
+    #[error(transparent)]
+    ParseInt(#[from] std::num::ParseIntError),
+}
+
+/// Error cases for I/O operations
+#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
+#[non_exhaustive]
+#[allow(missing_docs)]
+pub enum FileIoErrorType {
+    #[error("read")]
+    Read,
+    #[error("write")]
+    Write,
+}
+
+/// Error cases for accessing files
+#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
+#[non_exhaustive]
+#[allow(missing_docs)]
+pub enum FileAccessErrorType {
+    #[error("open")]
+    Open,
+    #[error("create")]
+    Create,
+}

rust/pv_core/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![allow(unused)]
+//! pv_core - basic library for pv-tools
+//!
+//! This library is intened to be used by tools and libraries that
+//! are used for creating and managing IBM Secure Execution guests.
+//! `pv_core` provides abstraction layers for secure memory management,
+//! logging, and accessing the uvdevice.
+//!
+//! It does not provide any cryptographic operations through OpenSSL.
+//! For this use `pv` which reexports all symbos from this crate.
+mod error;
+mod log;
+mod macros;
+mod tmpfile;
+mod utils;
+mod uvdevice;
+mod uvsecret;
+
+pub use crate::log::PvLogger;
+pub use error::{Error, FileAccessErrorType, FileIoErrorType, Result};
+
+/// Miscellaneous functions and definitions
+pub mod misc {
+    pub use crate::utils::pv_guest_bit_set;
+    pub use crate::utils::{create_file, open_file, read_exact_file, read_file, write_file};
+    pub use crate::utils::{parse_hex, to_u16, to_u32, try_parse_u128, try_parse_u64};
+    pub use crate::utils::{read, write};
+    pub use crate::utils::{Flags, Lsb0Flags64, Msb0Flags64};
+
+    pub use crate::tmpfile::TemporaryDirectory;
+}
+
+/// Definitions and functions for interacting with the Ultravisor
+pub mod uv {
+    pub use crate::uvdevice::secret::{AddCmd, ListCmd, LockCmd};
+    pub use crate::uvdevice::secret::{ListableSecretType, SecretEntry, SecretList};
+    pub use crate::uvdevice::{
+        uv_ioctl, ConfigUid, UvCmd, UvDevice, UvDeviceInfo, UvFlags, UvcSuccess,
+    };
+}
+
+/// Functionalities to verify UV requests
+pub mod request {
+    /// Functionalities for reading add-secret requests
+    pub mod uvsecret {
+        pub use crate::uvsecret::AddSecretMagic;
+        pub use crate::uvsecret::UserDataType;
+    }
+
+    /// Version number of the request in system-endian
+    pub type RequestVersion = u32;
+    /// Request magic value
+    ///
+    /// The first 8 byte of a request providing an identifier of the request type
+    /// for programs
+    pub type RequestMagic = [u8; 8];
+    /// A `MagicValue` is a bytepattern, that indicates if a byte slice contains the specified
+    /// (binary) data.
+    pub trait MagicValue<const N: usize> {
+        /// Magic value as byte array
+        const MAGIC: [u8; N];
+        /// Test whether the given slice starts with the magic value.
+        fn starts_with_magic(v: &[u8]) -> bool {
+            if v.len() < Self::MAGIC.len() {
+                return false;
+            }
+            v[..Self::MAGIC.len()] == Self::MAGIC
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Provides cargo version Info about this crate.
+///
+/// Produces `pv_core-crate <version>`
+pub const fn crate_info() -> &'static str {
+    concat!(env!("CARGO_PKG_NAME"), "-crate ", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"))
+}
+
+// Internal definitions/ imports
+const PAGESIZE: usize = 0x1000;
+use ::utils::assert_size;
+use ::utils::static_assert;
+
+#[doc(hidden)]
+/// stuff pv_core and pv share. Not intended for other users
+pub mod for_pv {
+    pub use crate::uvdevice::secret::ser_gsid;
+    pub use crate::uvdevice::secret::SECRET_ID_SIZE;
+}

rust/pv_core/src/macros.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+macro_rules! path_to_str {
+    ($path: expr) => {
+        $path.as_ref().to_str().unwrap_or("no UTF-8 path")
+    };
+}
+pub(crate) use path_to_str;
+
+macro_rules! file_error {
+    ($ty: tt, $ctx: expr, $path:expr, $src: expr) => {
+        $crate::Error::FileIo {
+            ty: $crate::FileIoErrorType::$ty,
+            ctx: $ctx.to_string(),
+            path: $path.to_string(),
+            source: $src,
+        }
+    };
+}
+pub(crate) use file_error;
+
+macro_rules! bail_spec {
+    ($str: expr) => {
+        return Err($crate::Error::Specification($str.to_string()))
+    };
+}
+pub(crate) use bail_spec;
+
+#[doc(hidden)]
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! file_acc_error {
+    ($ty: tt, $path:expr, $src: expr) => {
+        $crate::Error::FileAccess {
+            ty: $crate::FileAccessErrorType::$ty,
+            path: $path.to_string(),
+            source: $src,
+        }
+    };
+}

rust/pv_core/src/tmpfile.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+use std::{
+    ffi::{CString, OsStr},
+    os::unix::prelude::OsStrExt,
+    path::{Path, PathBuf},
+};
+
+/// Rust wrapper for `libc::mkdtemp`
+fn mkdtemp<P: AsRef<Path>>(template: P) -> Result<PathBuf, std::io::Error> {
+    let template_cstr = CString::new(template.as_ref().as_os_str().as_bytes())?;
+    let template_raw = template_cstr.into_raw();
+    unsafe {
+        // SAFETY: template_raw is a valid CString because it was generated by
+        // the `CString::new`.
+        let ret = libc::mkdtemp(template_raw);
+
+        if ret.is_null() {
+            Err(std::io::Error::last_os_error())
+        } else {
+            // SAFETY: `template_raw` is still a valid CString because it was
+            // generated by `CString::new` and modified by `libc::mkdtemp`.
+            let path_cstr = std::ffi::CString::from_raw(template_raw);
+            let path = OsStr::from_bytes(path_cstr.as_bytes());
+            let path = std::path::PathBuf::from(path);
+
+            Ok(path)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// This type creates a temporary directory that is automatically removed when
+/// it goes out of scope. It utilizes the `mkdtemp` function and its semantics,
+/// with the addition of automatically including the template characters
+/// `XXXXXX`.
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub struct TemporaryDirectory {
+    path: Box<Path>,
+}
+
+impl TemporaryDirectory {
+    /// Creates a temporary directory using `prefix` as directory prefix.
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// An error is returned if the temporary directory could not be created.
+    pub fn new<P: AsRef<Path>>(prefix: P) -> Result<Self, std::io::Error> {
+        let mut template = prefix.as_ref().to_owned();
+        let mut template_os_string = template.as_mut_os_string();
+        template_os_string.push("XXXXXX");
+
+        let temp_dir = mkdtemp(template_os_string)?;
+        Ok(Self {
+            path: temp_dir.into_boxed_path(),
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the path of the created temporary directory.
+    pub fn path(&self) -> &Path {
+        self.path.as_ref()
+    }
+
+    fn forget(mut self) {
+        self.path = PathBuf::new().into_boxed_path();
+        std::mem::forget(self);
+    }
+
+    /// Removes the created temporary directory and it's contents.
+    pub fn close(mut self) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+        let ret = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&self.path);
+        self.forget();
+        ret
+    }
+}
+
+impl AsRef<Path> for TemporaryDirectory {
+    fn as_ref(&self) -> &Path {
+        self.path()
+    }
+}
+
+impl Drop for TemporaryDirectory {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&self.path);
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use std::path::PathBuf;
+
+    use super::{mkdtemp, TemporaryDirectory};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn mkdtemp_test() {
+        let template_inv_not_last_characters = "XXXXXXyay";
+        let template_inv_too_less_x = "yayXXXXX";
+        let template_inv_path_does_not_exist = "../NA-yay/XXXXXX";
+
+        let template = "yayXXXXXX";
+
+        let err = mkdtemp(template_inv_not_last_characters).expect_err("invalid template");
+        let err = mkdtemp(template_inv_too_less_x).expect_err("invalid template");
+        let err =
+            mkdtemp(template_inv_path_does_not_exist).expect_err("path does not exist template");
+
+        let path = mkdtemp(template).expect("mkdtemp should work");
+        assert!(path.exists());
+        assert!(path.as_os_str().to_str().expect("works").starts_with("yay"));
+        std::fs::remove_dir(path);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn temporary_directory_empty_name_test() {
+        let temp_dir = TemporaryDirectory::new("").expect("should work");
+        let path = temp_dir.path().to_owned();
+        assert!(path.exists());
+
+        // Test that close removes the directory
+        temp_dir.close();
+        assert!(!path.exists());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn temporary_directory_drop_test() {
+        let temp_dir = TemporaryDirectory::new("").expect("should work");
+        let path = temp_dir.path().to_owned();
+        assert!(path.exists());
+
+        // Test that the destructor removes the directory
+        drop(temp_dir);
+        assert!(!path.exists());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn temporary_directory_close_test() {
+        let temp_dir = TemporaryDirectory::new("yay").expect("should work");
+
+        let path = temp_dir.path().to_owned();
+        assert!(path.exists());
+        assert!(path.as_os_str().to_str().expect("works").starts_with("yay"));
+
+        // Test that close() removes the directory
+        temp_dir.close();
+        assert!(!path.exists());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn temporary_directory_as_ref_test() {
+        let temp_dir = TemporaryDirectory::new("").expect("should work");
+
+        assert_eq!(temp_dir.path(), temp_dir.as_ref());
+    }
+}

rust/pv_core/src/utils.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,562 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+use crate::{
+    macros::{bail_spec, file_error, path_to_str},
+    Error, FileAccessErrorType, FileIoErrorType, Result,
+};
+use std::{
+    fs::File,
+    io::{Read, Write},
+    path::Path,
+};
+use zerocopy::{AsBytes, BigEndian, FromBytes, FromZeroes, U64};
+
+/// Trait that describes bitflags, represented by `T`.
+pub trait Flags<T>: From<T> + for<'a> From<&'a T> {
+    /// Set the specified bit to one.
+    /// # Panics
+    ///Panics if bit is >= 64
+    fn set_bit(&mut self, bit: u8);
+    /// Set the specified bit to zero.
+    /// # Panics
+    ///Panics if bit is >= 64
+    fn unset_bit(&mut self, bit: u8);
+    /// Test if the specified bit is set.
+    /// # Panics
+    ///Panics if bit is >= 64
+    fn is_set(&self, bit: u8) -> bool;
+}
+
+/// Bitflags in MSB0 ordering
+///
+/// Wraps an u64 to set/get individual bits
+#[repr(C)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, AsBytes, FromZeroes, FromBytes)]
+pub struct Msb0Flags64(U64<BigEndian>);
+impl Flags<u64> for Msb0Flags64 {
+    #[track_caller]
+    fn set_bit(&mut self, bit: u8) {
+        assert!(bit < 64, "Flag bit set to greater than 63");
+        let mut v = self.0.get();
+        v |= 1 << (63 - bit);
+        self.0.set(v)
+    }
+
+    #[track_caller]
+    fn unset_bit(&mut self, bit: u8) {
+        assert!(bit < 64, "Flag bit set to greater than 63");
+        let mut v = self.0.get();
+        v &= !(1 << (63 - bit));
+        self.0.set(v)
+    }
+
+    #[track_caller]
+    fn is_set(&self, bit: u8) -> bool {
+        assert!(bit < 64, "Flag bit set to greater than 63");
+        self.0.get() & (1 << (63 - bit)) > 0
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<u64> for Msb0Flags64 {
+    fn from(value: u64) -> Self {
+        Self(value.into())
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<&u64> for Msb0Flags64 {
+    fn from(value: &u64) -> Self {
+        (*value).into()
+    }
+}
+
+/// Bitflags in LSB0 ordering
+///
+/// Wraps an u64 to set/get individual bits
+#[repr(C)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, AsBytes, FromZeroes, FromBytes)]
+pub struct Lsb0Flags64(U64<BigEndian>);
+impl Flags<u64> for Lsb0Flags64 {
+    #[track_caller]
+    fn set_bit(&mut self, bit: u8) {
+        assert!(bit < 64, "Flag bit set to greater than 63");
+        let mut v = self.0.get();
+        v |= 1 << bit;
+        self.0.set(v)
+    }
+
+    #[track_caller]
+    fn unset_bit(&mut self, bit: u8) {
+        assert!(bit < 64, "Flag bit set to greater than 63");
+        let mut v = self.0.get();
+        v &= !(1 << bit);
+        self.0.set(v)
+    }
+
+    #[track_caller]
+    fn is_set(&self, bit: u8) -> bool {
+        assert!(bit < 64, "Flag bit set to greater than 63");
+        self.0.get() & (1 << bit) > 0
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<u64> for Lsb0Flags64 {
+    fn from(value: u64) -> Self {
+        Self(value.into())
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<&u64> for Lsb0Flags64 {
+    fn from(value: &u64) -> Self {
+        (*value).into()
+    }
+}
+
+/// Tries to convert a BE hex string into a 128 unsigned integer
+/// The hexstring must contain 32chars of hexdigits
+///
+/// * `hex_str` - string to convert  can be prepended with "0x"
+/// * `ctx` - Error context string in case of an error
+/// ```rust
+/// # use std::error::Error;
+/// # use pv_core::misc::try_parse_u128;
+/// # fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error>> {
+/// let hex = "11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff";
+/// try_parse_u128(&hex, "The test")?;
+/// #     Ok(())
+/// # }
+/// ```
+///
+/// # Errors
+/// If `hex_string` is not a 32 byte hex string an Error appears
+pub fn try_parse_u128(hex_str: &str, ctx: &str) -> Result<[u8; 16]> {
+    let hex_str = if hex_str.starts_with("0x") {
+        hex_str.split_at(2).1
+    } else {
+        hex_str
+    };
+    if hex_str.len() != 32 {
+        bail_spec!(format!(
+            "{ctx} hexstring must be 32chars long to cover all 16 bytes"
+        ));
+    }
+    parse_hex(hex_str).try_into().map_err(|_| {
+        Error::Specification(format!(
+            "{ctx} hexstring must be 32chars long to cover all 16 bytes"
+        ))
+    })
+}
+
+/// Tries to convert a BE hex string into a 64 unsigned integer
+/// The hexstring must *NOT* contain 16 chars of hexdigits, but
+/// 16 chars at most.
+///
+/// * `hex_str` - string to convert  can be prepended with "0x"
+/// * `ctx` - Error context string in case of an error
+/// ```rust
+/// # use std::error::Error;
+/// # use pv_core::misc::try_parse_u64;
+/// # fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error>> {
+/// let hex = "1234567890abcdef";
+/// try_parse_u64(&hex, "The test")?;
+/// #     Ok(())
+/// # }
+/// ```
+///
+/// # Errors
+/// If `hex_string` is not a 32 byte hex string an Error appears
+pub fn try_parse_u64(hex_str: &str, ctx: &str) -> Result<u64> {
+    let hex_str = if hex_str.starts_with("0x") {
+        hex_str.split_at(2).1
+    } else {
+        hex_str
+    };
+    if hex_str.len() > 16 {
+        bail_spec!(format!(
+            "{ctx} hexstring {hex_str} must be max 16 chars long"
+        ));
+    }
+    Ok(u64::from_str_radix(hex_str, 16)?)
+}
+
+/// Open a file.
+///
+/// Wraps [`File::open`]
+///
+/// * `path` - Path to file
+pub fn open_file<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<File> {
+    File::open(&path).map_err(|e| Error::FileAccess {
+        ty: FileAccessErrorType::Open,
+        path: path_to_str!(path).to_string(),
+        source: e,
+    })
+}
+
+/// Create a file.
+///
+/// Wraps [`File::create`]
+///
+/// * `path` - Path to file
+pub fn create_file<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<File> {
+    File::create(&path).map_err(|e| Error::FileAccess {
+        ty: FileAccessErrorType::Create,
+        path: path_to_str!(path).to_string(),
+        source: e,
+    })
+}
+
+/// Read exactly COUNT bytes into a buffer and return it.
+///
+/// * `path` - Path to file
+/// * `ctx` - Error context string in case of an error
+///
+/// # Errors
+/// If this function encounters an "end of file" before completely filling
+/// the buffer, it returns an error. The contents of `buf` are unspecified in this case.
+///
+/// If aber so hast du mmmeny other read error is encountered then this function immediately
+/// returns. The contents of `buf` are unspecified in this case.
+///
+/// If this function returns an error, it is unspecified how many bytes it
+/// has read, but it will never read more than would be necessary to
+/// completely fill the buffer.
+pub fn read_exact_file<P: AsRef<Path>, const COUNT: usize>(
+    path: P,
+    ctx: &str,
+) -> Result<[u8; COUNT]> {
+    let mut f = std::fs::File::open(&path).map_err(|e| Error::FileAccess {
+        ty: crate::FileAccessErrorType::Open,
+        path: path_to_str!(path).to_string(),
+        source: e,
+    })?;
+
+    if f.metadata()?.len() as usize != COUNT {
+        bail_spec!(format!("{ctx} must be exactly {COUNT} bytes long"));
+    }
+
+    let mut buf = [0; COUNT];
+    f.read_exact(&mut buf)
+        .map_err(|e| file_error!(Read, ctx, path_to_str!(path).to_string(), e))?;
+    Ok(buf)
+}
+
+/// Read content from a file and add context in case of an error
+///
+/// * `path` - Path to file
+/// * `ctx` - Error context string in case of an error
+///
+///
+/// # Errors
+/// Passes through any kind of error `std::fs::read` produces
+pub fn read_file<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P, ctx: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    std::fs::read(&path).map_err(|e| {
+        file_error!(
+            Read,
+            ctx,
+            path.as_ref().to_str().unwrap_or("no UTF-8 path"),
+            e
+        )
+    })
+}
+
+/// Reads all content from a [`std::io::Read`] and add context in case of an error
+///
+/// * `path` - Path to file
+/// * `ctx` - Error context string in case of an error
+///
+///
+/// # Errors
+/// Passes through any kind of error `std::fs::read` produces
+pub fn read<R: Read>(rd: &mut R, path: &str, ctx: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let mut buf = vec![];
+    rd.read_to_end(&mut buf).map_err(|e| Error::FileIo {
+        ty: FileIoErrorType::Write,
+        ctx: ctx.to_string(),
+        path: path.to_string(),
+        source: e,
+    })?;
+    Ok(buf)
+}
+
+/// write content to a file and add context in case of an error
+///
+/// * `path` - Path to file
+/// * `ctx` - Error context string in case of an error
+///
+///
+/// # Errors
+/// Passes through any kind of error `std::fs::write` produces
+pub fn write_file<D: AsRef<[u8]>>(path: &str, data: D, ctx: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    std::fs::write(path, data.as_ref()).map_err(|e| Error::FileIo {
+        ty: FileIoErrorType::Write,
+        ctx: ctx.to_string(),
+        path: path.to_string(),
+        source: e,
+    })
+}
+
+/// Write content to a [`std::io::Write`] and add context in case of an error
+///
+/// * `path` - Path to file
+/// * `ctx` - Error context string in case of an error
+///
+///
+/// # Errors
+/// Passes through any kind of error `std::fs::write` produces
+pub fn write<D: AsRef<[u8]>, W: Write>(wr: &mut W, data: D, path: &str, ctx: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    wr.write_all(data.as_ref()).map_err(|e| Error::FileIo {
+        ty: FileIoErrorType::Write,
+        ctx: ctx.to_string(),
+        path: path.to_string(),
+        source: e,
+    })
+}
+
+macro_rules! usize_to_ui {
+    ($(#[$attr:meta])* => $t: ident, $name:ident) => {
+        ///Converts an [`usize`] to an [`
+        $(#[$attr])*
+        ///`] if possible
+        pub fn $name(u: usize) -> Option<$t> {
+            if u > $t::MAX as usize {
+                None
+            } else {
+                Some(u as $t)
+            }
+        }
+
+    }
+}
+
+usize_to_ui! {
+#[doc = r"u32"]
+=> u32, to_u32}
+usize_to_ui! {
+#[doc = r"u16"]
+=> u16, to_u16}
+
+/// Converts the hexstring into a byte vector.
+///
+/// Stops if the end or until a non hex chat is found
+pub fn parse_hex(hex_str: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut hex_bytes = hex_str.as_bytes().iter().map_while(|b| match b {
+        b'0'..=b'9' => Some(b - b'0'),
+        b'a'..=b'f' => Some(b - b'a' + 10),
+        b'A'..=b'F' => Some(b - b'A' + 10),
+        _ => None,
+    });
+
+    let mut bytes = Vec::new();
+    while let (Some(h), Some(l)) = (hex_bytes.next(), hex_bytes.next()) {
+        bytes.push(h << 4 | l)
+    }
+    bytes
+}
+/// Report if the `prot_virt_guest` sysfs entry is one.
+///
+/// If the entry does not exist returns false.
+///
+/// for non-s390-architectures:
+/// Returns always false
+/// A non-s390 system cannot be a secure execution guest.
+#[allow(unreachable_code)]
+pub fn pv_guest_bit_set() -> bool {
+    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "s390x"))]
+    return false;
+    //s390 branch
+    let v = std::fs::read("/sys/firmware/uv/prot_virt_guest").unwrap_or_else(|_| vec![0]);
+    let v: u8 = String::from_utf8_lossy(&v[..1]).parse().unwrap_or(0);
+    v == 1
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn msb_flags() {
+        let v = 17;
+        let v_flag: Msb0Flags64 = v.into();
+        assert_eq!(v, v_flag.0.get());
+
+        let mut v: Msb0Flags64 = 4.into();
+        v.unset_bit(61);
+        assert_eq!(v.0.get(), 0);
+        v.set_bit(61);
+        assert_eq!(4, v.0.get());
+
+        let mut v = Msb0Flags64::default();
+        v.set_bit(0);
+        assert_eq!(&[0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
+        v.set_bit(0);
+        assert_eq!(&[0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
+        v.set_bit(1);
+        assert_eq!(&[0xc0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
+        v.set_bit(2);
+        assert_eq!(&[0xe0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
+        v.set_bit(3);
+        assert_eq!(&[0xf0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
+
+        v.unset_bit(3);
+        assert_eq!(&[0xe0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
+        v.unset_bit(3);
+        assert_eq!(&[0xe0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
+
+        v.set_bit(16);
+        assert_eq!(&[0xe0, 0, 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], v.as_bytes());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[should_panic]
+    fn msb_flags_set_panic() {
+        Msb0Flags64::default().set_bit(64)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[should_panic]
+    fn msb_flags_unset_panic() {
+        Msb0Flags64::default().unset_bit(64)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn lsb_flags() {
+        let v = 17;
+        let v_flag: Lsb0Flags64 = v.into();
+        assert_eq!(v, v_flag.0.get());
+
+        let mut v: Lsb0Flags64 = 4.into();
+        v.unset_bit(2);
+        assert_eq!(v.0.get(), 0);
+        v.set_bit(2);
+        assert_eq!(4, v.0.get());
+
+        let mut v = Lsb0Flags64::default();
+        v.set_bit(0);
+        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1], v.as_bytes());
+        v.set_bit(0);
+        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1], v.as_bytes());
+        v.set_bit(1);
+        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3], v.as_bytes());
+        v.set_bit(2);
+        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7], v.as_bytes());
+        v.set_bit(3);
+        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xf], v.as_bytes());
+
+        v.unset_bit(3);
+        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7], v.as_bytes());
+        v.unset_bit(3);
+        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7], v.as_bytes());
+
+        v.set_bit(16);
+        assert_eq!(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 7], v.as_bytes());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[should_panic]
+    fn lsb_flags_set_panic() {
+        Lsb0Flags64::default().set_bit(64)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[should_panic]
+    fn lsb_flags_unset_panic() {
+        Lsb0Flags64::default().unset_bit(64)
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_hex() {
+        let s = "123456acbef0";
+        let exp = vec![0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0xac, 0xbe, 0xf0];
+        assert_eq!(super::parse_hex(s), exp);
+
+        let s = "00123456acbef0";
+        let exp = vec![0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0xac, 0xbe, 0xf0];
+        assert_eq!(super::parse_hex(s), exp);
+
+        let s = "00123456acbef0ii90";
+        let exp = vec![0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0xac, 0xbe, 0xf0];
+        assert_eq!(super::parse_hex(s), exp);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn to_u32() {
+        assert_eq!(Some(17), super::to_u32(17));
+        assert_eq!(Some(0), super::to_u32(0));
+        assert_eq!(Some(u32::MAX), super::to_u32(u32::MAX as usize));
+        assert_eq!(None, super::to_u32(u32::MAX as usize + 1));
+        assert_eq!(None, super::to_u32(usize::MAX));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_u128() {
+        assert!(matches!(
+            try_parse_u128("123456", ""),
+            Err(Error::Specification(_))
+        ));
+        assert!(matches!(
+            try_parse_u128("-1234", ""),
+            Err(Error::Specification(_))
+        ));
+        assert!(matches!(
+            try_parse_u128("0011223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", ""),
+            Err(Error::Specification(_))
+        ));
+        assert!(matches!(
+            try_parse_u128("dd11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", ""),
+            Err(Error::Specification(_))
+        ));
+        assert!(matches!(
+            try_parse_u128("-1223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", ""),
+            Err(Error::Specification(_))
+        ));
+
+        assert!(matches!(
+            try_parse_u128("0x123456", ""),
+            Err(Error::Specification(_))
+        ));
+        assert!(matches!(
+            try_parse_u128("-0x1234", ""),
+            Err(Error::Specification(_))
+        ));
+        assert!(matches!(
+            try_parse_u128("0x0011223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", ""),
+            Err(Error::Specification(_))
+        ));
+        assert!(matches!(
+            try_parse_u128("0xdd11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", ""),
+            Err(Error::Specification(_))
+        ));
+        assert!(matches!(
+            try_parse_u128("0x-1223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", ""),
+            Err(Error::Specification(_))
+        ));
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            [
+                0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0x00, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd,
+                0xee, 0xff
+            ],
+            try_parse_u128("11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", "").unwrap()
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            [
+                0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0x00, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd,
+                0xee, 0xff
+            ],
+            try_parse_u128("0x11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff", "").unwrap()
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            [
+                0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd,
+                0xee, 0xff
+            ],
+            try_parse_u128("00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff", "").unwrap()
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            [
+                0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd,
+                0xee, 0xff
+            ],
+            try_parse_u128("00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff", "").unwrap()
+        );
+    }
+}

rust/pv_core/src/uvdevice.rs

@@ -3,13 +3,15 @@
 // Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
 
 #![allow(non_camel_case_types)]
-use crate::file_acc_error;
+use crate::FileAccessErrorType;
 use crate::{Error, Result};
-use libc::c_ulong;
 use log::debug;
-use std::convert::TryInto;
-use std::fs::File;
-use std::os::unix::prelude::{AsRawFd, RawFd};
+use std::{
+    convert::TryInto,
+    ffi::c_ulong,
+    fs::File,
+    os::unix::prelude::{AsRawFd, RawFd},
+};
 
 #[cfg(not(test))]
 use ::libc::ioctl;
@@ -22,6 +24,7 @@ mod ffi;
 mod info;
 mod test;
 pub use ffi::uv_ioctl;
+pub mod secret;
 
 pub use info::UvDeviceInfo;
 #[allow(dead_code)] //TODO rm when pv learns attestation
@@ -178,7 +181,11 @@ impl UvDevice {
                 .read(true)
                 .write(true)
                 .open(UvDevice::PATH)
-                .map_err(|e| file_acc_error!(Open, UvDevice::PATH, e))?,
+                .map_err(|e| Error::FileAccess {
+                    ty: FileAccessErrorType::Open,
+                    path: (UvDevice::PATH).to_string(),
+                    source: e,
+                })?,
         ))
     }
 

rust/pv_core/src/uvdevice/ffi.rs

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 // Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
 
 use crate::{assert_size, static_assert};
-use zerocopy::{AsBytes, FromBytes};
+use zerocopy::{AsBytes, FromBytes, FromZeroes};
 
 pub const UVIO_ATT_ARCB_MAX_LEN: usize = 0x100000;
 pub const UVIO_ATT_MEASUREMENT_MAX_LEN: usize = 0x8000;
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ assert_size!(uvio_ioctl_cb, 0x40);
 /// Note that bit 0 (UVIO_IOCTL_UVDEV_INFO_NR) is always zero for `supp_uv_cmds`
 /// as there is no corresponding UV-call.
 #[repr(C)]
-#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone, AsBytes, FromBytes)]
+#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone, AsBytes, FromZeroes, FromBytes)]
 pub struct uvio_uvdev_info {
     pub supp_uvio_cmds: u64,
     pub supp_uv_cmds: u64,
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ pub const UVIO_ATT_UID_LEN: usize = 0x10;
 /// UV will return invalid command rc.
 /// Obviously all numbers are in BIG-endian!
 #[repr(C)]
-#[derive(Debug, AsBytes, FromBytes)]
+#[derive(Debug, AsBytes, FromZeroes, FromBytes)]
 pub struct uvio_attest {
     pub arcb_addr: u64,                          //in
     pub meas_addr: u64,                          //out

rust/pv_core/src/uvdevice/info.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ use crate::{
     Result,
 };
 use std::fmt::Display;
-use zerocopy::{AsBytes, FromBytes};
+use zerocopy::{AsBytes, FromZeroes};
 
 /// Information of supported functions by the uvdevice
 ///

rust/pv_core/src/uvdevice/secret.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,489 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+use crate::{
+    assert_size,
+    misc::to_u16,
+    request::{uvsecret::AddSecretMagic, MagicValue},
+    uv::{uv_ioctl, UvCmd, UvDevice},
+    Error, Result, PAGESIZE,
+};
+use byteorder::{BigEndian, ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};
+use serde::{Serialize, Serializer};
+use std::{
+    fmt::Display,
+    io::{Cursor, Read, Seek, Write},
+    slice::Iter,
+    vec::IntoIter,
+};
+use zerocopy::{AsBytes, FromBytes, FromZeroes, U16, U32};
+
+/// _List Secrets_ Ultravisor command.
+///
+/// The List Secrets Ultravisor call is used to list the
+/// secrets that are in the secret store for the current SE-guest.
+pub struct ListCmd(Vec<u8>);
+impl ListCmd {
+    fn with_size(size: usize) -> Self {
+        Self(vec![0; size])
+    }
+
+    /// Create a new list secrets command with a one page capacity
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        Self::with_size(PAGESIZE)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Default for ListCmd {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self::new()
+    }
+}
+
+impl UvCmd for ListCmd {
+    fn data(&mut self) -> Option<&mut [u8]> {
+        Some(self.0.as_mut_slice())
+    }
+
+    fn cmd(&self) -> u64 {
+        uv_ioctl(UvDevice::LIST_SECRET_NR)
+    }
+
+    fn rc_fmt(&self, _rc: u16, _rrc: u16) -> Option<&'static str> {
+        None
+    }
+}
+
+/// _Add Secret_ Ultravisor command.
+///
+/// The Add Secret Ultravisor-call is used to add a secret
+/// to the secret store for the current SE-guest.
+pub struct AddCmd(Vec<u8>);
+
+impl AddCmd {
+    /// Create a new Add Secret command using the provided data.
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// This function will return an error if the provided data does not start with the
+    /// ['crate::AddSecretRequest'] magic Value.
+    pub fn new<R: Read>(bin_add_secret_req: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(PAGESIZE);
+        bin_add_secret_req.read_to_end(&mut data)?;
+
+        if !AddSecretMagic::starts_with_magic(&data[..6]) {
+            return Err(Error::NoAsrcb);
+        }
+        Ok(Self(data))
+    }
+}
+
+impl UvCmd for AddCmd {
+    fn data(&mut self) -> Option<&mut [u8]> {
+        Some(&mut self.0)
+    }
+
+    fn cmd(&self) -> u64 {
+        uv_ioctl(UvDevice::ADD_SECRET_NR)
+    }
+
+    fn rc_fmt(&self, rc: u16, _rrc: u16) -> Option<&'static str> {
+        match rc {
+            0x0101 => Some("not allowed to modify the secret store"),
+            0x0102 => Some("secret store locked"),
+            0x0103 => Some("access exception when accessing request control block"),
+            0x0104 => Some("unsupported add secret version"),
+            0x0105 => Some("invalid request size"),
+            0x0106 => Some("invalid number of host-keys"),
+            0x0107 => Some("unsupported flags specified"),
+            0x0108 => Some("unable to decrypt the request"),
+            0x0109 => Some("unsupported secret provided"),
+            0x010a => Some("invalid length for the specified secret"),
+            0x010b => Some("secret store full"),
+            0x010c => Some("unable to add secret"),
+            0x010d => Some("dump in progress, try again later"),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// _Lock Secret Store_ Ultravisor command.
+///
+/// The Lock Secret Store Ultravisor-call is used to block
+/// all changes to the secret store. Upon successful
+/// completion of a Lock Secret Store Ultravisor-call, any
+/// request to modify the secret store will fail.
+pub struct LockCmd;
+impl UvCmd for LockCmd {
+    fn cmd(&self) -> u64 {
+        uv_ioctl(UvDevice::LOCK_SECRET_NR)
+    }
+
+    fn rc_fmt(&self, rc: u16, _rrc: u16) -> Option<&'static str> {
+        match rc {
+            0x0101 => Some("not allowed to modify the secret store"),
+            0x0102 => Some("secret store already locked"),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// List of secrets used to parse the [`crate::uv::ListCmd`] result.
+///
+/// The list should not hold more than 0xffffffff elements
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
+pub struct SecretList {
+    total_num_secrets: usize,
+    secrets: Vec<SecretEntry>,
+}
+
+impl<'a> IntoIterator for &'a SecretList {
+    type Item = &'a SecretEntry;
+    type IntoIter = Iter<'a, SecretEntry>;
+
+    fn into_iter(self) -> Self::IntoIter {
+        self.iter()
+    }
+}
+
+impl IntoIterator for SecretList {
+    type Item = SecretEntry;
+    type IntoIter = IntoIter<Self::Item>;
+
+    fn into_iter(self) -> Self::IntoIter {
+        self.secrets.into_iter()
+    }
+}
+
+impl FromIterator<SecretEntry> for SecretList {
+    fn from_iter<T: IntoIterator<Item = SecretEntry>>(iter: T) -> Self {
+        let secrets: Vec<_> = iter.into_iter().collect();
+        let total_num_secrets = secrets.len() as u16;
+        Self::new(total_num_secrets, secrets)
+    }
+}
+
+impl SecretList {
+    /// Creates a new SecretList.
+    ///
+    /// The content of this list will very liekly not represent the status of the guest in the
+    /// Ultravisor. Use of [`SecretList::decode`] in any non-test environments is encuraged.
+    pub fn new(total_num_secrets: u16, secrets: Vec<SecretEntry>) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            total_num_secrets: total_num_secrets as usize,
+            secrets,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Returns an iterator over the slice.
+    ///
+    /// The iterator yields all secret entries from start to end.
+    pub fn iter(&self) -> Iter<'_, SecretEntry> {
+        self.secrets.iter()
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the length of this [`SecretList`].
+    pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
+        self.secrets.len()
+    }
+
+    /// Returns `true` if the [`SecretList`] contains no [`SecretEntry`].
+    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
+        self.secrets.is_empty()
+    }
+
+    /// Reports the number of secrets stored in UV.
+    ///
+    /// This number may be not equal to the provided number of [`SecretEntry`]
+    pub fn total_num_secrets(&self) -> usize {
+        self.total_num_secrets
+    }
+
+    /// Encodes the list in the same binary format the UV would do
+    pub fn encode<T: Write>(&self, w: &mut T) -> Result<()> {
+        let num_s = to_u16(self.secrets.len()).ok_or(Error::ManySecrets)?;
+        w.write_u16::<BigEndian>(num_s)?;
+        w.write_u16::<BigEndian>(
+            self.total_num_secrets
+                .try_into()
+                .map_err(|_| Error::ManySecrets)?,
+        )?;
+        w.write_all(&[0u8; 12])?;
+        for secret in &self.secrets {
+            w.write_all(secret.as_bytes())?;
+        }
+        w.flush().map_err(Error::Io)
+    }
+
+    /// Decodes the list from the binary format of the UV into this internal representation
+    pub fn decode<R: Read + Seek>(r: &mut R) -> std::io::Result<Self> {
+        let num_s = r.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?;
+        let total_num_secrets = r.read_u16::<BigEndian>()? as usize;
+        let mut v: Vec<SecretEntry> = Vec::with_capacity(num_s as usize);
+        r.seek(std::io::SeekFrom::Current(12))?; //skip reserved bytes
+        let mut buf = [0u8; SecretEntry::STRUCT_SIZE];
+        for _ in 0..num_s {
+            r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
+            //cannot fail. buffer has the same size as the secret entry
+            let secr = SecretEntry::read_from(buf.as_slice()).unwrap();
+            v.push(secr);
+        }
+        Ok(Self {
+            total_num_secrets,
+            secrets: v,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<ListCmd> for SecretList {
+    type Error = Error;
+    fn try_from(mut list: ListCmd) -> Result<SecretList> {
+        SecretList::decode(&mut Cursor::new(list.data().unwrap())).map_err(Error::InvSecretList)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Display for SecretList {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        writeln!(f, "Total number of secrets: {}", self.total_num_secrets)?;
+        if !self.secrets.is_empty() {
+            writeln!(f)?;
+        }
+        for s in &self.secrets {
+            writeln!(f, "{s}")?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+fn ser_u32<S: Serializer>(v: &U32<BigEndian>, ser: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error> {
+    ser.serialize_u32(v.get())
+}
+
+fn ser_u16<S: Serializer>(v: &U16<BigEndian>, ser: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error> {
+    ser.serialize_u16(v.get())
+}
+
+/// Secret types that can appear in a [`SecretList`]
+#[non_exhaustive]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum ListableSecretType {
+    /// Association Secret
+    Association,
+    /// Invalid secret type, that should never appear in a list
+    ///
+    /// 0 is reserved
+    /// 1 is Null secret, with no id and not listable
+    Invalid(u16),
+    /// Unknown secret type
+    Unknown(u16),
+}
+impl ListableSecretType {
+    const RESERVED_0: u16 = 0x0000;
+    const NULL: u16 = 0x0001;
+    const ASSOCIATION: u16 = 0x0002;
+}
+
+impl Display for ListableSecretType {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            Self::Association => write!(f, "Association"),
+            Self::Invalid(n) => write!(f, "Invalid({n})"),
+            Self::Unknown(n) => write!(f, "Unknown({n})"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<U16<BigEndian>> for ListableSecretType {
+    fn from(value: U16<BigEndian>) -> Self {
+        match value.get() {
+            Self::RESERVED_0 => Self::Invalid(Self::RESERVED_0),
+            Self::NULL => Self::Invalid(Self::NULL),
+            Self::ASSOCIATION => ListableSecretType::Association,
+            n => Self::Unknown(n),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<ListableSecretType> for U16<BigEndian> {
+    fn from(value: ListableSecretType) -> Self {
+        match value {
+            ListableSecretType::Association => ListableSecretType::ASSOCIATION,
+            ListableSecretType::Invalid(n) | ListableSecretType::Unknown(n) => n,
+        }
+        .into()
+    }
+}
+
+#[doc(hidden)]
+pub const SECRET_ID_SIZE: usize = 32;
+
+#[doc(hidden)]
+pub fn ser_gsid<S>(id: &[u8; SECRET_ID_SIZE], ser: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
+where
+    S: serde::Serializer,
+{
+    let mut s = String::with_capacity(32 * 2 + 2);
+    s.push_str("0x");
+    let s = id.iter().fold(s, |acc, e| acc + &format!("{e:02x}"));
+    ser.serialize_str(&s)
+}
+
+/// A secret in a [`SecretList`]
+#[repr(C)]
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, AsBytes, FromZeroes, FromBytes, Serialize)]
+pub struct SecretEntry {
+    #[serde(serialize_with = "ser_u16")]
+    index: U16<BigEndian>,
+    #[serde(serialize_with = "ser_u16")]
+    stype: U16<BigEndian>,
+    #[serde(serialize_with = "ser_u32")]
+    len: U32<BigEndian>,
+    #[serde(skip)]
+    res_8: u64,
+    #[serde(serialize_with = "ser_gsid")]
+    id: [u8; SECRET_ID_SIZE],
+}
+assert_size!(SecretEntry, SecretEntry::STRUCT_SIZE);
+
+impl SecretEntry {
+    const STRUCT_SIZE: usize = 0x30;
+
+    /// Create a new entry for a [`SecretList`].
+    ///
+    /// The content of this entry will very liekly not represent the status of the guest in the
+    /// Ultravisor. Use of [`SecretList::decode`] in any non-test environments is encuraged.
+    pub fn new(index: u16, stype: ListableSecretType, id: [u8; 32], secret_len: u32) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            index: index.into(),
+            stype: stype.into(),
+            len: secret_len.into(),
+            res_8: 0,
+            id,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the index of this [`SecretEntry`].
+    pub fn index(&self) -> u16 {
+        self.index.get()
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the secret type of this [`SecretEntry`].
+    pub fn stype(&self) -> ListableSecretType {
+        self.stype.into()
+    }
+
+    /// Returns a reference to the id of this [`SecretEntry`].
+    pub fn id(&self) -> &[u8] {
+        &self.id
+    }
+}
+
+impl Display for SecretEntry {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        let stype: ListableSecretType = self.stype.into();
+        writeln!(f, "{} {}:", self.index, stype)?;
+        write!(f, "  ")?;
+        for b in self.id {
+            write!(f, "{b:02x}")?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+
+    use super::*;
+    use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter, Cursor};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn dump_secret_entry() {
+        const EXP: &[u8] = &[
+            0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, //idx + type
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, //len
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // reserved
+            // id
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        ];
+        let s = SecretEntry {
+            index: 1.into(),
+            stype: 2.into(),
+            len: 32.into(),
+            res_8: 0,
+            id: [0; 32],
+        };
+
+        assert_eq!(s.as_bytes(), EXP);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn secret_list_dec() {
+        let buf = [
+            0x00u8, 0x01, // num secr stored
+            0x01, 0x12, // total num secrets
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, //reserved
+            // secret
+            0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, //idx + type
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, //len
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // reserved
+            // id
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        ];
+
+        let exp = SecretList {
+            total_num_secrets: 0x112,
+            secrets: vec![SecretEntry {
+                index: 1.into(),
+                stype: 2.into(),
+                len: 32.into(),
+                res_8: 0,
+                id: [0; 32],
+            }],
+        };
+
+        let mut br = BufReader::new(Cursor::new(buf));
+        let sl = SecretList::decode(&mut br).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(sl, exp);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn secret_list_enc() {
+        const EXP: &[u8] = &[
+            0x00, 0x01, // num secr stored
+            0x01, 0x12, // total num secrets
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, //reserved
+            // secret
+            0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, //idx + type
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, //len
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // reserved
+            // id
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+            0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        ];
+
+        let sl = SecretList {
+            total_num_secrets: 0x112,
+            secrets: vec![SecretEntry {
+                index: 1.into(),
+                stype: 2.into(),
+                len: 32.into(),
+                res_8: 0,
+                id: [0; 32],
+            }],
+        };
+
+        let mut buf = [0u8; 0x40];
+        {
+            let mut bw = BufWriter::new(&mut buf[..]);
+            sl.encode(&mut bw).unwrap();
+        }
+        println!("list: {sl:?}");
+        assert_eq!(buf, EXP);
+    }
+}

rust/pv_core/src/uvdevice/test.rs

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #![cfg(test)]
 
 use std::{
+    ffi::{c_int, c_ulong},
     os::unix::prelude::FromRawFd,
     sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard},
 };
@@ -28,18 +29,18 @@ fn get_lock<T>(m: &'static Mutex<T>) -> MutexGuard<'static, T> {
 
 struct IoctlCtx {
     modify: Box<dyn FnMut(&mut ffi::uvio_ioctl_cb) -> i32 + Send + Sync>,
-    exp_cmd: ::libc::c_ulong,
+    exp_cmd: c_ulong,
     called: bool,
 }
 
 impl IoctlCtx {
-    pub fn exp_cmd(&mut self, cmd: ::libc::c_ulong) -> &mut Self {
+    pub fn exp_cmd(&mut self, cmd: c_ulong) -> &mut Self {
         self.exp_cmd = cmd;
         self
     }
     pub fn set_mdfy<F>(&mut self, mdfy: F) -> &mut Self
     where
-        F: FnMut(&mut ffi::uvio_ioctl_cb) -> ::libc::c_int + 'static + Send + Sync,
+        F: FnMut(&mut ffi::uvio_ioctl_cb) -> c_int + 'static + Send + Sync,
     {
         self.modify = Box::new(mdfy);
         self
@@ -62,11 +63,7 @@ impl IoctlCtx {
 pub mod mock_libc {
     use super::*;
 
-    pub unsafe fn ioctl(
-        fd: ::libc::c_int,
-        cmd: ::libc::c_ulong,
-        data: *mut ffi::uvio_ioctl_cb,
-    ) -> ::libc::c_int {
+    pub unsafe fn ioctl(fd: c_int, cmd: c_ulong, data: *mut ffi::uvio_ioctl_cb) -> c_int {
         let mut ctx = get_lock(&IOCTL_MTX);
         assert!(!ctx.called, "IOCTL called more than once");
         ctx.called = true;

rust/pv_core/src/uvsecret.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+
+use crate::{
+    misc::to_u16,
+    request::{MagicValue, RequestMagic},
+    uv::{ListCmd, UvCmd},
+    Error, Result,
+};
+use byteorder::{BigEndian, ByteOrder};
+use std::{
+    fmt::Display,
+    io::{Cursor, Read, Seek, Write},
+    mem::size_of,
+};
+use utils::{assert_size, static_assert};
+use zerocopy::{AsBytes, FromBytes, U16, U32};
+
+/// The magic value used to identify an add-secret request`]
+///
+/// The magic value is ASCII:
+/// ```rust
+/// # use pv_core::request::uvsecret::AddSecretMagic;
+/// # use pv_core::request::MagicValue;
+/// # fn main() {
+/// # let magic =
+/// b"asrcbM"
+/// # ;
+/// # assert!(AddSecretMagic::starts_with_magic(magic));
+/// # }
+///```
+///
+#[repr(C)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, AsBytes)]
+pub struct AddSecretMagic {
+    magic: [u8; 6], // [0x61, 0x73, 0x72, 0x63, 0x62, 0x4D]
+    kind: U16<BigEndian>,
+}
+assert_size!(AddSecretMagic, 8);
+
+impl MagicValue<6> for AddSecretMagic {
+    // "asrcbM"
+    const MAGIC: [u8; 6] = [0x61, 0x73, 0x72, 0x63, 0x62, 0x4D];
+}
+
+impl AddSecretMagic {
+    /// Get the magic value.
+    pub fn get(&self) -> RequestMagic {
+        let mut res = RequestMagic::default();
+        debug_assert!(res.len() == size_of::<AddSecretMagic>());
+        // Panic: does not panic, buf is 8 bytes long
+        self.write_to(&mut res).unwrap();
+        res
+    }
+
+    /// Try to convert from a byte slice.
+    ///
+    /// Retuns [`None`] if the byte slice does not contain a valid magic value variant.
+    pub fn try_from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
+        if !Self::starts_with_magic(bytes) || bytes.len() < size_of::<AddSecretMagic>() {
+            return Err(Error::NoAsrcb);
+        }
+
+        // Panic: Will not panic, bytes is at least 8 elements long
+        let kind = BigEndian::read_u16(&bytes[6..8]);
+        let kind = UserDataType::try_from(kind)?;
+        Ok(Self::from(kind))
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the [`UserDataType`] of this [`AddSecretMagic`].
+    pub fn kind(&self) -> UserDataType {
+        // Panic: Will never panic. The value is cheched during construcion of the object for
+        // beeing one of the enum values.
+        self.kind.get().try_into().unwrap()
+    }
+}
+
+/// Types of (non architectured) user data for an add-secret request
+#[repr(u16)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum UserDataType {
+    /// Marker that the request does not contain any user data
+    Null = 0x0000,
+    /// Arbitrary user data (max 512 bytes)
+    Unsigned = 0x0001,
+    /// User data message signed with an Ec key, (max 256 byte)
+    SgnEcSECP521R1 = 0x0002,
+    /// User data message signature with a Rsa key of 2048 bit size, (max 256 byte)
+    SgnRsa2048 = 0x0003,
+    /// User data message signature with a Rsa key of 3072 bit size, (max 128 byte)
+    SgnRsa3072 = 0x0004,
+}
+
+impl UserDataType {
+    /// Returns the maximum user-data size in bytes.
+    pub fn max(&self) -> usize {
+        match self {
+            UserDataType::Null => 0,
+            UserDataType::Unsigned => 512,
+            UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1 => 256,
+            UserDataType::SgnRsa2048 => 256,
+            UserDataType::SgnRsa3072 => 128,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl Display for UserDataType {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        write!(
+            f,
+            "{}",
+            match self {
+                Self::Null => "None",
+                Self::Unsigned => "unsigned",
+                Self::SgnEcSECP521R1 => "ECDSA signed",
+                Self::SgnRsa2048 => "RSA 2048 signed",
+                Self::SgnRsa3072 => "RSA 3072 signed",
+            }
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<u16> for UserDataType {
+    type Error = Error;
+
+    fn try_from(value: u16) -> std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        if value == UserDataType::Null as u16 {
+            Ok(UserDataType::Null)
+        } else if value == UserDataType::Unsigned as u16 {
+            Ok(UserDataType::Unsigned)
+        } else if value == UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1 as u16 {
+            Ok(UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1)
+        } else if value == UserDataType::SgnRsa2048 as u16 {
+            Ok(UserDataType::SgnRsa2048)
+        } else if value == UserDataType::SgnRsa3072 as u16 {
+            Ok(UserDataType::SgnRsa3072)
+        } else {
+            Err(Error::UnsupportedUserData(value))
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<UserDataType> for AddSecretMagic {
+    fn from(kind: UserDataType) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            magic: Self::MAGIC,
+            kind: (kind as u16).into(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+    use crate::{
+        request::{
+            uvsecret::{AddSecretMagic, UserDataType},
+            MagicValue,
+        },
+        Error,
+    };
+
+    #[test]
+    fn convert_user_data() {
+        assert!(matches!(
+            UserDataType::try_from(5),
+            Err(Error::UnsupportedUserData(5))
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn magic_get() {
+        let user_data = AddSecretMagic::from(UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1);
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            user_data.get(),
+            [0x61, 0x73, 0x72, 0x63, 0x62, 0x4D, 0x00, 0x02]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn magic_try_from() {
+        let bin = [0x61, 0x73, 0x72, 0x63, 0x62, 0x4D, 0x00, 0x02];
+
+        let magic = AddSecretMagic::try_from_bytes(&bin).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            magic,
+            AddSecretMagic {
+                magic: AddSecretMagic::MAGIC,
+                kind: (UserDataType::SgnEcSECP521R1 as u16).into()
+            }
+        );
+    }
+}

rust/pvapconfig/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[package]
+name = "pvapconfig"
+description = "A tool to configure the AP resources inside a SE guest based on UV secrets and an AP config file."
+authors = ["Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>"]
+version = "0.9.0"
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+clap = { version ="4.1", features = ["derive", "wrap_help"]}
+lazy_static = "1.1"
+openssl = { version = "0.10" }
+openssl-sys = { version = "0.9" }
+pv_core = { path = "../pv_core"}
+rand = "0.8"
+regex = "1"
+serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
+serde_yaml = "0.9"
+utils = { path = "../utils" }

rust/pvapconfig/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<!--
+Copyright 2023 IBM Corp.
+s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
+-->
+# pvapconfig
+## Description
+**pvapconfig** is used to automatically set up the AP configuration
+within an IBM Secure Execution guest.

rust/pvapconfig/man/pvapconfig.1

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+.\" pvapconfig.1
+.\"
+.\" Copyright 2023 IBM Corp.
+.\" s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+.\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
+.\"
+.\" use
+.\"   groff -man -Tutf8 pvapconfig.1
+.\" or
+.\"   nroff -man pvapconfig.1
+.\" to process this source
+.\"
+.TH PVAPCONFIG 1 "DEC 2023" "s390-tools"
+.SH NAME
+pvapconfig \- automatic configure APQNs within an SE KVM guest.
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.TP 9
+.B pvapconfig [OPTIONS]
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+pvapconfig is a tool for automatically configuring the APQNs within an
+Secure Execution KVM guest with AP pass-through support. Based on a
+given AP configuration it tries to find matching APQNs and binds and
+associates them with the given secret(s).
+
+Here is a description of pvapconfig's process:
+.TP 3
+1. Check AP bus: Support for AP bus needs to be available and the AP
+bus needs to support APSB. APSB is only available within an KVM SE
+guest with AP pass-through support.
+.TP 3
+2. Check Ultravisor: UV support needs to be available and the UV needs
+to support the
+.I list secrets
+feature.
+.TP 3
+3. Read in and validate the AP configuration file. By default if not
+overwritten by the --config option the AP configuration is read from
+.I /etc/pvapconfig.yaml
+and syntactically verified. See section CONFIGFILE for details about
+the syntax and semantic of the configuration file.
+.TP 3
+4. Fetch the list of association secrets from the UV. Actually the
+index of the secret and the secret id for each entry is collected. The
+secret value is NOT fetched as it is NOT accessible but only usable
+within the UV firmware.
+.TP 3
+5. Gather all APQNs available within this KVM SE guest. Collect
+information about each APQN like online states, crypto card serial
+numbers and master key verification patterns (MKVP).
+.TP 3
+6. Go through all AP config entries. For each AP config entry try to
+find an APQN which is already configured (bound/associated) to
+satisfy this config entry. If such a match is found, the AP config
+entry is assumed to be fulfilled and marked as done.
+.TP 3
+7. All remaining APQNs which do not already satisfy an AP config entry
+are now examined for their bind and association state and maybe reset
+to unbound state.
+.TP 3
+8. Go through all AP config entries which are still not
+fulfilled. For each such AP config entry try to search for an APQN
+which would match to this entry and then prepare this APQN (bind,
+maybe associate). If successful, mark the AP config entry as done.
+.TP 3
+9. Evaluation of the applied AP config entries. Applied means the AP
+config entry has been fulfilled either in step 6 or in step 8. With
+the strict option given ALL AP config entries need to apply otherwise
+an error message is printed and pvapconfig returns with exit failure.
+If the strict option is not given, it is enough to satisfy at least one
+AP config entry from the configuration and pvapconfig will return
+successfully.
+.SH OPTIONS
+.TP 8
+.B -c, --config <configfile>
+Use <configfile> as the AP config file for pvapconfig. If pvapconfig
+is run without this option the default configuration file
+/etc/pvapconfig.yaml is used.
+.TP 8
+.B -h, --help
+Print pvapconfig usage information and exit.
+.TP 8
+.B -n, --dry-run
+Do not bind, unbind or associate APQNs but only process the
+configuration and the available APQNs and secrets and simulate the
+bind, unbind or associate action on the chosen APQN. Use it together
+with the verbose option to see which actions pvapconfig would do if
+unleashed.
+.TP 8
+.B -s, --strict
+All AP config entries need to be satisfied to have pvapconfig
+terminate with success. Without this option one applied AP config
+entry is enough to meet the expectations.
+.TP 8
+.B -v, --verbose
+Print out informational messages about what pvapconfig is actually
+doing.
+.TP 8
+.B -V, --version
+Print version information and exit.
+.SH CONFIGFILE
+The pvapconfig yaml configuration file consists of a list of AP config
+entries. Each entry may hold this information:
+.TP 2
+- mode: AP queue mode information, required, either "EP11" or "Accel".
+.TP 2
+- mkvp: AP queue Master Key Verification Pattern (MKVP), required for
+EP11, hex string optional prepented with 0x. The MKVP hex string value
+may hold either 16 bytes (32 hex characters) or 32 bytes (64 hex
+characters) but only the leftmost 16 bytes hold MKVP information and
+thus the rest is ignored.
+.TP 2
+- serialnr: Crypto Card Serial Number, string, optional for EP11,
+ignored for Accel. As this is a real ASCII string uppercase and
+lowercase character(s) count different.
+.TP 2
+- mingen: Card Minimal Generation, string "CEX4", "CEX5", "CEX6",
+"CEX7" or "CEX8" for Accelerator, string "CEC8" for EP11, optional. If
+given specifies the minimal accepted Crypto card generation.
+.TP 2
+- secretid: Secret id, hex string with optional 0x prepented, required
+for EP11, ignored for Accel. Details see the following text.
+.TP 2
+- name: ASCII string, optional, but see details below.
+.TP 2
+- description: Description of this AP config entry, string, ignored,
+  just for convenience for the reader or editor of the configuration.
+.PP
+The secret id uniquely identifies an association secret. However, it
+is a clumsy hex string of 64 characters which represent the readable
+sha256 value over the secret's name. So pvapconfig can use the name
+instead and calculate the secret id from the name. So the rule is:
+.TP 2
+- If name and secretid is given, the secretid needs to match to the
+sha256 hash over the given name for this AP config entry.
+.TP 2
+- If only name is given then the secretid is calculated with a sha256
+  hash over the given name.
+.TP 2
+- If only the secretid is given, there is nothing more to do but
+verify that the value is a hex string with 64 characters.
+.SH LOCKING
+Pvapconfig needs to have a consistent view of the AP resources
+during lifetime. There must not run multiple instances of pvapconfig
+or any manipulations of the AP resources in parallel. To prevent the
+execution of multiple pvapconfig instances the lock file
+/run/lock/pvapconfig.lock is established. A second instance of
+pvapconfig will detect this lock file and terminated with an error
+message. If for any reason this file still exists as a leftover from a
+previous pvapconfig crash for example, it needs to get removed by
+hand. The lock file contains the process id of the pvapconfig process
+which created this file.
+.SH RETURN VALUE
+.TP 8
+.B 0 - Successful termination.
+At least one AP config entry has been applied or at least one APQN has
+been found in a state matching to one AP config entry. If strict
+option is given, ALL AP config entries have been applied. An AP config
+entry is applied either by configuring the APQN accordingly or an APQN
+has been found which already fulfills the constrains.
+.RE
+.TP 8
+.B 1 - Failure.
+Either some kind of failure happened during processing the
+configuration or the configuration could not get applied
+successful. In all cases pvapconfig prints out a message to standard
+error with details about the failure. Also pvapconfig does NOT reset
+the APQNs to the state found at the startup when failing to apply the
+configuration.
+.SH NOTES
+For more information and details see the IBM documentation about
+Confidential Computing "Introducing IBM Secure Execution for Linux"
+available at https://www.ibm.com/docs/.
+.SH SEE ALSO
+\fBpvsecret\fR(1), \fBlszcrypt\fR(8), \fBchzcrypt\fR(8)

rust/pvapconfig/src/ap.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,817 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+//
+//! AP support functions for pvapconfig
+//
+
+use crate::helper::*;
+use regex::Regex;
+use std::fmt;
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::slice::Iter;
+use std::thread;
+use std::time;
+
+const PATH_SYS_BUS_AP: &str = "/sys/bus/ap";
+const PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_FEATURES: &str = "/sys/bus/ap/features";
+const PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_BINDINGS: &str = "/sys/bus/ap/bindings";
+const PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP: &str = "/sys/devices/ap";
+
+const RE_CARD_DIR: &str = r"^card([[:xdigit:]]{2})$";
+const RE_QUEUE_DIR: &str = r"^([[:xdigit:]]{2})\.([[:xdigit:]]{4})$";
+const RE_CARD_TYPE: &str = r"^CEX([3-8])([ACP])$";
+const RE_EP11_MKVP: &str = r"WK\s+CUR:\s+(\S+)\s+(\S+)";
+const RE_CCA_AES_MKVP: &str = r"AES\s+CUR:\s+(\S+)\s+(\S+)";
+const RE_CCA_APKA_MKVP: &str = r"APKA\s+CUR:\s+(\S+)\s+(\S+)";
+
+const SYS_BUS_AP_BINDINGS_POLL_MS: u64 = 500;
+
+const SYS_BUS_AP_BIND_POLL_MS: u64 = 500;
+const SYS_BUS_AP_BIND_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 10000;
+
+const SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_POLL_MS: u64 = 500;
+const SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 10000;
+
+/// Check if AP bus support is available.
+/// Returns Result with Ok(()) or Err(failurestring).
+pub fn check_ap_bus_support() -> Result<(), String> {
+    if !Path::new(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP).is_dir() {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "AP bus support missing (path {PATH_SYS_BUS_AP} is invalid)."
+        ));
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Check if AP bus supports APSB.
+///
+/// When APSB support is available returns Result
+/// with Ok(()) or otherwise Err(failurestring).
+pub fn ap_bus_has_apsb_support() -> Result<(), String> {
+    if !Path::new(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_FEATURES).is_file() {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "AP bus features support missing (file {PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_FEATURES} does not exist)."
+        ));
+    }
+    let features = sysfs_read_string(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_FEATURES).map_err(|err| {
+        format!("Failure reading AP bus features from {PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_FEATURES} ({err:?}).")
+    })?;
+    match features.find("APSB") {
+        Some(_) => Ok(()),
+        None => Err("Missing AP bus feature APSB (SE AP pass-through not enabled ?).".to_string()),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Wait for AP bus set up all it's devices.
+///
+/// This function loops until the AP bus reports that
+/// - all AP queue devices have been constructed
+/// - and all AP device have been bound to a device driver.
+/// This may take some time and even loop forever if there
+/// is something wrong with the kernel modules setup.
+/// Returns true when AP bus bindings are complete,
+/// otherwise false and a message is printed.
+/// When AP bus binding complete is not immediately reached
+/// and this function needs to loop, about every 5 seconds
+/// a message is printed "Waiting for ...".
+pub fn wait_for_ap_bus_bindings_complete() -> bool {
+    let mut counter = 0;
+    loop {
+        match sysfs_read_string(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_BINDINGS) {
+            Ok(s) => {
+                if s.contains("complete") {
+                    return true;
+                }
+            }
+            Err(err) => {
+                eprintln!(
+                    "Failure reading AP bus bindings from {} ({:?}).",
+                    PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_BINDINGS, err
+                );
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+        thread::sleep(time::Duration::from_millis(SYS_BUS_AP_BINDINGS_POLL_MS));
+        counter += 1;
+        if counter % 10 == 0 {
+            println!("Waiting for AP bus bindings complete.");
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum ApqnMode {
+    Accel,
+    Ep11,
+    Cca,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ApqnInfoAccel {
+    // empty
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ApqnInfoEp11 {
+    pub serialnr: String,
+    pub mkvp: String, // may be an empty string if no WK set
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ApqnInfoCca {
+    pub serialnr: String,
+    pub mkvp_aes: String,  // may be an empty string if no MK set
+    pub mkvp_apka: String, // may be an empty string if no MK set
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub enum ApqnInfo {
+    Accel(ApqnInfoAccel),
+    Ep11(ApqnInfoEp11),
+    Cca(ApqnInfoCca),
+}
+
+impl ApqnInfo {
+    fn accel_info(_carddir: &str, _queuedir: &str) -> Result<ApqnInfo, String> {
+        Ok(ApqnInfo::Accel(ApqnInfoAccel {}))
+    }
+
+    fn cca_info(carddir: &str, queuedir: &str) -> Result<ApqnInfo, String> {
+        let serialnr = match sysfs_read_string(&format!("{carddir}/serialnr")) {
+            Ok(r) => r,
+            Err(err) => {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "Failure reading serialnr from {carddir}/serialnr: {:?}.",
+                    err
+                ))
+            }
+        };
+        let mkvps = match sysfs_read_string(&format!("{carddir}/{queuedir}/mkvps")) {
+            Ok(r) => r,
+            Err(err) => {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "Failure reading mkvps from {carddir}/{queuedir}/mkvps: {:?}.",
+                    err
+                ))
+            }
+        };
+        let mut aes_mkvp = String::new();
+        let re_cca_aes_mkvp = Regex::new(RE_CCA_AES_MKVP).unwrap();
+        if !re_cca_aes_mkvp.is_match(&mkvps) {
+            return Err(format!(
+                "APQN {} failure parsing mkvps string '{}'.",
+                queuedir, mkvps
+            ));
+        } else {
+            let caps = re_cca_aes_mkvp.captures(&mkvps).unwrap();
+            let valid = caps.get(1).unwrap().as_str().to_lowercase();
+            if valid != "valid" {
+                eprintln!(
+                    "Warning: APQN {} has no valid AES master key set.",
+                    queuedir
+                );
+            } else {
+                aes_mkvp = caps.get(2).unwrap().as_str().to_lowercase();
+                if aes_mkvp.starts_with("0x") {
+                    aes_mkvp = String::from(&aes_mkvp[2..]);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        let mut apka_mkvp = String::new();
+        let re_cca_apka_mkvp = Regex::new(RE_CCA_APKA_MKVP).unwrap();
+        if !re_cca_apka_mkvp.is_match(&mkvps) {
+            return Err(format!(
+                "APQN {} failure parsing mkvps string '{}'.",
+                queuedir, mkvps
+            ));
+        } else {
+            let caps = re_cca_apka_mkvp.captures(&mkvps).unwrap();
+            let valid = caps.get(1).unwrap().as_str().to_lowercase();
+            if valid != "valid" {
+                eprintln!(
+                    "Warning: APQN {} has no valid APKA master key set.",
+                    queuedir
+                );
+            } else {
+                apka_mkvp = caps.get(2).unwrap().as_str().to_lowercase();
+                if apka_mkvp.starts_with("0x") {
+                    apka_mkvp = String::from(&apka_mkvp[2..]);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(ApqnInfo::Cca(ApqnInfoCca {
+            serialnr,
+            mkvp_aes: aes_mkvp,
+            mkvp_apka: apka_mkvp,
+        }))
+    }
+
+    fn ep11_info(carddir: &str, queuedir: &str) -> Result<ApqnInfo, String> {
+        let serialnr = match sysfs_read_string(&format!("{carddir}/serialnr")) {
+            Ok(r) => r,
+            Err(err) => {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "Failure reading serialnr from {carddir}/serialnr: {:?}.",
+                    err
+                ))
+            }
+        };
+        let mkvps = match sysfs_read_string(&format!("{carddir}/{queuedir}/mkvps")) {
+            Ok(r) => r,
+            Err(err) => {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "Failure reading mkvps from {carddir}/{queuedir}/mkvps: {:?}.",
+                    err
+                ))
+            }
+        };
+        let mut mkvp = String::new();
+        let re_ep11_mkvp = Regex::new(RE_EP11_MKVP).unwrap();
+        if !re_ep11_mkvp.is_match(&mkvps) {
+            return Err(format!(
+                "APQN {} failure parsing mkvps string '{}'.",
+                queuedir, mkvps
+            ));
+        } else {
+            let caps = re_ep11_mkvp.captures(&mkvps).unwrap();
+            let valid = caps.get(1).unwrap().as_str().to_lowercase();
+            if valid != "valid" {
+                eprintln!("Warning: APQN {} has no valid wrapping key set.", queuedir);
+            } else {
+                mkvp = caps.get(2).unwrap().as_str().to_lowercase();
+                if mkvp.starts_with("0x") {
+                    mkvp = String::from(&mkvp[2..]);
+                }
+                if mkvp.len() > 32 {
+                    mkvp = String::from(&mkvp[..32])
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(ApqnInfo::Ep11(ApqnInfoEp11 { serialnr, mkvp }))
+    }
+
+    fn info(mode: &ApqnMode, carddir: &str, queuedir: &str) -> Result<ApqnInfo, String> {
+        match mode {
+            ApqnMode::Accel => ApqnInfo::accel_info(carddir, queuedir),
+            ApqnMode::Cca => ApqnInfo::cca_info(carddir, queuedir),
+            ApqnMode::Ep11 => ApqnInfo::ep11_info(carddir, queuedir),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct Apqn {
+    pub name: String,
+    pub card: u32,
+    pub domain: u32,
+    pub gen: u32,
+    pub mode: ApqnMode,
+    pub info: Option<ApqnInfo>,
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for Apqn {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "({},{})", self.card, self.domain)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Apqn {
+    pub fn bind_state(&self) -> Result<BindState, String> {
+        get_apqn_bind_state(self.card, self.domain)
+    }
+
+    pub fn set_bind_state(&self, state: BindState) -> Result<(), String> {
+        set_apqn_bind_state(self.card, self.domain, state)
+    }
+
+    pub fn associate_state(&self) -> Result<AssocState, String> {
+        get_apqn_associate_state(self.card, self.domain)
+    }
+
+    pub fn set_associate_state(&self, state: AssocState) -> Result<(), String> {
+        set_apqn_associate_state(self.card, self.domain, state)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Wrapper object around Vector of Apqns
+pub struct ApqnList(Vec<Apqn>);
+
+impl ApqnList {
+    #[cfg(test)] // only used in test code
+    pub fn from_apqn_vec(apqns: Vec<Apqn>) -> ApqnList {
+        ApqnList(apqns)
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(test)] // only used in test code
+    pub fn to_apqn_vec(&self) -> Vec<Apqn> {
+        self.0.clone()
+    }
+
+    pub fn iter(&self) -> Iter<'_, Apqn> {
+        self.0.iter()
+    }
+
+    pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
+        self.0.len()
+    }
+
+    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
+        self.0.is_empty()
+    }
+
+    /// Scan AP bus devices in sysfs and construct the Apqnlist.
+    ///
+    /// The list is a vector of struct Apqn for each APQN found in sysfs
+    /// which is online and the card type matches to the regular expression
+    /// RE_CARD_TYPE.
+    /// On success a vector of struct Apqn is returned. This list may be
+    /// empty if there are no APQNs available or do not match to the conditions.
+    /// On failure None is returned.
+    /// Fatal errors which should never happened like unable to compile a
+    /// static regular expression will result in calling panic.
+    /// # Panics
+    /// Panics if the compilation of a static regular expression fails.
+    pub fn gather_apqns() -> Option<ApqnList> {
+        let mut apqns: Vec<Apqn> = Vec::new();
+        let re_card_type = Regex::new(RE_CARD_TYPE).unwrap();
+        let re_queue_dir = Regex::new(RE_QUEUE_DIR).unwrap();
+        let card_dirs =
+            match sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs_matching_regex(PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP, RE_CARD_DIR) {
+                Ok(r) => r,
+                Err(err) => {
+                    eprintln!(
+                        "Failure reading AP devices {} ({:?}).",
+                        PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP, err
+                    );
+                    return None;
+                }
+            };
+        for dir in card_dirs {
+            let path = format!("{PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP}/{dir}");
+            let card_type = match sysfs_read_string(&format!("{path}/type")) {
+                Ok(r) => r,
+                Err(err) => {
+                    eprintln!("Failure reading card type from {} ({:?}).", path, err);
+                    return None;
+                }
+            };
+            if !re_card_type.is_match(&card_type) {
+                eprintln!("Failure parsing card type string '{}'.", card_type);
+                return None;
+            }
+            let caps = re_card_type.captures(&card_type).unwrap();
+            let gen = caps.get(1).unwrap().as_str().parse::<u32>().unwrap();
+            let mode = match caps.get(2).unwrap().as_str().parse::<char>().unwrap() {
+                'A' => ApqnMode::Accel,
+                'C' => ApqnMode::Cca,
+                'P' => ApqnMode::Ep11,
+                _ => panic!("Code inconsistence between regex RE_CARD_TYPE and evaluation code."),
+            };
+            if pv_core::misc::pv_guest_bit_set() {
+                // the UV blocks requests to CCA cards within SE guest with
+                // AP pass-through support. However, filter out CCA cards as these
+                // cards cause hangs during information gathering.
+                if mode == ApqnMode::Cca {
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+            let queue_dirs = match sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs_matching_regex(&path, RE_QUEUE_DIR) {
+                Ok(r) => r,
+                Err(err) => {
+                    eprintln!(
+                        "Failure reading AP queue directories in {} ({:?}).",
+                        path, err
+                    );
+                    return None;
+                }
+            };
+            for queue_dir in queue_dirs {
+                let _online = match sysfs_read_i32(&format!("{path}/{queue_dir}/online")) {
+                    Ok(1) => true,
+                    _ => continue,
+                };
+                let caps = re_queue_dir.captures(&queue_dir).unwrap();
+                let cardstr = caps.get(1).unwrap().as_str();
+                let card = u32::from_str_radix(cardstr, 16).unwrap();
+                let domstr = caps.get(2).unwrap().as_str();
+                let dom = u32::from_str_radix(domstr, 16).unwrap();
+                // For the mpvk and serialnr to fetch from the APQN within a SE
+                // guest the APQN needs to be bound to the guest. So if the APQN
+                // is not bound, temporarily bind it here until the info has
+                // been retrieved.
+                let mut tempbound = false;
+                if pv_core::misc::pv_guest_bit_set() {
+                    let cbs = match get_apqn_bind_state(card, dom) {
+                        Ok(bs) => bs,
+                        Err(err) => {
+                            eprintln!(
+                                "Error: Failure reading APQN ({},{}) bind state: {}",
+                                card, dom, err
+                            );
+                            BindState::NotSupported
+                        }
+                    };
+                    if cbs == BindState::Unbound {
+                        let r = set_apqn_bind_state(card, dom, BindState::Bound);
+                        if r.is_err() {
+                            eprintln!(
+                                "Warning: Failure to temp. bind APQN ({},{}): {}",
+                                card,
+                                dom,
+                                r.unwrap_err()
+                            );
+                            continue;
+                        } else {
+                            tempbound = true;
+                        }
+                    };
+                };
+                let info = match ApqnInfo::info(&mode, &path, &queue_dir) {
+                    Err(err) => {
+                        // print the error but continue with info set to None
+                        eprintln!(
+                            "Warning: Failure to gather info for APQN ({},{}): {}",
+                            card, dom, err
+                        );
+                        None
+                    }
+                    Ok(i) => Some(i),
+                };
+                if tempbound {
+                    let r = set_apqn_bind_state(card, dom, BindState::Unbound);
+                    if r.is_err() {
+                        eprintln!(
+                            "Warning: Failure to unbind temp. bound APQN ({},{}): {}",
+                            card,
+                            dom,
+                            r.unwrap_err()
+                        );
+                    }
+                };
+                apqns.push(Apqn {
+                    name: queue_dir.clone(),
+                    card,
+                    domain: dom,
+                    gen,
+                    mode: mode.clone(),
+                    info,
+                });
+            }
+        }
+        Some(ApqnList(apqns))
+    }
+
+    /// Sort this Apqnlist by card generation:
+    /// newest generation first, older generations last.
+    pub fn sort_by_gen(&mut self) {
+        self.0.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| b.gen.cmp(&a.gen));
+    }
+
+    /// Check MK restriction
+    ///
+    /// Within one card there must not exist 2 APQNs with same
+    /// MK setup. This rule only applies to EP11 cards.
+    /// Returns true if this check passed,
+    /// otherwise false and a message is printed.
+    pub fn check_mk_restriction(&self) -> bool {
+        for a1 in self.0.iter() {
+            for a2 in self.0.iter() {
+                if a1.card == a2.card
+                    && a1.domain < a2.domain
+                    && a1.mode == ApqnMode::Ep11
+                    && a1.info.is_some()
+                    && a2.info.is_some()
+                {
+                    let i1 = match a1.info.as_ref().unwrap() {
+                        ApqnInfo::Ep11(i) => i,
+                        _ => continue,
+                    };
+                    let i2 = match a2.info.as_ref().unwrap() {
+                        ApqnInfo::Ep11(i) => i,
+                        _ => continue,
+                    };
+                    if i1.mkvp.is_empty() || i2.mkvp.is_empty() {
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    if i1.mkvp == i2.mkvp {
+                        eprintln!("APQN {} and APQN {} have same MPVK", a1, a2);
+                        return false;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        true
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum BindState {
+    Bound,
+    Unbound,
+    NotSupported,
+}
+
+/// Query bind state for this APQN.
+///
+/// Returns a BindState enum as defined above or on failure
+/// an error string. Does NOT print any error messages.
+pub fn get_apqn_bind_state(card: u32, dom: u32) -> Result<BindState, String> {
+    let path = format!(
+        "{}/card{:02x}/{:02x}.{:04x}/se_bind",
+        PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP, card, card, dom
+    );
+    match sysfs_read_string(&path) {
+        Err(err) => Err(format!(
+            "Failure reading se_bind attribute for APQN({},{}): {:?}.",
+            card, dom, err
+        )),
+        Ok(str) => match str.as_str() {
+            "bound" => Ok(BindState::Bound),
+            "unbound" => Ok(BindState::Unbound),
+            "-" => Ok(BindState::NotSupported),
+            _ => Err(format!("Unknown bind state '{str}'.")),
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+/// Bind or unbind an APQN.
+///
+/// The action is determined by the BindState given in.
+/// But of course only Bound and Unbound is supported - otherwise
+/// this function panics!
+/// The function actively loops over the bind state until
+/// the requested bind state is reached or a timeout has
+/// occurred (SYS_BUS_AP_BIND_TIMEOUT_MS).
+/// On success () is returned, on failure an error string
+/// is returned. Does NOT print any error messages.
+/// # Panics
+/// Panics if a desired bind state other than Bound or Unbound is given.
+pub fn set_apqn_bind_state(card: u32, dom: u32, state: BindState) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let path = format!(
+        "{}/card{:02x}/{:02x}.{:04x}/se_bind",
+        PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP, card, card, dom
+    );
+    let r = match state {
+        BindState::Bound => sysfs_write_i32(&path, 1),
+        BindState::Unbound => sysfs_write_i32(&path, 0),
+        _ => panic!("set_apqn_bind_state called with invalid BindState."),
+    };
+    if r.is_err() {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "Failure writing se_bind attribute for APQN({},{}): {:?}.",
+            card,
+            dom,
+            r.unwrap_err()
+        ));
+    }
+    let mut ms: u64 = 0;
+    loop {
+        thread::sleep(time::Duration::from_millis(SYS_BUS_AP_BIND_POLL_MS));
+        ms += SYS_BUS_AP_BIND_POLL_MS;
+        if ms >= SYS_BUS_AP_BIND_TIMEOUT_MS {
+            break Err(format!(
+                "Timeout setting APQN({},{}) bind state.",
+                card, dom
+            ));
+        }
+        let newstate = match get_apqn_bind_state(card, dom) {
+            Err(err) => return Err(err),
+            Ok(s) => s,
+        };
+        if newstate == state {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum AssocState {
+    Associated(u16),
+    AssociationPending,
+    Unassociated,
+    NotSupported,
+}
+
+/// Query association state for this APQN.
+///
+/// Returns an AssocState enum as defined above or on failure
+/// an error string. Does NOT print any error messages.
+pub fn get_apqn_associate_state(card: u32, dom: u32) -> Result<AssocState, String> {
+    let path = format!(
+        "{}/card{:02x}/{:02x}.{:04x}/se_associate",
+        PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP, card, card, dom
+    );
+    match sysfs_read_string(&path) {
+        Err(err) => Err(format!(
+            "Failure reading se_associate attribute for APQN({},{}: {:?}",
+            card, dom, err
+        )),
+        Ok(str) => {
+            if let Some(prefix) = str.strip_prefix("associated ") {
+                let value = &prefix.parse::<u16>();
+                match value {
+                    Ok(v) => Ok(AssocState::Associated(*v)),
+                    Err(_) => Err(format!("Invalid association index in '{str}'.")),
+                }
+            } else {
+                match str.as_str() {
+                    "association pending" => Ok(AssocState::AssociationPending),
+                    "unassociated" => Ok(AssocState::Unassociated),
+                    "-" => Ok(AssocState::NotSupported),
+                    _ => Err(format!("Unknown association state '{str}'.")),
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn set_apqn_associate_state_associate(card: u32, dom: u32, idx: u16) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let path = format!(
+        "{}/card{:02x}/{:02x}.{:04x}/se_associate",
+        PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP, card, card, dom
+    );
+    let r = sysfs_write_i32(&path, idx as i32);
+    if r.is_err() {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "Failure writing se_associate attribute for APQN({},{}): {:?}.",
+            card,
+            dom,
+            r.unwrap_err()
+        ));
+    }
+    let mut ms: u64 = 0;
+    loop {
+        thread::sleep(time::Duration::from_millis(SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_POLL_MS));
+        ms += SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_POLL_MS;
+        if ms >= SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_TIMEOUT_MS {
+            break Err(format!(
+                "Timeout setting APQN({},{}) association idx {} state.",
+                card, dom, idx
+            ));
+        }
+        let newstate = match get_apqn_associate_state(card, dom) {
+            Err(err) => return Err(err),
+            Ok(s) => s,
+        };
+        if let AssocState::Associated(i) = newstate {
+            if idx == i {
+                return Ok(());
+            } else {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "Failure: APQN({},{}) is associated with {} but it should be {}.",
+                    card, dom, i, idx
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn set_apqn_associate_state_unbind(card: u32, dom: u32) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let bindpath = format!(
+        "{}/card{:02x}/{:02x}.{:04x}/se_bind",
+        PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP, card, card, dom
+    );
+    let r = sysfs_write_i32(&bindpath, 0);
+    if r.is_err() {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "Failure writing se_bind attribute for APQN({},{}): {:?}.",
+            card,
+            dom,
+            r.unwrap_err()
+        ));
+    }
+    let mut ms: u64 = 0;
+    loop {
+        thread::sleep(time::Duration::from_millis(SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_POLL_MS));
+        ms += SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_POLL_MS;
+        if ms >= SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_TIMEOUT_MS {
+            break Err(format!(
+                "Timeout setting APQN({},{}) association unbind state.",
+                card, dom
+            ));
+        }
+        let newstate = match get_apqn_associate_state(card, dom) {
+            Err(err) => return Err(err),
+            Ok(s) => s,
+        };
+        if newstate == AssocState::Unassociated {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Associate or Unassociate an APQN.
+///
+/// The action is determined by the AssocState given in.
+/// But of course only Associated and Unassociated is supported
+/// otherwise this function panics!
+/// The function actively loops over the association state until
+/// the requested state is reached or a timeout has
+/// occurred (SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_TIMEOUT_MS).
+/// The unassociate is in fact a unbind. So the code triggers
+/// an unbind and then loops over the sysfs se_associate until
+/// "unassociated" is reached.
+/// On success () is returned, on failure an error string
+/// is returned. Does NOT print any error messages.
+/// # Panics
+/// Panics if a desired bind state other than Associated or
+/// Unassociated is given.
+pub fn set_apqn_associate_state(card: u32, dom: u32, state: AssocState) -> Result<(), String> {
+    match state {
+        AssocState::Associated(idx) => set_apqn_associate_state_associate(card, dom, idx),
+        AssocState::Unassociated => set_apqn_associate_state_unbind(card, dom),
+        _ => panic!("set_apqn_associate_state called with invalid AssocState."),
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    // These tests assume, there is an AP bus available
+    // Also for each APQN which is online, it is assumed
+    // to have a valid master key set up (for Ep11 and CCA).
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_check_ap_bus_support() {
+        if Path::new(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP).is_dir() {
+            assert!(check_ap_bus_support().is_ok());
+        } else {
+            assert!(check_ap_bus_support().is_err());
+        }
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn test_check_ap_bus_apsb_support() {
+        if Path::new(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP).is_dir() {
+            // if we are inside a secure execution guest the
+            // apsb check should succeed. Outside an SE guest
+            // the check should fail.
+            if pv_core::misc::pv_guest_bit_set() {
+                assert!(ap_bus_has_apsb_support().is_ok());
+            } else {
+                assert!(ap_bus_has_apsb_support().is_err());
+            }
+        } else {
+            assert!(ap_bus_has_apsb_support().is_err());
+        }
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn test_wait_for_ap_bus_bindings_complete() {
+        let r = wait_for_ap_bus_bindings_complete();
+        if Path::new(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP).is_dir() {
+            assert!(r);
+        } else {
+            assert!(!r);
+        }
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn test_gather_apqns() {
+        let r = ApqnList::gather_apqns();
+        if Path::new(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP).is_dir() {
+            assert!(r.is_some());
+            // fail if no entries found
+            let l = r.unwrap();
+            let v = l.to_apqn_vec();
+            for a in v {
+                match a.mode {
+                    ApqnMode::Accel => {
+                        // fail if no ApqnInfo is attached
+                        assert!(a.info.is_some());
+                    }
+                    ApqnMode::Ep11 => {
+                        // fail if no ApqnInfo is attached
+                        assert!(a.info.is_some());
+                        let info = a.info.unwrap();
+                        let i = match &info {
+                            ApqnInfo::Ep11(i) => i,
+                            _ => panic!("ApqnInfo attached onto Ep11 APQN is NOT ApqnInfoEp11 ?!?"),
+                        };
+                        // fail if no serialnr
+                        assert!(!i.serialnr.is_empty());
+                        // mkvp is either empty (no WK set) or has exact 32 characters
+                        assert!(i.mkvp.is_empty() || i.mkvp.len() == 32);
+                    }
+                    ApqnMode::Cca => {
+                        // fail if no ApqnInfo is attached
+                        assert!(a.info.is_some());
+                        let info = a.info.unwrap();
+                        let i = match &info {
+                            ApqnInfo::Cca(i) => i,
+                            _ => panic!("ApqnInfo attached onto Cca APQN is NOT ApqnInfoCca ?!?"),
+                        };
+                        // fail if no serialnr
+                        assert!(!i.serialnr.is_empty());
+                        // aes mkvp is either empty (no MK set) or exact 16 characters
+                        assert!(i.mkvp_aes.is_empty() || i.mkvp_aes.len() == 16);
+                        // apka mkvp is either empty (no MK set) or exact 16 characters
+                        assert!(i.mkvp_apka.is_empty() || i.mkvp_apka.len() == 16);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        } else {
+            assert!(r.is_none());
+        }
+    }
+}

rust/pvapconfig/src/cli.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+//
+//! Command line interface for pvapconfig
+//
+
+use clap::Parser;
+use lazy_static::lazy_static;
+
+/// The default pvapconfig config file
+pub const PATH_DEFAULT_CONFIG_FILE: &str = "/etc/pvapconfig.yaml";
+
+#[derive(Parser, Clone)]
+pub struct Cli {
+    /// Provide a custom config file (overwrites default /etc/pvapconfig.yaml).
+    #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE")]
+    pub config: Option<String>,
+
+    /// Dry run: display the actions but don't actually perform them on the APQNs.
+    #[arg(short = 'n', long = "dry-run")]
+    pub dryrun: bool,
+
+    /// Enforce strict match: All config entries need to be fulfilled.
+    ///
+    /// By default it is enough to successfully apply at least one config entry.
+    /// With the strict flag enabled, all config entries within a config file
+    /// need to be applied successful.
+    #[arg(long = "strict")]
+    pub strict: bool,
+
+    /// Provide more detailed output.
+    #[arg(short, long)]
+    pub verbose: bool,
+
+    /// Print version information and exit.
+    #[arg(short = 'V', long)]
+    pub version: bool,
+}
+
+lazy_static! {
+    pub static ref ARGS: Cli = Cli::parse();
+}
+
+impl Cli {
+    /// verbose returns true if the verbose command line option
+    /// was given, otherwise false is returned.
+    pub fn verbose(&self) -> bool {
+        self.verbose
+    }
+
+    /// dryrun returns true if the dry-run command line option
+    /// was given, otherwise false is returned.
+    pub fn dryrun(&self) -> bool {
+        self.dryrun
+    }
+
+    /// strict returns true if the strict flag was given, otherwise
+    /// false is returned.
+    pub fn strict(&self) -> bool {
+        self.strict
+    }
+}

rust/pvapconfig/src/config.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+//
+//! Functions around handling the pvapconfig configuration file
+//
+
+use openssl::sha::sha256;
+use regex::Regex;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde_yaml::{self};
+use std::fs::File;
+use std::slice::Iter;
+
+pub const STR_MODE_EP11: &str = "ep11";
+pub const STR_MODE_ACCEL: &str = "accel";
+
+const RE_EP11_MKVP_32: &str = r"^(0x)?([[:xdigit:]]{32})$";
+const RE_EP11_MKVP_64: &str = r"^(0x)?([[:xdigit:]]{64})$";
+const RE_SERIALNR: &str = r"^(\S{16})$";
+const RE_EP11_GEN: &str = r"^cex(8)$";
+const RE_ACCEL_GEN: &str = r"^cex([4-8])$";
+const RE_SECRETID: &str = r"^(0x)?([[:xdigit:]]{64})$";
+
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Default, Clone)]
+#[serde(default, deny_unknown_fields)]
+pub struct ApConfigEntry {
+    pub name: String,        // name and description are unmodified from the config file
+    pub description: String, // accel after validation     ep11 after validation
+    pub mode: String,        // "accel"                    "ep11"
+    pub mkvp: String,        // empty                      32 hex lowercase characters
+    pub serialnr: String,    // empty                      empty or 16 non-whitespace characters
+    pub mingen: String,      // empty or "cex4"..."cex8"   empty or "cex8"
+    pub secretid: String,    // empty                      64 hex lowercase characters
+}
+
+impl ApConfigEntry {
+    fn validate_secretid(&mut self) -> Result<(), String> {
+        // either secret id or name may be given
+        if self.secretid.is_empty() && self.name.is_empty() {
+            return Err("Neither secretid nor name given.".to_string());
+        }
+        // if name is given, calculate sha256 digest for this name
+        // test for the hash calculated here can be done with openssl:
+        // echo -n "Hello" >in.bin; openssl dgst -sha256 -binary -out out.bin in.bin; hexdump -C out.bin
+        if self.name.is_empty() {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        let hash = sha256(self.name.as_bytes());
+        let hashstr = crate::helper::u8_to_hexstring(&hash);
+        // if there is a secretid given, this must match to the hash
+        if !self.secretid.is_empty() {
+            if self.secretid != hashstr {
+                return Err("Mismatch between sha256(name) and secretid.".to_string());
+            }
+        } else {
+            self.secretid = hashstr;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// # Panics
+    /// Panics if the compilation of a static regular expression fails.
+    fn validate_ep11_entry(&mut self) -> Result<(), String> {
+        // mkvp is required
+        let mut mkvp = self.mkvp.trim().to_lowercase();
+        if mkvp.is_empty() {
+            return Err("Mkvp value missing.".to_string());
+        }
+        // either 64 hex or 32 hex
+        if Regex::new(RE_EP11_MKVP_64).unwrap().is_match(&mkvp) {
+            // need to cut away the last 32 hex characters
+            mkvp = String::from(&mkvp[..mkvp.len() - 32])
+        } else if Regex::new(RE_EP11_MKVP_32).unwrap().is_match(&mkvp) {
+            // nothing to do here
+        } else {
+            return Err(format!("Mkvp value '{}' is not valid.", &self.mkvp));
+        }
+        self.mkvp = match mkvp.strip_prefix("0x") {
+            Some(rest) => String::from(rest),
+            None => mkvp,
+        };
+        // serialnr is optional
+        let serialnr = self.serialnr.trim().to_string();
+        if !serialnr.is_empty() && !Regex::new(RE_SERIALNR).unwrap().is_match(&serialnr) {
+            return Err(format!("Serialnr value '{}' is not valid.", &self.serialnr));
+        }
+        self.serialnr = serialnr;
+        // mingen is optional, but if given only CEX8 is valid
+        let mingen = self.mingen.trim().to_lowercase();
+        if !mingen.is_empty() && !Regex::new(RE_EP11_GEN).unwrap().is_match(&mingen) {
+            return Err(format!("Mingen value '{}' is not valid.", &self.mingen));
+        }
+        self.mingen = mingen;
+        // secretid or name is required
+        let secretid = self.secretid.trim().to_lowercase();
+        if !secretid.is_empty() && !Regex::new(RE_SECRETID).unwrap().is_match(&secretid) {
+            return Err(format!("Secretid value '{}' is not valid.", &self.secretid));
+        }
+        self.secretid = match secretid.strip_prefix("0x") {
+            Some(rest) => String::from(rest),
+            None => secretid,
+        };
+        // name is optional, ignored here
+        // description is optional, ignored here
+        // but the secretid needs some more validation
+        self.validate_secretid()
+    }
+
+    /// # Panics
+    /// Panics if the compilation of a static regular expression fails.
+    fn validate_accel_entry(&mut self) -> Result<(), String> {
+        // mkvp is ignored
+        self.mkvp.clear();
+        // serialnr is ignored
+        self.serialnr.clear();
+        // mingen is optional, but if given must match to CEX4..CEX8
+        let mingen = self.mingen.trim().to_lowercase();
+        if !mingen.is_empty() && !Regex::new(RE_ACCEL_GEN).unwrap().is_match(&mingen) {
+            return Err(format!("Mingen value '{}' is not valid.", &self.mingen));
+        }
+        self.mingen = mingen;
+        // secretid is ignored
+        self.secretid.clear();
+        // name is optional, ignored here
+        // description is optional, ignored here
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn validate(&mut self) -> Result<(), String> {
+        // trim name
+        self.name = self.name.trim().to_string();
+        // mode is always required
+        let mode = self.mode.trim().to_lowercase();
+        match mode.as_str() {
+            STR_MODE_EP11 => {
+                self.mode = mode;
+                self.validate_ep11_entry()?;
+            }
+            STR_MODE_ACCEL => {
+                self.mode = mode;
+                self.validate_accel_entry()?;
+            }
+            _ => return Err(format!("Unknown or invalid mode '{}'.", mode)),
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+/// Wrapper object around Vector of ApConfigEntry
+pub struct ApConfigList(Vec<ApConfigEntry>);
+
+impl ApConfigList {
+    #[cfg(test)] // only used in test code
+    pub fn from_apconfigentry_vec(apconfigs: Vec<ApConfigEntry>) -> ApConfigList {
+        ApConfigList(apconfigs)
+    }
+
+    pub fn iter(&self) -> Iter<'_, ApConfigEntry> {
+        self.0.iter()
+    }
+
+    pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
+        self.0.len()
+    }
+
+    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
+        self.0.is_empty()
+    }
+
+    fn read_yaml_file(fname: &str) -> Result<Vec<ApConfigEntry>, String> {
+        let file = match File::open(fname) {
+            Ok(f) => f,
+            Err(err) => {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "Failure to open AP config file {}: {:?}",
+                    fname, err
+                ))
+            }
+        };
+        match serde_yaml::from_reader(file) {
+            Ok(cfg) => Ok(cfg),
+            Err(err) => Err(format!(
+                "Failure parsing AP config file {}: {:?}",
+                fname, err
+            )),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn validate(config: &mut [ApConfigEntry]) -> Result<(), String> {
+        for (i, entry) in config.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+            let ename = if !entry.name.trim().is_empty() {
+                format!("AP config entry {} '{}'", i, entry.name.trim())
+            } else {
+                format!("AP config entry {}", i)
+            };
+            if let Err(err) = &entry.validate() {
+                return Err(format!("{}: {}", ename, err));
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Read in and validate the yaml configuration from a file.
+    /// Returns a Result with Ok(ApConfigList) on success
+    /// or an Err(errorstring) on failure.
+    pub fn read_and_validate_yaml_file(fname: &str) -> Result<ApConfigList, String> {
+        let mut apconfig = ApConfigList::read_yaml_file(fname)?;
+        ApConfigList::validate(&mut apconfig)?;
+        Ok(ApConfigList(apconfig))
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+
+    use super::*;
+    use std::env;
+    use std::fs;
+    use std::io::Write;
+
+    const GOOD_CONFIGS: [&str; 8] = [
+        "# good test 1
+- name: my Accelerator
+  mode: AcCel
+  mingen: Cex7\n",
+        "# good test 2
+- name: my Accelerator 2
+  description: Accelerator entry with description
+  mode: Accel\n",
+        "# good test 3
+- name: my EP11 APQN 1
+  mode: Ep11
+  mkvp:  0xDB3C3B3C3F097DD55EC7EB0E7FDBCB93
+  serialnr: 93AADFK719460083
+  secretid: 0xBC9d46c052BC3574454C5715757274629a283767ed237922cfb8651c0e77320A\n",
+        "# good test 4
+- name: my EP11 APQN 2
+  mode: EP11
+  mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93
+  serialnr: 93aaDHzu42082261
+  secretid: 0x2ca853f959fc5ce5f1888cb48dae39514a27bb66520ac85f6073a7f678d262c0\n",
+        "# good test 5
+- name: my EP11 APQN 3
+  mode: EP11
+  mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93db3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93
+  serialnr: 93aaDHzu42082261
+  secretid: 0xd146c9ae77cdff25fa87a5b3487587dc29a4e391b315c98570e8fa2e2ec91454\n",
+        "# no name but secretid given
+- mode: EP11
+  mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93
+  secretid: 0x0767668dd22f23fa675c4641e04bb4e991f443be4df13ce3896b8eeca59fcc10\n",
+        "# no secretid but name given
+- mode: EP11
+  name: My-EP11-AP-config
+  mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93\n",
+        "# secretid and name given
+- mode: EP11
+  name: My-EP11-AP-config
+  mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93
+  secretid: 0x0767668dd22f23fa675c4641e04bb4e991f443be4df13ce3896b8eeca59fcc10\n",
+    ];
+
+    const BAD_CONFIGS: [&str; 12] = [
+        "# mode missing
+- name: bad test 1
+  mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93
+  secretid: 0x0767668dd22f23fa675c4641e04bb4e991f443be4df13ce3896b8eeca59fcc10\n",
+        "# invalid mode
+- name: bad test 2
+  mode: CCA
+  mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93
+  secretid: 0x0767668dd22f23fa675c4641e04bb4e991f443be4df13ce3896b8eeca59fcc10\n",
+        "# Accelerator with wrong CEX3
+- name: bad test 3
+  mode: Accel
+  mingen: Cex3\n",
+        "# Accelerator with wrong CEX9
+- name: bad test 4
+  mode: Accel
+  mingen: CEX9\n",
+        "# EP11 with mkvp missing
+- name: bad test 5
+  mode: EP11
+  serialnr: 93AADHZU42082261\n",
+        "# EP11 with non hex mkvp
+- name: bad test 6
+  mode: EP11
+  mkvp: 0xabcdefghijklmnopqqponmlkjihgfedcba
+  serialnr: 93AADHZU42082261\n",
+        "# EP11 with mkvp too big
+- name: bad test 7
+  mode: EP11
+  mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93aa
+  serialnr: 93AADHZU42082261\n",
+        "# EP11 with mkvp too small
+- name: bad test 8
+  mode: EP11
+  mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb
+  serialnr: 93AADHZU42082261\n",
+        "# EP11 with invalid CEXx
+- name: bad test 9
+  mode: EP11
+  mingen: CEX7
+  mkvp: 0x00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
+  serialnr: 93AADHZU42082261\n",
+        "# EP11 with invalid Serialnr
+- name: bad test 10
+  mode: EP11
+  mkvp: 0x00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
+  serialnr: 93AADHZU4208226\n",
+        "# EP11 with invalid Serialnr
+- name: bad test 11
+  mode: EP11
+  mkvp: 0x00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
+  serialnr: 93AAD ZU42082261\n",
+        "# EP11 with sha256(name) != secretid
+- name: bad test 12
+  mode: EP11
+  mkvp: 0x00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
+  serialnr: AABBCCDDEEFFGGHH
+  secretid: 0x2ca853f959fc5ce5f1888cb48dae39514a27bb66520ac85f6073a7f678d262c0\n",
+    ];
+
+    const BAD_DESERIALIZE: [&str; 2] = [
+        "/*\ntotal nonsense\n */\n",
+        "# wrong/unknown field
+- name: de-serialize failure 1
+  type: EP11\n",
+    ];
+
+    fn write_yaml_config_to_temp_file(content: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
+        let dir = env::temp_dir();
+        let rnd = rand::random::<u32>();
+        let fname = format!("{}/config-test-{}.yaml", dir.to_str().unwrap(), rnd);
+        let mut f = match File::create(&fname) {
+            Ok(f) => f,
+            Err(_) => return Err(format!("Failure creating temp file '{fname}'.")),
+        };
+        match f.write_all(content.as_bytes()) {
+            Ok(_) => Ok(fname),
+            Err(_) => {
+                fs::remove_file(&fname).ok();
+                Err(format!("Failure writing to temp file '{fname}'."))
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_good_yaml() {
+        for yaml in GOOD_CONFIGS {
+            let f = write_yaml_config_to_temp_file(yaml).unwrap();
+            let config = ApConfigList::read_and_validate_yaml_file(&f).unwrap();
+            assert!(!config.is_empty());
+            fs::remove_file(&f).ok();
+        }
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn test_bad_yaml() {
+        for yaml in BAD_CONFIGS {
+            let f = write_yaml_config_to_temp_file(yaml).unwrap();
+            let r = ApConfigList::read_and_validate_yaml_file(&f);
+            assert!(r.is_err());
+            fs::remove_file(&f).ok();
+        }
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn test_invalid_deserizalize() {
+        for yaml in BAD_DESERIALIZE {
+            let f = write_yaml_config_to_temp_file(yaml).unwrap();
+            let r = ApConfigList::read_and_validate_yaml_file(&f);
+            assert!(r.is_err());
+            fs::remove_file(&f).ok();
+        }
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn test_sha256() {
+        assert!(
+            crate::helper::u8_to_hexstring(&sha256("Hello".as_bytes()))
+                == "185f8db32271fe25f561a6fc938b2e264306ec304eda518007d1764826381969"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            crate::helper::u8_to_hexstring(&sha256("SECRET1".as_bytes()))
+                == "03153249db7ce46b0330ffb1a760b59710531af08ec4d7f8424a6870fae49360"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            crate::helper::u8_to_hexstring(&sha256("SECRET2".as_bytes()))
+                == "258499e710e0bd3bb878d6bac7e478b30f3f3e72566989f638c4143d14f6c0b6"
+        );
+    }
+}

rust/pvapconfig/src/helper.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+//
+//! Collection of helper functions for pvapconfig
+//
+
+use regex::Regex;
+use std::error::Error;
+use std::fs;
+use std::fs::{File, OpenOptions};
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+
+pub const PATH_PVAPCONFIG_LOCK: &str = "/run/lock/pvapconfig.lock";
+
+/// Convert u8 slice to (lowercase) hex string
+pub fn u8_to_hexstring(slice: &[u8]) -> String {
+    let s = String::with_capacity(2 * slice.len());
+    slice.iter().fold(s, |acc, e| acc + &format!("{e:02x}"))
+}
+
+/// Convert hexstring to u8 vector
+/// The hexstring may contain whitespaces which are ignored.
+/// If there are other characters in there or if the number
+/// of hex characters is uneven panic() is called.
+/// # Panics
+/// Panics if the given string contains characters other than
+/// hex digits and whitespace. Panics if the number of hex digits
+/// is not even.
+#[cfg(test)] // currently only used in test code
+pub fn hexstring_to_u8(hex: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut s = String::new();
+    for c in hex.chars() {
+        if c.is_ascii_hexdigit() {
+            s.push(c);
+        } else if c.is_whitespace() {
+            // ignore
+        } else {
+            panic!("Invalid character '{c}'");
+        }
+    }
+    if s.len() % 2 == 1 {
+        panic!("Uneven # of hex characters in '{s}'");
+    }
+    let mut hex_bytes = s.as_bytes().iter().map_while(|b| match b {
+        b'0'..=b'9' => Some(b - b'0'),
+        b'a'..=b'f' => Some(b - b'a' + 10),
+        b'A'..=b'F' => Some(b - b'A' + 10),
+        _ => None,
+    });
+    let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(s.len());
+    while let (Some(h), Some(l)) = (hex_bytes.next(), hex_bytes.next()) {
+        bytes.push(h << 4 | l)
+    }
+    bytes
+}
+
+/// Read sysfs file into string
+pub fn sysfs_read_string(fname: &str) -> Result<String, Box<dyn Error>> {
+    let mut file = File::open(fname)?;
+    let mut content = String::new();
+    file.read_to_string(&mut content)?;
+    let trimmed_content = String::from(content.trim());
+    Ok(trimmed_content)
+}
+
+/// Write string into sysfs file
+pub fn sysfs_write_string(fname: &str, value: &str) -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error>> {
+    let mut file = OpenOptions::new().write(true).open(fname)?;
+    file.write_all(value.as_bytes())?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Read sysfs file content and parse as i32 value
+pub fn sysfs_read_i32(fname: &str) -> Result<i32, Box<dyn Error>> {
+    let content = sysfs_read_string(fname)?;
+    Ok(content.parse::<i32>()?)
+}
+
+/// Write an i32 value into a sysfs file
+pub fn sysfs_write_i32(fname: &str, value: i32) -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error>> {
+    sysfs_write_string(fname, &value.to_string())
+}
+
+/// For a given (sysfs) directory construct a list of all subdirs
+/// and give it back as a vector of strings. If there is no subdir,
+/// the vector is empty.
+pub fn sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs(dname: &str) -> Result<Vec<String>, Box<dyn Error>> {
+    let mut v: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+    let entries = fs::read_dir(dname)?;
+    for entry in entries.flatten() {
+        let file_type = match entry.file_type() {
+            Ok(ft) => ft,
+            _ => continue,
+        };
+        if !file_type.is_dir() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let fname = match entry.file_name().into_string() {
+            Ok(s) => s,
+            _ => continue,
+        };
+        v.push(fname);
+    }
+    Ok(v)
+}
+
+/// For a given (sysfs) directory construct a list of all subdirs which
+/// match to the given regular expression and give the list back as a
+/// vector of strings. If there is no subdir, the vector is empty.
+pub fn sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs_matching_regex(
+    dname: &str,
+    regex: &str,
+) -> Result<Vec<String>, Box<dyn Error>> {
+    let mut v: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+    let re = Regex::new(regex)?;
+    let entries = sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs(dname)?;
+    for entry in entries {
+        if re.is_match(&entry) {
+            v.push(entry);
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(v)
+}
+
+/// LockFile for inter-process locking
+///
+/// Simple class for process locking for pvapconfig.
+/// The lock concept is simple: The existence of a file is used as the
+/// locking indicator. If the file exists something is locked, if it does
+/// not exist something is not locked. In the lock file the PID of the
+/// process created the file ("owning this file") is written in.
+/// With the ProcessLock object leaving scope the associated lock file
+/// is automatically deleted. It is assumed that the creation of a file
+/// is an atomic operation - that's true for most filesystems but may
+/// cause problems with network based filesystems.
+/// Example:
+/// ```
+/// let lock = LockFile::lock("/var/lock/process.lock");
+/// assert!(lock.is_ok());
+/// let lock2 = LockFile::lock("/var/lock/process.lock");
+/// assert!(lock2.is_err());
+/// drop(lock);
+/// let lock3 = LockFile::lock("/var/lock/process.lock");
+/// assert!(lock3.is_ok());
+/// ```
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct LockFile {
+    lockfile: PathBuf,
+}
+
+impl LockFile {
+    /// Try to establish the lock file.
+    /// Upon success the given file is fresh created and has the pid of this
+    /// process written in. The function returns a new LockFile object
+    /// which has implemented the Drop Trait. So with this object going out
+    /// of scope the lock file is deleted. If establishing the lock file
+    /// fails for any reason (for example the file already exists), the
+    /// function fails with returning an Error string. This function does
+    /// NOT panic if establishing the lock file fails for any reason. If
+    /// the lock file could be esablished but writing in the PID fails, a
+    /// warning is printed but the function continues with returning a
+    /// LockFile object.
+    pub fn try_lock(fname: &str) -> Result<Self, String> {
+        let lockfile = PathBuf::from(fname);
+        let mut file = match OpenOptions::new()
+            .write(true)
+            .create_new(true)
+            .open(&lockfile)
+        {
+            Err(err) => {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "Failure trying to create lock file {fname}: {err:?}."
+                ))
+            }
+            Ok(f) => f,
+        };
+        let _ = file
+            .write(format!("{}", std::process::id()).as_bytes())
+            .map_err(|err| {
+                println!("Warning: could not write PID into lockfile {fname}: {err:?}.")
+            });
+        Ok(LockFile { lockfile })
+    }
+}
+
+impl Drop for LockFile {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        let _ = fs::remove_file(&self.lockfile).map_err(|err| {
+            println!(
+                "Warning: could not remove lockfile {}: {err:?}.",
+                self.lockfile.display()
+            )
+        });
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use pv_core::misc::TemporaryDirectory;
+
+    // Only very simple tests
+
+    const TEST_BYTES: [u8; 8] = [0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef];
+    const TEST_HEXSTR: &str = "0123456789abcdef";
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_u8_to_hexstring() {
+        let str = u8_to_hexstring(&TEST_BYTES);
+        assert!(str == TEST_HEXSTR);
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn test_hexstring_to_u8() {
+        let bytes = hexstring_to_u8(TEST_HEXSTR);
+        assert!(bytes.as_slice() == TEST_BYTES);
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn test_sysfs_read_string() {
+        let r = sysfs_read_string("/proc/cpuinfo");
+        assert!(r.is_ok());
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn test_sysfs_read_i32() {
+        let r = sysfs_read_i32("/proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail");
+        assert!(r.is_ok());
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn test_sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs() {
+        let r = sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs("/proc/self");
+        assert!(r.is_ok());
+        let v = r.unwrap();
+        assert!(!v.is_empty());
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn test_sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs_matching_regex() {
+        let r = sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs_matching_regex("/proc/self", "fd.*");
+        assert!(r.is_ok());
+        let v = r.unwrap();
+        assert!(!v.is_empty());
+        for e in v {
+            assert!(e.strip_prefix("fd").is_some());
+        }
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn test_sysfs_write_i32() {
+        let temp_dir =
+            TemporaryDirectory::new("pvtests").expect("creating a temporary directory should work");
+        let test_path = temp_dir.path().join("test");
+        let test_path = test_path.as_os_str().to_str().expect("should work");
+        let mut file = File::create(test_path).unwrap();
+        let _ = file.write_all(b"XYZ");
+        drop(file);
+        let r = sysfs_read_i32(test_path);
+        assert!(r.is_err());
+        let r = sysfs_write_i32(test_path, 999);
+        assert!(r.is_ok());
+        let r = sysfs_read_i32(test_path);
+        assert!(r.is_ok());
+        let v = r.unwrap();
+        assert!(v == 999);
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn test_lockfile() {
+        let temp_dir =
+            TemporaryDirectory::new("pvtests").expect("creating a temporary directory should work");
+        let file_path = temp_dir.path().join("my.lock");
+        let file_path_str = file_path.to_str().expect("should work");
+
+        let r1 = LockFile::try_lock(file_path_str);
+        assert!(r1.is_ok());
+        let r2 = LockFile::try_lock(file_path_str);
+        assert!(r2.is_err());
+        drop(r1);
+        let r3 = LockFile::try_lock(file_path_str);
+        assert!(r3.is_ok());
+    }
+}